



# **Citizen Security and Justice Program III (CSJP III)**

**(JA-L1043 / 3191/OC-JA)  
(JA-X1008 / ATN/CF-14470-JA,  
ATN/CN-14471-JA)**

## **Project Completion Report (PCR)**

**Original Project Team:** Arnaldo Posadas (IFD/ICS), Team Leader; Joel Korn, Jennifer Peirce, Melissa Gonzalez, and Mary Vrinotis (IFD/ICS); Mariel Fiat (ICS/CJA); Marcella Distrutti (SCL/GDI); Jacqueline Mazza (SCL/LMK); Brodrick Watson (CCB/CJA); Lila Mallory and Graham Williams (FMP/CJA); Bernardita Saez (LEG/SGO); and Federico Changanaki, Tom McArdle, external consultants.

**PCR Team:** Francesco De Simone, Team Leader; Nathalie Alvarado, Arnaldo Posadas, Karelia Villa, Santiago Perez Vincent, Mariana Catano (IFD/ICS); Lorenzo Escondeur, Rochelle Samuels (CCB/CJA); Naveen Jainath-Umrao, Veronica Benedettelli (FMP/CJA); Pilar Jimenez de Arechaga (LEG/SGO); Kai Hertz, Claudia Ogliarolo (ORP/GCM); Sherries Ruddock (CCB/CCB); Eduardo Fajnzylber (SPD/SDV); Lesley Cassar (CCB/CCB); Claudia Alcaraz-Irizarry (CCB/CCB); Juanita Riano (OII/OII); Miguel Szekely, Gina Baena (consultants).

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## Electronic Links

1. [Development Effectiveness Matrix \(DEM\) Summary](#)
2. [Final version of the Progress Monitoring Report \(PMR\)](#)
3. [PCR Checklist](#)
4. [Feedback collected during exit workshop](#)

## Optional Electronic Links

1. Impact Evaluation Report
  - a. [Impact Evaluation of the Parenting Programme](#)
  - b. [Impact Evaluation of the Violence Interruption Programme](#)
2. [Final Evaluation](#)

## Acronyms and Abbreviations

ADR	Alternative Dispute Resolution
CAC	Community Action Committees
CBO	Community-Based Organizations
CDC	Community Development Committees
C&V	Crime and Violence
CSJP	Citizen Security and Justice Programme
CSP	Citizen Security Plan
DFID	Department for International Development of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
JCF	Jamaica Constabulary Force
JNCVS	Jamaica National Crime Victimization Survey
JP	Justices of the Peace
JTI	Justice Training Institute
LA	Latin America
LAC	Latin America and the Caribbean Region
MDA	Ministries, Departments and Agencies
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MOJ	Ministry of Justice
MOU	Memorandums of Understanding
MNS	Ministry of National Security
NCD	National Council on Drug Abuse
NGO	Non-governmental Organizations
PEP	Parenting Education Programme
PEU	Program Executing Unit
PMI	Peace Management Initiative
PSC	Programme Steering Committee
PSU	Psychological Services Unit
RJP	Restorative Justice Policy

RM	Results Matrix
SDC	Social Development Commission
TOC	Theory of Change
UFC	Unite for Change Framework
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VST	Vocational Skills Training
WSIPP	Washington State Institute of Public Policy
ZOSO	Zones of Special Operations

## BASIC PROJECT INFORMATION

### ^JA-L1043 Citizen Security and Justice Program III

<b>Country Beneficiary</b> Jamaica	<b>Loan Instrument</b> Investment Loan	<b>Borrower</b> JA-JA - JAMAICA	<b>Loan(s)</b> 3191/OC-JA	<b>Sector</b> Social Investment	<b>Sub-Sector</b> Citizen Safety
<b>Date of Board Approval</b> Jun 18, 2014	<b>Date of Eligibility for First Disbursement</b> Dec 18, 2014	<b>Date of Closure (CO)</b> Jun 21, 2021	<b>Loan Amount - Original</b> 20,000,000.00	<b>Loan Amount - Current</b> 20,000,000.00	<b>Parl Passu</b>
<b>Total Project Cost</b> 20,000,000.00	<b>Months In Execution from Approval</b> 84	<b>Months In Execution from First Disbursement</b> 78	<b>Original Date of Final Disbursement</b> Dec 11, 2019	<b>Actual Date of Final Disbursement</b> Dec 11, 2020	<b>Cumulative Extension(Months)</b>
<b>Total Amount Disbursed</b> 20,000,000.00	<b>Total Percentage of Disbursement</b> 100%				

### ^ Ratings of project Performance in PMRs



Has This Project Received Funds from another Project?

☐ Yes ☒ No

Has This Project Sent Funds to Another Project?

☐ Yes ☒ No

Development Effectiveness Classification

Partly successful

No	PMR Date	PMR Stage	Classification	Disbursement Percentage (As of Dec 31)
1	May 06, 2015	Second period Jan-Dec 2014	Satisfactory	18%
2	Apr 15, 2016	Second period Jan-Dec 2015	Satisfactory	28%
3	Apr 21, 2017	Second period Jan-Dec 2016	Satisfactory	42%
4	Apr 11, 2018	Second period Jan-Dec 2017	Satisfactory	57%
5	May 03, 2019	Second period Jan-Dec 2018	Satisfactory	80%
6	Apr 28, 2020	Second period Jan-Dec 2019	Satisfactory	94%
7	May 04, 2021	Second period Jan-Dec 2020	Satisfactory	100%

## ^ Bank Staff




Positions	At PCR Jun 21, 2021	At Approval Jun 18, 2014
Vice-President VPS	Lopez, Benigno	Levy,Santiago
Vice-President VPC	Martinez, Richard	Vellutini,Roberto
Country Manager	Turner-Jones,Therese (CCB/CCB)	
Sector Manager	Schwartz Rosenthal,Moises (IFD/IFD)	Rodriguez-Ortiz,Ana (IFD/IFD)
Division Chief	Gimenez Duarte, Lea Raquel (IFD/ICS)	Santiso,Carlos (IFD/ICS)
Country Rep		Turner Jones,Therese (CCB/CJA)
Project Team Leader	De Simone,Francesco (ICS/CJA)	Posadas,Arnaldo Enrique (IFD/ICS)
PCR Team Leader		

## ^ Staff Time and Cost



Stage Project Cycle	# of Staff Weeks	USD (including Travel and Consultant Costs)
Preparation	68.5	390,163.78
Supervision	186.1	1,002,475.93
Total	254.6	1,392,639.71

## ^ Time



## I. INTRODUCTION

The present document is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Citizen Security and Justice Programme III (CSJP III-3191/OC-JA and associated grant ATN/CF-14470-JA, ATN/CN-14471-JA) operation, the third phase of the CSJP series. CSJP I was launched in 2002 as a crime and violence (C&V) prevention programme to: i) address the most prevalent forms of interpersonal violence and crime in twenty-eight (28) urban communities in Jamaica; ii) strengthen violence and crime prevention policy formulation capacity and monitoring; and iii) decrease youth offending. After the implementation of the first phase, the Government of Jamaica requested its donors to continue providing support for the next two phases of this program; hence the overall CSJP implementation period spans from 2002 to 2020.<sup>1</sup> The aim of this PCR is to document exclusively the achievement of the CSJP III results, their sustainability, and lessons learned. Using a development objectives-based methodology to assess the project's performance, the document is structured around four core criteria: i) how *relevant* the project objectives and design were at approval and during implementation, ii) how *effective* the project was in achieving its objectives, iii) how *efficient* the project's use of resources was in achieving its objectives; and iv) how *sustainable* the achieved results are.<sup>2</sup>

The overall rating of the project by the administration is **Partly successful**, with the following ratings observed in each section: Relevance (Satisfactory), Effectiveness (Partly unsatisfactory), Efficiency (Excellent), Sustainability (Satisfactory). We will discuss these results in each section.

### I.1 Project's context

The Bank has supported the Government of Jamaica -CSJP<sup>3</sup> series of programmes since inception. The programme has continuously sought to reduce C&V in vulnerable communities,<sup>4</sup> through interventions addressing individual, family, and community risk factors. CSJP began in nine communities and then expanded to 50 communities under its phase III. The key institutions involved were the Ministry of National Security (MNS) and the Ministry of Justice (MOJ); other Government partner agencies, and non-governmental and community-based social services organizations also had important roles.

C&V have been for decades the most serious threat to the national security and development of Jamaica, to the integrity of the state, and to the lives of all Jamaicans.<sup>5</sup> Indeed, Jamaica's homicide rates have been systematically higher than both the regional and global averages for several years.<sup>6</sup> In Jamaica, most of the perpetrators and victims of violent crimes are young males ages 15-30 and they often conform to a pattern of weak or non-existent attachment to labor markets, educational institutions, or family environments.<sup>7</sup> An evaluation of the Violence Interruption Programme, showed the enormous rate of exposure to all forms of C&V among youths in CSJP communities, and that

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<sup>1</sup> Project Completion Report (PCR), Citizen Security and Justice Programme II (JA-L1009, JA-X1003 & JA-X1006).

<sup>2</sup> IDB (2019). OVE's Review of Project Completion Reports (PCRs) and Expanded Supervision Reports (XSRs)-2018/2019 Validation Cycle.

<sup>3</sup> Including two loans (CSJP I - 1344/OC-JA and CSJP II - 2272/OC-JA) and two PSGs (ATN/ CF-12651-JA and GRT/CF-13323-JA) funded by Department for International Development of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (DFID) for CSJP II. Total funds approx. US\$50 million, excluding the present operation.

<sup>4</sup> Communities selected based at least in part on high crime rates.

<sup>5</sup> Government of Jamaica (2013). National Security Policy, available here: <https://cabinet.gov.jm/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/NATSEC-March-25-2014-1-1.pdf>

<sup>6</sup> Spencer & Zhonghui (2019). Victimization and life satisfaction: Evidence from a high crime country. Social Indicators Research 144:475-495.

<sup>7</sup> IDB (2014). Loan Proposal and Nonreimbursable Technical Cooperation, Citizen Security and Justice Programme III (3191/OC-JA and ATN/CF-14470-JA, ATN/CN-14471-JA).

only 16% of youths in those communities grew up with two parents.<sup>8</sup> For Jamaica, the average cost from homicides over 2010-2014 was between 0.10 and 0.50% of the GDP. Other indirect costs and negative effects range from victims' loss of productivity and earnings to child victims' lower school attendance or witnessing of abuse in their home or community, to a tendency for children to reproduce violent behaviors when adults.<sup>9</sup> Thus, the consequences of violence can last for generations.

To respond to these compounding issues, the Government of Jamaica has traditionally favored crime control. The purpose of CSJP III was to provide alternatives to traditional crime control measures by focusing on violence prevention. To do so, CSJP III specifically focused on the following:

- Component I - Culture Change for Peaceful Co-existence and Community Governance: This component included interventions that provide knowledge, skills, and opportunities allowing residents of target communities to challenge and change attitudes that promote or tolerate violence.
- Component II – Labour Market Attachment and Employability: This component delivered a comprehensive program for selected youth, tailored by job-readiness levels, including classroom and workplace training, life skills, job preparation and placement services, remedial and formal education programs, among others.
- Component III - Community Justice Services: This component sought to increase access to justice services complementary to the formal court system, following evidence-based models and strengthening of the Ministry of Justice to manage and monitor community justice services.

The logic and conceptual framework of CSJP III were grounded in a Theory of Change (TOC) that viewed crime and violence as a public health problem, drawing from other experiences of Latin American countries that responded to these phenomena via targeted, evidence-based interventions, and prevented or interrupted violence with actions at the individual and community levels. The local adaptation of this family of models saw an interrelationship between individual and community risk factors - recognizing the importance of treating both the individual and the community. The CSJP III TOC sought to foster individual and community-level resiliency via an array of targeted interventions across these two levels of service-delivery (see Figure A1 in Annexes). Some of the factors contributing to the overall problem of high crime and violence rates in inner-city communities, which affect mainly youth, include the presence of gangs, CDCs not having the capacity to address safety needs in the community, low levels of employment, education and skills, and lack of access by vulnerable communities to the justice system. These factors were tackled with specific interventions to achieve the key objectives (associated to 13 outcome indicators), and the general objective (linked to the achievement of four impact indicators).

The project was originally planned to have an implementation period of five years running until December 2019; however, it was extended by one year, to December 2020, due to delays in the implementation of certain activities and to strengthen aspects of sustainability and ensure continuity of certain key activities. However, the extension period ended up largely overlapping with the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic, which had a significant impact on project activities.

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<sup>8</sup> Gayle, H., Albarus, N., Thompson, O. & Johnson, J. (2019). Citizen Security and Justice Programme (CSJP III. 2018 Evaluation of the Violence Interruption Programme. Final Report.

<sup>9</sup> Willman (2009), as cited in IDB 2014. OVE'S Corporate Evaluation, Implementation Challenge: Lessons from Five Citizen Security Projects.



## II. CORE CRITERIA. PROJECT PERFORMANCE

### II.1 Relevance

#### a. Alignment with country development needs

During project preparation, it was noted that Jamaica had showed some progress on C&V indicators due to CSJP I and CSJP II implementation. The evaluation of these previous phases concluded that the program contributed to a reduction in C&V, among other positive effects, in the target communities.<sup>10</sup> Moreover, according to the Country Programme Evaluation (2014),<sup>11</sup> the objective of increasing safety and security was advanced through the decrease of murders and shootings, and the increase of satisfaction with crime prevention, given IDB's continuing support. Nevertheless, challenges of C&V persisted. Jamaica's homicide rate remained among the highest in the Caribbean.<sup>12</sup> Hence, the Bank and its co-funders (Department for International Development (DFID) and Canada) supported the design and implementation of risk assessment instruments to improve targeting of at-risk youth under CSJP III. At inception of CSJP III, and according to the IDB loan document, target communities were selected based on three criteria: a) Low-income status, b) high crime and violence levels, and c) ability of community residents to participate in program activities. Yet, more than half of the 50 communities included in CSJP III were included in earlier phases of the program (legacy communities).

At approval, the project was aligned with the Government of Jamaica's National Outcome 5 in the Vision 2030 National Development Plan, its Unite for Change (UFC) framework (launched in 2014) and its National Policy for Gender Equality (launched in 2011). It was also connected with the MOJ's National Restorative Justice Policy (RJP) (launched in 2012), which sought reparation, reintegration, and restoration of relationships with a view to preventing future harm.

During implementation, the project was aligned with the MNS's Five-Pillar Citizen Safety and Crime Prevention Strategy (2017). This document was the cornerstone to achieving the MNS's long-term goal of reducing and preventing C&V. In particular, CSJP III was aligned with three of the five pillars: a) with pillar 2, *Swift and Sure Justice*, supporting MOJ and MNS's partnership of using consistent court management system that will improve access to justice and restoring public confidence in justice; b) with pillar 3, *Crime Prevention through Social Development*, which sought to reduce the future risk of crime by targeting individuals who are at a high risk of becoming offenders (through Ministry-driven and supported programmes); and c) with pillar 4, *Situational Crime Prevention Strategy*, which is geared at interrupting, preventing and changing social norms by targeting at-risk communities.

At closure, the project was aligned with national level priorities of reducing C&V, with MOJ and MNS policies (e.g., Five-Pillar Strategy and Widening Access to Justice), with community-level needs (e.g., through surveys and safety plans), and with individual-level needs for medium and high-risk persons, through case management. Moreover, the MNS' Citizen Security Plan (CSP) (released in 2020), which is currently the main document defining the Government of Jamaica's approach to Citizen Security, was modeled on and aligned to the CSJP III. The CSP will support some degree of sustainability of CSJP III interventions, given that it includes the youth-risk assessment tool for targeting and case management approach, both developed by CSJP III. One hundred communities

<sup>10</sup> Project Completion Report (PCR), Citizen Security and Justice Programme II (JA-L1009, JA-X1003 & JA-X1006).

<sup>11</sup> IDB (2014). Country Program Evaluation, Jamaica 2009-2014. The Office of Evaluation and Oversight (OVE).

<sup>12</sup> In 2011 Jamaica's homicide rate (41 per 100,000) was the Caribbean's highest: Bahamas-36, Barbados-11(2010), Guyana-17, and Trinidad and Tobago-26 (UNODC Global Study on Homicide Statistics, 2011).

are expected to be impacted by community transformation initiatives being implemented under the CSP and coordinated by the newly established Citizen Security Secretariat (CSS).<sup>13</sup>

Although CSJP III did not achieve all its outcome indicators (see 2.II.b and Annex I), the program was coherent in seeking to address many integrated challenges that help drive the high crime and violence in Jamaica. As such, it was relevant to national and ministerial policies, as well as community and individual needs. The program was also innovative in its treatment of crime and violence as vectors to be addressed within a public-health approach. This too is a positive step forward, particularly when compared to international good practice in the field and academic theory.<sup>14</sup>

### **b. Strategic Alignment**

During design and approval, CSJP was aligned with the Operational Guidelines for Program Design and Execution in the Area of Civic Coexistence and Public Safety (GN-2535-1) and the [Citizen Security Conceptual Framework](#), through two of the three priority areas (components), specifically areas ii) violence prevention, and iii) activities relating to control, criminal justice, and rehabilitation. It was also aligned with the IDB Country Strategy with Jamaica 2013-2014 (GN-2694-2) with the priority area and strategic objectives number ii), focusing on social protection and safety, the Country Program Document in the 2014 Operational Program Report (GN-2756), the Citizen Security Initiative (GN-2660), and the Operational Policy on Gender Equality in Development (GN-2531-10), through the proactive action of mainstreaming the gender perspective in development interventions. Finally, at design the Programme was aligned with the IDB's Update to the Institutional Strategy 2010-2020 (AB-3008), particularly with sections 2.A. (Key Changes in the Region) and 2.B.1 (Social Exclusion and Inequality).

At implementation and closure, the project was aligned with the IDB Country Strategy with Jamaica 2016-2021 (GN-1831-21), particularly in the cross-cutting areas of crime and gender, addressing challenges that spanned several sectors and offering synergies and complementarities with strategic areas.<sup>15</sup> According to this strategy, the major linkages of the cross-cutting area of crime are observed with the strategic/priority areas ii) increasing private sector productivity and growth, and iii) reinforcing human capital protection and development. The high levels of crime in Jamaica are both a consequence and a cause of the country's low growth. Crime, including domestic violence, adds significant hidden costs to business and government transactions. Additionally, actions to address crime divert resources from development, and a high incidence of crime fosters an atmosphere of fear and tension that polarizes society. Lower income households are also more likely to be located within high crime areas, while young, poor males are overrepresented as perpetrators and victims of crime. The lack of attachment to the workplace, family, school, and/or training programs is associated with increased involvement in crime.<sup>16</sup>

### **c. Relevance of Design**

As recognized previously,<sup>17</sup> Jamaica was a pioneer in the preparation and implementation of citizen security and justice programmes in the LAC region. CSJP III's general objective was to enhance

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<sup>13</sup> Since 2020, and as of writing time, the IDB is providing Technical Assistance to the Citizen Security Secretariat, which is in charge of implementing the CSP, to establish a Delivery Unit model, the first of its kind in the LAC region in the citizen security area. The CSS Delivery Unit helps ensure that the CSP is adequately implemented, and its targets and goals are achieved. This activity also helps sustain part of the legacy of CSJP III

<sup>14</sup> Rengifo, A. & Rees, D. (2021). CSJP III Final Evaluation: Final report. Ernst & Young Services Limited.

<sup>15</sup> The strategic areas of the IDB Country Strategy 2016-2021 are i) improving public sector management, ii) increase private sector productivity and growth, and iii) reinforce human capital protection and development.

<sup>16</sup> IDB (2016). IDBG Country Strategy with Jamaica 2016-2021.

<sup>17</sup> Project Completion Report (PCR), Citizen Security and Justice Programme II (JA-L1009, JA-X1003 & JA-X1006).

citizen security and justice in Jamaica in target communities. The project's preparation benefitted from the recommendations and lessons gathered from CSJP I and CSJP II. Specifically, CSJP III's design focused on strengthening the project's governance structure,<sup>18</sup> compared to its previous iterations. This included: improving targeting processes by implementing a more complex risk-factor assessment for selecting and monitoring beneficiaries and tailoring interventions; establishing an electronic case-management system to maintain records for beneficiaries receiving multiple interventions, managed by professional staff;<sup>19</sup> a robust investment in M&E resources and capacity, including a new database and training for managing client, intervention, and indicator information. The specific objectives established to meet the general objective were: (i) improving behaviors for non-violent conflict resolution; (ii) increasing labor market attachment among youth; and (iii) increasing access to effective community and alternative justice services. Both, the general and specific objectives were in line with the country's priorities in this sector.

The logic and conceptual framework of CSJP III were grounded in a Theory of Change (TOC) that viewed crime and violence as a public health problem, drawing from other experiences of Latin American countries<sup>20</sup> that responded to these phenomena via targeted, evidence-based interventions, and prevented or interrupted violence with actions at the individual and community levels.<sup>21</sup> The local adaptation of this family of models saw an interrelationship between individual and community risk factors<sup>22</sup> - recognizing the importance of treating both the individual and the community. The CSJP III TOC sought to foster individual and community-level resiliency via an array of targeted interventions across these two levels of service-delivery (see Figure A1 in Annexes). Some of the factors contributing to the overall problem of high crime and violence rates in inner-city communities, which affect mainly youth, include the presence of gangs<sup>23</sup>, CDCs not having the capacity to address safety needs in the community<sup>24</sup>, low levels of employment, education and skills, and lack of access by vulnerable communities to the justice system. These factors were tackled with specific interventions to achieve the key objectives (associated to 13 outcome indicators), and the general objective (linked to the achievement of 4 impact indicators).

In retrospective, as will be discussed later, this design could have elaborated further on the articulation between the different levels of interventions, as the TOC of the program did not fully specify how individual/community level outcomes would relate to one another (sequence and/or scale), or how the interventions deployed at each level would connect with one another. The ToC also lacked a clearer specification regarding the sequencing and interactions across the two levels

<sup>18</sup> For the eventual transfer of CSJP services into line ministries to function, the governance structure of CSJP needed to be strengthened (policy and operational), including MDA partnerships. Loan Proposal and Non-reimbursable Technical Cooperation, Citizen Security and Justice Programme III (3191/OC-JA and ATN/CF-14470-JA, ATN/CN-14471-JA).

<sup>19</sup> Including social workers, psychologists, and job placement officers who would work with each client individually, including on assessment activity plans, and ongoing monitoring. Loan Proposal and Non-reimbursable Technical Cooperation, Citizen Security and Justice Programme III (3191/OC-JA and ATN/CF-14470-JA, ATN/CN-14471-JA).

<sup>20</sup> In the LAC region, there is positive evidence that a possible line of intervention aimed at avoiding youth crime needs to focus on improving their employment prospects through job training. In an RCT of the *Juventud y Empleo* program in the Dominican Republic, the employment rate of youth improved five percentage points between the treatment and control group- improvements in wages and job formality were greater. (Card, David, et al, "The Labor Market Impacts of Youth Training in the Dominican Republic," *Journal of Labor Economics* 29:2). Similar trends were found in vocational training programs in five LAC countries: Ibarraran, P. and David Rosas Shady (2009). Evaluating the Impact of Job Training Programmes in Latin America: Evidence from IDB-Funded Operations. *Journal of Development Effectiveness* 1 (2): 195-216.

<sup>21</sup> Cerda, M., Tracy, M. & Keyes, K.. (2018). Reducing urban violence: A contrast of public health and criminal justice approaches. *Epidemiology* 29:142-150.

<sup>22</sup> Rengifo, A. & Rees, D. (2021). CSJP III Final Evaluation: Final report. Ernst & Young Services Limited.

<sup>23</sup> Leading to inter-and intra-community divisions and conflicts.

<sup>24</sup> To promote positive social norms, or to advocate to government authorities for resources related to safety.

of interventions (community and individual level) and their respective outcomes. These weaknesses reflected in the lack of results at the impact level, where the four impact indicators associated with reductions in recorded violence and perceptions of safety/courts at the community-level<sup>25</sup> were not achieved. They are also reflected in the achievement of the outcome level indicators, of which only 7 out of 15 reached planned targets. We discuss in more detail these aspects below.

The specific objective of (i) improving behaviors for non-violent conflict resolution was linked to five outcome indicators, three of which did not achieve their targets, and to 17 output indicators through the activities of Component 1 “Culture Change and Community Governance.” The specific objective of (ii) increasing labor market attachment among youth was also linked to five outcome indicators, two of which did not meet their targets, and to 13 output indicators by means of Component 2 “Labor Market Attachment and Employability.” The specific objective of (iii) increasing access to effective community and alternative justice services was linked to three outcome indicators (two of which did not achieve their targets), and to 16 output indicators through Component 3 Community Justice Services. The indicators related to individual-level outcomes were the ones that observed the more positive contributions to the Programme’s results.

The mechanisms linking these interventions and their associated outcomes were complex and arguably not properly articulated. For example, while the implementation of case management reflected the critical strategic shifts of the program - including emphasis on targeting and M&E - these shifts focused mostly on the individual level (case-managed “clients”) and did not adequately consider the link with additional interventions at other levels of crime prevention (family, community, neighborhood). Thus, while key components of the ToC were consistent with the overarching public health approach to C&V, the integration of these into a cohesive set of actors and actions was not clear in the design and implementation of the program.<sup>26</sup>

It is also important to note that the impact indicators and their planned goals, particularly those of reducing murders and shootings were likely overly ambitious (in terms of community-level metrics) given the context of the communities and the scope of the project and areas served by CSJP III, and may have failed to take properly into account the critical mass of individuals necessary to effect community change.<sup>27</sup> These communities were and continue to be exceedingly difficult environments in terms of levels of actual or attempted lethal violence.<sup>28</sup> This is also noted in the Report of the Final Evaluation of the CSJP III. If a given programme is poorly positioned to contribute to major reductions in short/ medium term crime trends (particularly beyond prioritized areas/groups), due to the scale or nature of the intervention, then its primary goals should be scaled-down or reframed. Community-level indicators of impact in the form of murders or shootings may be relevant indicators to consider and monitor but they may not be sensitive to programs that emphasize long-term, multi-level prevention work, over more tactical, crime-control responses that favor short-term stabilization and change in local dynamics of violence. Setting ultimate outcomes and targets that more closely track the nature of the intervention (e.g., risk-reduction; numbers of persons supported that leave gangs or avoid entering gangs/ criminal life; reduced recidivism of clients etc.) does not

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<sup>25</sup> The four indicators were I.1 Reduction of murders in CSJP target communities, I.2 Reduction of shootings in parishes with CSJP target communities, I.3 Increase in perception of safety at night by residents in CSJP target communities, and I.4 Increase perception that the courts provide justice quickly and help crime victims.

<sup>26</sup> Rengifo, A. & Rees, D. (2021). CSJP III Final Evaluation: Final report. Ernst & Young Services Limited.

<sup>27</sup> No studies were done of what other interventions were taking place in those communities and according to the Final Evaluation Report (2021), CSJP III could be better targeted if it had been done at the community, rather than parish level (given the crime/violence disparity across communities even within parishes) if the data had been available.

<sup>28</sup> According to estimates of the CSJP III Final Evaluation Report, the 2020 average murder rate in CSJP III communities was 163 per 100,000 residents, up from 144 in 2014. Both estimates are extraordinarily high, between three to four times national figures and higher than in countries undergoing widespread civil unrest and war.

imply that stakeholders should not consider murders and shootings and other indicators of serious violence but rather that these may be considered as complementary or secondary targets.<sup>29</sup>

In sum, the project's development objectives were aligned with country development needs and Bank Country Strategy/corporate goals at the time of approval, during execution, and evaluation (project closure). Although the design was robust in terms of being backed by a public health model with evidence of its success, the implementation was hampered by the lack of sufficient specification on the rollout of activities (i.e., how the interventions deployed at each level would connect to one another, the lack of clarity among the sequence and cross-level interactions, and to their outcomes). This aspect should have been elaborated further at design. Nevertheless, the project addressed the challenges established at inception through the interventions included in the final phase.

Taking into account all of the above, the Administration's rating for this section is **Satisfactory**.

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
<sup>29</sup> Rengifo, A. & Rees, D. (2021). CSJP III Final Evaluation: Final report. Ernst & Young Services Limited.

**Table 1. Results Matrix (Approval, Startup plan and @exit)**

Indicators	At approval			Startup plan			At project completion (PCR)			Comments
	Unit of measure	Baseline	EOP (P)	Unit of measure	Baseline	EOP (P)	Unit of measure	Baseline	EOP (A)	
Specific Objective 1: Improved behaviors for non-violent gender-responsive conflict resolution in target communities										
1.1 Target communities with gang interruption activities that achieved ceasefire agreements that were sustained for at least 6 months	% of communities	0.00	60.00	% of communities	0.00	60.00	% of communities	0.00	67.74	
1.2 Persons who reportedly avoided certain areas of their own community because of fear of crime (in CSJP target communities)	% of respondents	22.00	18.00	% of respondents	22.00	18.00	% of respondents	22.00	31.60	
1.3 Witnesses to crime who talked to police about the last crime they witnessed in their community in the past year (in CSJP target communities)	% of respondents	21.00	27.00	% of respondents	21.00	27.00	% of respondents	21.00	33.55	
1.4 Use of coercive parenting strategies by participants in target communitiesà (Children who suffered physical punishment by their parents)	% of respondents	69.00	59.00	% of respondents	69.00	59.00	% of respondents	69.00	47.6	
1.5 CDC Community Safety Plans in target communities that include findings from women’s safety audits and action plans to address the findings	% of CDC Safety Plans	0.00	100.00	% of CDC Safety Plans	0.00	100.00	% of CDC Safety Plans	0.00	50.00	
Specific Objective 2: Increased equitable labor market attachment among female and male youth of target communities										
2.1 Group 1 (most job-ready) participants who obtain a job through services / support	% of participants	10.00	15.00	% of participants	10.00	15.00	% of participants	10.00	50.68	
2.2 Group 1 and 2: beneficiaries receiving support who are in their final year and complete secondary or tertiary education	% of participants	90.00	90.00	% of participants	90.00	90.00	% of participants	90.00	100.00	

Indicators	At approval			Startup plan			At project completion (PCR)			Comments
	Unit of measure	Baseline	EOP (P)	Unit of measure	Baseline	EOP (P)	Unit of measure	Baseline	EOP (A)	
2.3 Group 2 (intermediate job-readiness) for HEART-certified Level 1 & 2 participants who move to Level 3	% of participants	25.00	56.00	% of participants	25.00	56.00	% of participants	25.00	60.50	
2.4 Group 3 (low job-readiness) pre-vocational participants who pass the eligibility test for HEART level 1	% of participants	45.00	64.00	% of participants	45.00	64.00	% of participants	45.00	46.10	
2.5 New community enterprises that are still in operation at least one year after receiving support (e.g. training, grant).	% of new businesses	0.00	40.00	% of new businesses	0.00	40.00	% of new businesses	0.00	100.00	
<b>Specific Objective 3: Increased use of effective gender-responsive community and alternative justice services in target communities</b>										
3.1 New mediation cases settled in target communities	% of new cases settled	0.00	67.00	% of new cases settled	0.00	67.00	% of new cases settled	0.00	80.90	
3.2 Restorative justice cases in which an agreement is reached (in target communities)	% of cases	0.00	50.00	% of cases	0.00	50.00	% of cases	0.00	95.11	
3.3 Juveniles selected for the Child Diversion Program (in pilot locations) who complete the requirements	% of juveniles	0.00	75.00	% of juveniles	0.00	75.00	% of juveniles	0.00	0.00	

**Figure 1. Vertical Logic: Citizen Security and Justice Program III (CSJP III) (3191/OC-JA)**





C1. Culture change and community governance		C2. Labor market attachment and employability		C3. Community Justice Services	
SC1.1 Improved knowledge and attitudes of individuals, families, and groups to resolve conflicts in target communities	SC1.2 Increased capacity of community governance mechanisms to address safety issues in target communities	SC2.1 Increased equitable vocational, cognitive and social skills of female and male target community members	SC2.2 Increased equitable access to on-the-job training and employment by female and male target community residents	SC3.1 Increased capacity of service providers to provide gender-responsive justice services to target community members	SC3.2 Increased access to gender-responsive justice services by target community residents
<p>PC.1.1.4 Violence interruption services provided (e.g. gang interruption)</p> <p>PC.1.1.5 Violence prevention and conflict resolution education and training provided in schools</p> <p>PC.1.1.6 Social marketing for awareness and attitude change to promote 'culture of lawfulness' (e.g. to address violent gender norms, anti-snitch culture)</p> <p>PC.1.1.7 Community events to improve citizen-police relations conducted</p> <p>PC.1.1.8 Crisis intervention activities conducted (including but not limited to violence and gang interruption)</p> <p>PC.1.1.9 Satisfaction surveys conducted and monitored for each type of training or intervention</p> <p>PC.1.1.10 Women's Health Survey (incl a module on violence against women) designed and implemented</p> <p>PC.1.1.11 Case Management System Implemented</p>	<p>community governance capacity on operations</p> <p>PC.1.2.3 Gender-responsive Community infrastructure (situational crime prevention project and multi-purpose centres) built or renovated</p> <p>PC.1.2.4 Community gender-responsive safety plans developed with safety audits for vulnerable groups</p> <p>PC.1.2.5 Advocacy campaigns developed and implemented for gender-responsive community safety plans</p> <p>PC.1.2.6 Coordination at the local level among MDAs and with CDCs/CBOs</p>	<p>PC.2.1.4 Support for access to tertiary education provided to male beneficiaries</p> <p>PC.2.1.5 Support for access to tertiary education provided to female beneficiaries</p> <p>PC.2.1.6 Support for access to secondary education provided to male beneficiaries (students benefited by education projects)</p> <p>PC.2.1.7 Support for access to secondary education provided to female beneficiaries (students benefited by education projects)</p> <p>PC.2.1.8 Remedial education provided in or outside communities, with integrated and life-skills training for male participants</p> <p>PC.2.1.9 Remedial education provided in or outside communities, with integrated and life-skills training for female participants</p>	<p>(beneficiaries of employment support initiatives)</p> <p>PC.2.2.3 On-the-job or work orientation apprenticeship /internships provided for female youth, with emphasis on life skills and high-demand occupations (beneficiaries of employment support initiatives)</p> <p>PC.2.2.4 Business development services (BDS) provided for female and male community residents in entrepreneurship; emphasis on high-demand sectors</p>	<p>expanded and conducting new mediation cases in target communities</p> <p>PC.3.1.4 Child Diversion pilot designed and operational in target communities</p> <p>PC.3.1.5 Restorative Justice services designed and operational in target communities</p> <p>PC.3.1.6 Technical assistance and resources provided to Victim Services entities</p> <p>PC.3.1.7 Technical assistance and resources provided to Legal Aid Council members</p> <p>PC.3.1.8 Technical assistance and resources provided to Justices of the Peace service entities</p> <p>PC.3.1.9 Technical assistance and resources provided to DRF for training police &amp; justice officials (public officials trained on citizen security and justice)</p> <p>PC.3.1.10 Technical assistance and resources provided to Restorative Justice Programme (public officials trained on citizen security and justice)</p> <p>PC.3.1.11 Technical assistance and resources provided to Child Diversion Programme</p> <p>PC.3.1.12 Training provided to volunteers &amp; facilitators, and leaders in community justice services</p> <p>PC.3.1.13 Technical assistance provided to the Social Justice Consortium (within MOJ) to support delivery of services and human rights compliance</p>	<p>provided in target communities</p> <p>PC.3.2.3 Outreach conducted (rights-based culture and awareness of services) in target communities</p>

## **II.2 Effectiveness**

### **a. Statement of project development objectives.**

The project's general objective was to enhance citizen security and justice in target communities in Jamaica. The specific objectives were: (i) improving behaviors for non-violent gender-responsive conflict resolution; (ii) increasing equitable labor market attachment among female and male youth; and (iii) increasing use of effective gender-responsive community and alternative justice services.

Below we discuss the achievements linked to the specific objectives and some of the issues faced.

### **b. Results Achieved**

A total of 13 outcome indicators plus four impact indicators, were proposed to measure the three specific objectives. Table 2 shows the achievements of each of the project's outcome indicators. Below is a detailed explanation of the outcomes obtained by specific objective and some of the challenges faced affecting project's outcomes.

Specific objective (i) sought to improve behaviors for non-violent gender-responsive conflict resolution. Five outcome indicators were proposed to measure this specific objective, three of which (1.1, 1.3 and 1.4) achieved their goals. Of the two indicators that did not meet their goals, indicator 1.5 - CDC Community Safety Plans in target communities – which includes findings from women's safety audits and action plans to address those findings, achieved 50% of the EOP target (P). According to the Final Evaluation Report, concerted efforts were made during the first two years of the program, to develop these safety assessments. However, the activities that supported this intermediate outcome were abandoned from 2017 onwards (when 50% of the achievement was met), after the MNS requested that the Social Development Commission (SDC) switch its focus away from CSJP III communities (to those with higher policy priority/urgency) and focus its research on other topic areas. Therefore, the failure to meet this target appears to have been based on a deliberate policy decision.<sup>30</sup>

The other indicator (1.2 - Persons who reportedly avoided certain areas of their own community because of fear of crime - in CSJP target communities), did not meet its target. The baseline value of 22% worsened to 31.6% by EOP (meaning that more people avoided certain areas compared to the baseline). This was short of the intended goal of 18%. The expectation was that the Programme would contribute to improvements in safety perceptions in CSJP-III communities. Two different surveys were used to measure this outcome: the CSJP Community Surveys (see Semester Report #12) and the Jamaica National Crime Victimization Survey (JNCVS). The CSJP Community Surveys data showed that people's safety perception worsened between 2012 and 2015 and then remained largely unchanged until 2017. The JNCVS data showed a trend of improvement from a higher baseline up to 2016, followed by a decline in safety perceptions between 2017 and 2019. The CSJP Community Survey only included three non-CSJP comparison communities. In these three non-CSJP III communities, safety perception improved from the baseline between 2012 and 2015. Perception of fear then increased, compared to the largely flat performance in CSJP III communities, rising from 10% to 15% in 2017. The JNCVS data, on the other hand, showed that, nationally, safety perception improved by a similar percentage in both CJSP III and non-CSJP III communities between 2012 and 2016 (33% to

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<sup>30</sup> Rengifo, A. & Rees, D. (2021). CSJP III Final Evaluation: Final report. Ernst & Young Services Limited.

20%). The Final Evaluation of CSJP III concludes that “[...] while people were feeling more fearful over the period in CSJP III communities, they were getting more afraid in similar non-CSJP III communities.” Nevertheless, extrapolating conclusions from these comparisons is problematic, given sampling differences between the two surveys. The Final Evaluation of CSJP III also concludes that external factors may have affected safety perceptions. An example is the increased presence of security forces in violent communities under the Zones of Special Operations (ZOSOs) and State of Emergency starting in 2018-19; presence of these security interventions<sup>31</sup> in CSJP-III communities correlated with a worsening of safety perceptions.<sup>32</sup> Overall, the final evaluation concludes that the link between the Programme’s activities and this indicator is weak at best, and the contributory element of CSJP III could not be determined.<sup>33</sup>

The specific objective (ii) aimed to increase labor market attachment among female and male youth. This objective achieved 80% of the target, with 4 of the 5 outcome indicators meeting or surpassing their EOP targets (2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and 2.5). Indicator 2.4 - Group 3 (low job-readiness) pre-vocational participants who pass the eligibility test for HEART level 1 - increased from the baseline value – from 45 to 46.10 by EOP – representing an achievement of 5.78% of the target. In terms of implementation, this indicator started to show some results in 2018, but the activity had to be suspended in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The total number of beneficiaries in this group was relatively low, however: a total of 180 persons passed the prevocational training and, of these, just under half (83) passed entry into HEART in the two years of operational performance. In 2019 the pass rate was much higher, but the actual numbers were low: 27 passed the entry test to HEART out of 32 who had passed prevocational training. The Final Semestral Progress Report noted that some of clients who had been engaged in the Job Certification skills training were not performing at the HEART Trust/NSTA standard, given their very low literacy and numeracy skills; this, in turn, might have impacted the expected outcomes of the Programme (i.e., employability and social skills of some clients may not improve at the end of the training). Although CSJP III sought to address this challenge through the continued provision for Life Skills Training under the SLA with HEART/NTA, it was recognized that the short-term implementation of the training, given the imminent closure of the Programme, could not possibly yield significant results.<sup>34</sup>

Specific objective (iii), focusing on “Increasing use of effective gender-responsive community and alternative justice services”, intended to increase the use of effective gender-responsive community and alternative justice services. The achievement of this specific objective was linked to three outcome indicators, of which two met their target (3.1 and 3.2) by EOP. The outcome indicator 3.3 - Juveniles selected for the Child Diversion Program (in pilot locations) who complete the requirements - was not achieved, for reasons mostly beyond the control of CSJP III. The Child

<sup>31</sup> Starting in 2018, Jamaica went through one of its most acute spikes in gang-related crime and homicides in its recent history, which led to the declaration of SOEs and ZOSOs in several parishes. ZOSO/SOE declarations covered between 20% and 25% of the CSJP-III communities. ZOSOs were put in place by the Act of 2017, establishing that the Prime Minister, may, by order, declare any geographically defined area within a single continuous boundary in Jamaica as ZOSO if there were reasonable grounds to believe that rampant criminality, gang warfare, escalating violence and murder and the threat to the rule of law and public order were present on these zones.

<sup>32</sup> Presence of security forces under ZOSO or State of Emergency could have impacted people’s safety perceptions in several ways: a) higher proportion of those surveyed included criminals who had more reason to fear a security forces presence; b) presence of security forces raised media attention and awareness of lack of safety in their area, and c) people may have felt at risk of injury due to clashes between security forces and criminals.

<sup>33</sup> Rengifo, A. & Rees, D. (2021). CSJP III Final Evaluation: Final report. Ernst & Young Services Limited.

<sup>34</sup> Rengifo, A. & Rees, D. (2021). CSJP III Final Evaluation: Final report. Ernst & Young Services Limited.; MNS (2020). Semestral Progress Report Thirteen Semester July-December 2020. Citizen Security and Justice Programme III.

Diversion Program needed legislative approval before CSJP III could provide this service; such approval was significantly delayed until the closing phases of the project and significantly affected related activities, products and goals.<sup>35</sup> This line of work was further affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, which hit right when the preparatory stage for the child diversion program was starting. The legislative delays prevented any tangible progress in implementation but did not stop critical preparatory work from being completed. This preparation included, for example, building out the infrastructure (e.g., Justice Centers with four specific Child Diversion service points), and developing Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) to establish referrals and service delivery partners. The operational groundwork also took place, including the training of 305 key stakeholders in Child Diversion curriculum. Later, the targets for in-person training sessions were adversely affected as a result of the restrictions implemented under the COVID-19 pandemic.<sup>36</sup> Through the MOUs established with entities like the Women's Centre Foundation of Jamaica, the HEART Trust/NSTA and the National Council on Drug Abuse (NCDA), 51 children were assessed and referred to the relevant entities for treatment during the very last semester of CSJP-III implementation. Looking ahead, these partnerships are expected to support implementation of the Child Diversion programme post CSJP III.<sup>37</sup>

The main external challenge faced at closure of CSJP III was the COVID-19 pandemic. The Pandemic hit in March of 2020; at that time, the project was 9 months away from closure (December 2020), and many activities were in full swing (some, such as the Child Diversion, had just started). It needs to be highlighted that CSJP III activities such as trainings, remedial education, Violence Interruption, community centers, parent training – among others – were predominantly in-person. In fact, one could argue that the in-person aspect was key as the project was geared towards keeping youths away from violence producers by keeping them involved in activities that required their presence. Once the in-person aspect was lost due to the restrictions in place under the pandemic, many activities had to be ceased altogether. While some remote activities were attempted, lack of connectivity and smart devices limited severely the beneficiaries' ability to participate. The implementation of several activities was therefore either delayed or cancelled, and in some instances underperformed because of the pandemic. Violence in communities continued to be a challenge over the last semester of the project, albeit measures such as curfew that were put in place during the pandemic. Violence flared up in some communities, preventing residents from accessing services especially Alternative Dispute Resolution services. Violence in communities also affected attendance at the skills training programme and at least three project beneficiaries were reported to have to drop out of the programme because they had to migrate away from violence hotspots. Mitigation measures were put in place, including virtual communication for activities such as training, alternative dispute resolution techniques and the impact evaluation.<sup>38</sup> Nevertheless, lack of connectivity and equipment for many beneficiaries and some providers was a significant constraint during COVID-19.

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<sup>35</sup> The risk posed by legislative delays was not identified in the Loan Proposal document and therefore mitigation measures were not put in place.

<sup>36</sup> Rengifo, A. & Rees, D. (2021). CSJP III Final Evaluation: Final report. Ernst & Young Services Limited.

<sup>37</sup> Rengifo, A. & Rees, D. (2021). CSJP III Final Evaluation: Final report. Ernst & Young Services Limited.; MNS (2020). Semestral Progress Report Thirteen Semester July-December 2020. Citizen Security and Justice Programme III.

<sup>38</sup> MNS (2020). Semestral Progress Report Thirteen Semester July-December 2020. Citizen Security and Justice Programme III.

**Table 2. Results Achieved Matrix**

Specific Objectives/Indicator	Unit of Measure	Baseline value	Baseline year	Targets & Actual achievement		% Achieved	Means of verification
Specific Objective 1: Improved behaviors for non-violent gender-responsive conflict resolution in target communities							
1.1 Target communities with gang interruption activities that achieved ceasefire agreements that were sustained for at least 6 months.	% of communities	0.00	2013	P	60.00	100	Sources: PEU Database; Activity pre/post survey (PMI project reports to PEU) Means: Analysis of data and construction of rates. Frequency: Annual Responsibility: MNS
				P(a)	60.00		
				A	67.74		
1.2 Persons who reportedly avoided certain areas of their own community because of fear of crime (in CSJP target communities)	% of respondents	22.00	2013	P	18.00	0	Sources: CSJP Community Surveys (2012, 2014, 2016, 2018). Means: Analysis of data and construction of rates Frequency: Bi-annual Responsibility: MNS
				P(a)	18.00		
				A	31.60		
1.3 Witnesses to crime who talked to police about the last crime they witnessed in their community in the past year (in CSJP target communities)	% of respondents	21.00	2013	P	27.00	100	Sources: CSJP Community Surveys (2012, 2014, 2016, 2018). Means: Analysis of data and construction of rates Frequency: Bi-annual Responsibility: MNS
				P(a)	27.00		
				A	33.55		
1.4 Use of coercive parenting strategies by participants in target communities→ (Children who suffered physical punishment by their parents)	% of respondents	69.00	2013	P	59.00	100	Source: Activity pre/post surveys Means: Impact evaluation carried out on the parenting course intervention (See M&E Plan); Analysis of data Frequency: Annual Responsibility: MNS
				P(a)	59.00		
				A	47.6		
1.5 CDC Community Safety Plans in target communities that include findings from women's safety audits and action plans to address the findings	% of CDC Safety Plans	0.00	2013	P	100.00	50	Sources: PEU Database; Activity pre/post surveys; CDC reports. Means: Analysis of data and construction of rates Frequency: Bi-annual Responsibility: MNS
				P(a)	100.00		
				A	50.00		
Specific Objective 2: Increased equitable labor market attachment among female and male youth of target communities							
2.1 Group 1 (most job-ready) participants who obtain a job through services / support	% of participants	10.00	2013	P	15.00	100	Sources : PEU Database; Activity pre/post surveys Means: Review of data; Impact evaluation (see M&E Plan) Frequency: Semi-Annual Responsibility: PEU
				P(a)	15.00		
				A	50.68		
2.2 Group 1 and 2: beneficiaries receiving support who are in their final year and complete secondary or tertiary education	% of participants	90.00	2013	P	90.00	100	Sources : PEU Database; Activity pre/post surveys Means: Review of quantitative data Frequency: Semi-Annual
				P(a)	90.00		
				A	100.00		

Specific Objectives/Indicator	Unit of Measure	Baseline value	Baseline year	Targets & Actual achievement		% Achieved	Means of verification
							Responsibility: PEU
2.3 Group 2 (intermediate job-readiness) for HEART-certified Level 1 & 2 participants who move to Level 3	% of participants	25.00	2013	P	56.00	100	Sources : PEU Database; Activity pre/post surveys Means: Review of quantitative data Frequency: Semi-Annual Responsibility: PEU
				P(a)	56.00		
				A	60.50		
2.4 Group 3 (low job-readiness) pre-vocational participants who pass the eligibility test for HEART level 1	% of participants	45.00	2013	P	64.00	5.78	Sources : PEU Database; Activity pre/post surveys Means: Review of quantitative data Frequency: Semi-Annual Responsibility: PEU
				P(a)	64.00		
				A	46.10		
2.5 New community enterprises that are still in operation at least one year after receiving support (e.g., training, grant)	% of new businesses	0.00	2013	P	40.00	100	Sources : PEU Database; Activity pre/post surveys Means: Review of quantitative data Frequency: Semi-Annual Responsibility: PEU
				P(a)	40.00		
				A	100.00		
Specific Objective 3: Increased use of effective gender-responsive community and alternative justice services in target communities							
3.1 New mediation cases settled in target communities	% of new cases settled	0.00	2013	P	67.00	100	Sources: PEU Database; MoJ records; Activity pre/post surveys Means: Review of quantitative data Frequency: Annual Responsibility: PEU & MoJ
				P(a)	67.00		
				A	80.90		
3.2 Restorative justice cases in which an agreement is reached (in target communities)	% of cases	0.00	2013	P	50.00	100	Sources: PEU Database; MoJ records; Activity pre/post surveys Means: Review of quantitative data Frequency: Annual Responsibility: PEU & MoJ
				P(a)	50.00		
				A	95.11		
3.3 Juveniles selected for the Child Diversion Program (in pilot locations) who complete the requirements	% of juveniles	0.00	2013	P	75.00	0	Sources: PEU Database; DCS & MoJ records; Activity pre/post surveys Means: Review of quantitative data Frequency: Annual Responsibility: PEU & MoJ
				P(a)	75.00		
				A	0.00		

Where: P = Start-Up Plan; P (a) = Revised Annual Target; A = Actual.

### c. Counterfactual Analysis

As mentioned, the general development objective of CSJP III was to enhance citizen security and justice in target communities in Jamaica. The achievement of this overarching objective was linked to the attainment of four impact indicators: I.1 Murders in CSJP target communities, I.2 Shootings in parishes with CSJP target communities, I.3 Perception of safety at night by residents in CSJP target communities, and I.4 Perception that the courts provide justice quickly and help crime victims.

Although no counterfactual scenario was identified through an impact evaluation for measuring the four indicators, the Final Evaluation of the CSJP III (Rengifo & Rees, 2021) conducted an estimation exercise to evaluate the impact on performance outcomes related to crime and public safety using a series of multivariate statistical models that compare trends observed in targeted communities pre/post intervention and relative to comparison communities that did not receive the intervention.<sup>39</sup> Findings indicate that CSJP III did not have a statistically significant effect on I.1 - Murders in CSJP target communities - nor on I.2 - Shootings in parishes with CSJP target communities - (2017-2020) relative to average pre-intervention trends (2014-2016), or relative to the set of comparison communities included in the analyses.<sup>40</sup> However, the evaluation did find localized, positive relationships between the timing of CSJP III and reductions in levels or trends in murders in a subset of nine (9) communities (18% of all targeted areas). In the case of murders, these significant crime-suppression effects were identified in the communities of Canterbury, Flanker, Majesty Gardens, North Gully, Ellerslie Gardens/De la Vega/Tawes Pen, Greendale, Matthews Lane, and Parade Gardens. In the case of shootings, similar positive effects were found in five communities (Greendale, Matthews Lane, Parade Gardens, Canterbury, and Majesty Gardens).<sup>41</sup> Furthermore, the descriptive analyses included in the final evaluation indicate that “CSJP III did not meet its stated target for 2019 as ratings of nighttime safety in CSJP areas did not improve through 2019 (target: 79.1 vs observed 67.9%). While no target was set for daytime safety ratings, our review of the JNCVS data shows that resident perceptions remained positive but relatively flat over time.” Regarding I.4 Perception that the courts provide justice quickly and help crime victims, the final evaluation states that “there is some indication that perceptions of the criminal courts improved over time, although these remained below target, and inconsistently associated with the overall group of communities engaged by CSJP III.” Please refer to the final evaluation for a deeper analysis on the four impact indicators<sup>42</sup>.

Besides the Final Evaluation estimates, a set of impact evaluations were conducted to measure the effects of different programs (i.e., Parenting Education Programme, Vocational Skill Training) linked to CSJP III interventions and two of its specific objectives. Other evaluations and M&E activities (i.e., Evaluation of the Violence Interruption Programme, CSJP III midterm and final evaluation, Social Norms survey, Semi-annual progress reports) were conducted as part of the

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<sup>39</sup> The authors reported that, given data availability, they controlled for potential confounders that measure critical co-occurring interventions and other factors that reflect local heterogeneity in terms of relative poverty/unemployment. They employed count regression models that consider the nature of the dependent variables (i.e., counts of murders/shootings and major crimes) and embedded these in an interrupted time-series (ITS) design to model the CSJP III as a discrete, time-bound intervention across all CSJP communities starting in 2017 (Rengifo & Rees, 2021).

<sup>40</sup> Findings are robust across impact measures and models that include other predictors that could have acted as potential confounders, such as the age structure of the local population, the dependency ratio of households or the year of inclusion of a given community into CSJP. They are also robust to varying operationalizations of the timing or “dosage” of the intervention (Rengifo & Rees, 2021).

<sup>41</sup> Rengifo, A. & Rees, D. (2021). CSJP III Final Evaluation: Final report. Ernst & Young Services Limited.

<sup>42</sup> For a deeper analysis on the four impact indicators, please refer to pages 57-94 of the [Final Evaluation](#).

efforts of generating data and documenting CSJP results, which we will discuss later in this section.

The specific objective (i) sought to improve behaviors for non-violent gender-responsive conflict resolution. In this case, five outcome indicators were proposed to measure this specific objective as stated in the previous section.<sup>43</sup>

Linked to this specific objective, one impact evaluation was conducted for assessing the Parenting Education Programme (PEP), related to the result indicator 1.4 - Use of coercive parenting strategies by participants in target communities/ Children who suffered physical punishment by their parents.<sup>44</sup> The Programme, which was rolled out in November of 2017, built on a pilot project that was implemented by the CSJP III in the western section of the island with positive results. Its overall objective was to nurture the capacity in parents to engage in effective parenting strategies without the use of coercion, and for the improvement of the parents' knowledge and attitudes to resolve conflict without violence.<sup>45</sup> The PEP baseline data included 373 parents (223 in the treatment group and 149 in the control group) with an overall attrition of 28.7%. Results of the impact evaluation conducted through a randomized controlled trial (RCT)<sup>46</sup> show that the intervention led to a significant reduction in coercive parenting practices reported by caregivers in a follow-up survey conducted 6 months after the end of the intervention. The estimated intention-to-treat effect ranges from 0.28 to 0.45 standard deviations across different models, a medium effect size, in the range of those estimated for parenting programs in other LMICs. Specifically, the improvement in coercive parenting practices was due to medium-to-large reductions in caregiver's likelihood to yell at and beat their children for misbehaving. The intervention also led to a (less-robust) improvement in positive encouragement practices (around 0.2 standard deviations).<sup>47</sup>

The specific objective (ii) aimed to increase labor market attachment among female and male youth. One impact evaluation was conducted linked to this specific objective and the vocational skills training (VST) component of the program. Results of the impact evaluation showed that

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<sup>43</sup> 1.1 Target communities with gang interruption activities that achieved ceasefire agreements that were sustained for at least 6 months, 1.2 Persons who reportedly avoided certain areas of their own community because of fear of crime (in CSJP target communities), 1.3 Persons who reportedly avoided certain areas of their own community because of fear of crime (in CSJP target communities), 1.4 Use of coercive parenting strategies by participants in target communities/ Children who suffered physical punishment by their parents, and 1.5 CDC Community Safety Plans in target communities that include findings from women's safety audits and action plans to address the findings.

<sup>44</sup> Previous studies conducted in Jamaica have addressed the cultural beliefs and practices of corporal punishment in child rearing, and disciplinary practices as a staple activity (Crawford-Brown, 1999; Smith & Mosby, 2003; Smith, Springer, & Barret, 2011). Some of the parents lack understanding of the negative consequences of their own behaviors. A review of the literature has shown that, as it relates to child-rearing practices, parental involvement and effectiveness will contribute to positive outcomes (Pearce, Jones, Schwab-Stone, Ruchkin, 2003)., though the opposite is also true: negative child rearing practices increase the possibility of putting children at risk for undesirable and antisocial behavior in the future (McKinney, Donnelly & Renk, 2008; Holloway, Yamamoto, Suzuki & Mindnich, 2008).

<sup>45</sup> Spence M. & Simpson, D. (2020). Disrupting the Transmission of Violence, The Citizen Security and Justice Programme III. Parenting Education Model.

<sup>46</sup> The methodology used was a Randomized Control Trial, where 30 communities were randomly weighted and preselected without replacement from the 50 communities served by CSJP III. Three instruments were used for the evaluation the Parenting and Family Adjustment Scales Questionnaire, the Alabama Parenting Questionnaire, and a third questionnaire which comprised variables of interest not included in the previous questionnaires, such as beliefs, educational achievements, job expectations, hobbies, likes and dislikes, criminal behavior, and degree of self-confidence (Spence & Simpson, 2020).

<sup>47</sup> De Simone, F., Mejia, C., Martínez-Carrasco, J., Perez-Vincent, S. & Villalba, H. (2021). Mitigating Coercive Parenting Through Home Visitations: Impacts of a Parenting Program Targeted at 50 Vulnerable Communities in Jamaica. Manuscript in preparation.



across groups of case-managed clients with a VST component, self-reported measures of self-esteem and aspirations about the future improved over time.<sup>48</sup> VST was also found to have a positive impact on self-reported employment at follow-up (15.6 percentage points), relative to other clients who did not receive VST.<sup>49</sup> Vocational training programs, delivered by HEART, included participants considered Group 2 and Group 3, cutting across the above intermediate outcome metrics. The evaluation distinguished the treatment group as persons who received the VST program, case management, and other CSJP III services. In contrast, the control group were persons who were in case management but had only received counselling. Hence, changes observed, even in the control group, could potentially be attributable to the CSJP III more broadly. The impact evaluation results support the finding of CSJP III's stronger impact at individual-level interventions rather than community-level, which is consistent with findings from impact evaluations of similar social interventions / crime prevention programmes.<sup>50</sup>

In addition to the above impact evaluations, a qualitative evaluation of the Violence Interruption Programme (VIP) in Montego-Bay and Spanish Town was also conducted. This evaluation related to the specific objective (i) and (ii). The evaluation sought to understand the contribution of the VIP to changing community norms and practices that contribute to social violence; as well as to assess the effectiveness of the processes used in implementing the programme. The assessment focused on the primary (preventative/foundational), secondary (visible/curative) and tertiary (relief/ceasefire) impacts of the VIP.<sup>51</sup> The overall objective of VIP was to contribute to the reduction of conflict and promote sustained peace in communities affected by violence. Specific objectives included: (1) identifying and detecting potential shooting events; (2) identifying and detecting individuals and groups at the highest risk of involvement of shooting or killing; (3) interrupting potential violence by mediating conflicts and preventing retaliation; (4) changing behaviors and norms of those at highest risk of involvement in shooting or killing; and (5) using data to inform daily efforts, make necessary changes to interruption strategies. Among its results, it was found that of the 17 Violence Interruptors (VIs) studied, all had a positive measurable impact on reducing violence in their community, against the odds of organized crime, poor support from elders, political corruption, aggressive policing, and scarce resources. The result of violence reduction (in the form of net homicide) over the three years 2016 to 2018 is a good indicator of tertiary and secondary (and to a lesser extent primary) impacts. The data collected under the evaluation showed that the results ranged from a 100% reduction in homicides in Lakes Pen, 88% at 31 St. John's Road, and 76% in March Pen; to 53% in Lilliput and 29% in Salt Spring; to 20% in Granville and 0% in Gordon Pen. Social services providers praised the VIs for increasing the perception of safety in their communities and contributing to changing the social norms in the communities with respect to violence. Beneficiaries also praised VIs for being a source of material support and providing access to social and professional services.<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> Self-reporting by participants via interviews/ survey showed some positive results: a) the treatment group was more optimistic about their future than the control group, b) there was a clear improvement in soft skills in the treatment group (Rengifo & Rees, 2021).

<sup>49</sup> Although the nature of the employability is unknown and was likely a mix of formal and informal work. The employability effect was not gender neutral, with men benefiting more than women. The average man had a probability 19.9% higher of being employed than a woman (Rengifo & Rees, 2021).

<sup>50</sup> Mainly The Cure Violence model, as discussed in Butts, Gouvis Roman, Bostwick, and Porter (2015). Cure Violence: A Public Health Model to Reduce Gun Violence. Annual Review of Public Health. Vol. 36:39-53, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-publhealth-031914-122509>

<sup>51</sup> The Chicago Cure Violence model, which is based on treating violence as a public health problem, was adapted to create the VIP, which treats violence as a disease that requires remedy before it becomes epidemic (Gayle, Albarus, Thompson, & Johnson, 2019).

<sup>52</sup> Gayle, H., Albarus, N., Thompson, O. & Johnson, J. (2019). Citizen Security and Justice Programme (CSJP) III. 2018 Evaluation of The Violence Interruption Programme. Final Report (Restricted).

For specific objective (iii) - Increasing use of effective gender-responsive community and alternative justice services - there was no counterfactual scenario constructed through an impact evaluation. Nevertheless, some positive results were obtained. For instance, throughout the CSJP III period, a total of 3,059 agreements were reached for the 3,952 restorative justice cases received (78%). This means more than double the EOP target was achieved by 2020 (in percentage terms). It is also worth mentioning that Legal Aid was also strengthened by a CSJP III-funded activity with 175 participants (Police Officers and Justices of the Peace) trained in legal aid issues. This in turn is likely to expand access and use of Legal Aid. Other capacity building training activities in the Justice space included enhancing the sustainability of the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) strategies in communities, through the Justice Training Institute (JTI), which trained Justices of the Peace (JPs) in this area. During the final semester, for example, three Lay Magistrates' Court training sessions with 83 beneficiaries were held. Likewise, three Fraudulent Documents Training Workshops with a total of 111 beneficiaries and five Mediation Refresher Workshops with 75 participants were conducted in the same period. 249 personnel (School Administrators, JPs, Police Officers and Faith/Religious Leaders) were also trained in Restorative Justice Practices in the same period. While none of this training and sensitization speaks directly to effectiveness, it does suggest progress in developing these emergent and underused services with the right stakeholders for the long-term.<sup>53</sup>

In line with the results obtained and reported above, and as for the IDB, 2020 Update to the 2018 PCR guidelines, the Administration's rating for this section considering that 50% or more of the specific objectives were partially achieved, is **Partly Unsatisfactory**.

This rating needs to be put in the following context: CSJP III was a complex, multilayered intervention that, despite missing impact indicator targets, delivered 72.6% of intermediate outcomes and 70.2% of outputs, often exceeding targets. The most significant gains materialized at the individual-level, rather than at the community-level. Despite not delivering on some targets, CSJP-III resulted in empowerment of and lifelong positive impacts on a number of citizens within targeted communities. As noted, this may be the consequence of lack of clarity at design with respect to the interrelatedness of the interventions at different levels (vertical logic) plus the stress and effects of the external factors such as the spike in violence which led to ZOSOs and the COVID-19 pandemic, both hampering the operation's results at the national level, and affecting the project in its key, closing years. The program also built a strong M&E framework that contributed ideas and evidence to implementation. Major data collection initiatives were implemented internally or externally, and there is a substantial amount of data directly linked to the Results Matrix of the program and to other markers of institutional performance.

Finally, it is important to note that, in its review of this PCR, the Government of Jamaica, through the PIOJ, noted the current factors as having hindered the Programme's ability to reach some of its intended goals:

- Insufficient focus (at project design and execution) on community-level safety interventions vis-à-vis interventions at the individual level, such as training, internships, employment opportunities etc. As a result, many individuals benefitted from the programme but subsequently left their communities, thus reducing the impact of the programme on the overall status of the communities.
- The project did not address crime management as complementary to violence prevention activities to address the community safety issues.

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<sup>53</sup> Rengifo, A. & Rees, D. (2021). CSJP III Final Evaluation: Final report. Ernst & Young Services Limited.

- Insufficient mechanisms to promote coordination between activities conducted under CSJP III and other violence prevention activities conducted under other initiatives in the same communities, leading to occasional duplication as well as missed opportunities for synergies.
- Contextual factors, particularly low or negative growth rates experienced over the implementation period, which limited continued access of youth trained under the programme, to sustained employment.
- The inclusion of an increasing number of communities over the span of the programme; with few of the original communities exiting the programme. No mechanisms were established to assess when the objectives of the programme were met in a certain community and whether communities could “graduate” from the programme. As a result, CSJP III resources were inadequate to respond to the demand placed on the programme, despite efforts to target activities to high-risk youth.

#### **d. Unanticipated outcomes**

The project achieved the expansion of access to legal aid and victim services for all 50 beneficiary communities. This result included training of 175 police officers and justices of the peace in legal aid issues, enhancing the sustainability of ADR strategies, implementation of three fraudulent documents training workshops, five mediation refresher workshops, and personnel trained in restorative justice practices. In addition, the Programme supported counselling and funeral costs paid for by the program for the families of murder victims (a line of work known as Victims Services).

A special note is needed for the results from the CSJP Case Management system. As noted, this system channeled youths through a series of assessments and provided services according to the level of individual risk of involvement in crime and violence. While the case management system was an integral part of CSJP III, no specific outcome indicators were linked to it under the programme’s results matrix and therefore is reported under the Unanticipated Outcomes section.

In 2020, the CSJP III PEU conducted a study based on data collected through UPSHOT, the electronic Case Management System; this initial analysis found a positive impact in terms of a reduction of the level of risk, particularly for high-risk individuals. This data was later reviewed and reassessed by the team of researchers that conducted the Final Evaluation of the Programme. The Final Evaluation team found data quality issues, including duplication of cases, in the dataset; nevertheless, after cleaning the dataset, they agreed in finding a positive impact from CSJP III case management:

- The database included 1,353 unique cases.
- Overall, the risk profile of the pool of case management clients decreased substantially, with high-risk individuals reducing their relative share of active caseloads from 47% at initial assessment (n= 635) to about 12% at reassessment (n=169).
- Consistently with the data above, the share of clients in the medium-risk category increased from 52.7% to 69.9% across all of programme regions.
- Substantial changes in individual risk scores between initial assessment and reassessment were found: 47% of clients in the sample were recorded as having a

positive change in their overall risk levels, with most decreasing from high to medium risk (28%).

- Risk levels increased for only about 3% of clients.
- This data validates findings highlighted elsewhere in the report: that CSJP II had a positive impact particularly at the individual level.

Finally, CSJP-III III also provided counselling and financial support to cover for the funeral costs to families of murder and violence victims.

#### **e. Impact Evaluations**

Under CSJP-III three (3) impact evaluations were carried out.

- **Evaluation of the Parenting Programme** (see electronic link on page ii). Family violence carries high health, social, and economic costs and increases the risk of perpetuating the cycle of violence across generations. In studies, parenting programs have been shown to improve parenting practices. Under CSJP III, an intervention was implemented to reduce coercive parenting. The intervention was led by the Ministry of National Security and targeted caregivers of children aged 6 to 15 in vulnerable communities. Treated caregivers were visited by a parental trainer for six months and invited to three sessions of a group training workshop during that period. An RCT was conducted to evaluate the intervention's impact. Using data from a follow-up survey completed six months after the intervention, robust evidence was found of reduced coercive parenting practices among treated caregivers compared to the control group. The improvement was due to a reduction in the reported likelihood of caregivers yelling and beating their children for misbehaving. The effect found was greater for caregivers with higher pre-intervention levels of coercive parenting. The results are in line with findings from other contexts showing that parenting interventions can effectively reduce coercive parenting among caregivers of school-aged children in highly violent middle-income settings.
- **Evaluation of the Vocational Skills Training Programme (VST)**. Under CSJP-III, an evaluation of the VST component was conducted; while the data was collected and has undergone a preliminary analysis, the final results of the evaluation are not available as of writing time (expected December 2023). Below is a summary of preliminary findings. The VST Programme was delivered by the HEART trust. The evaluation distinguished the treatment group as persons who received the VST program, case management, and other CSJP III services. In contrast, the control group were persons who were in case management but had only received counselling. Because of this design, any changes observed, even in the control group, could potentially be attributable to CSJPIII more broadly, and not exclusively to the VST. Another methodological limitation was that there was no available data on crime and violence specifically relating to either the treatment group or control group. With these caveats in mind, self-reporting by participants via interviews/survey showed some positive results:
  - The treatment group were more optimistic about their future than the control group.
  - There was a clear improvement in soft skills in the treatment group.
  - There was a positive treatment effect for employability. The average effect of VST on treated persons is 15.6% in the improvement of their likelihood of being employed. Although the nature of the employability is unknown and was likely a mix of formal and informal work.

- The employability effect was not gender neutral, with men benefiting more than women. The average man had a probability 19.9% higher of being employed than a woman.

In summary, the Impact Evaluation was able to find some positive effectiveness elements in levels of optimism, soft skills, and employment, particularly for men. However, the evaluation has not collected data sufficient to discern impact on criminality, risk reduction, or other more objective outcome measures.

- **Evaluation of the Violence Interruption Programme (see link on page ii).** This evaluation focused on the VIP, which is a Programme modeled on the Cure Violence initiatives adopted in the US and other countries. The evaluation relied on a qualitative methodology. Its main findings are as follows:
  - All the 17 Violence Interruptors (Vis) studied had a positive measurable impact on reducing violence in their community, despite scarce resources and a challenging operational context.
  - Where the VIP operated in conjunction with other CSJP activities, more resources were available to address violence reduction, at all levels.
  - VIs and CSJP Case Managers did not always work together in a way that ensured effective impact on youths. Their degree of cooperation varied on a case-by-case basis, ranging from cooperation to duplication, to, more rarely, conflict. The two work streams could have been more closely coordinated.
  - The VIP's weakest area was sustainability, mostly due to scarce human, financial and operational resources. Only one community was found to have a VI team sufficiently large to cover its area of competence. The research team concluded that the sustainability outlook of the programme was not promising.
  - Overall, the evaluation found that the VIP model, based on the Chicago Cure Violence method, can be adapted to and implemented in Jamaica with positive results.

### II.3 Efficiency

This section evaluates the extent to which costs incurred in achieving projects results were reasonable.

## Table 3 Costs of the Project

		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Collapse Components <input type="button" value="Show"/> <input type="button" value="Inactive Outputs"/> <input type="button" value="Milestones"/>							
1	Improved knowledge and attitudes of individuals (m/f), families and groups to resolve conflicts in target communities	Component Revised Cost <b>9,239,849.91</b>							
Outputs		2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Cost
1.1	Training courses provided to community members on parenting	P -	0	85,695.83	108,648.52	126,521.74	26,173.91	-	347,040
		P(a) -	42,735.04	122,478.63	128,632.48	43,782.10	50,855.80	73,606.94	1,316,617.77
		A	72,084.33	132,289.50	199,767.50	191,766	345,619	301,484.50	45,121.57
1.2	Training courses provided to community members on healthy gender norms.	P -	86,456.62	91,304.35	82,608.70	73,913.04	39,130.43	-	373,413.14
		P(a) -	47,008.55	77,777.78	81,196.58	73,913.04	30,000	2,000	756,033.56
		A	47,478.27	138,762.50	165,277.50	158,559.79	149,750	94,205.50	26,945.57
1.3	Counselling / psycho-social support provided to victims/witnesses of violence (including domestic violence).	P -	527,172	582,496	672,903	587,710	546,444	-	2,916,725
		P(a) -	316,218.41	537,342.99	725,763.33	712,113.53	535,750.95	200,000	669,704
		A	1,030	8,334	30,305	474,460	242,370	46,540	4,378
2	Increased capacity of community governance mechanisms to address gender-responsive safety issues in target communities	Component Revised Cost <b>4,439,945.18</b>							
Outputs		2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Cost
2.1	Training and technical assistance provided to female and male community leaders and residents to improve community governance capacity on needs assessment and strategic planning.	P -	145,930.30	145,930.30	218,895.45	145,930.30	72,965.15	-	729,651.50
		P(a) -	111,709	145,930	15,000	-	-	50,000	50,000
		A	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2.2	Training and technical assistance provided to female and male community leaders and residents to improve community governance capacity on operations.	P -	145,930.30	145,930.30	145,930.30	145,930.30	145,930.30	-	729,651.50
		P(a) -	155,369	145,930.30	145,930.30	145,930.30	145,930.30	-	884,418.06
		A	70,413.76	92,680	186,113	180,533	208,748	71,219	-
2.3	Gender-responsive Community infrastructure (situational crime prevention project and multi-purpose centres) built or renovated.	P -	636,820	630,435	86,957	0	0	-	1,354,212
		P(a) -	423,667.19	630,435	-	-	-	671,382	2,953,248
		A	771,321	388,703	248,929	109,175	418,718	345,020	246,148.63
2.4	Community gender-responsive safety plans developed with safety audits for vulnerable groups.	P -	55,652	58,435	25,247	30,435	0	-	169,769
		P(a) -	52,011	58,435	25,247	30,435	-	120,000	475,161
		A	0	76,042	41,365	232,154	5,600	0	14,698.72
2.5	Advocacy campaigns developed and implemented for gender-responsive community safety plans.	P -	13,022	33,478	42,609	9,130	0	-	98,239
		P(a) -	19,282	33,478	10,000	9,130	0	-	0
		A	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2.6	Peace-building through cultural and sporting activities.	P -	20,294	76,522	76,522	50,435	0	-	223,773
		P(a) -	29,401.71	76,522	76,522.68	43,943.45	-	-	51,107.45
		A	0	2,960	3,835	369	0	0	7,164
2.7	Coordination at the local level among MDAs and with CDCs/CBOs.	P -	35,757	40,000	30,939	30,939	0	-	137,635
		P(a) -	13,333.33	39,162.39	30,410.26	30,939.13	23,789.67	-	26,010.67
		A	0	0	2,221	0	0	0	2,221

### 3 Increased equitable vocational, cognitive and social skills of female and male target community members (m/f)

Component Revised Cost

10,821,602

Outputs		2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Cost
3.1 Technical assistance delivered on case management system for job training / placement.	P	-	33,496	65,217	93,478	65,217	0	-	257,408
	P(a)	-	42,735.04	65,217	10,000	65,217.05	32,923.08	10,000	10,000
	A	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
3.2 Vocational training provided to targeted male beneficiaries.	P	-	180,703	278,695.50	384,182	28,261	41,521.50	-	913,363
	P(a)	-	228,398.27	200,695	300,182	13,261	10,521	150,000	3,350,023.80
	A	443,551.30	77,107.50	294,892.25	596,737	1,115,445	672,290.75	65,036.76	3,265,060.56
3.3 Vocational training provided to targeted female beneficiaries.	P	-	180,703	278,695.50	384,182	28,261	41,521.50	-	913,363
	P(a)	-	228,398.27	200,695	300,182	13,261	10,521	118,738	3,317,010.80
	A	443,551.30	77,107.50	294,892.25	596,737	1,115,445	670,539.75	100,337.84	3,298,610.64
3.4 Support for access to tertiary education provided to male beneficiaries.	P	-	163,722.50	136,435	109,147.50	90,956.50	68,217	-	568,478.50
	P(a)	-	108,000	69,480	89,922	37,800	-	-	687,615.76
	A	448,338.86	55,550.50	66,816.50	79,109.90	66,841	18,859	0	735,515.76
3.5 Support for access to tertiary education provided to female beneficiaries.	P	-	163,722.50	136,435	109,147.50	90,956.50	68,217	-	568,478.50
	P(a)	-	162,000	104,220	89,922	37,800	-	-	403,013.40
	A	163,736.50	55,550.50	66,816.50	79,109.90	66,841	18,859	0	450,913.40
3.6 Support for access to secondary education provided to male beneficiaries.	P	-	100,000	80,000	70,000	65,000	60,000	-	375,000
	P(a)	-	45,341	60,051.71	75,000	79,059	-	1,500	82,743.82
	A	26,756.32	4,632.50	1,035	15,479	7,546	25,795	0	81,243.82
3.7 Support for access to secondary education provided to female beneficiaries.	P	-	100,000	80,000	70,000	65,000	60,000	-	375,000
	P(a)	-	45,341	60,051.71	75,000	79,059	-	1,500	82,743.82
	A	26,756.32	4,632.50	1,035	15,479	7,546	25,795	0	81,243.82
3.8 Remedial education provided in or outside communities, with integrated and life-skills training for male participants.	P	-	233,286	741,836.50	492,697	481,987	423,652.50	-	2,373,459
	P(a)	-	171,888.88	380,019.38	531,934.15	681,987.17	601,829.28	100,000	1,447,423.80
	A	94,796.30	69,130	83,591.75	196,918.50	299,259.50	603,727.75	38,232.54	1,385,656.34
3.9 Remedial education provided in or outside communities, with integrated and life-skills training for female participants.	P	-	233,286	741,836.50	492,697	481,987	423,652.50	-	2,373,459
	P(a)	-	171,888.88	380,019.38	531,934.15	681,987.17	601,829.28	100,000	1,441,026.80
	A	88,399.30	69,130	83,591.75	196,918.50	299,259.50	603,727.75	100,337.84	1,441,364.64

### 4 Increased equitable access to on-the-job training and employment by female and male target community residents (m/f)

Component Revised Cost

7,537,246.04

Outputs		2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Cost
4.1 Job-seeking, placement, and training services provided to female and male target beneficiaries.	P	-	100,536	86,957	126,087	115,217	0	-	428,797
	P(a)	-	72,433.67	51,282.05	50,000	109,641.04	-	-	277,034.04
	A	6,997	17,657	71,235	71,504	38,634	26,526	9,246.71	241,799.71
4.2 On-the-job or work orientation apprenticeship/internships provided for male youth, with emphasis on life skills and high-demand occupations.	P	-	389,672.50	596,017	458,782.50	458,782.50	213,868	-	2,117,122.50
	P(a)	-	357,079.89	488,825	495,278	345,090.06	200,000	48,692.50	3,612,236
	A	683,585	552,680	603,551	730,398	716,720	276,609.50	176,290.60	3,739,834.10
4.3 On-the-job or work orientation apprenticeship/internships provided for female youth, with emphasis on life skills and high-demand occupations.	P	-	427,736	596,017	458,782.50	458,782.50	213,868	-	2,155,186
	P(a)	-	357,079.89	596,017	458,782.50	458,782.50	213,868	48,692.50	3,612,236
	A	683,585	552,680	603,551	730,398	716,720	276,609.50	176,290.60	3,739,834.10
4.4 Business development services (BDS) provided for female and male community residents in entrepreneurship; emphasis on high-demand sectors.	P	-	0	30,435	30,435	30,435	30,860	-	122,165
	P(a)	-	1,829.06	26,923.08	29,914.53	34,466.74	29,030.90	17,481	35,740
	A	0	0	166	3,184	2,822	12,087	15,068.75	33,327.75

5 Increased capacity of service providers to provide gender-responsive justice services to target community members (m/f)

Component Revised Cost

4,422,417.09

Outputs			2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Cost
5.1	Victim Services expanded and serving new female and male clients in target communities.	P	-	101,000	160,522	139,304	148,000	113,217	-	662,043
		P(a)	-	31,966	96,667	81,026	160,522	130,000	55,381	512,856.25
		A	0	25,563	75,351	97,377.25	138,816	120,368	85,431.44	542,906.69
5.2	Dispute Resolution Foundation services expanded and serving new female and male clients in target communities.	P	-	75,563	128,119	130,550	130,550	130,550	-	595,332
		P(a)	-	-	53,419	33,333	130,550	130,550	-	130,550
		A	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
5.3	Dispute Resolution Foundation services expanded and conducting new mediation cases in target communities.	P	-	23,478	73,043	34,783	52,174	0	-	183,478
		P(a)	-	7,692	45,299	65,385	52,174	-	-	52,174
		A	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
5.4	Child Diversion pilot designed and operational in target communities (female/male).	P	-	31,304	66,522	78,261	78,261	69,565	-	323,913
		P(a)	-	7,692	45,300	65,384	78,261	69,565	-	126,930.97
		A	0	0	9,782	26,240.97	21,343	13,924	214,510.76	285,800.73
5.5	Restorative Justice services designed and operational in target communities.	P	-	8,609	18,261	20,870	5,217	5,217	-	58,174
		P(a)	-	7,692	15,470	20,870	5,217	5,217	-	5,217
		A	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
5.6	Technical assistance and resources provided to Victim Services entities (female/male).	P	-	10,696	21,913	15,652	15,652	-	-	63,913
		P(a)	-	-	15,726	12,308	15,652	20,226	-	20,226
		A	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
5.7	Technical assistance and resources provided to Legal Aid Council (female/male) members.	P	-	957	2,392	2,392	1,912	1,912	-	9,565
		P(a)	-	3,419	2,564	1,709	9,646	-	29,110.85	29,110.85
		A	0	0	0	0	0	0	22,931.68	22,931.68
5.8	Technical assistance and resources provided to (female and male) Justices of the Peace service entities.	P	-	10,242	18,436	18,436	19,319	18,436	-	84,869
		P(a)	-	7,692	26,495	23,504	150,000	6,978	60,000	650,163.64
		A	0	1,836	69,099	157,671.64	251,217	110,340	66,630.43	656,794.07
5.9	Technical assistance and resources provided to DRF for training police & justice (female and male) officials.	P	-	0	26,087	26,087	26,087	0	-	78,261
		P(a)	-	-	21,368	17,094	26,087	13,712	-	13,712
		A	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
5.10	Technical assistance and resources provided to Restorative Justice Programme.	P	-	27,391	43,478	34,783	34,783	34,783	-	175,218
		P(a)	-	44,786	30,866	30,000	370,000	34,783	350,774	2,671,408.53
		A	337,791	274,581.90	337,747	453,896.63	552,043	364,575	492,717.092	813,351.62
5.11	Technical assistance and resources provided to Child Diversion Programme.	P	-	10,697	26,739	26,739	21,391	21,391	-	106,957
		P(a)	-	12,820	29,914	17,094	34,188	12,941	-	23,032.18
		A	0	0	0	10,091.18	0	7,859	152,659.73	170,609.91
5.12	Training provided to volunteers (female/male) & facilitators (female/male), and leaders (female/male) in community justice services.	P	-	44,609	68,348	74,783	38,261	33,043	-	259,044
		P(a)	-	17,436	53,504	40,000	74,783	33,043	42,877	147,035.67
		A	0	703	14,060	33,167.67	42,909	13,319	5,554.05	109,712.72
5.13	Technical assistance provided to the Social Justice Consortium (within MoJ) to support delivery of services and human rights compliance.	P	-	11,826	44,609	52,174	52,173	43,478	-	204,260
		P(a)	-	-	39,821	43,846	73,846	40,000	-	40,000
		A	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

6 Increased access to gender-responsive justice services by target community residents (m/f)

Component Revised Cost

1,205,982.35

Outputs			2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Cost
6.1	Sensitization training and material provided to target community residents (female/male) and justice system officials (female/male) on community justice services.	P	-	48,609	10,870	10,870	7,739	6,522	-	84,610
		P(a)	-	52,152	67,787	94,444	194,872	0	-	272,928.41
		A	0	2,987	62,867	68,555.41	138,519	56,902	12,753.11	342,583.52
6.2	Service points expanded/renovated; mobile service units provided in target communities.	P	-	86,617	148,174	96,174	81,391	24,348	-	436,704
		P(a)	-	435,420	207,436	194,872	-	-	50,000	702,462.56
		A	0	56,505.10	156,674	194,351.46	115,189	129,743	354,948.20	1,007,410.76
6.3	Outreach conducted (rights-based culture and awareness of services) in target communities.	P	-	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	-	50,000
		P(a)	-	-	42,000	42,735.04	137,276	117,276.87	-	230,591.38
		A	0	7,002	44,558	33,483.51	28,271	14,736	16,172.41	144,222.92



Other Costs		2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Cost
Monitoring and Evaluation	P	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
	P(a)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
	A	87,733	353,087	325,942	551,595	404,916	469,863	240,143	2,433,279
Audit	P	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
	P(a)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
	A	0	17,015	16,238	16,749	17,071	17,539	0	84,612
Transition Plan	P	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
	P(a)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
	A	0	9,491	0	6,226	12,284	88,290	245,157	361,448
Programme Management	P	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
	P(a)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
	A	578,988	678,801	695,278	565,638	580,846	510,768	384,877	3,995,196
Operational Costs	P	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
	P(a)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
	A	417,522	447,938	375,519	416,160	422,030	306,735	172,291	2,558,195

Total Costs include inactive outputs

Total		2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Cost
Total cost	P	0	7,609,854,328,574,089,387,067,255,875,025,498,983,358,691.09	0	31,635,389.64				
	P(a)	0	5,232,019,057,062,414,646,537,555,986,895,390,144,017,477,632,848,001,9737,667,042,57						
	A	5,839,607.02	5,016,465	6,097,099	8,550,314.31	10,086,404	7,169,263	3,588,470.01	46,347,622.34

For this section, an ex-post cost-benefit analysis (CBA) was conducted. The purpose of a CBA is to provide a set of quantitative metrics, so that by associating a monetary amount with each cost and benefit item, one can compare the costs of conducting such projects with their benefits and calculate the net benefits (measured by the net present value, the internal rate of return or the benefit-cost ratio). In projects that focus on crime prevention, the benefits are mostly due to the avoided or reduced potential damages and losses related to crimes that are prevented by the project interventions. Following the CBA ex ante<sup>54</sup> approach and given data availability restrictions,<sup>55</sup> the ex-post CBA focuses on estimating the benefits for Component 1 in a) target communities with reduced violence (gang-related, murders/shootings), and b) reduction of coercive parenting strategies by participants in target communities; and, for Component 2, in increased employability for beneficiaries in the VST program. The costs of these components amount to 29.6% of the CSJP III total costs.

<sup>54</sup> A CBA ex ante (2014) for the project was conducted by Changanauquí. The estimated benefits of the three components of the project amounted to US\$196.3 million dollars with a present value of US\$73.3 million with a discount rate of 12%. The total annual costs of the project, assumed to be spent equally over five years, were US\$55 million with a present value of US\$39.7 million dollars. Thus, the net present value of benefits is US\$33.7 million dollars, with a cost/benefit ratio of 1.85, meaning that 1.85 US dollars will be recovered for every dollar invested. Due to data restrictions, the CBA ex ante for Component 1 only focused on two indicators where there is evaluation literature available that could guide their estimation methodology, namely: A) target communities that achieve cease fire agreements that were sustained for at least six months; and B) use of coercive parenting strategies by participants in target communities.

<sup>55</sup> At project closure, there was only attributable evidence for some interventions of Component 1: a), those linked to violence reduction and gang interruption (Counselling / psycho-social support provided to victims/witnesses of violence (including domestic violence), Violence interruption services provided (e.g. gang interruption), Violence prevention and conflict resolution education and training provided in schools, Crisis intervention activities conducted (including but not limited to violence and gang interruption) through the Final Evaluation of the CSJP III (Rengifo & Rees, 2021), b) the ones linked to reduction of coercive parenting strategies (Training courses provided to community members on parenting) with the impact evaluation of the PEP (De Simone, F., Mejia, C., Martínez-Carrasco, J., Perez-Vincent, S. & Villalba, H., 2021); and of Component 2: related to increase labor market attachment and employability with the impact evaluation of the VST program (forthcoming). Regarding Component 3, the CBA ex ante estimated the benefits considering the projected results of the Child Diversion program. As stated in previous sections, the implementation of the Child Diversion program was affected by the delays on the legislative approval and the COVID-19 pandemic.

Besides the above limitations, resulting in conservative estimates for this CBA, the robustness of the results, particularly for estimating the benefits of Component 1 a) - Target communities with reduced violence (gang-related, murders/shootings) - should be taken with caution given the numerous assumptions made. The projected outcome at the beginning of CSJP III in terms of reductions in murders and shootings was 20% over five years (indicator 1, for murders,<sup>56</sup> and indicator 2, for shootings<sup>57</sup>). As stated in the previous sections, these targets were not met. However, in the Final Evaluation (Rengifo & Rees, 2021), the authors conducted multiple analyses and in their “most robust statistical models, the presence of CSJP III was associated with a reduction in pre-intervention murders/shootings in 9 out of the 50 communities covered by the program (18% of all areas targeted)” (p. 136, Rengifo & Rees, 2021).<sup>58</sup> These results document localized, positive relationships between the timing of CSJP III and reductions in pre-intervention trends and level effects for murders and/or shootings murders in a subset of nine communities. In the case of reductions in pre-intervention trends for murders and/or shootings, these were identified in the communities of Canterbury, Flanker, Majesty Gardens, North Gully, Ellerslie Gardens/De la Vega/Tawes Pen. In the case of significant level effects, these were found in three communities: Greendale, Matthews Lane, and Parade Gardens.

For calculating the benefits of Component 1, we used the same data set used in Rengifo & Rees (2021) to estimate the impact of CSJP III on selected treatment communities. The communities were chosen based on the results of ITS Poisson models, estimated separately for each treatment community; when either the trend or level effects were significantly negative, we calculated the quarterly difference between the predicted number of shootings or murders with and without the intervention. Fourteen communities were chosen by this procedure (including practically all the communities identified by Rengifo & Rees (2021)). Adding across these communities and years, we estimated that approximately 749 murders or shootings per year were avoided by the program.

As mentioned in the CBA ex ante, there are different methodologies to measure the cost of crime and violence and the benefits of crime reduction.<sup>59</sup> As in this previous CBA exercise, we followed an “accounting approach,” which involves adding up all the assorted public and private expenditures associated with crime. This requires collecting data or estimating disaggregated categories of the costs of crime and then adding them up in a single monetary figure to get the

<sup>56</sup> As noted in the Results Matrix for Indicator 1, the baseline is computed by dividing the number of reported homicides in CSJP target communities in 2012 (178) by the total population of the CSJP communities combined (352,690) and multiplying the result by 100,000. (50.46 is rounded to 50.5) The target is estimated based on the decline in the national murder rate from 2009 to 2012: from 62.76 to 40.14, or a 36% decline (using JCF murder incidents and STATIN mid-year population). However, this trend is levelling off (4.3% decline from 2011 to 2012), so the target for 2018 is estimated more modestly (20% of 50.5 is 10.1, which leads to a target rate of 40.4). The rate in CSJP communities will likely continue to be higher than the national rate, but the decline trend may be steeper. The population of CSJP communities is 352,690 (excluding 4 communities for which population data is not currently available). This is approx. 13% of the 2012 national population (STATIN end-year figure).

<sup>57</sup> As noted in the Results Matrix for Indicator 2, the Baseline is computed by dividing the number of reported shootings in parishes with CSJP target communities in 2012 (1,084) by the total population of the parishes (2,044,874) and multiplying the result by 100,000. 53.01 is rounded to 53. The target is estimated based on the decline in the national shooting rate from 2009 to 2012: 62.13 to 45.2, or a 27% decline (using JCF shooting incidents and STATIN mid-year population). However, this trend is levelling off (10% decline from 2011 to 2012), so the target for 2018 is estimated more modestly (20% of 53 is 10.6, which leads to a target rate of 42.6). The rate in CSJP communities will likely continue to be higher than the national rate, but the decline trend may be steeper.

<sup>58</sup> ITS/Poisson models were estimated using the covariates referenced in section 3.1.1 of the Final Evaluation report that consider potential influences linked to ZOSO/SOE declarations and PMI presence (within and beyond CSJP III areas) (Rengifo & Rees, 2021).

<sup>59</sup> There is no agreed general theoretical framework to quantify the costs of crime. The methodology most used is the accounting method, but there are other methods, for example estimating costs for specific sectors or groups; or estimating effects on economic growth by regressing GDP per capita on homicide rates, and controlling for a country's level of income inequality, and other variables.

total cost associated with crime. For example, non-tangible costs, such as the suffering of victims and their families, and the psychological effects of living in fear are not included. The costs associated with crime that we included are: direct costs of crime such as medical costs due to both fatal and non-fatal injuries caused by violent crimes (cost of care: \$68,406.82), public costs (comprising costs for the criminal justice system and crime prevention expenditures made by the public sector: 2.22% of Jamaican GDP), private expenditure (crime prevention expenses made by the private sector: 1.26% of Jamaican GDP), and the human capital cost (including loss of productivity of victims and loss of productivity of persons deprived of liberty: 0.54% of Jamaican GDP). To combine these figures with the avoided murders/shootings, we assume for the base scenario that 1 in every 100 murder/shootings is associated with costs of care and we divide the annual human capital, public and private costs by the number of murders/shootings reported in the data set for 2016 (1,004 events). Under these assumptions, the value of the benefits of violence reduction activities of Component 1 is about US\$93,059,451 dollars, with a present value of US\$33,542,262 dollars. This calculation uses the standard IDB discount rate for cost benefit analysis of projects of 12% and assumes a 20-year period that the benefits of the project will accrue.

For Component 1 b), we apply the findings of the impact evaluation on the effects of the PEP.<sup>60</sup> Results indicate a reduction in the reported likelihood of caregivers yelling and beating their children for misbehaving (reduced coercive parent practices). Specifically, we used the impact on the "Parent often shouts or gets angry" variable (Table A.7), which can be interpreted as a reduced probability. As outlined in the Loan Proposal document, the PEP used the Triple P model, as an evidence-based<sup>61</sup> and cost-effective training model, adapted for the Jamaican context.

The Washington State Institute of Public Policy (WSIPP) (2012) reported that when implemented as a public health approach for parent training, Triple P could save a community US\$722 per participant through the prevention of child abuse and neglect, and up to an additional US\$1,788 per participant through the prevention of child mental health disorders.<sup>62</sup> That is a total of US\$2,510 per participant over the life of the child (net present value and net of program costs). The NPV of the Triple intervention without subtracting the cost amounts to US\$4,486. Since Jamaica's per capita income is about 17% of US per capita income, we used as a proxy 17%<sup>63</sup> of the US savings, or US\$762.62 (2020) to estimate the benefits of the PEP.

In Jamaica, the PEP had 623 beneficiaries, divided in parents (223) and children (416). Since the potential savings are estimated from the child's perspective, we only considered the children to estimate the monetary benefits, for the average between the lower bound effect (24.9%) and for the higher bound effect (29.7). The value of the benefits of the PEP intervention in Jamaica was about US\$454,800 dollars, with a negative NPV of US\$1,177,355 dollars. These calculations use the standard IDB discount rate for cost benefit analysis of projects of 12 percent, and count the benefits only once, on the year the benefits accrued (i.e., the children were intervened).

<sup>60</sup> De Simone, F., Mejia, C., Martínez-Carrasco, J., Perez-Vincent, S. & Villalba, H. (2021). Mitigating Coercive Parenting Through Home Visitations: Impacts of a Parenting Program Targeted at 50 Vulnerable Communities in Jamaica. Manuscript in preparation.

<sup>61</sup> The full list of research evidence on Triple P is listed here: <http://www.triplep.net/glo-en/the-triple-p-system-at-work/evidence-based/key-research-findings/>

<sup>62</sup> Lee, S., Aos, S., Drake, E., Pennucci, A., Miller, M., & Anderson, L. (2012). Return on investment: Evidence-based options to improve statewide outcomes, April 2012 (Document No. 12-041201). Olympia: Washington State Institute for Public Policy.

<sup>63</sup> Jamaica's per capita income in 2013 was US\$9,048 in PPP terms, compared to the USA per capita income of US\$53,101 (Changanaquí, 2014).

As for the benefits for Component 2 in increased employability for beneficiaries in the VST program, we quantify the dollar benefits of how much extra employment and income would be generated from participating in the VST program. According to the impact evaluation results of the VST program, participants observed 15.6 percentage points increase in the likelihood of being employed. To estimate the benefit of an increase in employment, we multiply the observed increase in employment (15.6) times the total number of the VST participants (92), and times the annual wage reported in the Jamaica Labor Force Survey (2014) for receiving special training (J\$957,144) converted to US dollars (2020) (\$6,175.99).

The overall benefits of Component 2 in increased employability amounted to US\$662,075 dollars, also with a negative NPV of US\$4,047,816 dollars. These calculations use the standard IDB discount rate for cost benefit analysis of projects of 12 percent, assuming a 20-year period that the benefits of the project will accrue.

In sum, the CBA ex post shows that the total estimated benefits for the Components of the project included in the analysis have a present value of US\$ \$34,659,217 dollars, using a discount rate of 12%. The total annual costs of the project incurred in these Components were US\$13,254,122 dollars, with a net benefit per participant of US\$459.27 and a cost/benefit ratio of 2.61, meaning that 2.61 US dollars will be recovered for every dollar invested. We note that the highest benefits are due to Component 1 a). Again, given the data limitations listed above, these results should be taken with caution. According to the CBA results, and in line with the PCR guidelines, the Administration's rating for this section is **Excellent**.

**Table 3a. CBA Summary Table**

Indicator	Program
Benefits	\$34,659,217.04
Costs	\$13,254,121.81
Number of beneficiaries	46,536
Net Benefit	\$21,405,095.23
Net benefit per participant	\$459.97
Cost-Benefit ratio	2.61

\*Summary table from the Annex X Ex-post CBA.

As noted (footnote 63), at project closure, there was only attributable evidence for some interventions of Component 1: a), those linked to violence reduction and gang interruption (Counselling / psycho-social support provided to victims/witnesses of violence (including domestic violence), Violence interruption services provided (e.g. gang interruption), Violence prevention and conflict resolution education and training provided in schools, Crisis intervention activities conducted (including but not limited to violence and gang interruption) through the Final Evaluation of the CSJP III (Rengifo & Rees, 2021), b) the ones linked to reduction of coercive parenting strategies (Training courses provided to community members on parenting) with the impact evaluation of the PEP (De Simone, F., Mejia, C., Martínez Carrasco, J., Perez-Vincent, S. & Villalba, H., 2021); and of Component 2: related to increase labor market attachment and employability with the impact evaluation of the VST program (forthcoming). Regarding Component 3, the CBA ex ante estimated the benefits considering the projected results of the Child Diversion program. As stated in previous sections, the implementation of the Child Diversion program was affected by the delays on the legislative approval and the COVID-19 pandemic.

Overall, and as mentioned, the CBA covers components amounting to 29.6% of the CSJP III total costs. To complement the CBA, the following table presents the evolution of the five relevant

monitoring indexes (the Cost Performance Index (CPI), the CPI annual (CPI(a)), the Schedule Performance Index (SPI), the SPI annual (SPI(a)), and the disbursements performance indicator), together with the synthetic indicator and the validated classification. During the entire window of execution, the project was classified as “satisfactory”.

	PMI Stage	CPI	SPI	CPI(a)	SPI(a)	Disb	T3	Synthetic Indicator	Auto-calculated Classification
2021	After project Reaches 95% of total disbursements	4.08	4.76	1.02	1.00	1.00	12.00	2.52	Satisfactory
2020	After project Reaches 95% of total disbursements	4.08	4.76	1.02	1.00	1.00	6.00	2.52	Satisfactory
2019	After Eligibility	1.80	1.50	1.36	1.49	0.94	-	3.00	Satisfactory
2018	After Eligibility	1.75	1.23	1.21	1.10	0.80	-	3.00	Satisfactory
2017	After Eligibility	1.94	1.12	1.36	1.02	0.57	-	3.00	Satisfactory
2016	After Eligibility	1.94	1.30	1.21	0.90	0.42	-	3.00	Satisfactory
2015	After Eligibility	2.67	1.79	1.03	0.88	0.28	-	2.70	Satisfactory
2014	After Eligibility	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.18	-	3.00	Satisfactory

### Grant Support (ATN/CF-14470-JA, ATN/CN-14471-JA)

The program included grant support (ATN/CF-14470-JA, ATN/CN-14471-JA) from the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) in the amount of US\$16,749,500 and Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs Trade and Development (DFATD) in the amount of US\$18,353,400. Financial commitments at project start were made in British Pounds and Canadian Dollars, respectively. Because both currencies devaluated during the lifetime of the project compared to the US Dollar, the grants accumulated significant exchange rate losses, accounting for approximately US\$5.8M in decreased resources available to project execution. Of the initial approved amount of the DFID resources, US\$13,088,754.02 was disbursed and US\$174,418.38 was cancelled and returned to the donor. On the other hand, from the initial approved amount for DFATD, US\$15,733,388.58 was disbursed and US\$310,320.30 was cancelled and returned. Both cancellations were processed after the final disbursement date as the PEU was unable to spend these resources for planned transition activities and due to certain activities, that could not be completed because of the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the overall program’s efficiency, outcomes and outputs were not impacted by the cancellations.

	DFID	DFATD
Project No.	ATN/CF-14470-JA	ATN/CN-14471-JA
Approved Amount	US\$16,749,500	US\$18,353,400
Disbursed Amount	US\$13,088,754.02	US\$15,733,388.58
Cancelled Amount	US\$174,418.38	US\$310,320.30
Variance/ Exchange Rate Loss	US\$3,486,327.62	US\$2,309,691.20

## II.4 Sustainability

### a. General Sustainability Aspects

The sustainability of the operation's results relies significantly on the MNS' CSP (released in 2020). This document outlines and defines the Government of Jamaica's approach to Citizen Security for a five-year period and was modeled largely on the activities and lessons learned of CSJP III. The main responsibility for the implementation of the CSP lies with the Citizen Security Secretariat, which is led by the former permanent secretary of MNS, who oversaw implementation of CSJP III. Even a cursory review of the CSP shows that it has drawn significantly from the program to this new strategy. For instance, the CSP includes the youth-risk assessment tool for targeting and case managers, both developed by CSJP III. One hundred communities are expected to be impacted by community transformation initiatives being implemented under the CSP. Similarly, the CSP relies significantly on the "whole of Government" approach to violence prevention, which in Jamaica was pioneered by CSJP-III. Because the CSP is central for the Government of Jamaica's citizen security strategy over the coming years, it can be reasonably stated that the legacy of CSJP III leaves through the CSP.

Part of the strategic shifts implemented under CSJP III to achieve sustainability involved deeper and more significant partnerships to be developed between the PEU and community organizations and MDAs. According to the Final Evaluation, this was achieved to a fair degree by identifying and relying on over 26 types of organizations often across multiple sub-components of the program to implement or support discrete activities under the Programme. These MDAs and organizations, therefore, represent an additional factor supporting the continuity and sustainability of project results.

Despite these positive factors, the project's final evaluation also recognizes challenges in the transition of key activities to relevant MDAs, and particularly the MNS, particularly in the final years of the project. One of the main issues was related to transition of activities to the MNS and other key partner MDAs. For example, although a partnership under the Programme was formalized with relevant MDAs, including HEART/NSTA, to ensure that delivery of services to at risk youths continued after the end of the project, the Final Evaluation found that transition arrangements did not materialize as was initially envisioned. Apart from the MNS, no other MDAs allocated budget to continue CSJP services and activities after the end of the Programme. Additionally, the Final Evaluation found some transition-related challenges within the MNS.<sup>64</sup> Interviews conducted for the Final Evaluation indicated that the project's PEU operated as an almost independent unit within MNS; while this helped insulate the project from policy shifts during execution, it did create a disconnect – perceived or real – between the PEU and the MNS, which

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<sup>64</sup> During the final years of CSJP-III implementation, there was a lively debate within Jamaica regarding the usefulness of social interventions as a tool to counter violence, vis-à-vis more traditional law enforcement measures. Following a wave of crime that started around 2017/18, the Government of Jamaica implemented significant law enforcement measures such as ZOSOs and State of Emergency to bring violence under control. Around that time, actors within the country noted that the increase in crime had happened at the same time as various social interventions were being implemented, including CSJP-III. This increase on its own did not demonstrate that CSJP or other prevention programmes were unsuccessful or ineffective. Indeed, a counterpoint often raised by the IDB and the other donors was that these critiques did not consider the counterfactual: what would the homicide rate be if CSJP had not been implemented? Regardless, these issues raise the question, tackled further on in this document, of whether a reduction in the homicide rate is an adequate target for violence-prevention programmes? While the IDB sees these high-level impact goals as mostly aspirational – with an understanding that they are affected by a variety of factors exogenous to the project - the key actors in Jamaica clearly expected a reduction in the homicide rate to be the result of the project. This produced a misalignment of expectations that negatively affected perceptions surrounding the Programme and hence implementation and sustainability.



may have affected the transition process, and hence sustainability. On the other hand, it is worth noting that the project Donors (IDB, DFID and Canada) strongly emphasizing the importance of the transition process for sustainability, as testified by a wide array of activities, meetings – both high-level and technical - and technical and financial support to the transition process, particularly in the last 3 years of the project.

Regarding the MNS components, one sustainability challenge was related to caseloads for case managers. At project close, case managers handled on average 67 individuals each. Preliminary calculations showed that after project end this case load could increase to 150 cases if the number of individuals involved expands. This would have implications for the effectiveness, efficiency, and impact of the case management system, if one considers average caseloads recommended in the academic literature. On the other hand, it is key to note that the risk assessment tool and case management approach developed by CSJP has been adopted by the MNS and is currently being implemented.

An almost completely separate consideration on sustainability applies to the Justice component of the project (Component III). It is important to note that almost since inception, the MoJ considered CSJP-funded activities as an integral part of its portfolio of services, in both technical and financial terms. In turn, this resulted in an almost seamless transition of activities at project end.

Finally, it is important to underscore that the final year of the project – which is key to consolidate activities and outcomes – was heavily impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic. As noted above, this had a significant impact on sustainability, as the pandemic happened at a time when transition was in process. Activities had to be interrupted or severely curtailed which negatively impacted the ability to guarantee sustainability.

Based on the above considerations, the Administration's rating for this section is **Satisfactory**.

## **b. Environmental and Social Safeguards**

The Programme is classified as Category "C". There are no significant negative social or environmental risks associated with the activities, as per the Environment and Safeguards Compliance Policy (OP-703).

## **III. NON-CORE CRITERIA**

### **III.1 Bank Performance**

#### **1) Bank performance in ensuring quality at entry**

The quality at entry performance by the Bank is rated as Satisfactory. As stated in previous sections, the operation was relevant and aligned to the country development needs. Although the design was robust and backed by an evidence-based public health model, the implementation was hampered by the lack of sufficient specification on the rollout of activities (i.e., how the interventions deployed at each level would connect to one another, the lack of clarity on sequencing and cross-level interactions). This aspect could have been elaborated further at project's inception.

At design, there were also structural concerns regarding the lack of available data at the community level and of data necessary for measuring outcomes. Although this was identified as a high-risk issue (i.e., lack of data generation for effective monitoring and evaluation) in the Loan Proposal document and provisions were made to address this concern, these turned out not to be sufficient, as the project experienced data availability issues, particularly at the community level, that became evident in the evaluation and closing phase.<sup>65</sup>

Another area for improvement was the adequacy of risk management, given that the two risks that were classified as “high” in the Risk Analysis workshop at inception: (i) insufficient commitment to implement Transition Plan; and (ii) lack of data generation for effective monitoring and evaluation, both materialized. In both cases, significant mitigation measures were put in place. However, particularly for the data generation part, these turned out not to be sufficient. Regarding the Transition Plan risk, it is difficult to argue that the Bank and the other project Donors could have implemented additional measures to support the transition: monthly, and at times weekly meetings were implemented over the last three years of the project exclusively to follow up on transition; a specialized Change Management consultant supported the project since inception and conducted numerous field visits to Jamaica; action plans were put together and followed-up on; the Management institute for National Development (MIND) was hired to support the transition; technical assistance resources were made available to support the transition of the Case Management System; and high-level meetings were held with the Minister of National Security, the Permanent Secretary, the Planning Institute of Jamaica, the head of Donor agencies, and other relevant partners. Ultimately, changing priorities at MNS seem to have been the main driver leading to an unsuccessful implementation of the Transition Plan.

## 2) Quality of Bank supervision

Overall, the quality of supervision of the Bank was Satisfactory and aligned with the goal of fulfilling the operation’s goals. The main issue of concern noted throughout the implementation was that the Bank might have acted more proactively in identifying/signaling the potential problems with the ambitious impact indicators goals (reduction of homicide rate). Details regarding the Bank’s performance with respect to the supervision of the Transition Plan are reported above; in summary: while extensive mitigation measures were implemented, this was not sufficient to ensure full implementation of the Transition Plan. An additional note regarding monitoring and evaluation arrangements: as noted elsewhere, despite strong M&E arrangements made at project design, the quality of data at closing fell short of the desired standards of completeness and quality; in this, the Bank could have taken a more proactive approach in monitoring data quality, particularly in the final years of the process. One of the issues reported by the PEU was that the donors put a strong focus on compliance and reporting of results matrix data, rather than emphasis on data relevant for measuring impact; here the Bank could have taken a more proactive approach.

### III.2 Borrower Performance

This section focuses on the extent to which the Borrower ensured the quality of preparation and implementation of the operation, and complied with covenants and agreements, toward the achievement of development results. The borrower’s performance is assessed against the following findings:

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<sup>65</sup> In its review of this PCR, the Government of Jamaica notes that the PIOJ observed a reduced involvement of CDCs/NGOs in phase III of CSJP. This, in turn would have caused an increase in size of the PEU but a decreased strength and presence of the Community groups in the communities.



- Adequacy of transition arrangements for continuation of key activities after project closure: The Programme's sustainability was negatively affected by the ability of MDAs, including HEART/NSTA, to enable a sustainable implementation of services to at risk youths, the depth of the transition arrangements that was envisaged at design did not materialize.
- As noted in this PCR and in the project's final evaluation, weak or unavailable data affected the ability to fully evaluate the results of this project. This is counterintuitive because CSJP III was designed with the specific purpose in mind to strengthen the data collection and evaluation framework of previous iterations of the project. In CSJP III, three impact evaluations were designed and conducted; periodic surveys were done; the project also supported the 2019 National Crime Victimization Survey; and an M&E team was assembled. Nevertheless, at least three factors hampered efforts to generate and collect high-quality data for the project evaluation: 1) overall weak M&E capacity at key institutions involved in the project; 2) overall low quality of data produced by key partners and institutions; and 3) strong focus on compliance and reporting of results matrix data, rather than emphasis on data relevant for measuring impact; this last factor was largely driven by the three project donors, which had different reporting requirements.
- Regarding Readiness for Implementation, the project benefitted from being the third iteration of CSJP, which allowed for implementation to start swiftly after eligibility and for key activities to start readily, with few exceptions (e.g., Child Diversion).
- Regarding implementation arrangements, the borrower has reported a significant workload impact stemming from three different donors supporting the project. Although there was an effort to streamline requirements, particularly between the IDB and Canada, there were instances of specific requirements, in terms of both financial and results reporting, which certainly complicated execution for the borrower.
- Finally, within the context of factors presented above, it is important to highlight that the PEU, the MNS, the MoJ, and the other MDAs involved were able to deliver a challenging project, which was implemented in 50 of the most difficult communities in the country; in security conditions that were often challenging; with high-risk youths as beneficiaries; throughout the COVID-19 pandemic and during years that saw some of the worst spikes in violence in recent Jamaican history; responding to the requirements of three different donor agencies. These contextual factors cannot be discarded and indeed point to a satisfactory performance against major odds. It can be argued that the CSJP-III PEU represents a best practice for administering a large, highly-complex, multi-component violence prevention programme.

#### IV. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

**Table 4. Findings and Recommendations**

Findings	Recommendations
<b>Dimension 1: Technical-sectorial</b>	
Finding # 1 Project design: The proposed impact indicators in the RM were ambitious, particularly considering the Jamaican context; the mix of interventions implemented at different levels were not necessarily linked to these intended nation-wide objectives, such as the reduction in the homicide rate. Additionally, activities were added to the project that were not adequately reflected in the results matrix.	The structural social problems at the national level in Jamaica that drive crime and violence are not necessarily a reflection of the motivations and drivers of behavior at the individual level that the project sought to target. Throughout the life of the project, there were no systematic attempts to reconsider the community-level orientation of the impact indicators stated in the RM considering the more individual level focus implied by case management/targeting developed as part of CSJP III. In future operations as complex as CSJP III, involving different levels of interventions, the Bank may want to consider a review of these aspects in the early phases of the project.
Finding #2 Insufficient focus on community-level interventions.	<p>Findings from the Government of Jamaica review of this PCR indicate a need for greater emphasis on community-level interventions, to complement those at the individual-level. The Government of Jamaica notes that there was insufficient focus (at project design and execution) on community-level safety interventions vis-à-vis interventions at the individual level. As a result, many individuals benefitted from the programme but subsequently left their communities, thus reducing the impact of the programme on the overall status of the communities.</p> <p>Future programmes should consider how to better balance these two aspects (see also finding #3), for example by ensuring a closer collaboration with law enforcement activities at the community level (e.g. joint activities with the Police).</p>
Finding # 3 Project design: Within the overall Public Health Approach to fighting crime and violence, the relations between the different levels of intervention, their interplay, sequence of implementation, and how they affected different outcomes within CSJP-III was not clearly articulated. Furthermore, there was insufficient coordination between CSJP- and non-CSJP activities in the beneficiary communities.	As mentioned throughout the document, it was not clear how the interventions deployed at each level connected to one another. The sequence and cross-level interactions across the two levels of interventions (community and individual level) and to their outcomes were also not fully articulated. To the program's designers, and those delivering it, was clear that the issues that drove crime and violence required sustained, multi-level and multi-faceted prevention strategies. Additionally, there were other violence prevention activities being conducted under other initiatives in CSJP communities simultaneous to CSJP activities. A lack of coordination led to overlap and missed opportunities for synergies. Both within-project and between-project coordination of activities should be taken into account for future projects.

Findings	Recommendations
Finding # 4 Project monitoring & evaluation: challenges linked to data limitations or lack of data at the community level	Despite M&E having been made a priority for the third iteration of CSJP, structural issues in access to data outside of the PEU e.g., absence of geocoded information of JCF crimes, absence of updated SDC community profiles, absence of client-specific information for activities was a persistent challenge throughout the operation's life. Limited assessment of community level programme impacts was a consequence of the lack of detailed survey-based information between 2017 and 2020, and incomplete contextual data at baseline and over time, across target and comparison areas. In the future, the M&E plan should identify any gaps or lack of data that should be collected.
Finding # 5 Project monitoring & evaluation: The overall model of service delivery of CSJP IIII included an ambitious M&E workstream. As a result, the M&E unit was often overburdened by the size and complexity of the M&E and reporting requirements of the program.	Major data collection initiatives were implemented internally or externally, and there was a substantial amount of data directly linked to the Results Matrix of the program and to other markers of institutional performance. M&E reporting requirements abounded (e.g., monthly reports, quarterly reports, semester reports from the various donors) resulting in the M&E specialists acting more as compliance agents charged with data collection, compilation, and reporting. Consequently, strategic M&E functions suffered. In the future, similar projects with complex results matrices should strive to balance reporting requirements and strategic M&E activities such as focusing on impact evaluations and feeding back findings into implementation.
Finding #6 Environmental and social factors: Jamaica experienced a peak in organized violence that required extraordinary measures such as the enactment of ZOSO/SOE declarations	While the program was reasonably well-equipped to deal with local vectors of risk, it was not designed to respond to these large-scale changes in the national security space. In the future, the Bank may want to consider what mitigation strategies may be designed to consider these large external shocks that might affect the operation's results and revise/re-scale some of the outcomes.
Finding #7 The project did not address crime management as complementary to violence prevention activities. to address the community safety issues.	<p>In its review of this PCR, the Government of Jamaica, through the PIOJ, expressed the view that the programme's inability to deliver on some of its planned products and outcomes was due, at least in part, to failure to adequately address crime management. As noted throughout the document, crime management was not a major element of the project's design and execution. The Programme's closing evaluation did not stress this aspect, probably because violence prevention programme normally do not address directly crime management. Nevertheless, the PCR team is of the opinion that PIOJ's comment is relevant and that it needs to be reflected in this document, particularly because it captures a tension that emerged, particularly in the final phases of CSJP-III execution, between violence prevention and crime management.</p> <p>In the future, similar programme should at the very least consider in more detail whether crime management measures should be included or, alternatively, what measures may be included to ensure greater coordination between violence prevention and crime management activities funded through government or other sources.</p>
Dimension 2: Organizational and Managerial	

Findings	Recommendations
Finding #8 Challenges related to inter-institutional coordination.	Recommendation # 6 In complex sectors such as security and justice, it is key to guarantee strong inter-institutional coordination mechanisms. The Final Evaluation of CSJP III found a level of disconnect between different actors, particularly MNS and MOJ, as reflected also by the low frequency of PSC and their diminished importance as the project progressed. For similar future programmes, it is recommended that inter-institutional mechanisms be defined and established since inception. Their implementation properly followed up and mitigation measures should be designed in case these mechanisms fail.
Finding #9 Lack of mechanisms to ensure that communities could “graduate” from the Programme.	<p>In its review of this PCR, the Government of Jamaica, through the PIOJ highlighted that the inclusion of an increasing number of communities over the span of the programme affected the availability of resources and ability to concentrate those resources where they were most needed. Consequently, as few of the original (CSJP-I) communities exited the programme, resources were spread increasingly thin in the final phases of CSJP-III, when 50 communities were targeted. No mechanisms were established to assess when the objectives of the programme were met in a certain community and whether communities could “graduate” from the programme. As a result, CSJP III resources were inadequate to respond to the need of the highest-risk communities.</p> <p>The PCR team finds this comment to be quite relevant and suggests that future Programmes, particularly Programmes running for extended period of times, may consider mechanisms to assess progress of different communities, based on data and objective indicators, and whether those that have made inroads may graduate.</p>
<b>Dimension 3: Public Processes/ Actors</b>	
Finding #10 Transition and sustainability	As noted in the relevant section, a major challenge for the sustainability of the project was to ensure that MDAs tasked with providing services to beneficiaries beyond the end of the project did so. Future projects may consider already at design how to create incentives for partner MDAs to continue providing this type of support beyond the end of the project.
Dimension 4: Fiduciary	We note that the PEU performed well in the preparation and submission of financial documents to MOFPS and IDB during the life of the project.

## V. ANNEXES

Figure A1. CSJP III TOC design

