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**BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES**
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CBT</td>
<td>Cognitive behavioral therapy</td>
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<td>CPTED</td>
<td>Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design</td>
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<td>CSD/HUD</td>
<td>Housing and Urban Development Division</td>
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<td>CSJ</td>
<td>Citizen security and justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECLAC</td>
<td>Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
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<td>GITOC</td>
<td>Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime</td>
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<tr>
<td>IACHR</td>
<td>Inter-American Commission on Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and communications technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFD/ICS</td>
<td>Innovation in Citizen Services Division</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
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<td>LAC</td>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
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<td>LAPPOP</td>
<td>Latin American Public Opinion Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>LGBTQ+</td>
<td>Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer or questioning</td>
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<tr>
<td>NASEM</td>
<td>National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>OVE</td>
<td>Office of Evaluation and Oversight</td>
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<td>SDG</td>
<td>Sustainable development goals</td>
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<td>SFD</td>
<td>Sector framework document</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>United Nations Environment Programme</td>
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<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
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<td>WEF</td>
<td>World Economic Forum</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
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GLOSSARY

Assault: Physical attack against the body of another person resulting in serious bodily injury, excluding indecent/sexual assault; threats, slapping, or punching; and assault leading to death (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)).

Citizen security and justice sector institutions: The institutions responsible for providing public services for crime and violence prevention, identification, detection, control, management, investigation, prosecution, rehabilitation, and reintegration, such as the police, public prosecutors, the judicial branch, and prison systems. This also includes the lead agencies responsible for the preparation, planning, execution, implementation, and assessment of public policies, plans, and programs for citizen security and justice, such as security, interior, defense, and justice ministries, depending on their organizational structure and powers in each country.

Clearance rate: Percentage of cases in which at least one suspect has been identified or arrested (UNODC, 2019).

Cybercrime: Offenses against and by means of computer systems (Council of Europe). There are four main categories: (i) cyber-dependent crimes, which are attacks targeting a computer or computer system that threaten the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of computer data and systems (e.g., attacks on critical infrastructure, ransomware); (ii) cyber-enabled crimes (e.g., online fraud, cyberbullying, or distribution of abusive material, and distribution of child sexual abuse and exploitation material); (iii) computer-supported crimes (traditional crimes for which the use of the device is incidental but provides electronic evidence); and (iv) crimes related to the proliferation in the use of computers (e.g., software piracy) (UNODC; Jahankhani et al., 2014; and Velasco, 2022).

Cyberviolence: The use of computer systems to cause, facilitate, or threaten violence against individuals that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual, psychological, or economic harm or suffering (Council of Europe, 2018).

Digitalization: The use of digital technologies to change a business model and provide new revenue and value-producing opportunities (Gartner). Examples of digital technologies are blockchain, fifth-generation mobile networks (5G), Internet of things, cloud computing, artificial intelligence (including machine learning and deep learning), big data analytics, robotics, and virtual reality (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2021).

Diverse populations or groups: Persons with disabilities, indigenous peoples, Afro-descendant population, and the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer or questioning (LGTBQ+) community (IDB).

Environmental crime: Illegal activities harming the environment and aimed at benefiting individuals, groups, or companies through the exploitation of, damage to, trade in, or theft of natural resources (United Nations Environment Programme and Interpol, 2016).

Gender violence or gender-based violence: Harmful acts directed at an individual or a group of individuals based on their gender. It is rooted in gender inequality, the abuse of power, and the existence of harmful norms. The term is primarily used to underscore the fact that structural, gender-based power differentials place women and girls at risk for multiple forms of violence. While women and girls suffer disproportionately from gender-based violence, men and boys can also be targeted. The term is also sometimes used to
describe targeted violence against LGBTQ+ populations, when referring to violence related to norms of masculinity/femininity or gender norms (UN Women).

**Homicide:** Unlawful death purposefully inflicted on a person by another person as a result of domestic disputes, interpersonal violence, violent conflicts over land resources, intergang violence over turf or control, and predatory violence and killing by armed groups. It does not include intentional homicide arising from armed conflicts (UNODC, 2019).

**Human trafficking:** The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, or receipt of persons by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or a position of vulnerability, or the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs (UN, 2000).

**Organized criminal group:** A group of three or more persons that was not randomly formed; existing for a period of time; acting in concert with the aim of committing at least one crime punishable by at least four years’ incarceration; in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit (United Nations Convention on Transnational Organized Crime).

**Penitentiary staff:** Employees of adult prisons and juvenile correctional facilities in charge of administrative, treatment, custodial, and other services such as maintenance, food, etc. (UNODC).

**Populations or groups vulnerable to crime and violence:** People whose personal characteristics① or environmental circumstances② make them subject to multiple and aggravated forms of discrimination (intersectionality), and who are more likely to be victims or perpetrators of crime and violence (based on UNODC and the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women).

**Robbery:** The theft of a person’s property, overcoming resistance through force or threat of force, including mugging (purse snatching) and theft with violence, and excluding pickpocketing and extortion (UNODC).

**Sexual violence:** Crimes such as rape and sexual assault, including sexual offenses against children (UNODC).

**Violence against women and girls:** Any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual, or mental harm or suffering to women and girls, including threats of such acts, coercion, or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life. Violence against women and girls encompasses, but is not limited to, physical, sexual, and psychological violence occurring in the family or within the general community, and perpetrated or condoned by the State (UN Women).

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① Such as their race or ethnicity, socioeconomic status, school attendance/employment, maternity, age, disability, asset ownership, sexual orientation and gender identity, etc.

② Such as their urban or rural location, migratory status, imprisonment, geographic remoteness, presence of organized crime, etc.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

CITIZEN SECURITY AND JUSTICE SECTOR FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT

Crime and violence are a serious problem for Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). The region reports high rates of homicide, assault, robbery, sexual violence, and a growing rate of crime victimization. This problem inflicts high human costs and impacts sustainable, inclusive economic growth of the region by taking up numerous public and private resources, reducing business productivity and competitiveness, undermining confidence in institutions and the rule of law, and compromising the development of future generations.

The Citizen Security and Justice Sector Framework Document is intended to guide the work of the Inter-American Development Bank Group (IDB Group or Bank) with Latin American and Caribbean countries with respect to citizen security and justice policies and programs to address this problem.

To define the approach for the Bank’s work on this issue, it is necessary to acknowledge the complexity and dynamic nature of crime and violence. Crime and violence manifest differently in different LAC countries and between one part and another of the same country. Their complexity and momentum are also reflected in the emergence of new crimes and worsening of certain crime dynamics, aggravated by the presence of organized crime, such as cybercrime, microtrafficking, human trafficking, and environmental crime.

Given this general diagnostic assessment, this sector framework document (SFD) highlights five priority challenges that, given their relevance and the availability of information and diagnostics, offer points of access and room for action to address this problem:

(i) Worsening risk factors among vulnerable populations are increasing the need for social policies for crime and violence prevention.

(ii) Policing institutions do not respond effectively to crime and fail to establish ties of cooperation and trust with citizens.

(iii) The justice system is inefficient and lacks coordination for effective, accessible, and transparent case clearance.

(iv) The prison systems crisis is reflected in ineffective rehabilitation and reintegration policies, overpopulation, and high recidivism.

(v) There is weak institutional capacity and coordination at the national and local levels for sector policy and program design, management, and evaluation.

A comprehensive, multidisciplinary, and contextualized approach is needed to address these challenges effectively. Such an approach must seek to improve institutional capacity by identifying the specific problems to be solved and prioritizing them at a local level, creating organizational environments that foster experimentation, promoting learning, and engaging multiple sectors to ensure that reforms are viable, legitimate, and relevant.

To provide a road map of the initiatives to be considered within this approach and identify areas where more evidence for and from the region is needed, the SFD presents an updated summary of evidence about actions and programs to strengthen citizen security and justice. This summary includes new approaches to prevent gender-based violence, provides information on addressing human trafficking and other combined offenses,
highlights initiatives to strengthen police careers, and presents new programs for the reintegration of offenders into society.

The SFD also identifies strategic, technical, and operational lessons learned through the IDB Group’s work experience in the sector. A noteworthy strategic lesson is the importance of advancing structural reforms to build institutional capacity, provide online services for improved coverage and service, promote partnerships with the private sector, and better apply the gender and diversity lens. The technical lessons highlight the value of using innovative approaches for crime prevention and social services programs, and improving data collection and analysis for program design, monitoring, and evaluation. A notable operational lesson is the relevance of promoting cross-sector collaboration within the IDB Group and providing technical and financial support for the supervision and execution of operations.

Based on the challenges cited, the evidence available, and the lessons learned, the SFD highlights two large work areas: First, implementation of prevention and social service measures targeting vulnerable groups, which deter crime and violence through personal, social, and economic capacity-building; second, institutional capacity-building in the citizen security and justice sector (with emphasis on public management, digitalization and information, and transparency and integrity), to effectively implement specific responses to local problems. These areas are summarized in five lines of action:

(i) Line of action 1. Deliver crime and violence prevention and social services with an emphasis on vulnerable populations.

(ii) Line of action 2. Strengthen the effectiveness and legitimacy of police forces to prevent, address, and solve crime.

(iii) Line of action 3. Strengthen the effectiveness of justice sector institutions for efficient, coordinated, transparent, and timely case investigation and resolution.

(iv) Line of action 4. Strengthen the effectiveness of penitentiary institutions for rehabilitation and reintegration of persons in conflict with the law.

(v) Line of action 5. Strengthen citizen security and justice governance, including the regulatory framework, coordination, and management.

For every line of action, knowledge and dissemination priorities were established to: (i) improve information for the design, monitoring, and evaluation of public policies and programs; (ii) improve the availability and accessibility of evidence about their effectiveness; (iii) identify opportunities to improve policies and public institutions; and (iv) foster dialogue among policy-makers, academia, civil society, and other relevant stakeholders. Collaboration actions and synergies with the private sector are also identified within these lines, such as advisory services, the transfer of technical knowledge, and others.

For the IDB Group, the region’s high rates of crime and violence are an obstacle to achieving its mission of helping accelerate the economic and social development of its member countries. This SFD describes a new action framework for citizen security and justice at the Bank, renewing its commitment to continue supporting the region in addressing this serious problem.
I. THE CITIZEN SECURITY AND JUSTICE SECTOR FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF EXISTING REGULATIONS, THE INSTITUTIONAL STRATEGY, AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

1.1 The objective of the Citizen Security and Justice Sector Framework Document is to guide the work of the Inter-American Development Bank Group (IDB Group or Bank) with the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) with respect to policies and programs to address citizen security and justice (CSJ).³

1.2 This sector framework document (SFD) has been prepared in accordance with document GN-2670-5, “Strategies, Policies, Sector Frameworks, and Guidelines at the IDB,” which establishes the Bank’s regulatory framework for sectors. It replaces the previous SFD approved in July 2017 (document GN-2771-7).

1.3 This SFD is aligned with the second Update to the Institutional Strategy (document AB-3190-2), particularly the development challenges of improving productivity and innovation as well as social inclusion, and the crosscutting themes of institutional capacity and rule of law, and gender equality and diversity, which are also goals of the Strategy on Social Policy for Equity and Productivity (document GN-2588-4). This SFD is aligned with the IDB’s new Environmental and Social Policy Framework and connected to the following sector framework documents:⁴ Capacity Development (document GN-3012-3), Social Protection and Poverty (document GN-2784-12), Gender and Diversity (document GN-2800-8), Early Childhood Development (document GN-2966-2), Transparency and Integrity (document GN-2981-2), Housing and Urban Development (document GN-2732-11), Labor (document GN-2741-12), Environment and Biodiversity (document GN-2827-8), and Climate Change (document GN-2835-8). Lastly, it is consistent with the Gender Action Plan (document GN-2531-19) and the IDB Group Gender and Diversity Action Plan 2022-2025 (document GN-3116-1).

1.4 This SFD is associated with several Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) for 2030 established by the United Nations: SDG 1, “End poverty as a risk factor associated with violent crime and victimization;” SDG 3, “Reduce the homicide rate in the region as the leading cause of death among young people (ages 15 to 29) and, in general, of the loss of many lives annually;” SDG 5, “Achieve gender equality and empower women and girls to prevent violence against women;” SDG 8, “Promote inclusive and sustainable economic growth, and increased access to education and health care services to reduce risk factors associated with violence;” SDG 10, “Reduce inequality within and among countries;” SDGs 13 and 15, “Natural disasters and climate change as risk factors that drive violence;” SDG 16, “Strengthen the rule of law and make criminal justice systems fairer and more effective to prevent violence and promote trust in public authorities;” and SDG 17, “Partnerships for the goals.”

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³ This document was prepared by the Innovation in Citizen Services Division (IFD/ICS), with participation from other divisions and departments of the IDB, IDB Lab, and IDB Invest.
⁴ Table 1 shows the areas of alignment with the mentioned SFDs.
II. MAIN CHALLENGES FOR THE REGION

2.1 Crime and violence pose a serious problem for Latin America and the Caribbean. The region has had a high rate of homicides in recent decades. In 2018, the homicide rate was 19.7 per 100,000 inhabitants, triple the global average of 6.3 (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 2019a) (see Figure 1). The region’s high rates of violence and criminality are also evident in other crimes.\(^5\) The assault rate in LAC in 2018 was 144.2 per 100,000 inhabitants, compared to the global average of 89.4 (see Figure 2). In recent years, LAC reported an average robbery rate of 294 per 100,000 inhabitants, almost triple the global average of 106.4 (see Figure 3), and a sexual violence rate of 63.8 per 100,000 inhabitants, nearly twice the global average of 34.5 (see Figure 4) (UNODC, 2019e). The crime victimization rate rose from 19% in 2010 to 24.1% in 2018/2019 (see Figure 5) (Krishnan, 2020). Stated another way, nearly one of four people in the region had been victims of a crime in the 12 months prior to the survey.\(^6\)

2.2 This problem requires actions to address five priority challenges: (i) Worsening risk factors among vulnerable populations are increasing the need for social policies for crime and violence prevention; (ii) policing institutions do not respond effectively to crime and fail to establish ties of cooperation and trust with citizens; (iii) the justice system is inefficient and lacks coordination for effective, accessible, and transparent case clearance; (iv) the prison systems crisis is reflected in ineffective rehabilitation and reintegration policies, overpopulation, and high recidivism; and (v) there is weak institutional capacity and coordination at the national and local levels for sector policy and program design, management, and evaluation.

2.3 Why is it important to reduce crime and violence in the region? In addition to the enormous direct human costs, crime and violence impact social development in various ways. Evidence for the region shows that crime and violence reduce foreign direct investment, especially in the secondary and tertiary sectors (Bianco, Ruiz, and Wooster, 2019); reduce production, employment, and profit margins for businesses, driving their exit from the market (Rozo, 2018; Utar, 2020); and reduce men’s earnings and productivity, the number of hours worked, and women’s workforce participation (Velásquez, 2019). Exposure to criminal, violent contexts negatively impacts the educational achievement of children and young people (Brown and Velásquez, 2017; Monteiro and Rocha, 2017) and results in low birthweight and poor fetal health (Foureaux and Manacorda, 2015; Quintana-Domeque and Rodenas-Serrano, 2017), an impact that can have lifelong effects on school and job performance (Behrman and Rosenzweig, 2004).

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\(^5\) The analysis and comparison of official crime statistics should consider that the numbers depend on the incidence of crimes, the propensity to report crime, and the quality of records. Reporting rates in LAC are below those of high-income countries (Jaitman and Anauati, 2020).

\(^6\) As indicated in paragraph 2.7, the regional rates hide a wide heterogeneity among the countries of the region. According to data published by UNODC, in the IDB’s 26 borrowing member countries, the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of the following indicators are: (i) intentional homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants (1990-2018): 8.25 (p25), 15 (p50), and 31.21 (p75); (ii) aggravated assault rate per 100,000 inhabitants (2003-2018): 46.25 (p25), 93.13 (p50), and 201.98 (p75); (iii) robbery rate per 100,000 inhabitants (2010-2017): 124.76 (p25), 238.36 (p50), and 422.83 (p75); and (iv) total sexual violence rate per 100,000 inhabitants (2004-2017): 30.3 (p25), 47.02 (p50), and 60.93 (p75). The variation from country to country in these indicators may be due to differing legal definitions of the crimes, different methods of counting and recording crimes, and different rates of crime reporting.
2.4 Crime and violence take up numerous public and private resources in LAC. An update of the costs of crime based on the methodology of the study conducted by Jaitman (editor) (2017) estimates that the average cost of crime for LAC countries is 3.3% of GDP. This amounts to US$174 billion (based on the 2018 exchange rate) or US$325 billion (adjusted for purchasing power parity) (see Figures 6 and 7). The cost of crime for countries of the region is approximately equivalent to two thirds of the public budget for education or half of the budget for health care, and is 50% higher than for high-income countries.

2.5 Crime and violence impact the productivity and competitiveness of businesses in the region. Among companies in LAC, 25% identified crime as a serious or very serious constraint in doing business, compared to 12% in Europe and 15% worldwide (Enterprise Surveys, World Bank, 2019). In addition, 23% of companies in the region reported losses due to theft and vandalism, compared to 10% in Europe and 14% worldwide; and 66% said they pay for private security, compared to 40% in Europe and 50% worldwide. Extortion is another way companies have been affected (Magaloni et al., 2020). Increased crime disproportionately affects certain sectors such as tourism, by reducing the influx of visitors (Troy, 2012). According to the Global Competitiveness Report (World Economic Forum (WEF), 2020), business executives in LAC indicated that the health crisis increased the incidence of crime, violence, and organized crime, which in turn increased costs for companies compared to the previous period (2017-2019).

2.6 The high incidence of crime in the region creates the perception of insecurity and impacts trust in institutions, becoming a barrier to the functioning of the justice system. LAC is the region where people feel least safe in their communities (Gallup, 2020). In 2018, nearly 70% of citizens feared becoming the victim of a crime at some point or all the time (Zechmeister and Lupu, 2019). That is partly why, since 2009, people in LAC have considered crime as the main problem in their countries, above unemployment; this only changed in 2020, the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic (see Figure 8). This impacts trust in institutions: for the past 25 years, trust in the police and the judicial branch has been low. In 2020, only 36% and 25% of the population trusted these institutions, respectively (Latinobarómetro, 2021) (see Figure 9). Lack of trust is a very serious issue. Citizen trust in CSJ institutions is not only normatively desirable but also the basis for judicial systems to work as they should (Bradford et al., 2017).

2.7 What are the characteristics of crime and violence in LAC? Crime and violence are complex, dynamic issues that manifest differently in subregions, countries, and areas within the same country. Between 1990 and 2018, the average homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants was 26.3 in Central America, 20.3 in South America, and 17.3 in the Caribbean (see Figure 10). These averages obscure differences among countries within the same subregion. For

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7 These estimates include public spending on security (police services, justice, and prison administration), private sector spending on security, and the social cost of crime (victimization and the income not generated by incarcerated people).

8 Calculation based on comparable data from Poland, Ireland, Czech Republic, Holland, Portugal, and Sweden.

9 Data for LAC is from surveys conducted in 11 countries, in 2016 (2 countries) and 2017 (9).
example, in 2018, the homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants was 52 in El Salvador and 7 in Nicaragua (see Figures 11, 12, 13, and 14). There are also differences between subregions and countries by type of crime. For example, in the countries with the lowest homicide rates, crimes are mostly the result of domestic violence and ordinary street crimes (Lagos and Dammert, 2012). Conversely, in the countries with higher homicide rates, there are higher rates of organized crime (such as drug trafficking and other illicit economies) (UNODC, 2019c). Violence levels also vary within the same country (see Table 2). In Central America, for example, almost half of the homicides are concentrated in less than 10% of the municipios (Granguillhome, 2017). Breaking it down further, crime usually concentrates in a few areas: A study of 42 LAC cities found that 50% of crimes were concentrated in between 0.5% and 10.5% of street segments (Chainey et al., 2019). Homicides also show significant differences by gender and age (see Figures 15 and 16) and by the way they are committed. It is estimated that in 2018 around 61% of homicides in Central America, 57% in South America, and 54% in the Caribbean were committed with firearms, figures well above the world average of 38% for the same year (Small Arms Survey, 2021).

2.8 **The problem’s complexity is reflected in the emergence of new crimes and the worsening of certain criminal practices.** These impact people, businesses, and governments and challenge CSJ institutions in the region. The following practices stand out:

2.9 **Organized crime.** Much of the violence in LAC can be attributed to organized crime, which poses an enormous challenge to the region’s institutions. A significant percentage of LAC citizens, ranging from 20% in Paraguay to 53% in Brazil, have indicated that organized crime is the biggest threat to their safety (Krishnan, 2020) (see Figure 17). Organized crime groups use violence to control territory and make money from illegal activities (Giraldo et al., 2014; Abadie et al., 2015), posing a major challenge to the legitimacy of the State (Blattman et al., 2021). With respect to criminality levels, three LAC countries are in the top 10, and eight are in the top 25, according to the Global Organized Crime Index, which measures organized crime levels in 193 countries (Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime (GITOC), 2021). An estimated one third of homicides in the region are connected to organized crime and gangs (UNODC, 2019c). Weapons often play a critical role in organized crime and amplify violence (UNODC, 2020). The influence of organized crime, which is financed mostly through drug trafficking, is also seen in crimes such as human trafficking, illicit exploitation of natural resources, forced displacements, robbery, physical assault, extortion, and kidnapping (Garzón and Alvarado, 2022). In addition to cocaine trafficking, Central America is one of the world’s three main regions for illegal markets (arms trafficking, crimes against flora and fauna, and cannabis commerce). In South America, drug trafficking and environmental crimes are prominent. The Caribbean plays an important role as a corridor for drug and arms

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10 Colombia is ranked number 2, Mexico 4, Honduras 10, Paraguay 16, Panama 17, Venezuela 18, Brazil 22, and Guatemala 23.

11 With very limited data available and few countries reporting these types of homicides, it is estimated that worldwide, between 16% and 34% of homicides are related to organized crime. In the Americas, this accounts for between 32% and 64%, well above the 7% to 8% in Europe. The lower limit includes all homicides, and the upper limit includes homicides with known circumstances. The Americas includes 13 countries of the region.
trafficking from other subregions (GITOC, 2021). In addition, the illicit resources that organized crime introduces into the legal economy by means of money laundering give it enormous power to corrupt public officials and the private sector (Garzón and Alvarado, 2022).

2.10 **Cybercrime. New crimes and opportunities to commit traditional crimes online have emerged.** The growing use of digital technologies has impacted criminal practices, increasing opportunities and methods to commit crimes with lower risk of detection, and providing opportunities for new types of crimes (Jahankhani et al., 2014). Cybercrimes impact people, businesses, and governments, cross traditional country borders, and their identification and prosecution pose great challenges. This is exacerbated by the participation of organized crime. Cybercrime accounts for half of the crimes against property worldwide (IDB and Organization of American States (OAS), 2020), and the probability of arresting and prosecuting the offenders is less than 0.05% (WEF, 2020). Exposure to cybercrime increased with the COVID-19 pandemic through online fraud and scams, attacks against government institutions, and crimes targeting small and medium-sized enterprises (Velasco, 2022). Other crimes that increased were child abuse sexual and exploitation (Interpol, 2020; ECLAC and United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), 2020) and gender-based violence, particularly against LGBTQ+ persons, through various acts of cyberviolence (UNODC, 2020; Inter-American Commission of Women, 2020) (see Image 1).

2.11 **Microtrafficking. Illegal drug markets fuel violence and other crimes** (Garzón and Alvarado, 2022). Overt points of sale for the distribution of drugs in small quantities in the local market are a security concern for citizens and associated with criminal groups establishing control zones (Beltrán and Garzón, 2014). Competition to control these markets usually explains high levels of violence in certain locations (Durán-Martínez, 2015). In addition, other illegal activities occur at drug points of sale, such as fencing stolen goods, arms trafficking, betting and gambling, smuggling, and human trafficking (Garzón and Alvarado, 2022). These illicit economies usually exploit vulnerable persons such as children and adolescents, using them to stand lookout, hold, move, or sell drugs (Windle and Coomber, 2020).

2.12 **Human trafficking. This growing global crime phenomenon impacts at least 40.3 million people** (International Labour Organization (ILO), 2017; Walk Free Foundation, 2019). There are different forms of human trafficking, such as exploitation for sexual purposes, forced labor, production and dissemination of child sexual abuse and exploitation material, child begging, forced marriage, forced recruitment, and organ extraction. Human trafficking is among the most lucrative illegal activities for organized crime, generating approximately US$150 billion per year, with LAC accounting for 8% of this (ILO, 2014). Despite being a very complex, hard-to-detect phenomenon, since 2003 the number of victims reported, and human traffickers sentenced, has grown worldwide and in LAC (UNODC, 2018). In the region, most of the victims discovered are women and girls (79% in Central America and the Caribbean and 74% in South America). The most frequently identified modality is sexual exploitation (81% of victims in Central America and the Caribbean and 64% in South America), followed by forced labor (13% of victims in Central America and the Caribbean and 35% in South America). Human trafficking is an increasingly domestic phenomenon: most of the victims identified came from their own country or subregion (91% in
Central America and the Caribbean and 97% in South America) (UNODC, 2020c). The migrant population, LGBTQ+ persons, children and adolescents, indigenous communities, and Afro-descendants are more vulnerable to becoming victims of this crime (U.S. State Department, 2020).

2.13 **Environmental crimes.** The exploitation of, harm to, trade in, or theft of natural resources has serious consequences for local populations (United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and Interpol, 2016). This type of crime generates between US$110 billion and US$281 billion per year (UNEP and Interpol, 2016). Estimates are that two thirds of this income come from forestry crimes, illegal mining, and trafficking in waste (Nellemann et al. (eds.), 2018), and one third comes from illegal wildlife trade, illegal exploitation and theft of oil, and illegal, unreported, and unregulated fisheries. Of these crimes, illegal mining has grown in LAC because of increased demand for gold and minerals (GITOC, 2016). The consequences of these crimes affect local populations (for example, pollution due to waste disposal and use of pesticides and mercury, and violence from the presence of organized crime), as well as society and governments (impacting food supply chains, health care costs, and trade income) (Ungar, 2022). For example, in the Amazon, it is estimated that illegal mining resulted in an increase of more than 90% in the deforestation rate (from 52.9 square kilometers in 2017 to 101.7 square kilometers in 2020) (Siqueira-Gay et al., 2021) and that gold mining results in more than 30 tons of mercury being dumped into Amazon basin rivers and lakes annually, impacting health and the fauna (GITOC, 2016).

2.14 **Why is there so much crime and violence in LAC?** Criminology, psychology, and economics theories and evidence developed in the past few decades (Becker, 1968; Bronfenbrenner, 1981; Farrington, 2003) have helped to understand how various factors shape people’s propensity to engage in violent, criminal activities. These factors can be classified as: (i) individual risks (childhood trauma and abuse, intrafamily violence, etc.); (ii) interpersonal and community risks (violent neighborhoods, criminal peers, presence of gangs, etc.); and (iii) social and institutional risks (poor education and job opportunities, weak CSJ institutions, etc.).

2.15 **Given the complexity and variety of the factors associated with the crime and violence problem, the public policy approach needs to be comprehensive, multidisciplinary, and contextualized.** This approach should promote the local identification and prioritization of the specific problems to be solved; create organizational environments that foster experimentation; promote learning based on this experimentation; and engage multiple sectors to ensure that reforms are viable, legitimate, and relevant (Andrews et al., 2017).

2.16 **The effective implementation of focused social prevention strategies and institutional capacity-building of the CSJ sector are key tools for this approach.** The CSJ sector’s institutional capacity needs to be developed by strengthening: (i) public management (human talent, structure, and coordination); (ii) digitalization and information (information systems, digital services, and data); and (iii) transparency and integrity (internal control and accountability). This

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12 Especially, indigenous peoples through violence and forced displacement (Carmen and Waghiyi, 2012; Bangerd and Rainsfrod, 2020) and the murder of environmental rights defenders (Global Witness, 2017).

13 Worldwide, the loss of fiscal revenues to environmental crimes is between US$11 billion and US$28 billion annually.
contributes to the increased effectiveness and legitimacy of CSJ institutions, which impacts: (i) the probability of being arrested and sentenced; and (ii) the severity, speed, and characteristics of the punishment. Therefore, this shapes the cost and incentives of committing a crime.

2.17 Based on the characteristics of the crime and violence problem and the theoretical framework that considers its main causes and guidelines for addressing it effectively, five key challenges were identified for LAC. These challenges pose more specific problems connected to crime and violence that, because of their relevance and the availability of information and diagnostics, offer points of access and room for action to address this problem.

A. **Challenge 1. Worsening risk factors among vulnerable populations are increasing the need for social policies for crime and violence prevention.**

2.18 The deterioration of socioeconomic conditions due to the COVID-19 pandemic crisis creates serious challenges for peaceable coexistence and citizen security in the medium term. Rising inequality (Bottan et al., 2020; Deaton, 2021; Yonzan et al., 2021), school dropout\(^{14}\) (Azevedo et al., 2020; Pérez-Alfaro et al., 2020), and domestic violence (Perez-Vincent et al., 2020); as well as falling employment\(^{15}\) and income (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2020b and 2021; ILO, 2021; Webster et al., 2021) are some consequences of the crisis that might make people more vulnerable to becoming victims or perpetrators and contribute to increasing violence and crime. Moreover, criminal groups involved in illicit economies are widespread, exposing the population to criminal dynamics (UNODC, 2019). This combination of factors, which has the potential to deteriorate coexistence and security, increases the need for social policies for violence prevention that focus on extremely vulnerable populations.

2.19 **Women. The pandemic and the economic crisis have increased violence against women and their demand for institutional assistance.** One in three women worldwide and one in four women in LAC have been victims of physical and/or sexual violence perpetrated by their partner, while 11% have been attacked by someone other than their partner (Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), 2022). Moreover, based on national surveys available for the region, between 60% and 76% of women and girls have been victims of, or experienced, an episode of gender-based violence in various parts of their lives (ECLAC, 2020). Recent surveys of violence against women in five Caribbean countries find the highest rates of intimate partner violence among women who are in unequal power relations\(^{16}\) (Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) and UN Women, 2020). Mobility restrictions and the economic crisis caused by the pandemic exacerbated

\(^{14}\) Pandemic restrictions and school closures impacted more than 165 million students in LAC in 2020; an estimated 3 million of them are at risk of not returning to school after the crisis (ECLAC, 2020c).

\(^{15}\) At the peak of the pandemic in LAC (June 2020), up to 31 million jobs had been lost: 14% of total employment. Since then, the region has begun a recovery process that slowed in early 2021, and job losses remained at 4.7% compared to prepandemic levels (at end-June 2021). The workers who lost their jobs in higher proportions were young people, those with less education, informal workers, and particularly, women (IDB, 2022, based on data for 15 countries, retrieved on 12 May 2022).

\(^{16}\) The highest rates of intimate partner violence in Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago are found among women who agree with the statements, “A woman’s most important role is to take care of her home” (49%) and “It is natural that men should be the head of the family” (48%), as well as those who experience at least one controlling behavior (60%) (CDB and UN Women, 2020).
diverse risk factors such as women being in lockdown with their abusers, uncertainty, stress, and economic insecurity, resulting in more domestic violence (Perez-Vincent et al., 2020). Calls to domestic violence hotlines in LAC increased significantly during the pandemic, reflecting higher demand for institutional assistance from women victims of violence (Pérez-Vincent and Carreras, 2021; UN Women, 2020). Estimates are that women, who already account for the majority of human trafficking victims, were also among the population groups most impacted by trafficking for sexual and labor exploitation during the pandemic (UNODC, 2021d).

2.20 Children and adolescents. Violence seriously affects children and adolescents, requiring more preventive measures and responses to its impacts. Worldwide, annually one out of every two children becomes a victim of some type of violence (UNICEF and World Health Organization (WHO), 2020). In LAC, an estimated 58% of children have been victims of physical, sexual, or emotional abuse (Hills et al., 2016), and 64% of children under age 15 experience some form of violent discipline by their caregivers on a regular basis with important differences between Latin American countries and Caribbean countries (UNICEF, 2018). School closures, social distancing measures, economic activity restrictions, and reduced basic health care services during the pandemic increased the exposure of children and adolescents to violence, both at home from their parents and caregivers and on social media, where they spent long days with little or no supervision (ECLAC and UNICEF, 2020).

2.21 Migrant population. Migrants, a growing group in LAC, are very exposed to violence and usually do not turn to the authorities because of mistrust or fear, which increases their vulnerability (Leyva-Flores, R. et al., 2019). In LAC, lessening exposure to crime and violence is an important factor in the decision to migrate (Abuelafia et al., 2019; Orozco-Aleman and Gonzalez-Lozano, 2018). Migrants must face many challenges in this quest for greater safety and security, both in transit and at their destinations. There are few statistics on crime and violence against migrants in their destination countries in the region. However, statistics are available regarding the percentage of foreign victims of homicide in eight LAC countries, which rose from 0.9% in 2013 to 1.3% in 2016 (UNODC, 2019) (see Figure 18). In addition, in 10 countries, 4.5% of femicide victims in 2019 and 2020 were foreign citizens (ECLAC, 2020). The people and networks

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17 The gender dynamics worsened by the pandemic are a potentially relevant factor for violence and political instability in the region, beyond their short-term impacts. The available evidence shows that gender inequality increases the likelihood of armed conflicts and violent political protests, to the detriment of nonviolent protests (Schaftenaar, 2022). In particular, societies where women feel less secure are also characterized by greater instability and levels of conflict (Hudson et al. 2009).

18 The percentage of children under age 15 who experienced some type of violent child discipline (psychological or corporal) is 63% in Latin American countries and 83% in Caribbean countries. Likewise, the percentage of adults who regard physical punishment as necessary to educate is 10% in Latin American countries and 28% in Caribbean countries (UNICEF, 2018).

19 A recent IDB study (Abuelafia et al., 2019) investigated the causes of emigration in the countries of the Northern Triangle of Central America. A survey of 1,859 migrants from Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador living in the main metropolitan areas of the United States found that 41% identified crime and violence as one of the main causes for migrating.

20 Belize, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Mexico, and Panama.

21 Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, and Uruguay.
involved in smuggling migrants expose them to unsafe travel conditions and risks of physical violence, forced labor, torture, extortion, and kidnapping (mainly men); and physical and sexual violence, degrading treatment, and health impacts (especially women), as seen in Central America during the COVID-19 pandemic (UNODC, 2021d). Between 60% and 80% of migrant women and girls traveling to the United States through Mexico are victims of rape during the journey (UNODC, 2021c). In 2022, because of the economic, health, and climate crisis, an estimated 3.5 million children and adolescents in LAC will migrate (47% more than in 2021), becoming exposed to dangers such as violence, trafficking, exploitation, extortion, kidnapping, and homicide (UNICEF, 2021). In addition, the migrant population reports crime less often, for example, sexual or domestic violence in Colombia (Ibáñez et al., 2020). The local population usually mistakenly associates migrants with crime, such as in Chile, Colombia, and Peru (Bahar et al., 2020; Ajzenman et al., 2020) or in Trinidad and Tobago (Anatol and Kangalee, 2021). This fosters xenophobia and creates additional challenges for peaceful coexistence.

2.22 Diverse populations. Violence can increase because of prejudices against certain populations related to their sexual orientation and gender identity, disability status, ethnicity, or race. Although the causes and manifestations of this violence vary depending on the presence and intersectionality of these factors (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), 2015), these populations are highly vulnerable. For example, in several LAC countries, indigenous women, Afro-descendant women, and women with disabilities suffer violence above the regional average. In Mexico, an estimated 59% of indigenous women have suffered some form of violence or job discrimination in their lifetime (Mexico’s National Institute of Indigenous Peoples, 2017). In Ecuador, the percentage of Afro-Ecuadorian women who report being victim of some form of gender-based violence in their lifetime is up to 6.7 percentage points higher than mestizo women and 7.8 higher than indigenous women (Ecuador’s National Institute of Statistics and Census, 2019). In Brazil, homicides of Afro-descendant women increased 54.2% between 2003 and 2013, while homicides of non-Afro-descendant women decreased 9.8% (Cerreira et al., 2019). In Colombia 72% of women with disabilities who have been married or living with a partner have suffered at least one form of violence (psychological, physical, sexual, or economic) from their partner in their lifetime, compared to 67% of women without disabilities (Marques García et al., 2019). LGBTQ+ persons experience hate crimes and discrimination (Barrientos, 2016) and are more likely than heterosexuals to be victims of family or partner violence in their lifetime (Whitfield et al., 2021). Within this group, transgender people are highly vulnerable to poverty, inequality, and exclusion and experience particularly brutal violence (IACHR, 2018). Among the migrant population, reports show that homosexual and transgender males are up to 14 times more likely to be victims of rape, sexual harassment, and demands for sexual favors than heterosexual males (Leyva-Flores R. et al., 2019). These populations, normally more vulnerable to economic crises, are more exposed to increased violence and, particularly, forms of human

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22 A World Bank report looking at 16 representative countries from various regions and legal traditions of the world (four from LAC) found that seven have mechanisms to monitor acts of violence against LGBTQ+ persons (from LAC: Costa Rica, Mexico, and Uruguay), while nine have no such mechanisms (from LAC: Jamaica) (Cortez et al., 2021).
trafficking such as forced recruitment by groups operating outside the law, forced labor, and sexual exploitation (U.S. State Department, 2020).

B. Challenge 2. Policing institutions do not respond effectively to crime and fail to establish ties of cooperation and trust with citizens.

2.23 Citizen confidence in police officers in LAC is low, and they are perceived as not very reliable or effective. In 2019, LAC was the region with the lowest level of trust in the police (49%),23 well below the global average (69%) and far lower than Western Europe, Southeast Asia, and North America, which surpassed 80% (Gallup, 2020). LAC also has the lowest worldwide ranking on an index of the perception of reliability of police services, with an average score of 3.5 out of 7 between 2007 and 2019, below the global average (4.3) and average for North America (5.9) (IDB, 2022) (see Figure 19). The homicide clearance rate, an indicator measuring the effectiveness of policing institutions, is 43% in the Americas, well below the worldwide rate (63%) (UNODC, 2019b). Poor perceptions of reliability and lack of trust make citizens less willing to finance the police and report minor crimes (Cafferata and Scartascini, 2021). This can lead to a vicious circle that is detrimental to the functioning of the CSJ system: fewer resources and information about crime reduce the capacity and effectiveness of police and further erode people’s confidence in them and their effectiveness.

2.24 Low levels of trust and reliability reflect limits in the institutional capacity of police. LAC is the region with the second most police officers per 100,000 inhabitants24 with 407 in the period 2013-2018 (see Figure 20). Yet there are not enough police officers to guarantee safety (United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2014; Ungar, 2011; Development Bank of Latin America, 2014). Institutional capacity, including efficient public management (Frühling, 2009), effective use of technology and information, and transparency and integrity mechanisms are fundamental to the success of the police and their reform processes.25 Research from the IDB (IDB, 2022, pending publication) looked at 18 police departments in large cities in LAC26 and 3 outside the region (Los Angeles, Madrid, and New York). The main institutional challenges for the police in LAC found during this study and in other diagnostic assessments on the subject are presented below.

2.25 There are serious shortcomings in police staff selection and training. The basic education of people who join the police force is limited,27 and their reasons for joining are mostly associated with perceptions of easy access and stable

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23 At the same time, this level of trust in the police is the highest achieved in the region during the past decade, according to Gallup’s 2020 Global Law and Order report (Gallup, 2020).

24 There are significant differences between subregions in LAC: the Caribbean has 638.8 police officers per 100,000 inhabitants, followed by South America with 332.5 and Central America with 284.1.

25 Reforms in LAC have included structural reorganization, professional support, control and accountability mechanisms, legal changes in criminal investigations, and community policing (Ungar, 2011), as well as changes in the security sector’s governance structures, demilitarization, strengthening of management and information systems, and community relationship-building models (Casas et al., 2018).

26 Asunción (Paraguay), Bogotá (Colombia), Bridgetown (Barbados), Buenos Aires (Argentina), Mexico City (Mexico), Florianópolis (Brazil), Georgetown (Guyana), Kingston (Jamaica), La Paz (Bolivia), Lima (Peru), Montevideo (Uruguay), New Providence (Bahamas), Rosario (Argentina), San José (Costa Rica), Santiago (Chile), Santo Domingo (Dominican Republic), Quito (Ecuador), and Tegucigalpa (Honduras).

27 For hiring, 94% of police departments require a high school diploma. Among police officers, in LAC only 14.4% have a college degree, compared to 44.8% outside the region.
employment, rather than vocation or knowledge of what the job entails (IDB, 2022). This creates shortcomings in hiring human talent with the expected standards of quality. Staff selection follows traditional criteria, such as not having a criminal history and undergoing medical and psychological exams, in addition to an interview (88% of the police departments studied), a physical agility test (77%), and a personality test (72%). Requirements for interpersonal skills,28 which are essential for a proactive, citizen-oriented, transparent police force, are less common. There are challenges in training processes that need to be addressed: (i) the predominance of military-style models whose training plans disregard the needs of current police job profiles29—despite evidence emphasizing the need to acquire critical thinking skills (Owens et al., 2018)—and their distance from scientific advances in fields related to citizen security; (ii) the short duration of training (11 months on average); (iii) external pressures that incentivize the graduation of most trainees; and (iv) use of training as a formal requirement to get promoted rather than a continuous learning tool (IDB, 2022).

2.26 **Police forces offer job stability and competitive salaries but limited benefits and few incentives for career development.** Police compensation in LAC seems competitive compared to public administration and some police departments in high-income countries: incoming police officers earn 1.7 times the national minimum wage versus 1.1 times outside the region. Police officers acknowledge this but still consider themselves underpaid given the risks they assume (IDB, 2022). Nonwage benefits are not widely offered in LAC.30 The wage gap between ranks is generally small, which disincentivizes taking on more responsibilities. Career development is limited by differentiated promotion paths for officers and junior officers, and by the short duration of police careers (20 to 25 years), which some countries are reconsidering (IDB, 2022).

2.27 **Most police departments evaluate member performance, but the performance management process still has weaknesses** (IDB, 2022). The most important elements of performance evaluations—problem-solving, communication skills, ingenuity and initiative, teamwork, and complaints from supervisors—are not selection requirements or training topics. Moreover, indicators such as arrests, case-solving rates, and evidence collection are less significant in these evaluations. The performance management process for almost half of the police departments in the study has flaws. These include lack of performance objectives and targets, low frequency of evaluations, lack of monitoring and response to a police officer’s behavior patterns before they become problematic, lack of systematization of citizen complaints, and record keeping on paper (IDB, 2022).

2.28 **Police forces in the region are still predominantly male.** Despite women accounting for approximately half of the population, only 20% of police officers in LAC are women, compared to 25% in New York, Los Angeles, and Madrid (IDB, 2022).

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28 Such as not having a domestic violence history and having conflict mediation abilities and communication, critical thinking, and problem solving skills.

29 This includes strategic capabilities for: (i) building teams and systematically identifying and solving problems; (ii) establishing ties with the community, young people, civil society, and the private sector; (iii) guaranteeing procedural justice; and (iv) generating and analyzing information for decision-making.

30 Only three are widespread: health insurance (received by 88% of employees), life insurance (82%), and professional support for mental health (75%). Other important benefits are not as popular: retirement (54%), housing assistance (21%), and education (17%).
Career development for women in LAC’s police forces is not prioritized in human talent management. This is reflected in the relatively low participation of women in upper management ranks (IDB, 2022). This is detrimental to the effectiveness and legitimacy of police forces, because higher participation of women is associated with: (i) fewer problematic interactions between the police and citizens (Shoub et al., 2021); (ii) less use of force and risk of injury, better domestic violence prevention, and fewer citizen complaints compared to male officers (Council on Criminal Justice, 2021); and (iii) more reports of partner violence and lower probability of domestic violence followed by incidents of abuse (Miller and Segal, 2014).

Police forces are adopting digital technologies, which will require a comprehensive strategy with new operational procedures and change management to fully realize their potential. Several technologies have potential to support crime prevention and reduction. Police forces in LAC have adopted technology, but its penetration is even lower than in other regions. For example, while in Los Angeles, Madrid, and New York every police officer has a radio, on average in LAC there is one radio for every six officers. In these three police forces, there is a computer for every two police officers; in LAC, there is one for every 37 (IDB, 2022). Police in LAC should continue adopting digital technologies and developing the necessary operational processes and change management to fully realize their potential (Koper et al., 2015; Lum et al., 2017). Currently, technology is adopted through pilot projects and not as an overall strategy, and there is a contradiction between eagerness to access state-of-the-art technology and institutional rigidity when implementing it (Casas et al., 2018). The effective and legitimate use of these new technologies poses not only technical and management challenges, but challenges in the areas of transparency, accountability, and internal and external control. For example, the adoption of technology tools for risk prediction and facial recognition can perpetuate any preexisting biases towards certain populations in the functioning of the criminal justice system (Angwin et al., 2016; Perkowitz, S., 2021). For this reason, it is essential that the underlying data and algorithms that feed these predictions, if used, are understood, validated, and transparent to those who are subject to their use (Dressel and Farid, 2021), and that their use is monitored to ensure that the underlying data and algorithms are not predisposing to biased and discriminatory decisions.

The use of innovative strategies, such as hot spots policing, has increased. A large majority of the 18 LAC police departments studied frequently use hot spots policing (94%) and other proactive strategies such as community policing (89%) and problem-oriented policing (78%), which are innovative practices with proven effectiveness in crime reduction. However, police officers are not selected, incentivized, or trained on the skills required for these strategies. They may lack

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31 In the 18 LAC police departments studied, women hold only 9% of upper management positions (10% for Latin America and 6% for the Caribbean), compared to 22% in Los Angeles, Madrid, and New York.

32 This includes technologies for crime data processing, crime analysis and prediction (incorporating artificial intelligence such as machine learning), oversight, transparency, and accountability (body-worn cameras). Some areas where technology has more potential to support police activities are crime prevention (hot spots policing), criminal analysis, monitoring of police resources, case clearance, accountability and transparency, and productivity improvements (Ariel, in Weisbud and Braga (eds.), 2019).
the inputs to use them successfully, such as information, community cooperation, technology, or budget (IDB, 2022).

2.31 **Transparency and accountability mechanisms, which are essential to strengthen police relations with citizens and effectiveness, are insufficient.** In LAC, 45% of citizens believe that most or all members of the police are corrupt; the bribery index for police services\(^{33}\) is 24%, higher than for other essential public services\(^{34}\) (Transparency International, 2019). The literature has documented four factors that contribute to creating opportunities for police corruption: (i) existence of monopoly power; (ii) wide discretion; (iii) lack of transparency in decision-making; and (iv) lack of accountability mechanisms (Mejía, 2010). Given this, police forces in the region have internal affairs units to investigate corruption and abuse of force. However, very few cases are investigated and result in sanctions, and information about those cases is rarely public. More than a quarter of police departments have no external oversight entity, and those that exist lack powers to prosecute and sanction officers effectively\(^{35}\) (IDB, 2022). The IDB study also found that, when there are specific protocols to guide police work and limit discretion (for example, in the use of force), these are not readily available to the public.

2.32 **Social upheavals and the COVID-19 pandemic put LAC’s police forces to the test, revealing shortcomings in institutions and community relations.** Police forces were on the front lines of the COVID-19 crisis response and had to undertake new tasks.\(^{36}\) This led to a significant reduction in their usual preventive and community actions, impacting their community relations (Alvarado et al., 2020). Cases of violence and excessive use of force by the police, which were already a problem in the region (UNDP, 2021; Iturralde, 2021), emerged while controlling demonstrations and overseeing pandemic-related restrictive measures (IDEA Internacional, 2020; Amnesty International, 2021), particularly against women, indigenous peoples, Afro-descendants, people from low-income neighborhoods, and the LGBTQ+ community (IACHR, 2015 and 2020).

C. **Challenge 3. The justice system is inefficient and lacks coordination for effective, accessible, and transparent case clearance.**

2.33 **The judicial branch is still one of the institutions with the lowest trust levels in LAC.** Only 25% of citizens have confidence in the judicial branch; in the past 25 years, the confidence level has not surpassed 37%. In LAC, 75% of citizens say there is little or no equality before the law, and 77% perceive access to justice as unfair\(^{37}\) (Latinobarómetro, 2021). LAC has the world’s lowest ranking on an index of perception of judicial independence (3.3 out of 7) (IDB, 2022, average for 2007-2019). In addition, 42% of citizens believe that most or all judges and

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\(^{33}\) Percentage of people who used services and paid a bribe in the past 12 months.

\(^{34}\) Followed by public services (19%), identity documents (15%), and public schools (12%).

\(^{35}\) On average, in 2019 internal affairs units investigated 256 abuse of force cases (2% of officers) and 138 corruption cases (1% of officers). Of these investigations, 30% resulted in sanctions for use of force, and 25% for corruption. Less than 10% of investigations for abuse of force resulted in suspension, and less than a quarter of investigations for corruption resulted in dismissal. More than 80% of police forces were unable to report on the number of cases investigated by external civilian organizations in their jurisdiction in the past year (IDB, 2022).

\(^{36}\) Such as presence in hospitals to help with the health emergency and in public spaces to oversee social distancing measures.

\(^{37}\) This is above perceptions of unfairness in access to health care (64%) and education (58%).
magistrates are corrupt, and the bribery index for court services is 11% (Transparency International, 2019). Lastly, 64% of the region’s population has little or no confidence that the judicial system will punish the guilty (Zechmeister and Lupu, 2019).

2.34 **The region has high levels of impunity.** Of homicide cases between 2003 and 2017, 11% resulted in a conviction.\(^{38}\) Nevertheless, there are wide differences between countries: some reach 20% and others only 2%, reflecting high levels of direct impunity (Lecuona and Rodríguez, 2018). On the Global Impunity Index 2020,\(^{39}\) there were no LAC countries in the low and very low impunity category. However, five were ranked as having intermediate impunity, seven as high or very high impunity, and six as “statistical impunity”\(^{40}\) (Le Clercq and Rodríguez, 2020).

2.35 **The legal assistance and public defense provided to defendants and victims are inadequate.** Comprehensive legal counsel services are associated with less recidivism, a lower probability of and shorter prison sentences, and more victim support (Przybylski, 2008; McNiel and Binder, 2007; Finigan et al., 2007; Bouffard et al., 2016; Anderson et al., 2019). Public defender services have achieved progress with units specializing in specific conflicts or populations. However, they still have institutional shortcomings and low budgets (González and Fandiño, 2018; Arellano, 2022). Prison surveys in the Caribbean indicate that poor quality legal counsel is commonplace. The majority of inmates surveyed in Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and Suriname (51% to 72%) said they had no legal representation or almost never saw their attorney during the legal process (Bergman et al., 2019).

2.36 **Lack of access to, and inefficiency of, justice impact both individuals and businesses.** The region has different types of barriers to access justice, which disproportionately affect diverse groups such as persons with disabilities (UN, 2020). These include physical, language-related, age-related, technology-related, and economic barriers (CEJA, 2013; Ramírez and Ilera, 2018; Bernales, 2018, cited by Arellano, 2022). These barriers affect incentives for business investment, distort production decisions, and give rise to legal uncertainty (Crawford et al., 1978). Justice that works well in other domains (such as family or commercial law) can promote the peaceful resolution of conflicts and disputes through formal mechanisms, improve coexistence, and help reduce crime and violence (Dalla Pellegrina, 2008; Amaral and Bandyopadhyay, 2015; Mocan et al., 2020).

2.37 **LAC has the world’s largest proportion of prisoners in pretrial detention.** On average, 43.2% of the region’s prison population is awaiting judgment, above the worldwide average (29.5%) (Fair et al., 2021). Migrants, low-income persons, and women have a higher probability of being in pretrial detention (Penal Reform International, 2020). Pretrial detention increases the prison population, worsens

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\(^{39}\) This index measures impunity by analyzing institutional capacities to prosecute crimes and deliver justice (structural dimension), the performance of the institutions responsible for these duties (functional dimension), and perception of the rule of law (human rights dimension) (Le Clercq and Rodríguez, 2020).

\(^{40}\) Intermediate impunity: 37th, Costa Rica (39.51 points); 39th, Barbados (40.48 points); 42nd, Panama (42.54 points); 49th, Colombia (46.88 points); and 50th, Chile (47.63 points). Intermediate (upper-high) impunity: 55th, Ecuador (48.17 points); 57th, Peru (48.31 points). Very high impunity: 59th, Guatemala (49.66 points); 60th, Mexico (49.67 points); 63rd, Guyana (52.07 points); 64th, Paraguay (53.15 points), and 68th, Honduras (59.69 points). Statistical impunity (due to inconsistencies in the information reported): Argentina, Brazil, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela.
overcrowding, and impacts criminal processing (Wooldredge et al., 2015). Defendants who remain detained before trial are less likely to prepare an effective defense (Foote, 1954) and have higher probabilities of being sentenced to incarceration, receiving longer sentences (Phillips, 2007), and pleading guilty (Dobbie et al., 2018; Heaton et al., 2017). Pretrial detention may also lead to recruitment by gangs and other criminal groups and has economic impacts such as increased costs to the State and the loss of jobs and income for families who rely on this income (Open Society Foundations, 2011). In addition, pretrial detention has other implications such as high costs to the State for housing and guarding detainees and loss of employment taxes and contributions (Derdoy et al., 2009; Ahumada et al., 2009).

2.38 High impunity and lack of trust, access, and speed in the administration of justice highlight weaknesses in this sector’s institutional capacity. LAC has a low number of judges or magistrates. The rate of judges or magistrates per 100,000 inhabitants in the period 2003-2018 was 9.1,41 below the worldwide average (17.5). Changes in this rate show a more pronounced downward trend (from 12.7 in 2003 to 6.8 in 2017) than for the rest of the world (from 17 in 2003 to 15.5 in 2017) (UNODC, 2019) (see Figure 21). The relatively low number of judges or magistrates combines with challenges in public management (human talent, coordination, and structure), use of technology and information, and transparency and integrity.

2.39 There is room for strengthening the institutional capacity for criminal prosecution at the offices of prosecutors and public defenders. It is necessary to strengthen all phases of criminal investigation, as well as legal representation for defendants, shorten case clearance times (which in some countries takes up to 30 months), operate nationwide, and increase the percentage of crimes that go to trial, which for homicides in LAC does not surpass 10% (Ungar, 2020). Institutional capacity-building should emphasize technology implementation, updates to regulatory frameworks, protocols, and operational procedures, staff training, and improved governance and interagency coordination. For example, coordination between police forces and public prosecutors involves legal issues related to information use and exchange, technical issues regarding data reconciliation, distrust between teams when exchanging information, and a lack of exchanges with other institutions, such as financial intelligence units and customs and tax administrations (Blanco et al., 2020).

2.40 Progress has been achieved in promoting a gender perspective and parity in the judicial system, but barriers to women’s participation persist. In some LAC countries, the percentage of female judges and prosecutors is near parity. Women account for 42% of judges in Peru and 43% in Colombia, and in Uruguay, 81% of the prosecutors are women. However, in other countries only between 25% and 30% of judges and prosecutors are female (United Nations, 2021). The percentage of women in the region’s high courts of justice rose from 8% in 2000 to 32% in 2018 (ECLAC, 2022). Lack of parity is associated with structural, social, and cultural barriers that hinder women’s access to, and promotion and retention in, the judiciary and prosecution services. These barriers include gender stereotypes that influence the tasks assigned to women judges, who are often

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41 This metric includes the officials authorized to hear civil, criminal, and other cases, including in courts of appeal, and to make dispositions in a court of law (UNODC).
relegated to social, family, or juvenile courts, which excludes them from other leadership and decision-making positions\(^{42}\) (United Nations, 2021). This occurs despite evidence that women judges improve the legitimacy of courts, contributing to a judicial branch that is more transparent, inclusive, and representative of the people whose lives it impacts. Women judges also contribute to the quality of decision-making with a more comprehensive, impartial, and empathetic perspective about consequences on the people affected (UNODC, 2019e).

### 2.41 Institutional challenges impact the effective enforcement of laws criminalizing violence against women.

All Latin American countries, except one, have laws against domestic violence; 18 LAC countries define femicide—or feminicide—as a crime; and 13 incorporate the concept of violence against women in their legislation (UNDP, 2017; ECLAC, 2018). However, factors such as investigations that do not incorporate the gender dimension, lack of technical training among judicial personnel, and entrenched prejudices among public servants contribute to high levels of impunity in cases of violence against women (United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), 2011; IACHR, 2011; UNODC, 2019b).

### 2.42 The judicial branch faces challenges implementing a horizontal model with close community ties that leverages the advantages of digitalization.

Most Latin American countries have moved from vertical judicial system structures to horizontal models and face challenges conducting interventions without hierarchies or distinctions among the cases entering the system and during the various stages of the process for judges in court (González and Fandiño, 2018; Arellano, 2022). Technology adoption also creates challenges, since it makes it necessary to revise legislative and regulatory frameworks and include ethical considerations to ensure its proper use, avoiding unwanted consequences such as bias and discrimination in judicial decisions. Other challenges are associated with establishing community ties and effectively implementing jury and citizen participation systems (Arellano, 2022). There is a need to define national criminal policy and a legal framework that provides institutions tools for better planning and coordination of criminal prosecution (Binder et al., 2019).

### 2.43 The COVID-19 pandemic exposed weaknesses and opportunities for the justice sector.

Mobility restrictions during the pandemic promoted the implementation of virtual hearings and trials, as well as electronic notifications, revealing problems such as the lack of proprietary platforms, variability in the digital skills of users, and lack of protocols to protect constitutional rights and guarantees while operating virtually (Arellano et al., 2020, cited by Arellano, 2022). In turn, the digital divide (skills and connectivity) in LAC made it difficult for some populations to adapt to the virtual modality, impacting trial transparency and the right to a public hearing (ILAC, 2020, cited by Arellano, 2022). Despite these constraints, digitalization increased the speed, scope, and efficiency of judicial proceedings as well as the use of alternative dispute settlement mechanisms such as mediation and arbitration (OECD, 2020a).

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\(^{42}\) Other reasons are difficulties reconciling personal and professional life, shortage of female mentors and support networks, hitting the “glass ceiling,” lack of transparency in appointment procedures, and lack of explicit public policies in the judicial or prosecutorial systems to promote the equal presence of women (United Nations, 2021).
D. **Challenge 4.** The prison systems crisis is reflected in ineffective rehabilitation and reintegration policies, overpopulation, and high recidivism.

2.44 **The prison population has been growing since 2000, and LAC is one of the regions with the highest incarceration rate.** LAC has a rate of 262 prisoners per 100,000 inhabitants, well above the worldwide average of 140 (World Prison Brief, 2022) (see [Figure 22](#)). The region has the world’s largest growth in prison population: since 2000, this population increased 120% in LAC, whereas worldwide it increased 24% (Alvarado and Grajales, 2019). In the past decade, this growth has caused prison systems to collapse. LAC prisons show high occupancy levels: 20 of the region’s 26 countries are above their maximum capacity (World Prison Brief, 2022) (see [Figure 23](#)).

2.45 **Prison conditions are poor and were worsened by the COVID-19 pandemic.** Surveys conducted in prisons in 14 LAC countries reveal that 58% of prisoners sleep on the floor, 20% lack regular access to drinking water, 29% lack health care, 28% have never made a phone call from prison, and 17% have never had visitors. Prisoners are also victims of violence: 46% reported being robbed, 16% being beaten, and 1% being sexually assaulted (Alvarado and Grajales, 2019). In overcrowded environments, these shortcomings worsened with the pandemic, which exposed prisons to health hazards and institutional crises (Penal Reform International, 2021).

2.46 **The prison system does not effectively prepare prisoners for their release, and they reoffend quickly.** Prison surveys in six Caribbean countries indicate that 40% of prisoners who reoffended did so within a year after their release. In four countries (Bahamas, Barbados, Guyana, and Suriname), one in four were reincarcerated within six months (Bergman et al., 2019). In addition to limited access to educational programs (ranging from 3% in Suriname to 49% in Jamaica) and employment programs (from 33% in Barbados to 57% in Jamaica), less than 20% of inmates reported having access to career counseling or guidance services prior to being released (Bergman et al., 2019). Combined results for 14 LAC countries show that few inmates participate in activities to prepare for release: half participate in sports, 43% in educational activities, and 47% in job activities (Alvarado and Grajales, 2019).

2.47 **The influence of organized crime in prisons is a concern.** In many cases, prisons do not help rehabilitate inmates but rather “incubate” criminal activities through training from organizations and networks operating inside and outside prisons (Dudley and Bargent, 2017). Mass incarceration has made gangs and organized crime groups more powerful on the street (Lessing, 2016). High recidivism has created a “revolving door” for criminals, who a high probability of returning to prison (Tobón, 2020), who choose to join a group that protects them in prison.

2.48 **Lack of information about prison institutions in LAC makes it difficult to design responses.** Overcrowding, incarceration conditions, and recidivism of former inmates reflect the serious institutional weaknesses of the prison sector.

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43 The IDB surveyed more than 11,000 inmates in 14 LAC countries: Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Peru, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago).
However, despite the magnitude and relevance of prisons to address crime and violence, there are few detailed diagnostic assessments of their institutional capacity, which adds another challenge to the development of comprehensive, contextualized policy responses.

E. Challenge 5. There is weak institutional capacity and coordination at the national and local levels for sector policy and program design, management, and evaluation.

2.49 The region has progressed in defining CSJ policies, programs, and plans. One of the security sector’s most significant advances in the 1990s was the enactment of laws establishing legal foundations for institutional transformation. In 2018, 16 of the region’s countries had laws on police, prevention, or security. That year, 15 of the region’s countries were identified as having a programmatic security plan in the form of a national security policy or a security plan (Chinchilla and Vorndran, 2018). Despite this progress, in many cases public policy approaches in the sector fluctuate, and there is little policy and legislation to promote reform. For example, in Chile and Honduras, changes to police job descriptions, career paths, and training, as well as justice digitalization processes, needed to be supported with new legal frameworks.

2.50 Weaknesses in institutional capacity and vertical and horizontal coordination affect the integrated, effective management of citizen security and justice. Implementation of CSJ policies, programs, and plans is impacted by poor planning and coordination among the different levels of government, turnover at the management level, lack of professional development, and low levels of funding (IDB, 2017). In addition, big incentives for public policy implementation are short-term, reactive measures that meet immediate political needs but do not sustainably and effectively reduce violence levels in the long term. Policies and programs also fail to recognize the existing interdependence between different CSJ system authorities, which affects the value chain needed to ensure effective crime policy. For example, effective crime deterrence depends on the effectiveness of criminal investigation, while prison overcrowding depends on the effectiveness of case processing. Moreover, the lack of digitalization and interoperability among the system’s various entities limits the effectiveness and transparency of CSJ services. Lastly, the quality of public expenditure on citizen security and justice in LAC, which averages 5% of the total, can improve through more preventive, targeted, and evidence-based policies (Serrano and Pessino, 2018). Improving the effectiveness of CSJ policies also requires greater coordination and identification of synergies and opportunities with the private sector, which can support policies for the social prevention of violence and contribute to the work of CSJ institutions through the mobilization of resources, advisory services, the transfer of technical knowledge, the provision of information for the identification and prioritization of problems, and the implementation of programs, financial and nonfinancial mechanisms, and safeguards.

2.51 The lack of uniform, periodic crime data limits the design, monitoring, and evaluation of CSJ policies. Crime statistics systems in LAC fall far short with

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44 On average, the countries in the region allocate resources equivalent to 0.2% of GDP to administering prison systems. Calculations are based on analyzing the public budgets of 17 countries of the region (Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay).
respect to planning, collection, analysis, and management. The information generated lacks regularity and detail and is not very accessible. The agencies responsible for data collection generally report to different levels of government and different bodies at each level. Moreover, in most countries, a lack of resources and training are obstacles to data collection and analysis, and some systems do not maintain political neutrality or a high public profile. Lastly, crime statistics systems do not use common concepts and classifications for scope and content and are not interoperable.

III. INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CITIZEN SECURITY AND JUSTICE POLICIES AND PROGRAMS

3.1 Challenges in generating sector evidence in the region. Despite the relevance of CSJ policies for LAC, there are very few rigorous evaluations of these policies. Challenges in evidence-gathering for this sector include: (i) the lack of open, reliable, and comparable statistics on crime, victimization, and the functioning of CSJ institutions; (ii) technical challenges to conduct evaluations, such as small sample sizes; (iii) a tradition of opacity in crime information; (iv) turnover among political leaders in the sector and lack of long-term strategies; and (v) political sensitivities regarding the impacts of crime prevention policies.

3.2 In the past few decades, rigorous evidence-gathering on the effectiveness of CSJ policies has progressed significantly in the United States, the United Kingdom, and other high-income countries.\textsuperscript{45} Despite this global progress, local generation of experience and evidence is essential to inform public policies in LAC. The region has specific challenges in citizen security and justice, which could limit the applicability and validity of the lessons learned in other contexts.

3.3 The evidence below offers a road map for initiatives to be prioritized to strengthen citizen security and justice in LAC, highlighting areas where new evidence could be gathered for and from the region.\textsuperscript{46}

A. Social prevention

3.4 Social prevention of crime is aimed at preventing crime by reducing individual, interpersonal, and community risk factors that increase the probability of committing crimes. This approach leads to interventions focused on people and on physical and social spaces.

3.5 People-based interventions. These interventions target children, adolescents, and their families. People first engage in criminal activities usually during adolescence or early adulthood. These activities are frequently associated with negative events or stimuli during childhood (Walters, 2018; Miley et al., 2020). Evidence shows that the probability of embarking on a career as a criminal during adulthood is very low (Holzer et al., 2020; Rocque, 2021).

3.6 Childhood. Children’s exposure to abuse, crime, and violence has negative consequences for their development and is a predictor of future violent behavior and criminal involvement (Sviatschi, 2021; Flores et al., 2021; Jones and Pierce, 2021).

\textsuperscript{45} Examples of this progress are evidence platforms such as Crime Solutions of the U.S. Department of Justice and the Crime Prevention Toolkit of the United Kingdom’s College of Policing.

\textsuperscript{46} Table 3 shows a summary of the evidence described in Section III.
Adopting measures that protect children from these situations is essential to reduce crime and violence in the medium term.

### 3.7 Positive parenting programs are useful tools to reduce child abuse and coercive parenting practices.

Several different programs aimed at offering strategies and practices to parents so they can manage their children’s behavior without resorting to abuse and violence have been developed and evaluated in recent decades (Mikton and Butchart, 2009; Furlong et al., 2012; Chen and Chan, 2016; Sama-Miller et al., 2017). Noteworthy among these programs is the Triple P (positive parenting program) model, implemented in 25 countries, which has reduced child abuse, the placement of children outside the home, and aggressive attitudes in parents and children (Sanders et al., 2004; Prinz et al., 2009; Prinz et al., 2016).

### 3.8 Better quality early childhood education and more access to social services during childhood are associated with lower juvenile and adult crime rates.

Social programs targeting vulnerable populations have the potential to reduce exposure to adverse experiences during childhood (Courtin et al., 2019). Evidence from the United States shows that access to better early childhood education (Anders et al., 2019) and nutrition assistance programs during the first years of life (Barr and Smith, 2021) decreased crime rates. Other programs to promote restraint and improve socioemotional and cognitive skills during childhood have also shown encouraging results. For example, the Perry Preschool Project (United States), which provided high-quality education to boys and girls ages 3 to 5, and the Hogares Comunitarios de Bienestar [Community Welfare Homes] program (Colombia), which provided children a home and a caregiver, reduced assaults and criminal behavior in the long run (Schweinhart, 2007; Barnett et al., 2005; Parks, 2000; Belfield, 2006).

### 3.9 Conditional transfer programs that are contingent on children’s education and health care have shown promising effects on crime reduction.

The direct objective of these programs is to reduce the economic and social vulnerability of households, protecting income and promoting access to key services for children’s well-being (generally, they have met this latter objective). Some recent studies have looked at the connection between the presence and expansion of these programs and reductions in crime, finding encouraging results in Brazil (Chioda et al., 2016; Machado et al., 2018), Colombia (Camacho and Mejía, 2013), and Mexico (Lance, 2014), with Uruguay being the exception (Borraz and Munyo, 2020).

### 3.10 Adolescence.

The environment where adolescents live influences their likelihood of engaging in criminal activities. Particularly, exposure to violence, dropping out of school, unemployment, and substance use during adolescence are predictors of future involvement in criminal acts (Kassing et al., 2022; Turner, 2020; Kim et al., 2021; Turanovic, 2019).

### 3.11 Staying in school is a protective factor against crime.

Education can prevent young people from getting involved in crime and being recruited by criminal organizations, because it reduces their exposure to criminal activities (Henry et al., 1999; Leban and Masterson, 2021). The positive impact of staying in school

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47 Uruguay’s results, which are the opposite of the findings from other studies, may be due to the transfers being paid in cash, unlike in other countries, which increased opportunities for theft and mugging.
requires environments without violence: several studies show that exposure to bullying situations can promote crime (Wolke et al., 2013; Walters, 2021).

3.12 **Summer work programs have been effective in reducing, at least in the short term, juvenile crime and incarceration rates** (Schochet et al., 2008; Heller, 2014; Gelber et al., 2014). Evidence, mostly from the United States, shows that summer work programs for young people can reduce crime by decreasing the time available and opportunities to engage in crime during the program (Kessler et al., 2021) and promoting job and educational skills and aspirations (Modestino, 2017). However, some authors argue that, for medium- and long-term crime prevention, these programs should be supplemented by strengthening the cognitive and socioemotional skills that enable young people to access quality, well-paid jobs (Lustig and Liem, 2010).

3.13 **Mentoring and cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) have demonstrated effectiveness in fostering self-control and resilience among at-risk youth.** Numerous programs based on creating spaces for young people to express themselves freely while educating them on the dangers and opportunities around them are aimed at preventing crime-related behaviors during adolescence (Heller et al., 2013; Waller, 2014). Examples of initiatives with great results are the Youth Inclusion Program (Laliberté, 2015) in England and Big Brothers, Big Sisters (Grossman and Tierney, 1998), and Becoming a Man (Heller et al., 2017) in the United States.

3.14 **Women.** Gender-based violence and specifically, violence against women, are the most frequent manifestations of violence in LAC. More evidence is needed on what works to prevent and address this violence, but some approaches show promising results (paragraphs 3.15, 3.16, and 3.17).

3.15 **Community mobilization programs have shown potential to reduce the level of violence in different environments** (Kerr-Wilson et al., 2020). These types of interventions get communities involved in fighting violence against women by questioning social norms and practices arising from gender roles (Roza and Martín, 2021). Programs with mostly positive results include SASA!, implemented in several countries, such as Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda (Stern et al., 2018; Michau and Namy, 2021; Abramsky et al., 2014; Namy et al., 2019); Stepping Stones and Creating Futures in South Africa (Gibbs et al., 2020); and Sumaq Warmi, an IDB-supported program in Peru (Agüero and Frisancho, 2021). Other interventions in school environments have shown positive impacts on sexist, violent attitudes and gender knowledge (Sosa-Rubí et al., 2017; Bando et al., 2018).

3.16 **The evidence regarding the impact of cash transfers for women in reducing violence against them is mixed** (Roza and Martín, 2021). Cash transfers can reduce economic insecurity, the gender gap, and stress levels in families, in turn decreasing violence (Haushofer and Shapiro, 2013; Aizer, 2010; Hidrobo et al., 2016). However, when a woman has more income, her partner could use violence to take away these resources (Hidrobo and Fernald, 2013; Baranov et al., 2020). The evidence is mostly encouraging (Buller et al., 2018) but suggests that the impact of these programs on violence against women depends on their features, the period studied, and characteristics of the context and household (Roza and Martín, 2021; Hidrobo and Fernald, 2013; Heath, Hidrobo, and Roy, 2020; Baranov et al., 2020).
3.17 **Programs with perpetrators of violence against women can be effective in reducing violence.** The participation of men who have engaged in violence in group discussion programs reduced partner and family violence and increased self-control, communication skills, and active paternity (UNFPA, 2021). Implementation of these programs in LAC is in its early stages and there is little local evidence of their impact on recidivism. A recent review of interventions and evaluations in LAC found promising experiences, demonstrating the potential effectiveness of this approach (Santoveña and Da Silva, 2016).

3.18 **Human trafficking.** Evidence of the effectiveness of human trafficking prevention programs is still rudimentary. These programs usually focus on raising awareness, building capacity for policy-making, and providing access to legal services for vulnerable populations. In the long term, they focus on decreasing risk factors such as gender inequality and lack of economic opportunities (Shinkle, 2016). With respect to child exploitation and abuse, programs conducted in schools and targeting parents and children are used the most to raise awareness about this issue (UNICEF, 2020; Lemke, 2018; Salas and Dider, 2019). Evidence of the effectiveness of campaigns to prevent human trafficking is mixed. The most effective usually target specific groups and have a clear message, adapt to the local context, promote specific actions (Bryant and Landman, 2020), and have a positive approach to empower the audience (Archer et al., 2016, in UKAID, 2020). Many authors also highlight the importance of educating health care staff on human trafficking (Rothman et al., 2017; Ahn et al., 2013; Greenbaum et al., 2018).

3.19 **Interventions based on physical or social spaces.** These interventions seek to improve physical or social spaces. Deteriorated physical spaces (with abandoned infrastructure, garbage, or graffiti) and social spaces (with street brawls, consumption of alcohol or drugs in public) are associated with increased crime. The Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) model showed encouraging results in crime deterrence. This approach includes planning, designing, and managing physical environments to reduce urban crime (Cooke, 2003; Kruger et al., 2001). International evidence shows that implementation of CPTED principles in London and Liverpool (United Kingdom) and Cape Town (South Africa) was associated with reduced crime rates (Piroozfar et al., 2019; Bowers, 2011; Matzopoulos et al., 2020). The most substantial evidence came from housing renovations and remediation of buildings and land (Kondo et al., 2018).

3.20 **The most successful urban development interventions have been complemented with social interventions.** Programs to improve the quality of physical environments coupled with social interventions (specifically, improving informal urban neighborhoods by investing in basic infrastructure and urban and social services) have shown encouraging results (Brakarz et al., 2002; Urban Development and Housing Sector Framework Document, 2013).

3.21 **Evidence of the impact of violence interrupters on crime is still emerging and mixed.** Violence interruption is an approach to reduce armed violence by changing individual and community attitudes and norms, addressing the underlying causes and using techniques such as mediation between rival gangs. This model, promoted by Cure Violence Global, showed promising results in cities such as New York, United States (Delgado et al., 2017); Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago (Maguire et al., 2018); and San Pedro Sula, Honduras (Ransford et
In addition to Cure Violence, other programs such as CeaseFire in Chicago and E-Responder in New York use violence interruption measures to combat gun violence (Skogan et al., 2009; Sichel et al., 2019).

B. Policing institutions

3.22 To reduce crime and violence, it is essential to strengthen the institutional capacity of the police. To achieve this, police forces can implement initiatives to improve management (staff recruitment and training, optimize police presence), adopt new technologies, strengthen community ties, transparency, and integrity, and apply targeted strategies to complex crimes.

3.23 **Recruitment and training. The strategy for police recruitment affects the profile of the group of candidates and the workforce’s diversity.** How the recruitment process is designed can impact the willingness of various types of candidates to join the police (Linos, 2018). The rudimentary evidence available indicates that making small changes in selection processes can have big effects on minority recruitment. For example, job postings focused on the challenges and professional benefits of the job, and encouraging messages to reduce anxiety during the selection process, have increased job applications and performance for minority group candidates (Linos, 2017; National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM), 2021).

3.24 **The profile of police officers can impact the number of crimes reported and the police’s legitimacy and effectiveness, although more research is needed regarding this connection.** The representativeness of police personnel in terms of gender or other characteristics might help citizens identify with the police and positively impact their perception of police performance, reliability, and equity (Ricucci et al., 2014; NASEM, 2021). Evidence available from the United States shows that having more female police officers increased the reporting of violent crimes against women (Miller, 2019) and reduced the rates of partner homicides and domestic abuse (Miller and Segal, 2014). Other findings included fewer problematic interactions between the police and citizens (Shoub et al., 2021) and less use of force, risk of injury, and fewer public complaints (Council on Criminal Justice, 2021). Beyond these findings, there is still limited evidence on the connections between selection processes and the profile of police officers with policing effectiveness (NASEM, 2021).

3.25 **The modernization of training systems and professionalization of police careers have been key elements in police reform.** Professionalization of police officer recruitment and training, specialization, wellness programs, promotion of gender equity, and strengthening of internal control and integrity systems are essential measures for institutional strengthening processes (Ricucci et al., 2014). Evidence from the region shows positive examples of these reforms. Police reform in Honduras that began in 2012 (supported by the Bank) modernized the police’s training and professional development system. The operation’s impact

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48 The evaluation of the Cure Violence program in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago (Maguire et al., 2018) was financed and published by the IDB. This evaluation found a significant increase in the number of violent crimes in the targeted areas (38.2% versus a 16.3% increase in comparable areas) and a decrease in calls to the police for murders, shootings, and injuries (a 22.6% decrease versus a 10.4% increase in comparable areas).
evaluation attributed to the program a 14.3% reduction in the homicide rate and a 7.5% increase in the public’s trust in the police (IDB, 2021).

3.26 **Violence de-escalation training shows promising results in reducing use of force** (Engel et al., 2020). The evidence available, mostly from high-income countries, shows that applying techniques to prevent and reduce violence escalation has decreased use of force incidents, citizen injuries, and officer injuries (Engel et al., 2022), and increased positive interactions with citizens (Todak and James, 2018).

3.27 **Police presence.** The frequency, location, response time, and types of activities done by police officers as part of their patrolling and surveillance duties are fundamental for crime prevention and response.

3.28 **There is extensive evidence that increased police presence helps reduce crime.** A larger police presence can be a deterrent for crime because it increases the likelihood of offenders being arrested and creates a sense of risk through police visibility. In turn, increased police capacity to make arrests contributes to the incapacitation of offenders (Chalfin and McCrary, 2017). Evidence indicates that increased police presence is associated with reduced crime, especially violent crimes (Chalfin and McCrary, 2018). Several studies show that simply increasing police visibility acts as a deterrent (Blesse and Diegmann, 2022; Weisburd, 2021; Di Tella and Schargrodsky, 2004).

3.29 **Hot spots policing is an effective crime reduction strategy.** Evidence shows a high concentration of crime at certain places (crime hot spots) and times (Gill et al., 2016; Ajzenman and Jaitman, 2016). This feature of crime has led to the development of intensive policing strategies in crime hot spots. In recent decades, various studies have shown that intensifying police patrolling in these hot spots reduces crime moderately but significantly (Braga et al., 2014; Weisburd and Eck, 2004; Bowers et al., 2011; Braga et al., 2012; Braga et al., 2019). Three recent evaluations of this strategy in Latin America (Collazos et al., 2021; Blattman et al., 2021; Chaineys et al., 2021) show that it can be implemented effectively in the region.

3.30 **Relationship with the community.** Legitimacy and citizen trust influence the police’s work and effectiveness (Kenney, 2013; Boateng, 2016; Lum and Nagin, 2016; Cafferata and Scartascini, 2021). In recent decades, various approaches to promote cooperation between the police and citizens were evaluated, including procedural justice, community policing, and problem-oriented policing.

3.31 **Implementation of procedural justice principles has shown promising results in improving citizen perceptions of the police.** This approach based on fair, equitable treatment and on law enforcement institutions obeying rules has improved perceptions of justice and legitimacy of police forces. Evidence shows that applying these principles generates a positive perception among citizens (Sahin et al., 2017; Mazerolle et al., 2013; Elliott et al., 2011; Engel, 2005; Dai et al., 2011). This in turn impacts crime reporting and access to information and increases the police’s effectiveness in preventing and addressing crime (Lum and Nagin, 2016; Boateng, 2016; Bayley, 1998; Kenney, 2013).

3.32 **Evidence about the ability of community policing models to help strengthen bonds between the police and the community is mixed.** The community policing model refers to an organizational, cultural, and decision-making approach to police services in which the community and local police jointly define the
priorities and methods to achieve them (Skolnick and Bayley, 1988). It usually includes three elements: citizen involvement, problem-solving, and decentralization (Skogan, 2005). Various community policing programs have shown promising results, including the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (Skogan et al., 1998) and Community-Oriented Policing (Wilson and Kelling, 1982) in the United States; Safer Commune (Ruprah, 2008) and the Quadrant Plan in Chile; and the National Plan for Community Policing by Quadrants (Mejía et al., 2013) in Colombia. However, recent evidence on the effectiveness of this approach in low- and middle-income countries has been less encouraging. A large-scale experiment in Brazil, Colombia, Liberia, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Uganda showed that community involvement did not increase trust in the police or reduce crime (Blair et al., 2021). This cast doubt about this approach in contexts with limited institutional capacity and the presence of criminal groups that challenge and compete with the police.

3.33 Problem-oriented policing has shown effectiveness in reducing crime. This approach to policing, inspired by community policing, is aimed at solving the community’s most pressing, immediate concerns, while still investigating the underlying causes of crime in the long term (Goldstein, 1979). This model targets areas, crime victims, or people at risk of being victimized. The evidence available, mostly from high-income countries, shows that it is one of the most effective approaches to reduce crime (Karn, 2013; Goldstein, 1990; Weisburd et al., 2010; Taylor, 2011). A recent meta-analysis—which reviewed 34 experimental and quasi-experimental studies in Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom—estimated that, on average, problem-oriented policing reduced crime, disorder, and the sense of insecurity by 34% (Hinkle et al., 2020).

3.34 Technology. The digital and information technologies revolution offers new promising tools to law enforcement institutions. In many cases, evidence of their effectiveness in reducing crime is still rudimentary.

3.35 Evidence of the effectiveness of license plate readers in reducing crime is not conclusive. The first analyses of the implementation of license plate readers showed promising impacts on recovering stolen vehicles and arresting car thieves (Taylor et al., 2011). However, evidence of their impact to reduce these types of crimes is still not conclusive (Koper and Lum, 2019). More studies are needed to determine the most effective use of license plate readers, the best scope and methods for deployment, and the costs and benefits associated with their use (Koper and Lum, 2019).

3.36 Monitored or closed-circuit television security cameras have reduced crime. Evidence shows that this technology helps reduce crime in monitored areas—especially drug, vehicle, and property crimes—without displacing it to other areas. The largest effects were recorded when cameras were installed in parking lots and residential areas (Piza et al., 2019). In Montevideo, Uruguay, the deployment of this type of surveillance reduced crime by 20% in monitored areas and had a spillover effect on nearby unmonitored areas (Munyo et al., 2016). In Medellín, Colombia, the deployment of cameras reduced crime in monitored areas by 24% (Gómez et al., 2021).

3.37 Evidence of the effectiveness of body-worn cameras in reducing crime and improving police-community relations is inconclusive. Body-worn cameras are recording devices that police officers use to collect audio and video when
interacting with the public. An extensive review (Lum et al., 2015) of the use of body-worn cameras did not find enough evidence to confirm this technology’s effectiveness in reducing crime. Another more recent review of the literature (Lum et al., 2020) also did not find robust evidence of the impact of body-worn cameras on police-community relations and the use of force. However, some individual studies did find that body-worn cameras reduce the use of force by the police (Ariel et al., 2015), increase the number of arrests (Katz et al., 2015; Owens et al., 2014), increase the proportion of detections that resulted in a criminal charge (Owens et al., 2014), and decrease the number of citizen complaints against officers (Grossmith et al., 2015). In LAC, the little evidence available is promising: An experimental study in Santa Catarina, Brazil (Barbosa et al., 2021) concluded that body-worn cameras reduced use of force by 61.2%.

3.38 Targeted strategies for crime prevention and control. Because of the complexity and heterogeneous nature of crime, specific strategies need to be implemented to address certain problems.

3.39 Women’s police stations facilitate victim’s access to the judicial-criminal system, although there is no conclusive evidence of their impact on reducing violence. Evidence of the effectiveness of police stations intended to assist victims of violence against women is mixed, probably because of the various approaches, staff training, and resources available in different contexts. Studies in Brazil, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Peru showed that these police stations have helped raise awareness (UN Women, 2011), but that victims have not generally found the type of assistance or guidance needed, and staff training has been inadequate (Jubb et al., 2010). In India, the establishment of women’s police stations increased crimes reported to police by 29% and increased women’s labor supply. This is consistent with women feeling safer because the costs of reporting crime are lower. However, no changes were found with respect to femicide or domestic violence (Amaral et al., 2021).

3.40 The focused deterrence strategy shows promising results in reducing crime connected to overt drug markets. This strategy involves coordinated action among public prosecutors, police forces, social services, and communities, to remain vigilant and inform repeat or previously identified offenders about the potential punishment for participating in illegal activities. At the same time, focused deterrence tries to understand the conditions behind recurring crime problems in a specific location and reach out to the community with social services. The evidence available about the effectiveness of this strategy in reducing crime connected to overt drug markets (Braga et al., 2018; Kennedy and Wong, 2009; Saunders et al., 2016) and among violent groups is promising.

3.41 Human trafficking is a combined crime that has required establishing special units, implementing joint investigations between institutions and countries, and using financial intelligence. Evidence of the effectiveness of these strategies is growing. Joint inspections involving the police, public prosecutors, and labor inspectors have been positive in Finland, Bulgaria, Latvia, and Estonia (Lietonen et al., 2020). Another common response is special anti-human trafficking units to facilitate national and international coordination and implement high standards for case investigation and protection of victims (Gallagher and Holmes, 2008; Gatti, 2013; Meshkovska et al., 2016; Schwarz and Geng, 2018). However, there is still not enough evidence to ensure their effectiveness (Jensen et al., 2020). Joint
investigation teams between countries, which accelerate information exchange and attract funding for interpreters, travel, and lodging (Severns et al., 2020), are also a promising tool to address crime and act as a deterrent. Lastly, conducting proactive financial investigations to follow the money generated by human trafficking is considered essential to combat this crime (Lafont Nicuesta, 2020; Kopp, 2012) by identifying potential victims (Coster van Voorhout, 2020) and gathering probative evidence (Broad, Lord, and Duncan, 2020).

3.42 **Organized crime.** The fight against organized crime requires a broad strategy that includes preventing criminal infiltration, pursuing criminal groups, protecting vulnerable people, and promoting cooperation among institutions (UNODC, 2021). Noteworthy among these tools are dialogues among different sectors of society (public, private, and civilian) (Lum and Nagin, 2016; Kenney, 2013), international cooperation for information exchange and design of joint strategies (Wysocki, 1978), interagency work in the CSJ sector (Hutahaean and Indarti, 2020), a regulatory framework guaranteeing the criminalization of organized crime (Blanco, 2016; Ridgeway et al., 2019), access to information and generation of joint databases (Casanovas et al., 2014), technical training for justice entities (Halai et al., 2021), intervention in the market conditions for illegal goods, and use of financial intelligence.

3.43 **More evidence of the effectiveness of anti-gang units in reducing crime is needed.** Specialized police units that gather and synthesize information on gangs are usually considered a relevant policy for combating organized crime (Decker and Pyrooz, 2015). However, evidence of their effectiveness is limited (Rostami, Melde, and Holgersson, 2014; Katz and Webb, 2006; Katz, 2006; Katz, 2000).

C. **Justice sector institutions**

3.44 **Access to justice services.** Growing evidence suggests that people in vulnerable contexts are more likely to have legal problems, because they are disproportionately exposed to circumstances that can create these problems, or less able to avoid or resolve them (World Justice Project, 2019; OECD, 2019). Unresolved legal problems might unleash combined problems for individuals and their families and communities, potentially impacting access to health care, education, housing, jobs, credit, and social services. By helping to reduce these unresolved conflicts, improved access to justice can have an impact on peaceable coexistence and inclusive growth.

3.45 **The promotion of legal assistance services for vulnerable populations has shown positive effects on the well-being of beneficiaries, protecting their rights and reducing victimization.** There is evidence of the positive impacts of these initiatives in countries with different income levels. In Peru, opening justice centers to provide legal and police services to women increased gender-based crime reporting and decreased domestic violence, femicides, and hospitalizations for mental health problems (Kavanaugh et al., 2019). In Kenya, access to free legal services for two years increased the number of days worked, investment, access to credit, and production volume for farmers (Aberra and Chemin, 2021). In Liberia, offering free mediation and defense services through paralegals for three months increased satisfaction with case outcomes (Sandefur and Siddiqi, 2015). In the United States, a program for people facing eviction provided training and advice to handle the process, increasing the likelihood of retaining
possession of their house and of compensation being paid to those evicted (Greiner et al., 2013).

3.46 **The evidence available on the effectiveness of protective orders—a widely used tool to mitigate violence against women—is promising but should continue being expanded.** A recent systematic review of the literature on the impact of protective orders shows positive, albeit modest, results in reducing domestic violence. However, since the quality of the available studies is limited, further evaluations of the effectiveness of this measure are needed (Dowling et al., 2018).

3.47 **Integrated service centers for justice and mobile courts are innovative options, but the evidence available about their effectiveness and impact is limited.** Various studies have evaluated these initiatives in low- and middle-income countries such as Bangladesh, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Nigeria, finding improved access to justice for vulnerable populations. In Peru, access to formal justice through one-stop service centers decreased the conflicts being resolved through informal mechanisms (Andrade-Ciudad et al., mimeo). However, there is still limited evidence about the impact of these options on effective dispute settlement, acceptance by the community, and other aspects of their implementation (Ewulum, 2019; Hosen and Ferdous, 2014; Maya, 2012; Hardwick, 2013).

3.48 **Justice modernization and digitalization. Judicial institution transformation and reform that focused on improving the judicial branch’s quality, efficiency, speed, and transparency have been shown to benefit productivity and economic development** (Chemin, 2020). For example, in India, simplifying court procedures reduced the number of pending cases, decreased breaches of contract, and increased investment and financing (Chemin, 2012). In Brazil, the establishment of civil courts with simplified, rapid procedures increased entrepreneurship in areas with capital-intensive industries (Lichand and Soares, 2014).

3.49 **Restorative justice.** Restorative justice measures—those aimed at suspending legal proceedings conditioned upon the accused making and fulfilling commitments to repair the harm done to the victim and the community—have shown promising results regarding victim satisfaction, offenders following through on agreed arrangements, and recidivism (Latimer et al., 2005; Strang et al., 2013; Livingstone et al., 2013; Wong et al., 2016). These results vary according to the type of measure, the institutional framework, the problem, and the population addressed.

3.50 **Drug treatment courts have shown positive results in reducing recidivism.** These programs are based on a monitoring, reward, and punishment system in which participants have their charges reduced or dropped if they do not relapse to drug use. Empirical evidence summarized in several meta-analyses agrees that these types of programs effectively impact the recidivism rate, although with some isolated exceptions (Sevigny et al., 2013; Stein et al., 2015; Latimer et al., 2006; Shaffer, 2006).

3.51 **Programs seeking solutions agreed upon through conferences in which victims, perpetrators, and the community participate help reduce recidivism rates.** These conferences are intended to provide all parties the opportunity to discuss the consequences of the crime and agree on the manner in which the
offender will repair the harm caused (for example, with apologies or monetary reparations). The evidence summarized in two meta-analyses concluded that these conferences are associated with fewer repeat convictions or arrests within two years (Sherman et al., 2015) and that their implementation is cost effective (Strang et al., 2013).

3.52 Legal framework and characteristics of sentencing. Imposing harsher sentences has been associated with reduced crime, but evidence about the widespread nature of these results is not conclusive. Effectively applying harsher sentences—through longer sentences or increased probability of arrest—can reduce crime due to the deterrent effect (increasing the expected costs of committing crimes) or because more criminals are incapacitated. The evidence available, mostly from high-income countries, indicates that imposing harsher sentences leads to reduced crime (Chalfin and McCrary, 2017). However, the literature is not conclusive: different authors indicate that the relationship is not necessarily linear (harsher sentences do not always lead to fewer crimes) and that the effects decrease when sanctions are already severe and in the long term (Nagin, 2013; Abrams, 2010; Mueller-Smith, 2015). The type of offender can also influence the results. For example, some studies found no effects for offenders sentenced because of drugs (Green and Winik, 2010) and for juvenile offenders (Lee and McCrary, 2009). In the case of guns, the most recent evidence shows that laws restricting their use decrease levels of violence and homicides (Lee et al., 2017; Doucette et al., 2019; Kaufman et al., 2018; Sabbath et al., 2020; Santaella Tenorio et al., 2016) or have no significant impact (McPhedran, 2016). In Colombia and Brazil, some gun control policies and other mechanisms that discourage their use have reduced homicide and gun crime rates (Cerqueira and de Mello, 2013; Vecino-Ortiz and Guzman Tordecilla, 2019; Aguirre et al., 2009; Villavecnes et al., 2000).

3.53 The impact of criminal system regulatory framework reforms toward an adversarial model with a separate judge and prosecutor should continue being studied. In recent decades, most LAC countries have achieved progress implementing adversarial models with a separate judge and prosecutor for criminal justice, setting aside inquisitorial criminal systems in which the judge is also the prosecutor. In many cases, the effective launch of the new framework still needs to be consolidated (González and Fandiño, 2018). Evidence about the impact of this new framework is limited. A recent study about Colombia’s experience (Zorro-Medina et al., 2020) indicates that the system with a separate judge and prosecutor resulted in some efficiency improvements in the judicial system (e.g., reduced the duration of criminal proceedings) but in turn was associated with an increased number of crimes recorded.

3.54 Alternatives to imprisonment. Alternative measures to imprisonment are policies that—when applied correctly and with suitable populations—can decrease criminal recidivism and help reduce crime rates and prison populations. Nevertheless, the wide variety of alternative measures and the variability of their design and implementation make it difficult to identify specific good practices (Villetaz et al., 2006).

3.55 Electronic monitoring has generally been effective, although some studies show null or negative results. Electronic monitoring is a verification method for alternative sentences to imprisonment, in which an offender wears an ankle
bracelet or electronic device so their location can be verified periodically. Studies in Argentina (Di Tella and Schargrodsky, 2013), Sydney, Australia (Williams and Weatherburn, 2020), France (Henneguelle et al., 2016), and Sweden (Marklund and Holmberg, 2009) show that using this technology has a positive impact on criminal recidivism. Nevertheless, a meta-analysis of 17 studies in the United States and Canada found null results, while some of these studies observed negative results (Belur et al., 2017).

3.56 There are other alternative sentencing methods for which there is less evidence, but which show promising effects in some contexts, the effectiveness of which should continue being evaluated. These initiatives include a temporary driver’s license suspension program in Germany, which lowered by 20% the probability of reoffending within a year (Gehrsitz, 2017).

D. Prison system

3.57 Current prison systems have the double objective of incapacitating criminals and providing them tools to prevent their subsequent involvement in criminal activities. The latter objective presents serious challenges, because of the adverse impacts that incarceration can have on individuals (Durlauf and Nagin, 2011; Steffensmeier and Ulmer, 2005; Sherman, 1993). Evidence shows that some policies and interventions moderate these impacts of imprisonment and contribute to the reintegration of released prisoners. Strengthening the sector’s institutional capacity and infrastructure is essential to effectively implement these interventions.

3.58 Prison infrastructure and management. Incarceration conditions and prison infrastructure quality impact the probability of recidivism after release. Studies from Colombia and Italy show that being assigned to prisons with better conditions (newer, less crowded, with more services) reduced the probability of recidivism in the short and medium term (Tobón, 2020; Drago, Galbiati, and Vertova, 2011). Other analyses indicate that assigning offenders to stricter security protocols than necessary increased recidivism rates after release (Chen and Shapiro, 2007; Gaes and Camp, 2009). In the United Kingdom, a recent study shows that juvenile offenders sent to detention centers focused on rehabilitation had lower recidivism rates than those sent to centers with a strictly punitive focus (Lotti, 2020).

3.59 Rehabilitation and reintegration programs. Rehabilitation and reintegration programs that are designed and implemented properly have the potential to reduce criminal recidivism. The most effective rehabilitation treatments are those based on cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT), education, family therapy, and treatment for sex offenders, according to a review of eight meta-analyses about prison rehabilitation (Lipsey and Cullen, 2007). Vocational education, drug treatment, and job programs also have positive effects (Drake et al., 2009; Visher and Travis, 2012).

3.60 CBT-based programs have shown significant effectiveness in reducing recidivism. The objective of these programs is to teach offenders about the thought processes and choices that precede criminal behavior, to support cognitive skills development and mitigate mindset bias. A meta-analysis of 58 studies shows that these programs reduced the recidivism rate by 25% on average (Lipsey et al., 2007). Another meta-analysis of 14 studies found an
average reduction of 23% in recidivism and 42% after program completion (Henwood et al., 2015).

3.61 **Vocational education programs aimed at promoting workforce reintegration can reduce recidivism and crime.** These programs seek to educate and train people with criminal records, providing them specific knowledge and social skills to achieve better workforce reintegration and prevent criminal recidivism. A meta-analysis of 17 experimental and quasi-experimental studies found that the recidivism rate among participants of these programs is 11 percentage points lower than for nonparticipants (Wilson et al., 2000). Another meta-analysis reached a similar conclusion, finding an average reduction of 13 percentage points in the recidivism rate (Davis et al., 2013).

3.62 **Motivational interviews can encourage change and prevent people from returning to crime.** Motivational interviews seek to transform extrinsic motivation mechanisms (e.g., incentives for good behavior or promoting empathy) into intrinsic motivation, to increase the participation of offenders in social reintegration interventions, increase their willingness to change, and decrease recidivism (McMurran, 2009). Studies in the United States (Clair-Michaud et al., 2015) and New Zealand (Anstiss et al., 2011) found that these interviews reduced the probability of reoffending. In other cases, there were no effects on crime for a high-risk offender group, but their motivation changed significantly (Austin et al., 2011). Motivational interviews were also effective in decreasing domestic violence recidivism (Vigurs et al., 2015).

3.63 **Prison visits have been associated with reduced probability of offenders committing crimes after completing their sentence.** Visits provide prisoners the opportunity to preserve and develop connections with family, friends, and the community. These positive bonds can motivate them to avoid reoffending after being released. A meta-analysis of 16 studies with a quasi-experimental approach identified that prisoners who receive visitors generally have a lower recidivism rate, particularly within a year of their release (Mitchell et al., 2016). Of the studies analyzed, one showed modest negative effects, and three did not find any effects.

E. Governance and coordination

3.64 **Strengthening data analysis. To implement and evaluate citizen security and justice policies, it is essential to share data and reinforce its analysis.** Data analysis is fundamental for all areas of CSJ policy, from criminal investigation to police deployment and legal case monitoring and supervision (Santos, 2014; Heeks and Renken, 2016). The lack of quality and availability of information is a structural obstacle in developing and implementing effective CSJ policies in the region (Mertz, 2014) and evaluating their results (Frühling, 2012; Di Tella and Schargrodsky, 2010). In recent years, many countries have developed computerized systems for case management and incident recording, generating massive databases with detailed information regarding legal cases, crime reporting to police, and emergency calls. However, leveraging of this data is still limited (Ramos and Chen, 2021). The evidence available shows that, for example, preparation of crime analysis is associated with lower rates of violent crimes (Baltaci, 2010), and information exchange among health care institutions, police, and local governments can help reduce crime and its associated financial costs (Florence et al., 2014).
Results-based management programs have shown potential to improve citizen security. Various programs to improve integration between law enforcement entities and local governments, strengthen crime analysis, and implement results-based management models have had promising impacts on some citizen security indicators. There is promising evidence from the region of their potential to help reduce crime. In Minas Gerais, Brazil, the IGESP Integrated Public Security Management Program to improve information-sharing, coordination, and integration between civil and military police reduced violent crimes against property by 23% and improved police response, measured through weapon seizures and case clearance rates (Soares and Viveiros, 2017). In Espírito Santo, Brazil, the “Estado Presente” program applied a management model based on indicators and results and is recognized for a significant decrease in the number of homicides (Silva Neto et al., 2018).

IV. LESSONS LEARNED FROM IDB GROUP EXPERIENCE IN THE CITIZEN SECURITY AND JUSTICE SECTOR

4.1 The lessons learned from the IDB Group’s work in citizen security and justice (CSJ) are based on a sample49 of 14 sovereign-guaranteed operations50 and one IDB Lab operation.51 This section was prepared in coordination with the Bank’s Knowledge and Learning Division (KIC/KLD) and took into consideration the evaluation by its Office of Evaluation and Oversight (OVE) (Fevre et al., 2014). That evaluation made the following recommendations, on which the Bank has been acting: (i) select and focus on a narrower range of interventions; (ii) simplify project design, pace interventions, and enhance the supervision and execution of operations; (iii) update risk analysis tools and strengthen mitigation mechanisms; and (iv) define a knowledge agenda for improving project design and policymaking. The IDB, acting through the CSJ cluster, has been strengthening its operational and analytical work. Some of the noteworthy lessons learned are below, grouped as strategic, technical, and operational lessons.

A. Strategic lessons

4.2 Progress on structural reforms for institutional capacity-building in the CSJ sector makes it possible to provide quality services to citizens. There has been progress in LAC implementing social violence prevention programs with multisector interventions to serve vulnerable populations. Citizen trust and the legitimacy of institutions implementing these programs need to continue being strengthened. Programs for structural institutional changes to improve the quality of CSJ public services through institutional reform have shown promising results. For example, the reform of the Honduras National Police modernized the police training system with changes to the admissions profile and curriculum, academic infrastructure, police professionalization, and technological equipment for criminal

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49 This analysis included reviewing project documents (project completion reports, monitoring reports, loan proposals, technical notes, impact evaluations, etc.) and interviewing project team leaders.

50 The operations analyzed were divided into three groups: (i) projects in execution (4113/OC-AR, 4891/OC-CH, 4871/OC-CR, 4518/BL-HO, 3849/OC-GU, 4400/OC-JA, 4873/OC-PE, 4959/OC-PE, and 3785/OC-UR); (ii) closed projects (2526/OC-CR, 2584/OC-EC, GRT/CF-16251-HO, 1965/OC-TT, 2745/BL-HO, 2534/OC-PE 2770/OC-UR, and 2881/OC-ES); and (iii) recently approved projects, noteworthy because of their design process (5155/OC-BR and 5214/OC-EC).

51 A legaltech solution to protect victims of gender-based violence was analyzed.
This reform also modernized the transparency and integrity system, improving the disciplinary and accountability process. In addition, the reform helped improve the public’s perception of the police and reduced crime. In Uruguay, the Bank helped strengthen the institutional capacity of the National Police through modernization of the curriculum, training, and technological equipment for hot spots policing, which reduced violent robberies by 23% in targeted areas (Chainey et al., 2020).

4.3 **Promoting regional mechanisms for cross-sector dialogue strengthens institutional capacity for project design through knowledge generation and information exchange in the sector.** The IDB’s [Citizen Security and Justice Week](#) has become an annual platform for ministerial dialogue to share knowledge of the sector and identify challenges, progress, and good practices in LAC that can be adapted for other countries, to strengthen the sector’s institutional capacity. A need identified in the region is to promote more training mechanisms such as online courses. This was demonstrated by increased demand for certification through the massive open online course “Leaders in Citizen Security and Justice Management,” which the BIDAcademy has offered since 2019. Police and civilian employees are taking this course to strengthen leaders’ capacities to design, implement, monitor, and evaluate citizen security and justice policies, plans, and programs. More than 20,000 civil servants in the region have received this training.

4.4 **Improving online access to public services for CSJ provides an opportunity to increase coverage and services for citizens in the post-COVID-19 era.** During the lockdown resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic, several LAC countries adopted digital technologies to ensure that people had access to CSJ services. Experience has shown that these technologies have to be adapted, to make them secure and comply with each country’s legal requirements. Technological innovations to improve access to justice in LAC show the need to: (i) further the digital transformation of courts with oral hearings, electronic dockets, and adapted legal frameworks (Villa et al., 2021); (ii) train public servants in digital skills; (iii) integrate change management, as happened on projects with the Office of the Prosecutor General in Guatemala, the prison system in El Salvador, and CSJ institutions in Peru and Colombia; and (iv) promote digital innovation in criminal investigation. For all these, ethical considerations for the appropriate use of digital technologies will be considered.

4.5 **Economic and social inclusion opportunities for vulnerable groups in operations can be promoted by prioritizing strategic partnerships with the private sector.** Through different initiatives, the different IDB Group institutions (IDB, IDB Invest, and IDB Lab) have witnessed the added value of working with the private sector to promote the job placement of people vulnerable to crime and violence, such as former prisoners. For example, in Panama, business sector participation was essential for the rehabilitation and economic reintegration of young people in conflict with the law. In Colombia, the Bank has explored public-private financing for prison infrastructure used for prisoner rehabilitation programs or victim support units. In Guatemala, the private sector helped support the

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52 For example, in Medellin, Colombia, IDB Lab piloted a cellphone app that enables victims of intrafamily violence to record legally valid evidence of undesirable or violent behavior (Ni1+-Gamechanger against gender violence, operation ATN/ME-18292-CO).
economic inclusion of women who are victims of intrafamily violence. In Chile, a partnership between the prison system and the banking sector implemented a pilot project of microloans, seed capital, and job preparation, achieving promising results for the economic and social integration of women in conflict with the law.

4.6 The strengthening of gender and diversity mainstreaming in project design and implementation increases the quality of public services for CSJ in the region. Institutional modernization programs for citizen security and justice have shown improved services to the public in this sector through increased participation of women in police workforces. These programs promote less use of physical force, decrease potential violent confrontations and cases of police brutality, and ensure more relationship-building with the community. For example, as a result of police reform in Honduras, women’s participation in police forces increased by 18 percentage points. In diversity, the need to reinforce positive differentiation in CSJ services was identified, to provide better service to diverse groups. In Guatemala, the public prosecutor’s citizen services offices in indigenous communities strengthened the staff trained to address intrafamily violence by educating them on the customs of these groups and providing interpreters of indigenous languages.

B. Technical lessons

4.7 Continuing to use innovative approaches for crime prevention and social services programs, such as behavioral change interventions, helps prevent current and future violence. Social violence prevention actions have been enriched by evidence generated regionally in recent years. These include innovative interventions that prevent violence through mechanisms to change individual behaviors and community norms to improve coexistence. The Cure Violence program implemented in Trinidad and Tobago showed a decrease of 60% in injuries and shootings in targeted areas (Maguire et al., 2018). The country is using virtual reality tools to reduce the harassment of women and developing projects to increase schooling and success in the labor market and decrease alcohol consumption. All these behaviors help prevent violence. In Jamaica, a positive parenting program with home visits and group sessions with parents considered high-risk achieved a significant reduction in coercive parenting practices (de Simone et al., 2021). In Uruguay, motivational interventions for adolescents and systemic family interventions to avoid a propensity for violent behavior showed positive effects. A study in Mexico quantified the association between young people’s violent behaviors and attitudes and the intrafamily violence to which they were exposed during childhood. This highlighted the importance of providing differentiated attention to women victims of violence and children in early development stages, to avoid the tendency to develop violent behaviors in the future because of exposure to violence at home (Flores et al., 2021).

4.8 Improving information collection and analysis strengthens criminal investigation in CSJ programs. Institutional capacity-building for data collection and analysis of statistical data through information platforms and crime analysis centers improves criminal investigation. In Ecuador, implementation of the DAVID information system strengthened the capacity for case management and criminal data analysis and has become a regional benchmark. In Uruguay, the implementation of a predictive policing tool (PredPol) and mapping of criminal
activity improved the quality of crime analysis and the effectiveness of policing. In El Salvador, the installation of digital infrastructure (fiber-optic network) at the Ministry of Justice and Security improved crime prevention and clearance through the implementation of systems for: (i) urban video surveillance of crimes and offenses in real time; (ii) electronic video surveillance of offenders (electronic bracelets as an alternative to imprisonment); and (iii) a crime analysis unit.

4.9 **Models for the social prevention of violence, rehabilitation, or capacity-building should be designed before developing the infrastructure.** Experience has shown that these types of programs require sequential planning of the intervention model before infrastructure bids are requested. This ensures that spaces are designed based on care needs or services required for the planned prevention, rehabilitation, or training programs, and has shown promising results. For example, the police project in Honduras showed the importance of defining the police curriculum and equipment and technology needed before preparing the police academy’s architectural designs. In Costa Rica, several modern police station models were designed, considering territorial conditions. A new type of infrastructure was also designed: comprehensive care units to implement a rehabilitation model for prisoners that complies with human rights regulations. In Panama, the design for a juvenile detention center considered personalized attention needs for stage-based individual and social development for young people in conflict with the law.

C. **Operational lessons**

4.10 **Promoting operations that include cross-sector collaboration with several IDB Group units helps provide comprehensive solutions.** Designing and implementing operations with other IDB units—including Housing and Urban Development (CSD/HUD), Gender and Diversity (SCL/GDI), Labor Markets (SCL/LMK), and Social Protection and Health (SCL/SPH)—has enabled joint coordination between CSJ and other sectors that serve vulnerable populations, helping to provide a comprehensive response to LAC countries with these programs. In Honduras, a double-booking program (IFD/ICS and CSD/HUD) is contributing to improve quality of life and reduce the incidence of violent crimes in vulnerable neighborhoods. The interventions of CSD/HUD for access to urban infrastructure services complement the IFD/ICS interventions to create safe spaces with access to police services and strengthen the coexistence, empowerment, and economic and social inclusion of young people and women vulnerable to crime.

4.11 **Offering different types of lending instruments makes it possible to adjust to the many disparate challenges, needs, and circumstances of the borrowing member countries.** In the past few decades, investment loans have represented the vast majority of IDB loan operations in the CSJ area. These operations have helped to support countries in medium- and long-term institutional reforms requiring investment in human talent, technology, and infrastructure. In recent years, these loans have been supplemented by other instruments offering features tailored to certain contexts. For example, conditional credit lines for investment projects (CCLIPs) have been used to approach reform and modernization processes systemically and progressively at security and justice institutions (e.g., operations BR-O0011 and CO-O0013) and can provide continuity for long-term institutional capacity-building. Loans based on results
(LBRs) offer a potentially nimble alternative to support meeting specific objectives with institutions that possess adequate institutional capacity. Policy-based loans (PBLs) may be appropriate to support institutional capacity-building, where prior policy and regulatory reforms are necessary, such as to improve access and quality of care for victims of gender-based violence. These instruments are supplemented by nonreimbursable technical cooperation operations (TCs), which are essential for responding to borrowing member countries in a timely way through dialogue support, operation design, management capacity-building, knowledge products, pilot projects, and knowledge transfer.

4.12 Providing technical and financial support to supervise CSJ operations is a critical factor for program startup and implementation. Implementation has demonstrated the need to provide technical support to the execution unit from the outset, so they can quickly become familiar with IDB policies and procedures, particularly for competitive bidding, procurement, and technical specifications for specialized infrastructure. Support from the technical teams of the Operations Financial Management and Procurement Services Office (VPC/FMP) and the Infrastructure and Energy Sector (INE/INE) has helped lessen the likelihood of setbacks and enabled the preparation of infrastructure designs based on international standards. Nonreimbursable technical-cooperation funding is important, to provide strategic advisory support and respond in a timely, efficient manner to governments during project implementation, especially for the design of specialized infrastructure. For example, technical support was needed to design and implement the comprehensive care units for the prisoner rehabilitation model in Costa Rica and the forensic laboratory for the Honduras National Police.

4.13 Improving the institutional capacity of the execution unit is an enabling factor for effective project execution. The capacity of execution units is affected by the lack of technical staff, lack of experience managing loan operations, and high turnover. Experience has demonstrated the need for sound institutional diagnostic assessments, to adjust the scope of the operation and build capacity at the executing agency. This enables more effective responses to operational, financial, and accounting responsibilities, as well as better management of integrity risk with respect to conflicts of interest, verification of information submitted by bidders for competitive bidding processes, and execution of works. Capacity-building for operational and financial planning of projects has improved their implementation and achievement of results.

V. LINES OF ACTION TO GUIDE THE IDB GROUP’S WORK IN THE CITIZEN SECURITY AND JUSTICE SECTOR

5.1 This sector framework document (SFD) is intended to guide the work of the IDB Group in the area of citizen security and justice (CSJ) with the objective of reducing crime and violence and, therefore, promoting social and economic well-being and guaranteeing the rule of law and good governance in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). Based on the diagnostic assessment (Section II), the evidence (Section III), and the lessons learned (Section IV)—which, in turn, are
driven by the Bank’s operational framework in the sector\textsuperscript{53} and the evaluations by
the Office of Evaluation and Oversight (OVE)—five lines of action are proposed.

5.2 These lines of action focus on two large areas: first, implementation of prevention
and social service measures targeting vulnerable groups, which deter crime and
violence through personal, social, and economic capacity-building; second,
institutional capacity-building in the CSJ sector with emphasis on public
management, digitalization and information, and transparency and integrity, to
effectively implement specific responses to local problems. The lines of action
include programs and policies on which the IDB Group can work together with the
countries of the region to address the structural causes of crime and violence in
LAC, as well as quick actions for timely, effective, and legitimate responses to
challenging situations.\textsuperscript{54}

5.3 In each line of action, knowledge and dissemination priorities are also proposed
to: (i) obtain more precise, disaggregated diagnostic assessments on types of
violence at the country level, for more targeted policy-making; (ii) increase
evidence and information available for the design, targeting, contextualization,
monitoring, and evaluation of public policies and programs; (iii) improve the
availability and accessibility of evidence of the effectiveness of public policies and
programs; (iv) identify opportunities to learn and improve the functioning of public
policies and institutions; and (v) foster exchange and dialogue about public
policies among policy-makers, academia, civil society, etc.

A. Line of action 1. Deliver crime and violence prevention and social services
with an emphasis on vulnerable populations.

5.4 Targeting the populations most vulnerable to becoming victims or perpetrators of
crime and violence, the IDB Group will support countries in developing
interventions to:\textsuperscript{55} (i) improve, in a targeted, selective manner, the access, quality,
effectiveness, and coverage of programs to prevent or respond to violence by
addressing specific risk factors; (ii) promote the testing and development of
quality service models that are evidence-based and specific according to risk
levels; and (iii) improve the monitoring and supervision of beneficiaries.

5.5 Preventing violence, mistreatment, and abuse of children and adolescents.
Interventions for parents and caregivers will focus on developing parenting skills
and positive child-rearing practices and will include home visits and group sessions.
In the school environment, programs will seek to prevent violence in schools by
targeting students, teachers, parents, and guardians, including perpetrators and
passive observers; prevent sexual violence and promote its reporting; and improve
self-defense skills among children and adolescents. At the community level,

\textsuperscript{53} Operational Guidelines for Program Design and Execution in the Area of Civic Coexistence and Public
Safety (document GN-2535-1), IDB (2012); Developing and Evaluating Citizen Security Programs in Latin
America, Technical Note IDB-TN-436.

\textsuperscript{54} These responses include many of the actions related to standardizing procedures, protocols, and models
for police management and deployment (paragraph 5.12), supporting the digitalization of mission-critical
justice processes (paragraph 5.16), and promoting exchange and dialogue on public policies between
policy-makers, academia, and civil society. To be sustainable and effective, these actions, in turn, require
work on institutional capacity-building of the CSJ sector.

\textsuperscript{55} These actions complement prevention actions in other sector framework documents (see Table 1).
strategies and campaigns will focus on protecting the well-being of children and adolescents and transforming social norms about punishment and abuse.

5.6 **Preventing youth violence.** The development of young people’s sociocognitive, socioemotional, and psychological skills will be promoted through extracurricular services programs, mentoring, and tutoring for peaceful conflict resolution and positive use of free time. This will be coupled with job education and training and support for production-oriented enterprises to contribute to young people’s social and job placement in partnership with the private sector. At the community level, work will focus on raising awareness and preventing human trafficking, cyberviolence and cyberbullying, and other emerging or high-impact crimes, with special emphasis on young migrants and young people from diverse groups.

5.7 **Preventing gender-based violence.** Work will focus on economically empowering women to prevent intrafamily and intimate partner violence, including using private sector mechanisms as instruments for financing and advising women-led or women-owned businesses.\(^5\) Actions will also be promoted that contribute to transforming social and cultural norms in the community, such as models of nonviolent masculinities. This includes actions to prevent gender-based violence in physical public spaces and virtual spaces in collaboration with the private sector.

5.8 **Strengthening the institutional capacity of the CSJ sector and the private sector to prevent violence and revictimization of vulnerable populations.** The IDB Group will support countries in: (i) strengthening information, service, reporting, and support channels (telephone-based or virtual); (ii) providing comprehensive medical, judicial, police, and psychological services (integrated service centers); (iii) providing support and information on court processes and victim rights, as well as protection mechanisms for victims, witnesses, and family members; (iv) strengthening coordination and referrals from CSJ institutions to providers of prevention, care, protection, and reintegration services for victims (e.g., shelter, legal assistance, health care, employment, etc.); and (v) promoting urban development interventions to create safe spaces. Work will also focus on building the private sector’s capacity to identify, prevent, and mitigate risks of gender-based violence, especially those risks associated with major projects, such as human trafficking (sensitive management social risks and impacts).

5.9 **Knowledge and dissemination gaps:** (i) diagnostic assessments of victimization and risk factors (emphasizing gender-based violence, violence against children and adolescents, and combined or emerging crimes); (ii) factors and impacts of exposure to crime and violence; (iii) impact of social prevention programs; and (iv) promotion and implementation of regional and subregional dialogues for social prevention with public sector, private sector and civil society organization stakeholders.

**B. Line of action 2. Strengthen the effectiveness and legitimacy of police forces to prevent, address, and solve crime.**

5.10 For this line of action, the IDB Group will focus on strengthening the institutional capacity of police in terms of effectiveness, equitable access, and community

\(^5\) This includes creating financial products (e.g., gender bonds and loans to financial institutions) and nonfinancial products (e.g., training and business networks), expanding access to markets for businesswomen, and supporting the creation of market standards to classify social investments more easily.
relationship-building in ways that help prevent, address, and control crime, and improve judicial investigation and citizen trust.

5.11 **Strengthening the institutional capacity of police.** Beginning in the area of public management, improvements will be made in the profile of police officers, personnel selection, initial and ongoing training (with a gender and vulnerable populations lens), career development, police wellness programs (including mental health), strategic planning, and performance definition and monitoring. Specialization to prevent, investigate, and control high-impact, combined, and emerging crimes (e.g., gender-based violence, crimes against children and adolescents, human trafficking, environmental crime, and cybercrime) will also be strengthened, along with training to reinforce crime scene processing, particularly for evidence collection and preservation, and protecting the rights of the people involved. In the area of transparency and integrity, it is essential to improve the mechanisms for internal control, transparency, accountability, and police communication with citizens, in order to enhance effectiveness and legitimacy and ensure respect for human rights. In the area of digitalization and information, necessary measures include adoption of digital tools for effective institutional and operational management (e.g., integrated information systems and cybersecurity training) and improvement of police statistics.

5.12 **Standardizing procedures, protocols, and models for police management and deployment.** Standardized protocols to support victims and aggressors will be developed and continuously updated. Evidence-based police management and deployment models will be designed and introduced, including relationship-building with the community (and civil society organizations), procedural justice, and use of information, while addressing gender and diversity considerations. Mechanisms will be promoted for coordination and information exchange between the police and public prosecutors during criminal investigations, particularly for combined crimes (such as human trafficking), emerging crimes (cybercrimes), and crimes involving vulnerable populations (children and adolescents). The physical infrastructure of police stations will be developed or improved to provide safe, quality, welcoming services that avoid revictimization. The infrastructure and equipment of criminal investigation laboratories should also be improved.

5.13 **Knowledge and dissemination gaps:** (i) diagnostic assessments of the characteristics and capacity of police institutions and policies; (ii) factors associated with the effectiveness and legitimacy of police (emphasizing human resource management); (iii) impact and case studies on police programs and policies (patrolling, community relationship-building, technology); and (iv) promotion and implementation of regional and subregional dialogues on citizen security policies with public sector, private sector and civil society organization stakeholders.

C. **Line of action 3. Strengthen the effectiveness of justice sector institutions for efficient, coordinated, transparent, and timely case investigation and resolution.**

5.14 The IDB Group will seek to strengthen access to, and efficient management and administration of, justice services provided by stakeholders all along the justice chain (public prosecutors, attorneys-general, and the judicial branch), considering the needs of vulnerable populations, and improve the effectiveness of these justice services (criminal, civil, and commercial).
5.15 **Strengthening the institutional capacity of judicial personnel.** In the area of public management, initiatives will strengthen selection processes, career development, and training for judges and judicial personnel with a gender and diversity lens. In the area of training, the emphasis will be on enhancing the investigative capabilities of public prosecutors, including handling evidence and preparing case files for high-impact, combined, and emerging crimes (e.g., gender-based violence, crimes against children and adolescents, human trafficking, environmental crime, and cybercrime), as well as providing computer training to judicial employees for technology adoption, specialization, and career development. Consideration will also be given to putting systems in place for the protection (safety) and self-care (mental health) of prosecutors and judges working on combined and high-impact cases. In the area of transparency and integrity, it will be necessary to strengthen the mechanisms for internal control, transparency, and accountability, in order to enhance effectiveness and legitimacy and ensure respect for human rights.

5.16 **Achieving progress in justice digitalization processes.** To accelerate the digitalization of justice, closer coordination will be necessary among the different levels of government, along with the development of change management. In addition, technology, computer, and training departments will need to be strengthened to support judicial employees in transitioning to the virtual delivery of judicial services. The simplification and automation of electronic judicial processes and interoperability among the different judicial institutions will also be promoted, along with development of integrated information management systems for case management, including cybersecurity training and improvement of judicial statistics (including smart big data observatories).

5.17 **Promoting access to justice with emphasis on the most vulnerable populations.** The supply of, and access to, basic justice services for victims will be increased by developing integrated justice centers in vulnerable areas, promoting models to ease congestion in the justice system such as restorative justice, mediation, and alternative dispute settlement, and establishing or strengthening specialized public prosecutors and courts (focused on gender-based violence, human trafficking, etc.). The development or adaptation of adequate physical infrastructure for courts will also be promoted for safe, quality facilities that are welcoming and avoid revictimization, especially of the most vulnerable. Access to justice for persons in conflict with the law will include actions to support pretrial services in criminal cases through risk analysis, assessment of individual needs, and specific protocols for pretrial detention. It will also include rationalizing the use of pretrial detention and raising awareness of the effectiveness of noncustodial measures in criminal cases using methods to prevent and punish violations. Lastly, cooperation among countries will be sought for cases involving transnational organized crime, with initiatives such as joint investigation teams.

5.18 **Knowledge and dissemination gaps:** (i) diagnostic assessments of characteristics, trust, and legitimacy of justice policies and institutions; (ii) factors associated with the effectiveness and legitimacy of justice institutions (emphasizing access to justice services and judicial careers); (iii) impact and case studies on justice programs and policies (emphasizing programs for modernization and digitalization, alternative dispute settlement, and alternative measures); (iv) analysis of the regulatory framework and development of a legal map for the coverage of justice digitalization processes; (v) diagnostic
assessments of priority court proceedings and key actions (with emphasis on judicial academies) in justice digitalization processes; and (iv) promotion and implementation of regional and subregional dialogues for justice with public sector, private sector and civil society organization stakeholders.

D. Line of action 4. Strengthen the effectiveness of penitentiary institutions for rehabilitation and reintegration of persons in conflict with the law.

5.19 The IDB Group will work to contribute to the social and economic reintegration and rehabilitation of persons in conflict with the law, based on their specific needs related to race, ethnicity, disability status, and sexual orientation and gender identity.

5.20 Strengthening the institutional capacity of the prison system. In the area of public management, work will be done to improve selection processes, career development, training, incentives, benefits, and professionalization of penitentiary personnel. This will be complemented by strengthening prison management, based on the crime risk levels and specific needs of prisoners. Digitalization and information systems will contribute to the confidential handling of files and generation of reliable, timely prison statistics. In the area of transparency, the internal control and accountability mechanisms will be strengthened, in order to enhance effectiveness and legitimacy and ensure respect for human rights.

5.21 Promoting the social and economic reintegration and rehabilitation of persons in conflict with the law. The IDB Group will support rehabilitation and reintegration programs, combining academic leveling, socioemotional support, job training, and promotion of entrepreneurship and financial inclusion to prevent recidivism, in partnership with the private sector. Initiatives will be promoted to ensure prisoners stay in touch with their families and have adequate representation and legal defense. Evidence-based rehabilitation treatments such as CBT, family therapy, treatment for sex offenders, drug treatment, and motivational interviewing will be implemented. Support will be provided to build or adapt prison facilities so that they are safe and secure, humane, and contribute to rehabilitation and reintegration processes.57

5.22 Knowledge and dissemination gaps: (i) diagnostic assessments of the characteristics and capacity of prison and social reintegration policies and institutions; (ii) factors associated with the effectiveness and legitimacy of prison institutions and reintegration programs (emphasizing prison infrastructure and management, regulatory framework, and human resources); (iii) impact and case studies of prison and social reintegration programs and policies; and (iv) promotion and implementation of regional and subregional dialogues on prison and social reintegration policies with public sector, private sector and civil society organization stakeholders.

E. Line of action 5. Strengthen citizen security and justice governance, including the regulatory framework, coordination, and management.

5.23 The IDB Group will help strengthen the planning, design, management, execution, and evaluation of policies, plans, and programs between CSJ apex agencies at different government levels.

5.24 **Strengthening the institutional capacity of CSJ apex agencies and the private sector.** Citizen security and justice laws, regulations, and rules will be updated and strengthened based on international standards and guaranteeing ethical considerations for the appropriate use of digital technologies. In the area of public management, CSJ apex agencies will receive support for training and modernization of planning, design, management, monitoring, and evaluation of integrated citizen security and justice policies, plans, and programs. Channels will be established for horizontal coordination between CSJ apex agencies and vertical coordination between the national and subnational levels, and mechanisms will be strengthened for collaboration and identification of synergies with the private sector for the mobilization of resources, advisory services, the transfer of technical knowledge, the provision of information for the identification and prioritization of problems, and the implementation of programs. For digitalization and information, the use of technology tools will be promoted to support the design, monitoring, and evaluation of evidence-based CSJ policies, plans, and programs. In the area of transparency and integrity, initiatives will promote communication and access to information on the sector, accountability to citizens, and participation of civil society and the private sector. Work with the private sector will foster corporate governance practices and standards to prevent crime and promote integrity, transparency, justice, and ethical behavior among companies. In the area of digitalization and information, the use of technology tools will be promoted to support the design, monitoring, and evaluation of CSJ policies, plans, and programs.

5.25 **Knowledge and dissemination gaps:** (i) administrative data and indicators for targeting, monitoring, and evaluation of CSJ sector policies and programs; (ii) training on CSJ management for national and subnational authorities and counterparts; (iii) systematic documentation of evidence on citizen security and justice for LAC (CSJ Evidence Platform) and policy design and implementation platforms (Safe Cities Platform); (iv) methodologies and tools for integral and participatory analysis of CSJ; (v) regional dialogues on CSJ policies; and (vi) knowledge dissemination through experts (South-South and North-South cooperation, public and private sectors).
ANNEX. FIGURES AND TABLES

A. Figures

Figure 1. Intentional homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants (1990-2018)

Note: Any comparisons between data from different countries should be made carefully, because of the differences in the legal definitions of crimes from country to country, crime counting and recording methods, and data reporting rates.
c. Annual change

Source: Prepared by the authors based on UNODC data.
Figure 2. Aggravated assault rate per 100,000 inhabitants (2003-2018)

[Return to main text]

a. Period mean (regions)

b. Period mean (countries)
c. Annual change

Source: Prepared by the authors based on UNODC data.
Figure 3. Robbery rate per 100,000 inhabitants (2010-2017)

a. Period mean (regions)

b. Period mean (countries)
c. Annual change

Source: Prepared by the authors based on UNODC data.
Figure 4. Total sexual violence rate per 100,000 inhabitants (2004-2017)

[Return to main text]

a. Period mean (regions)

b. Period mean (countries)
c. Annual change

Source: Prepared by the authors based on UNODC data.
Figure 5. Crime victimization in the LAC region and by subregions (2010-2018/2019)


Figure 6. Cost of crime by region (2018)

Prepared by the authors based on IDB data (2017).
Figure 7. Cost of crime by country (2018)

[Return to main text]

Prepared by the authors based on IDB data (2017).

Figure 8. Trending perceptions of the importance of crime and unemployment issues in Latin America (1995-2020)

[Return to main text]

Source: Latinobarómetro (1995-2020)

Note: The figure indicates the percentage of people who considered crime and unemployment as the most significant problem in their country. Includes 18 countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
Figure 9. Trending percentage of people who trust the judicial branch and the police in Latin America (1995-2020)

Source: Latinobarómetro (1995-2020)

Note: Includes 18 countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
Figure 10. Intentional homicide rate in LAC subregions per 100,000 inhabitants (1990-2018)

[a. Period mean]

Source: Prepared by the authors based on UNODC data.

[b. Annual change]
Figure 11. Intentional homicide rate in selected countries per 100,000 inhabitants (1990-2018): Caribbean subregion

[Return to main text]

\[\text{a. Period mean}\]

\[\begin{array}{cccccc}
\text{Jamaica} & \text{Trinidad y Tobago} & \text{Bahamas} & \text{Guyana} & \text{Surinam} & \text{Barbados} \\
40.8 & 28.3 & 22.0 & 16.7 & 9.8 & 9.0 \\
\end{array}\]

\[\text{Source: Prepared by the authors based on UNODC data.}\]

\[\text{b. Annual change}\]

\[\text{Source: Prepared by the authors based on UNODC data.}\]
Figure 12. Intentional homicide rate in selected countries per 100,000 inhabitants (1990-2018): South America subregion

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a. Period mean

b. Annual change, selected countries

Source: Prepared by the authors based on UNODC data.
Figure 13. Intentional homicide rate in selected countries per 100,000 inhabitants (1990-2018):
Central America subregion

[Return to main text]

a. Period mean

b. Annual change, selected countries

Source: Prepared by the authors based on UNODC data.
Figure 14. Murder victims per 100,000 inhabitants, by LAC country (2018 or most recent year)

Source: Prepared by the authors based on UNODC data.
Figure 15. Intentional homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants, disaggregated by gender (1990-2018)

a. Period mean

![Bar chart showing intentional homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants by gender for the Americas and South Asia, with bars indicating mean rates.]

- América Latina y el Caribe: Mujeres = 4.3, Hombres = 38.7
- Asia Meridional: Mujeres = 2.1, Hombres = 5.7

b. Annual change, rate of female homicides per 100,000 female inhabitants

![Line chart showing annual changes in the rate of female homicides per 100,000 female inhabitants for the Americas and the world, with data points from 1993 to 2018.]

- América Latina y el Caribe: Average annual change
- Mundo: Average annual change
c. Annual change, rate of male homicides per 100,000 male inhabitants

Source: Prepared by the authors based on UNODC data.
Figure 16. Intentional homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants, disaggregated by gender and age (1990-2018)

a. Period mean: women

b. Period mean: men

Source: Prepared by the authors based on UNODC data.
Figure 17. Percentage of people identifying organized crime as the biggest threat to their safety (average 2012, 2014, and 2019)

Source: Prepared by the authors based on LAPOP data for 2010-2018/2019.
Image 1. Types of cyberviolence

**Image Description**

- **Cyberharassment**
  - Defamation and other damage to reputation
  - Cyberbullying
  - Threats of violence, including sexual violence
  - Coercion
  - Insults or threats
  - Incitement to violence
  - Revenge porn
  - Incitement to suicide or self-harm
  - Etc.

- **Cybercrime**
  - Illegal access
  - Illegal interception
  - Data interference
  - System interference
  - Computer-related forgery
  - Computer-related fraud
  - Child pornography

- **ICT-related violations of privacy**
  - Computer intrusions
  - Taking, sharing, manipulation of data or images, including intimate data
  - Sextortion
  - Stalking
  - Identity theft
  - Doxing (collect and publish personal data)
  - Impersonation
  - Etc.

- **ICT-related hate crime**
  - Against groups based on race
  - Ethnicity
  - Religion
  - Gender
  - Sexual orientation
  - Disability
  - Etc.

- **ICT-related direct threats or actual physical violence**
  - Murder
  - Kidnapping
  - Sexual violence
  - Rape
  - Torture
  - Extortion
  - Blackmail
  - Swatting
  - Incitement to violence
  - Transmissions that themselves cause injuries
  - Attacks on critical infrastructure, cars, or medical devices
  - Etc.

- **Online sexual exploitation and sexual abuse of children**
  - Sexual abuse
  - Child prostitution
  - Child pornography
  - Corruption of minors
  - Solicitation of minors for sexual purposes
  - Sexual abuse via livestreaming
  - Etc.

Source: Council of Europe (2018).
Figure 18. Percentage of murder victims who are foreigners, LAC (2013-2016)

Source: Prepared by the authors based on UNODC data.
Note: The eight countries that report this data are Belize, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Mexico, and Panama.

Figure 19. Index of perception of reliability of police services (range 1-7, 7 is best) (2007-2019)

a. Period mean
b. Annual change

![Graph showing annual change in police officers per 100,000 inhabitants (2003-2017)](attachment:image)

Source: Prepared by the authors based on WEF and World Bank data.

**Figure 20. Rate of police officers per 100,000 inhabitants (2003-2017)**

[Return to main text]

a. Period mean

![Graph showing period mean for police officers per 100,000 inhabitants by region](attachment:image)
b. Annual change

Figure 21. Rate of judges or magistrates per 100,000 inhabitants (2003-2018)

Source: Prepared by the authors based on UNODC data.

a. Period mean
b. Annual change

Figure 22. Rate of inmates per 100,000 inhabitants, by world regions (2021 or most recent year)

Source: Prepared by the authors based on UNODC data.

Source: Prepared by the authors with World Prison Brief data.
Figure 23. Prison occupancy percentage for LAC countries
(2020 or latest year available)

Source: Prepared by the authors with World Prison Brief data.
B. Tables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Citizen Security and Justice SFD</th>
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<th>Thematic alignment</th>
<th>Detail in related SFD</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Early Childhood Development (document GN-2966-2)</td>
<td>Services for children and adolescent victims of violence</td>
<td><strong>Paragraph 2.34:</strong> Child protection services focus on caring for children who have been victims of abuse, abandonment, or neglect, or who lack a family environment capable of ensuring their protection. The care provided through these services includes children who are wards of the state: orphans, children whose parents are incarcerated, or child victims of domestic violence who have been separated from their family. The data regarding the frequency of use of these services in LAC is scant, and there is a recognition that existing figures are approximations.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Skills Development (document GN-3012-3)</td>
<td>Interventions and policies promoting the development of cognitive, language, motor, and socioemotional skills</td>
<td><strong>Paragraph 2.22:</strong> The home is where children live for most of their first five years, yet this environment does not always offer all of the stimulation and learning opportunities required for healthy development (resources, time, quality interactions). This is most frequently the case in poor households exposed to conditions of risk, stress, or violence, or in which the parents have low education levels. <strong>Paragraph 3.21:</strong> Despite the prevalence of violence in the home, there is little evidence in LAC regarding the effectiveness of family support programs in preventing this. Intimate partner violence and child maltreatment in the family are intimately related: both tend to coexist in the same home, and exposure to maltreatment in childhood is a predictor of violence in adulthood. <strong>Paragraph 2.29:</strong> Family support programs aim to improve families’ parenting practices and increase the frequency and quality of stimulation and interaction that children receive in their homes. These interventions seek to alter the behavior of parents and caregivers, focusing on play and psychosocial stimulation while also frequently addressing issues such as discipline, safety, hygiene, and feeding. <strong>Paragraph 3.2:</strong> Early childhood services are particularly important for children from disadvantaged families.</td>
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The Citizen Security and Justice Sector Framework Document is aligned with the following SFDs:
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<tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>Challenge of acquiring and certifying skills faced by population groups who have long been excluded or are lagging behind</td>
<td>Paragraph 2.6: Developmental gaps observed during infancy persist through school and are magnified as skills gaps during the years of young adulthood and adulthood. Special emphasis must be placed on developing the foundational skills that allow children to continue learning, such as reading and math. And there are several specific challenges to consider, including those of young people who are not in school and do not have the skills to successfully move on to further studies or work; of adults who do not have the skills or have not certified their skills to succeed in the labor market; and of vulnerable populations (including indigenous, rural, and low socioeconomic status populations; Afro-descendants; persons with disabilities; and migrants).</td>
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<td>Relationship between dropping out of school and risky behaviors</td>
<td>Paragraph 2.18: Young people are particularly susceptible to engaging in certain risky behaviors that could affect their education, including crime and violence. Risky behaviors tend to be prevalent among adolescents, increasing their probability of dropping out of school. Furthermore, young people may use substances such as alcohol, tobacco, and illegal drugs, which affects not only their education but also imposes additional costs to society (Cunningham et al., 2008). Homicide rates in LAC are higher among men between 15 and 29 years old compared to other age groups (UNDOC, 2017).</td>
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<td>Longer school days and violence prevention</td>
<td>Paragraph 3.8: Extending school days could have other benefits, such as freeing time for parents to work for more hours, or mitigating the negative impacts of students being exposed to risks.</td>
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<td>School dropout</td>
<td>Paragraph 3.14: On the individual and family side, effective interventions to decrease dropout are those that decrease the barriers to attend school. Paragraph 3.15: On the community and school side, effective interventions to decrease dropout include detecting early the risks of dropout, providing a safe school environment, and flexible offerings.</td>
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<td>Skills development and employability for young people</td>
<td>Paragraph 3.23: Aligning skills development to a country’s growth strategy and the demands of productive sectors improves the relevance of the skills being developed. To properly align the supply and demand of skills, it is important to involve industries and other social partners in the identification of skills needed, curricula design, and provision of learning. Paragraph 3.26: Training programs that place young people in jobs have had positive results in LAC. Impact evaluations in the region show that the effects are maintained in the long run. One possible explanation is that most of the programs evaluated in the region have incorporated some of the elements the literature considers successful: participation of private suppliers, demand-driven programs, a significant guidance and/or labor intermediation component, a strong emphasis on on-the-job training, and financial incentives for employers and beneficiaries.</td>
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<td>Access to relevant, high-quality learning opportunities</td>
<td>Line of action 1: Ensure access to high-quality and relevant learning opportunities throughout life.</td>
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<td>Quality and relevance of learning activities</td>
<td>Line of action 2: Strengthen quality and relevance assurance mechanisms.</td>
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<td>Gender and Diversity (document GN-2800-8)</td>
<td>Reduce the prevalence of violence against women and children and adolescents</td>
<td><strong>Paragraph 2.39:</strong> A number of countries in the region have developed care guidelines or protocols in the health sector that support a cross-sector response to violence against women; in most, however, there is no robust evidence as to their effectiveness.</td>
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<td>Decrease violence against women and children and adolescents through programs for men</td>
<td><strong>Paragraph 2.42:</strong> Although women and girls were the original focus of prevention interventions, the programs have also recently begun to target men and boys, though they currently only measure changes in attitude rather than behavior. Prevention interventions seek to mobilize the community to reduce violence at the population level through changes in social norms and practices related to gender roles and behaviors.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Prevent intrafamily violence</td>
<td><strong>Paragraph 2.44:</strong> Parenting programs have been identified as promising strategies for preventing children's exposure to parental violence, preventing intergenerational transmission, and reducing intimate partner violence.</td>
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<td>Prevalence of violence against women</td>
<td><strong>Paragraph 3.26:</strong> Violence against women is widespread. One in every three women in the world experiences physical and/or sexual violence at some point in her life. Intimate partner violence is one of the most common manifestations of gender violence. Worldwide, around 26% of women who have been married or in union have been the victims of intimate partner violence.</td>
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<td>Femicides</td>
<td><strong>Paragraph 3.28:</strong> Latin America and the Caribbean has high rates of femicide, defined as homicides of women aged 15 and older who are killed on account of their gender (Gender Equality Observatory for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2017). According to ECLAC data, 14 of the 25 countries with the highest rates of femicide in the world are in LAC: 12 women die every day in the region from this type of crime. The figures range widely, from 0.4 per 100,000 people in Chile to 13.3 per 100,000 in Honduras (ECLAC Data, 2017). In recent years, 16 of the region's countries have passed laws defining femicide as a crime, yet comparable data on this type of crime is quite poor.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Reduce the prevalence of violence against women and children and adolescents</td>
<td><strong>Paragraph 2.39:</strong> Another policy frequently used to tackle violence against women has been the creation of specialized police stations for women and children (present in 13 LAC countries). There is evidence of a positive association between this policy and increased crime reporting, but its ultimate effectiveness in reducing the recurrence of violence in the lives of women using the stations is unknown.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Discrimination and violence against vulnerable populations</td>
<td><strong>Paragraph 3.61:</strong> Persons with disabilities and LGBTI populations are more vulnerable to discrimination and social exclusion due to their identity differences. They are likely to experience violence, bullying, harassment, and discrimination in the provision of services and access to opportunities, including in health, education, work, and justice.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen Security and Justice SFD</td>
<td>Related SFD</td>
<td>Thematic alignment</td>
<td>Detail in related SFD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevent violence against women in CSJ services</td>
<td>Paragraph 4.13: The Bank has made a significant effort to integrate the prevention of violence against women and care for female survivors into its citizen security operations. The lines of action have been as follows: (i) programs to support women victims of violence by providing comprehensive services (medical, legal, police, and psychological, and economic empowerment); (ii) programs to promote women’s economic empowerment; (iii) activities to prevent violence against women in public spaces (streets, public transportation, schools, and surrounding areas); (iv) measures to promote mobile victim support units in communities to facilitate the reporting of violence; and (v) training actions targeting members of the police, with emphasis on content that influences response to gender, intrafamily violence, and domestic abuse.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job training programs for young people</td>
<td>Paragraph 2.34: Young people in LAC experience worse labor market outcomes than prime age adults. This is a worldwide phenomenon that, to some extent, is explained by more frequent turnover early in the life cycle. Evidence shows that, just like in every other region, young people in LAC spend more time searching for jobs that match their preferences than do older workers (Cunningham, 2016). However, youth in LAC also face disadvantages due to regulations that disproportionately affect them, skills deficiencies, and a misalignment between their aspirations and labor market realities.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employability</td>
<td>Challenge 4: Reduce the constraints faced by some population groups to access good employment opportunities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime prevention through environmental design</td>
<td>Paragraph 3.13: Spatial characteristics can influence levels of local violence. Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) aims to enhance the safety of public spaces by focusing on infrastructure and urban design rather than the perpetrators of the crime (Moser and McIlwaine, 2006).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender-focused safety policies and urban planning</td>
<td>Paragraph 4.5: Gender-focused urban planning benefits all residents. In Curitiba, Brazil, and in Guyana, women-led safety audits and the application of a gender-sensitive walking index helped identify barriers to mobility and design elements that contributed to increase perception of safety among women and girls, and thus increased residents' use of public spaces.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen Security and Justice SFD</td>
<td>Related SFD</td>
<td>Thematic alignment</td>
<td>Detail in related SFD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime prevention through environmental design</td>
<td>Paragraph 3.13: Spatial characteristics can influence levels of local violence. Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) aims to enhance the safety of public spaces by focusing on infrastructure and urban design rather than the perpetrators of the crime (Moser and McIlwaine, 2006).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Revitalization of degraded urban areas | Paragraph 2.7: Social exclusion in cities is perpetuated and reinforced by the persistence of informal and underserved neighborhoods, limited access to adequate housing, and unsafe and inaccessible public space. The specific dynamics of each of these spatial configurations is as follows:  
  a. Persistence of underserved and informal neighborhoods  
  b. Insufficient provision of safe public spaces for all |  |
<p>| Recovery of public spaces | Paragraph 3.14: Case studies indicate that increasing access to safe public spaces can generate an array of local public benefits. Increasing the safety of public spaces leads to higher use, which renders important benefits to population health (Ward Thompson, Roe, Aspinall et al., 2012). |  |
| Social inequality |  |  |
| Crime prevention through environmental design | Paragraph 3.13: Spatial characteristics can influence levels of local violence. Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) aims to enhance the safety of public spaces by focusing on infrastructure and urban design rather than the perpetrators of the crime (Moser and McIlwaine, 2006). |  |
| Social Protection and Poverty (document GN-2784-12) | Social protests and disruption of public security | Paragraph 2.6: Income inequality is just one of the many facets of structural social exclusion of LAC cities. Social exclusion stems from persistent unequal power relationships across economic, political, social, and cultural dimensions, which, in turn, results in unequal access to urban rights, opportunities, and resources. Social exclusion operates on different levels, including the neighborhood level (e.g., access to basic services and healthy environments) and the household level (e.g., access to housing and political participation). |  |
| Line of action 2: Strengthen the effectiveness and legitimacy of police forces to prevent, address, and solve crime. | Housing and Urban Development (document GN-2732-11) | Technology | Paragraph 3.38: Information and communications technology (ICT) is now essential to municipal capabilities. Using ICT to enable Smart City approaches, including cloud services, advanced analytics for Big Data, Blockchain, 5G, and others, can accelerate the quality of services provided by municipalities, such as emergency services and crime management (IDB, 2019b). In Madrid, the creation of an integrated center for emergencies reduced response times by 36% (CISEM, 2020). Similarly, Rio de Janeiro’s Operation Center, which integrated more than 30 city departments, improved emergency response times by 30% (Bouskela, Casseb, Bassi et al., 2016). |
| Environment and Biodiversity (document GN-2827-8) | Reinforce investigations of combined crimes | Paragraph 3.10: Biodiversity and terrestrial and marine ecosystems are severely threatened with high rates of loss and degradation. |  |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Citizen Security and Justice SFD</th>
<th>Related SFD</th>
<th>Thematic alignment</th>
<th>Detail in related SFD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Line of action 3:</strong> Strengthen the effectiveness of justice sector institutions for efficient, coordinated, transparent, and timely case investigation and resolution.</td>
<td>Environment and Biodiversity (document GN-2827-8)</td>
<td>Strengthen justice for land tenure</td>
<td>Paragraph 2.16: Clarity as to property rights and legal certainty as to land tenure can help improve management of natural resources and biodiversity and encourage private and public investment, as long as it is accompanied by complementary management measures and the right incentives. Several studies have emphasized that the lack of property rights/resources and tenure security are the major determinants of deforestation and overexploitation of fishery resources in LAC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Compliance with laws for environmental conservation</td>
<td>Paragraph 3.26f: Noncompliance with laws. All the foregoing weaknesses create a relatively generalized situation in which the regulatory and legal provisions are not fully complied with and/or compliance is not verified. In many cases, fines are assessed but never paid, in others, companies prefer to pay fines rather than comply with environmental requirements (Russell and Vaughan, 2003; Akella and Cannon, 2004). In this context, permitting systems become transaction costs with little added value for the companies or for environmental conservation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Line of action 4:</strong> Strengthen the effectiveness of penitentiary institutions for rehabilitation and reintegration of persons in conflict with the law.</td>
<td>Skills Development (document GN-3012-3)</td>
<td>Workforce reintegration for at-risk youth and juvenile offenders</td>
<td>Paragraph 3.23: Aligning skills development to a country’s growth strategy and the demands of productive sectors improves the relevance of the skills being developed. To properly align the supply and demand of skills, it is important to involve industries and other social partners in the identification of skills needed, curricula design, and provision of learning. Paragraph 3.26: Training programs that place young people in jobs have had positive results in LAC. Impact evaluations in the region show that the effects are maintained in the long run. One possible explanation is that most of the programs evaluated in the region have incorporated some of the elements the literature considers successful: participation of private suppliers, demand-driven programs, a significant guidance and/or labor intermediation component, a strong emphasis on on-the-job training, and financial incentives for employers and beneficiaries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Workforce reintegration of prisoners</td>
<td>Paragraph 3.40: For disadvantaged adults, targeted high-quality information and individualized advice and guidance encourage higher and more inclusive participation in skills development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Access to relevant, high-quality learning opportunities</td>
<td>Line of action 1: Ensure access to high-quality and relevant learning opportunities throughout life.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor (document GN-2741-12)</td>
<td>Employability programs for former convicts</td>
<td>Paragraph 3.7: Public Employment Services play a key role in bringing the unemployed back to work and helping firms find the right talent. Paragraph 3.8: Training programs to upskill and reskill the population could also help relocate workers to growing occupations.</td>
<td>Interventions to increase access to good employment opportunities for specific groups. Paragraph 3.40: Specific groups of individuals face barriers to good employment opportunities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen Security and Justice SFD</td>
<td>Related SFD</td>
<td>Thematic alignment</td>
<td>Detail in related SFD</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Line of action 5: Strengthen citizen security and justice governance, including the regulatory framework, coordination, and management.</td>
<td>Housing and Urban Development (document GN-2732-11)</td>
<td>Fragile urban governance and low capacity for data management</td>
<td><strong>Line of action 3:</strong> Boosting urban productivity / Paragraph 5.20: Improving coordination among territorial units: Effective city policies require coordination with adjacent urban and rural municipal governments and national institutions by: (i) developing effective metropolitan governance arrangements to manage, among other issues, mobility, waste, pollution, water resources, environmental and climate hazards, justice and citizen security, and local-police forces focused on communities’ wellbeing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate Change (document GN-2835-8)</td>
<td>Strengthen cross-sector coordination to protect the environment</td>
<td><strong>Target 5.1b:</strong> Intersector and multisector coordination on various levels. Understanding that responses to tackle climate change and its effects involve various sectors and levels of government, multisector and intersector interventions will be promoted.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transparency and Integrity (document GN-2981-2)</td>
<td>Weak institutional capacity</td>
<td><strong>Paragraph 2.18:</strong> Institutional weaknesses exacerbate corruption. Institutional failings and weaknesses provide a breeding ground for corruption and reduce the incentives for those in power to respect the law, provide public services in an efficient manner, and foster private investment. This, in turn, undermines economic development and the legitimacy of the State.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined crimes</td>
<td><strong>Paragraph 2.40:</strong> Corruption fuels other crime, such as tax evasion and asset laundering. Over the period 2004-2013, developing countries and emerging economies lost US$1.5 trillion due to illicit flows, according to a report by Global Financial Integrity (2015). Arruda and Farias (2014) examined the reasons countries accept illicit money flows and estimated the cost of these types of transactions.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrity of public officials</td>
<td><strong>Lines of action for public sector integrity.</strong> Paragraph 5.13: Integrity of public officials. Operational work, knowledge generation, and policy dialogue should all focus on promoting, communicating, and instilling ethical standards in the public sector, while also promoting conflict of interest policies, asset declaration systems, reporting mechanisms and whistleblower protection systems, and the investigation and punishment of improper conduct. This area includes support for policies to ensure transparent administrative decisions, including public hearings and other mechanisms for transparent regulatory decision-making. It also includes support for professional human resource systems based on transparent recruiting mechanisms and merit-based promotion for the three branches of government.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reducing impunity</td>
<td><strong>Lines of action for public sector integrity.</strong> Paragraph 5.18: Strengthening control bodies and reducing impunity. Recent corruption scandals demonstrate the importance of modernizing and strengthening control bodies so that these can improve their ability to detect, prevent, and punish acts of corruption, particularly in major public investments.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 2. Homicide rates per 100,000 inhabitants by LAC city and population size, 2016 or most recent year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Homicide rate (per 100,000 inhabitants)</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>San Salvador</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>238,244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>La Ceiba</td>
<td>130.7</td>
<td>197,267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>Caracas</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>2,082,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>San Pedro Sula</td>
<td>113.2</td>
<td>719,064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>Soyapango</td>
<td>81.6</td>
<td>283,223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>Belize City</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>57,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Cali</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>2,228,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Guatemala City</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>995,393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>Santa Ana</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>272,554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>Kingston</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>1,243,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Salvador</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>2,948,733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>Portmore</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>102,861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Escuintla</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>156,313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Port-au-Prince</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>987,310</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Petén</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>545,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahamas</td>
<td>Nassau</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>266,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>Belmopan</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>16,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>San Fernando</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>48,838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>Georgetown</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>24,849</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>San José</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>339,581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>Alajuela</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>302,074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Medellín</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>2,569,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>La Paz</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>766,468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>Managua</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>1,052,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>National District</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>1,403,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Bogota</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>7,181,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>Santo Domingo</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>4,210,121</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Rio de Janeiro</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>6,780,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>Port of Spain</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>37,074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>Panama City (capital)</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>477,328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Mexico City</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>8,855,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>Limón</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>60,710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>Montevideo</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>1,381,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Cuenca</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>603,269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Guayaquil</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>2,698,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Lima</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>9,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>São Paulo</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>12,330,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Salta</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1,214,441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Quito</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>2,011,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>City of Salto</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>123,120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>Chinqui</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>462,056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>City of La Costa</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>91,284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>Asunción</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>525,252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Piura</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>484,475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Buenos Aires</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>12,801,364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>City</td>
<td>Homicide rate (per 100,000 inhabitants)</td>
<td>Population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
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<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Santiago</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>5,614,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Biobio Region</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>1,557,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Valparaíso</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>295,113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Córdoba</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1,528,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Prepared by the authors based on UNODC and World Bank data.
Note: The colors associated with each country are classified as follows based on the number of inhabitants:
> 10,000,000 inhabitants Light brown
3,000,001 – 10,000,000 inhabitants Orange
1,000,001 – 3,000,000 inhabitants Yellow
250,000 – 1,000,000 inhabitants Beige
Table 3. Summary of Evidence in Section III

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject (paragraph)</th>
<th>Studies</th>
<th>Geographic scope</th>
<th>Classification*</th>
<th>Related line of action (paragraph)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Social prevention</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) People-based interventions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1a) Childhood</td>
<td>Positive parenting (3.7)</td>
<td>Mikton and Butchart, 2009; Furlong et al., 2012; Chen and Chan, 2016; Sama-Miller et al., 2017; Sanders at al., 2004; Prinz et al., 2009; Prinz et al., 2016</td>
<td>United States and Australia</td>
<td>Effective intervention*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality early childhood education and access to social services during childhood (3.8)</td>
<td>Courtin et al., 2019; Anders et al., 2019; Barr and Smith, 2021; Schweinhart, 2007; Barnett et al., 2005; Parks, 2000; Belfield et al., 2006</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Promising intervention</td>
<td>Preventing violence, mistreatment, and abuse of children and adolescents (5.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash transfers (3.9)</td>
<td>Chioda et al., 2016; Machado et al., 2018; Camacho and Mejia, 2013; Lance, 2018; Borraz and Munyo, 2020</td>
<td>Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Uruguay</td>
<td>Promising intervention</td>
<td>Preventing violence, mistreatment, and abuse of children and adolescents (5.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1b) Adolescence</td>
<td>Staying in school (3.11)</td>
<td>Henry et al., 1999; Leban and Masterson, 2021</td>
<td>United States, New Zealand, and Australia</td>
<td>Intervention with insufficient evidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summer work (3.12)</td>
<td>Schochet et al., 2008; Heller, 2014; Gelber et al., 2014; Kessler et al., 2021; Modestino, 2017; Lustig and Liem, 2010</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Effective intervention*</td>
<td>Preventing youth violence (5.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mentoring and cognitive behavioral therapy (3.13)</td>
<td>Heller et al., 2013; Waller, 2014; Laliberté, 2015; Grossman and Tierney, 1998; Heller et al., 2017</td>
<td>United States and England</td>
<td>Effective intervention*</td>
<td>Preventing youth violence (5.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject (paragraph)</td>
<td>Studies</td>
<td>Geographic scope</td>
<td>Classification*</td>
<td>Related line of action (paragraph)</td>
</tr>
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<td>---------------------</td>
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<td>-----------------</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1c) Women</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community mobilization (3.15)</td>
<td>Kerr-Wilson et al., 2020; Stern et al., 2018; Michau and Namy, 2021; Abramsky et al., 2014; Namy et al., 2019; Gibbs et al., 2017; Agüero and Frisancho, 2021</td>
<td>Peru, Uganda, Rwanda, Kenya, and South Africa</td>
<td>Mixed intervention (mostly positive)</td>
<td>Preventing gender-based violence (5.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School-based programs to prevent gender-based violence</td>
<td>Sosa-Rubi et al., 2017; Bando et al., 2018</td>
<td>Mexico and El Salvador</td>
<td>Intervention with insufficient evidence</td>
<td>Preventing gender-based violence (5.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash transfers for women (3.16)</td>
<td>Buller et al., 2018; Haushofer and Shapiro, 2013; Aizer, 2010; Hidobro et al., 2016; Hidobro and Femald, 2013; Baranov et al., 2020; Heath, Hidrobo, and Roy, 2020</td>
<td>Ecuador, Kenya, Mali, and United States</td>
<td>Mixed intervention (mostly positive)</td>
<td>Preventing gender-based violence (5.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programs for perpetrators of violence against women (3.17)</td>
<td>UNFPA, 2021; Santoveña and Da Silva, 2016</td>
<td>Colombia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Mexico, and Nicaragua</td>
<td>Promising intervention</td>
<td>Preventing gender-based violence (5.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1d) Human trafficking (3.18)</strong></td>
<td>Shinkle, 2016; UNICEF, 2020; Lemke, 2018; Salas and Dider, 2019; Bryant and Landman, 2020; Archer et al., 2016, in UKAID, 2020; Rothman et al., 2017; Ahn et al., 2013; Greenbaum et al., 2018</td>
<td>Nepal, United States, countries from every region</td>
<td>Interventions with insufficient or mixed evidence</td>
<td>Strengthening the institutional capacity of the CSJ sector and the private sector (5.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2) Interventions based on physical or social spaces</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Preventing crime through environmental design (3.19)</td>
<td>Cooke, 2003; Kruger et al., 2001; Piroozfar et al., 2019; Bowers, 2011; Matzopoulos et al., 2020; Kondo et al., 2018</td>
<td>South Africa, United States, Canada, Sweden, Denmark, and United Kingdom</td>
<td>Promising intervention</td>
<td>Strengthening the institutional capacity of the CSJ sector and the private sector (5.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban development interventions (3.20)</td>
<td>Brakarz et al., 2002; Urban Development and Housing Sector Framework Document, 2013</td>
<td>Chile, Colombia, Brazil, Argentina, and Bolivia</td>
<td>Promising intervention</td>
<td>Strengthening the institutional capacity of the CSJ sector and the private sector (5.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject (paragraph)</td>
<td>Studies</td>
<td>Geographic scope</td>
<td>Classification*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Violence interruption (3.21)</td>
<td>Delgado et al., 2017; Ransford et al., 2017; Skogan et al., 2009; Sichel et al., 2019</td>
<td>Honduras, Trinidad and Tobago, and United States</td>
<td>Promising intervention</td>
<td>Strengthening the institutional capacity of the CSJ sector and the private sector (5.8)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Policing institutions

1) Recruitment and training

| Profile of police officers (3.24) | Riccucci et al., 2014; Miller, 2019; Miller and Segal, 2014; Council on Criminal Justice, 2021; NASEM, 2021 | United States | Promising intervention | Strengthening the institutional capacity of police (5.11) |
| Modernizing education systems and professionalizing police careers (3.25) | Riccucci et al., 2014; Kristin, 2008; Rossi, 2019 | Honduras and United States | Promising intervention | Strengthening the institutional capacity of police (5.11) |
| Violence de-escalation training (3.26) | Engel et al., 2020; Engel et al., 2022 | United States | Promising intervention | Strengthening the institutional capacity of police (5.11) |

2) Interventions involving police presence

<p>| Police presence (3.28) | Chalfin and McCrany, 2017; Chalfin and McCrany, 2018; Biesse and Diegmann, 2022; Weisburg, 2021; Di Tella and Schargrodsky, 2004 | Argentina, United States, and Germany | Promising intervention | Strengthening the institutional capacity of police (5.11) |
| Hot spots policing (3.29) | Gill et al., 2016; Ajzenman and Jaitman, 2016; Braga et al., 2014; Weisburd and Eck, 2004; Bowers et al., 2011; Braga et al., 2012; Braga et al., 2019; Collazos et al., 2021; Blattman et al., 2021; Chainey et al., 2021 | Colombia, Chile, Argentina, Trinidad and Tobago, India, United States, United Kingdom, Sweden, and Australia | Effective intervention | Standardizing procedures, protocols, and models for police management and deployment (5.12) |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject (paragraph)</th>
<th>Studies</th>
<th>Geographic scope</th>
<th>Classification*</th>
<th>Related line of action (paragraph)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3) Relationship with the community</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Procedural justice (3.31)</td>
<td>Sahin et al., 2017; Mazerolle et al., 2013; Elliott et al., 2011; Engel, 2005; Dai et al., 2011; Lum and Nagin, 2016; Boateng, 2016; Bayley, 1998; Kenney, 2013</td>
<td>Ghana, Turkey, United States, and Australia</td>
<td>Promising intervention</td>
<td>Standardizing procedures, protocols, and models for police management and deployment (5.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community policing (3.32)</td>
<td>Skolnick and Bayley, 1988; Skogan et al., 1998; Wilson and Kelling, 1982; Ruprah, 2008; Mejia et al., 2013; Blair et al., 2021</td>
<td>Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Liberia, Pakistan, Philippines, Uganda, and United States</td>
<td>Intervention with mixed evidence</td>
<td>Standardizing procedures, protocols, and models for police management and deployment (5.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem-oriented policing (3.33)</td>
<td>Goldstein, 1979; Karn, 2013; Goldstein, 1990; Weisburd et al., 2010; Taylor, 2011; Hinkle et al., 2020</td>
<td>United States, Canada, and United Kingdom</td>
<td>Effective intervention*</td>
<td>Standardizing procedures, protocols, and models for police management and deployment (5.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>License plate readers (3.35)</td>
<td>Taylor et al., 2011; Koper and Lum, 2019</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Intervention with insufficient evidence</td>
<td>Strengthening the institutional capacity of police (5.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitored surveillance cameras (3.36)</td>
<td>Piza et al., 2019; Munyo et al., 2016; Gómez et al., 2021</td>
<td>Colombia, Uruguay, and United States</td>
<td>Promising intervention</td>
<td>Strengthening the institutional capacity of police (5.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Body-worn cameras (3.37)</td>
<td>Lum et al., 2015; Lum et al., 2020; Ariel et al., 2015; Katz et al., 2015; Owens et al., 2014; Grossmith et al., 2015; Barbosa et al., 2021</td>
<td>Brazil, Uruguay, United States, and United Kingdom</td>
<td>Intervention with mixed evidence</td>
<td>Strengthening the institutional capacity of police (5.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject (paragraph)</td>
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<tr>
<td>5) Targeted strategies for crime prevention and control</td>
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<tr>
<td>Women's police stations (3.39)</td>
<td>UN Women, 2011; Jubb et al., 2010; Amaral et al., 2021</td>
<td>Brazil, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Peru, and India</td>
<td>Intervention with mixed evidence</td>
<td>Standardizing procedures, protocols, and models for police management and deployment (5.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focused deterrence (3.40)</td>
<td>Braga et al., 2018; Kennedy and Wong, 2009; Saunders et al., 2016</td>
<td>United States, United Kingdom, and Uruguay</td>
<td>Promising intervention</td>
<td>Standardizing procedures, protocols, and models for police management and deployment (5.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint investigations between institutions and countries, and financial intelligence (3.41)</td>
<td>Lietonen et al., 2020; Gallagher and Holmes, 2008; Gatti, 2013; Meshkovska et al., 2016; Schwarz and Geng, 2018; Jensen et al., 2020; Severns et al., 2020; Lafort Nicuesta, 2020;</td>
<td>Argentina, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Serbia, Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, United Kingdom, Spain, and Holland</td>
<td>Interventions with insufficient evidence</td>
<td>Strengthening the institutional capacity of CSJ apex agencies and the private sector (5.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Organized crime</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Anti-gang units (3.43)</td>
<td>Decker and Pyrooz, 2015; Rostami, Melde, and Holgersson, 2014; Katz and Webb, 2006; Katz, 2006; Katz, 2000</td>
<td>United States and Sweden</td>
<td>Intervention with insufficient evidence</td>
<td>Strengthening the institutional capacity of CSJ apex agencies and the private sector (5.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C) Justice sector institutions</td>
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<tr>
<td>1) Access to justice services</td>
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<tr>
<td>Legal assistance for vulnerable populations (3.45)</td>
<td>Kavanaugh et al., 2019; Sandefur and Siddiqi, 2015;</td>
<td>Peru, Kenya, Liberia, and United States</td>
<td>Effective intervention</td>
<td>Promoting access to justice with emphasis on the most vulnerable populations (5.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject (paragraph)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Protective orders (3.46)</td>
<td>Dowling et al., 2018</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Promising intervention</td>
<td>Promoting access to justice with emphasis on the most vulnerable populations (5.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated service centers for justice and mobile courts (3.47)</td>
<td>Andrade-Ciudad et al., 2010; Ewulum, 2019; Hosen and Ferdous, 2014; Maya, 2012; Hardwick, 2013</td>
<td>Peru, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and United Kingdom</td>
<td>Intervention with insufficient evidence</td>
<td>Promoting access to justice with emphasis on the most vulnerable populations (5.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Justice modernization and digitalization (3.48)</td>
<td>Chemin, 2020; Chemin, 2012; Lichand and Soares, 2014</td>
<td>Brazil and India</td>
<td>Promising intervention</td>
<td>Achieve progress in justice digitalization processes (5.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Restorative justice</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Drug treatment courts (3.50)</td>
<td>Sevigny et al., 2013; Stein et al., 2015; Latimer et al., 2006; Shaffer, 2006</td>
<td>United States, Canada, and Australia</td>
<td>Effective intervention*</td>
<td>Promoting access to justice with emphasis on the most vulnerable populations (5.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solutions agreed upon through conferences (3.51)</td>
<td>Sherman et al., 2015; Strang et al., 2013</td>
<td>United States, Australia, and United Kingdom</td>
<td>Effective intervention*</td>
<td>Promoting access to justice with emphasis on the most vulnerable populations (5.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Legal framework and characteristics of sentencing (3.52)</td>
<td>Chalfin and McCrary, 2017; Nagin, 2013; Abrams, 2010; Mueller-Smith, 2015; Green and Winik, 2010; Lee and McCrary, 2009; Lee et al., 2017; Doucette et al., 2019; Kaufman et al., 2018; Sabbath et al., 2020; Santaella-Tenorio et al., 2016; Cerqueira and de Mello, 2013</td>
<td>Brazil, Colombia, United States</td>
<td>Intervention with mixed evidence</td>
<td>Strengthening the institutional capacity of CSJ apex agencies and the private sector (5.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject (paragraph)</td>
<td>Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adversarial model with a separate judge and prosecutor in regulatory frameworks (3.53)</td>
<td>Gonzalez and Fandiño, 2018; Zorro Medina et al., 2020</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Intervention with insufficient evidence</td>
<td>Strengthening the institutional capacity of CSJ apex agencies and the private sector (5.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Alternatives to imprisonment</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Electronic monitoring (3.55)</td>
<td>Di Tella and Schargrodsky, 2013; Henneguelle et al., 2016; Marklund and Holmberg, 2009; Beir et al., 2017</td>
<td>Argentina, United States, Canada, Australia, Sweden, Denmark, and France</td>
<td>Promising intervention (with some mixed evidence)</td>
<td>Promoting access to justice with emphasis on the most vulnerable populations (5.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other alternative sentencing methods (3.56)</td>
<td>Gehrsitz, 2017</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Intervention with insufficient evidence</td>
<td>Promoting access to justice with emphasis on the most vulnerable populations (5.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Prison system (3.59)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Prison infrastructure and management (3.58)</td>
<td>Tobón, 2020; Drago, Galbiati, and Vertova, 2011; Chen and Shapiro, 2007; Gaes and Camp, 2009; Lotti, 2020</td>
<td>Colombia, United States, United Kingdom, and Italy</td>
<td>Promising intervention</td>
<td>Promoting the social and economic reintegration and rehabilitation of persons in conflict with the law (5.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Rehabilitation and reintegration programs</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>CBT-based programs (3.60)</td>
<td>Lipsey et al., 2007; Henwood et al., 2015</td>
<td>United States, Canada, United Kingdom, and New Zealand</td>
<td>Effective intervention*</td>
<td>Promoting the social and economic reintegration and rehabilitation of persons in conflict with the law (5.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject (paragraph)</td>
<td>Studies</td>
<td>Geographic scope</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vocational education</td>
<td>Wilson et al., 2000; Davis et al., 2013</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Effective intervention*</td>
<td>Promoting the social and economic reintegration and rehabilitation of persons in conflict with the law (5.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivational interviews</td>
<td>McMurray, 2009; Clair-Michaud et al., 2015; Antis et al., 2011; Austin et al., 2011; Virgus et al., 2015</td>
<td>United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and New Zealand</td>
<td>Effective intervention*</td>
<td>Promoting the social and economic reintegration and rehabilitation of persons in conflict with the law (5.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prison visits</td>
<td>Mitchell et al., 2016</td>
<td>United States, United Kingdom, and Canada</td>
<td>Promising intervention</td>
<td>Promoting the social and economic reintegration and rehabilitation of persons in conflict with the law (5.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Governance and coordination</td>
<td>Data analysis (3.64)</td>
<td>United States and United Kingdom</td>
<td>Promising intervention</td>
<td>Strengthening the institutional capacity of CSJ apex agencies and the private sector (5.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results-based management programs</td>
<td>Soares and Viveiros, 2017; Silva Neto et al., 2018</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Promising intervention</td>
<td>Strengthening the institutional capacity of CSJ apex agencies and the private sector (5.24)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** (*) For category descriptions, see Table 4.
Table 4. Typology for classification of evidence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of intervention</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effective intervention</td>
<td>Consistent, predominantly positive evidence obtained through experimental studies conducted in developing countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective intervention*</td>
<td>Consistent, predominantly positive evidence obtained through experimental studies conducted in developed countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promising intervention</td>
<td>Consistent, predominantly positive evidence obtained through quasi-experimental studies or small number of experimental studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention with mixed evidence</td>
<td>Nonconclusive evidence (null or negative effects) obtained through experimental studies conducted in developed and developing countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention with insufficient evidence</td>
<td>Evidence obtained through correlational studies conducted in developed and developing countries Nonconclusive evidence obtained through quasi-experimental studies in developed and developing countries</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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