

FINAL

Project Completion Report

Project Name:	Citizen Security Programme
Country:	Guyana
Sector / Sub sector:	Social Investment – Citizen Safety
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Loan Number:	1752 /SF-GY
QRR Date:	Aug 11,2014
Final Approval Date:	Oct 7,2014

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AOP	Annual Operations Plan
CAC	Community Action Council
CANU	Customs Anti-Narcotics Unit
CO	Crime Observatory
CSP	Citizen Security Programme
DPP	Director of Public Prosecutions
EA	Executing Agency
EDMS	Electronic Document Management System
EOP	End of Project
GDF	Guyana Defense Force
GFS	Guyana Fire Service
GOG	Government of Guyana
GPF	Guyana Police Force
GPHC	Guyana Public Hospital Corporation
GPS	Guyana Prison Service
HR	Human Resource
ICIS	Integrated Crime Information System
IFMAS	Integrated Financial Management System
IDB	Inter- American Development Bank
IDCE	Institute of Distance and Continuing Education
IT	Information Technology
M&E	Monitoring & Evaluation
MIS	Management Information System
MOE	Ministry of Education
MOF	Ministry of Finance
MOH	Ministry of Health
MOHA	Ministry of Home Affairs
MOLGRD	Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development
MOLHS&SS	Ministry of Labour, Human Services and Social Security
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MOW&C	Ministry of Works and Communication
MP	Multi- Purpose
NGOs	Non- Governmental Organizations
PC	Project Coordinator
PIU	Project Implementation Unit
PPMR	Project Performance Monitoring Report
PRU	Planning & Research Unit
PS	Permanent Secretary
SMD	Strategic Management Department
SNS	Safe Neighbourhood Survey
TOR	Terms of Reference
UG	University of Guyana

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1. BASIC INFORMATION

BASIC DATA (AMOUNTS IN US \$)							
PROJECT NO:	TITLE: Citizen Security Programme (CSP)						
Borrower: Cooperative Republic of Guyana Executing Agency (EA): Ministry of Home Affairs	Date of Board Approval: June 28, 2006 Date of Loan Contract Effectiveness: January 31, 2007 Date of Eligibility for First Disbursement: August 8, 2007						
Loan(s): LO-1752/ SF-GY Sector: Social Investment- Citizen Safety	Months in Execution * From Approval: 94 months * From Contract Effectiveness: 88 months						
Lending Instrument: Investment	Disbursement Periods Original Date of Final Disbursement: January 31, 2012 Current Date of Final Disbursement: June 30, 2014 Cumulative Extension (Months): 29 months Special Extensions (Months):						
Poverty Targeted Investment (PTI):	Loan Amount(s) * Original Amount: US\$19,800,000. * Current Amount: US\$19,800,000. * Pari Passu (if applicable): 90/10						
Social Equity (SEQ):	Disbursements * Amount to date: US\$ ¹ 19.799.951,67						
Environmental Classification:	Total Project Cost (Original Estimate): US\$US\$22,000,000.						
	Redirectioning Has this Project? Received funds from another Project [N/A] Sent funds to another Project [N/A] N/A [N/A]						
	<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>To/From Project Number</th> <th>From Sub-Loan Number</th> <th>Amount</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	To/From Project Number	From Sub-Loan Number	Amount			
To/From Project Number	From Sub-Loan Number	Amount					
	* Current amount (adjusted for re-direction):						
	On Alert Status Is project currently designated "on alert" by PAIS: If yes then why is the project on alert (DO , IP Ratings and/or relevant PAIS indicators): Comments on relevance of "on alert" status for this project (if applicable):						

Summary Performance Ratings				
DO	<input type="checkbox"/> Highly Probable (HP)	<input type="checkbox"/> Probable (P)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Low Probability (LP)	<input type="checkbox"/> Improbable (I)
IP	<input type="checkbox"/> Very Satisfactory (VS)	<input type="checkbox"/> Satisfactory (S)	<input type="checkbox"/> Unsatisfactory (US)	<input type="checkbox"/> Very Unsatisfactory (VU)
SU	<input type="checkbox"/> Highly Probable (HP)	<input type="checkbox"/> Probable (P)	<input type="checkbox"/> Low Probability (LP)	<input type="checkbox"/> Improbable (I)

¹ IDB Financial Summary as at 14 March, 2014

11. The Project

A. Project Context²

2.1. The Citizen Security Programme (CSP) was designed in response to the unprecedented high levels of violence and crime that marked the period 2002 to 2006. These occurrences had a negative effect on the economy and this was apparent in the recorded low levels of economic growth. During the period 1998 – 2005, economic growth averaged only 0.2% per annum in contrast to an annual average growth of 7.1% over 1991-1997. The fiscal deficit fell to 13.4% of Gross Domestic Product in 2005. In the wake of the 2001 elections, increasing levels of crime and violence [from an average of 10-15 homicides/100,000 between 1974 - 2001 to 18 /100,000 by 2005] became obvious deterrents to the Government's efforts to attract international investment, which was a critical factor for the desired improvement in the performance of the economy. Accordingly, in response to citizen concern, high on the policy agenda of the government were the issues of citizen security and crime reduction.

2.2. While compiling statistics on crime and violence are the responsibility of the police, data was not always reliable, detailed, nor timely enough and these factors limited the development of evidence-based policies necessary to make focused interventions to improve the security environment.

In addition to the crime related deaths that threatened the nation's social capital, 'an upsurge of traffic accidents [from approximately 16-24/100,000] was 'further eroding feelings of security in Guyana'³. The combination of these social challenges had placed a burden on the national authorities to address the issue of citizen security with alacrity. The face of crime in Guyana reflected a perpetrator who was a male between 14 and 30 years, had dropped out of school, was unemployed, or underemployed, or had low school performance. In several instances he was a repeat offender.

2.3. The fear and insecurity of citizens also emerged from ethnic conflict which had stymied the unity and cooperation necessary for the building of cohesion at the individual, community and national levels. From a *"Realizing Safe Neighborhoods"* household survey conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics in 2005, the regions most affected were 4 and 6. In order to bridge the gaps from existing information systems, several other assessments were undertaken in a number of communities in these regions as a precursor to the design of this programme. The aim was to assess the problems and needs of the communities while arousing a sense of interest and expectation, critical to the mobilization of residents as the process of comprehensive reform in the security sector was introduced in the early months of project implementation. Most importantly, these assessments identified wide ranging sources of violence that were both internal (domestic violence- self-inflicted, parent – child, intimate partner relationships) as well as external (robbery, youth violence, occurring in the broader society). According to the Loan Proposal, *"residents spoke of the results of this fear: the gradual diminishment of participation in community and civic life; fewer interactions with youth and children and other community parents; decreased belief in police, and the rule of law causing underreporting; diminished contact with groups of other ethnic or racial backgrounds"*.

Sector Constraints

2.4. The institutions within the citizen security sector are primarily responsible for preventing and helping to reduce crime and violence in the country. The policy institution is the Ministry of Home Affairs, responsible for internal security and immigration. Its mission is ***"To ensure the maintenance of public order and safety throughout Guyana by formulating appropriate security policies that are responsive to the changing environment; overseeing the effective***

² CSP Loan Proposal

³ CSP Loan Proposal

implementation of these policies by related agencies and guaranteeing their execution as a result of appropriate resource allocations that include an emphasis on competent human capital as well as modern technology⁴. The agencies currently within the portfolio of the MOHA are: (i) the Guyana Police Force (GPF) which has among its functions the prevention and detection of crime, preservation of law and order, the preservation of peace, control of public order, protection of property, the enforcement of all laws and regulations and other duties required or under the authority of the Minister; (ii) the Police Complaints Authority, in charge of receiving and investigating complaints against the GPF; (iii) the Guyana Prison Service (GPF), in charge of the custody of prisoners; (iv) Guyana Fire Service (GFS), which provides prevention and extinguishing of fires; and the (v) General Register Office, which maintains the national records of births, deaths and marriages⁵.

An institutional assessment of the Ministry (2002) identified the following sector constraints:

- (i) Limited capacity to formulate and evaluate violence prevention and coexistence policies.
- (ii) Absence of a formal and systematic engagement with in-country stakeholders.
- (iii) Inadequate institutional framework⁶.

- 2.5. The GPF also had identified several constraints that had their origins in structures, training and police procedures that have remained essentially unchanged since the 1960s. Areas that were identified to benefit from change and renewal were human resource management, specifically, recruitment and selection, training, evaluation, promotion and personal development and organizational structure⁷.

Notwithstanding the several constraints, the GOG had been steadily pursuing a number of initiatives aimed at improving the security sector, thereby providing a safe environment for citizens and encouraging private investment. Examples of those mitigating interventions are the establishment of a National Commission on Law and Order comprised of representatives of Government, Parliament, and civil society, mandated to examine existing and proposed policies and to make policy recommendations to the President. The CSP was intended to carry out evidence-based policy interventions that would complement the policies and actions that the Commission was mandated to undertake.

- 2.6. Another initiative was the National Drug Strategy Master Plan 2005-2009, which proposed a comprehensive, integrated and coordinated approach to controlling the level and penetration of drugs into society since its correlation to, along with the proliferation of illicit guns had been intrinsically linked to violent crime and violence. Yet another initiative was the existing Drug Strategy developed to contribute to improved coordination among law enforcement and other stakeholder agencies engaged in restricting the inflow of weapons and drugs.
- 2.7. In addition, several strategies that were being pursued with partner agencies, such as the Ethnic Relations Commission and the National Commission on the Rights of the Child, included programme development that addressed issues of civic responsibility, the improvement of interpersonal relationships at the grassroots level and the enhancement of the protection of children and spouses from domestic violence (DV) and other forms of exploitation, violence and abuse. The CSP was therefore seen as the intervention that would reinforce the political superstructure - strengthening the institutional capacity at the policy level while promoting a social cohesion strategy at the community level. The foregoing provided the rationale for the intervention in the security sector in order to facilitate its modernization and transformation.

B. Project Description

⁴ Ministry of Home Affairs: Strategic Plan 2012 -2017. Final Revision, November, 2012.

⁵ CSP Loan Proposal

⁶ CSP Loan Proposal

⁷ Report: Commission on Disciplined Forces

- 2.8. This operation complemented other reforms that were at various stages of the project cycle and which were also benefitting from IDB support. In the criminal justice sector, the Modernization of the Justice Administration System was coming on stream, as the GOG pursued a comprehensive approach to the issue of security and justice in the country. These initiatives were all part of the Poverty Reduction Strategy as well as the Justice Sector Reform Strategy. Reforms in the justice sector were supported by the Bank through the Justice Administration System loan (GY-L1009).
- 2.9. The underlying philosophy was that achieving harmony, trust and improved relationships must begin with the elimination of discord and violence in the society a process that targets the family unit, thereafter cascading across communities and in so doing encompasses racial and ethnic dimensions. As an integral part of its pursuit towards social cohesion, this intervention targeted key institutions in the security sector – the Ministry of Home Affairs, the GPF and finally, in this first attempt at comprehensive reform, the community, where the specific focus was directed to locations that reflected serious challenges to citizen security.

(i) Development Objective

- 2.10. The goal of the program was ***‘to enhance citizen security and coexistence by contributing to the reduction in levels of crime, violence and insecurity in Guyana’***. The specific objectives are to: ***(a) identify, prevent and counteract risk factors and increase and promote protective factors in communities, families and individuals; (b) strengthen the capabilities of MOHA and GPF to implement crime preventive programmes at the national and local levels, and (c) strengthen social cohesion within communities and their preventive capacity.***

(ii) Components

- 2.11. The program design consisted of three components.

COMPONENT 1 – CAPACITY BUILDING OF THE MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS (MOHA)

The objective was ***‘to strengthen MOHA’s capacity in: (i) the formulation, execution and evaluation of evidence-based policies; and (ii) human resource development and the improvement of the overall institutional performance of the Ministry.***

- 2.12. Project execution of this component were focused on the following activities: (i) an integrated crime information system – Crime Observatory (CO) – inclusive of (a) a new data system and geo-reference mapping; (b) applied training in statistical analysis and problem identification; and (c) data links to information generated by forensic medicine, the prosecution office and the Guyana Revenue Authority - to monitor trends in crime and violence, facilitate information exchange, plan strategically and support the development and evaluation of public policy responses in Regions 4 and 6; (ii) the development of evidence based policies and interventions that address risk factors identified. This subcomponent was expected to address issues related to capacity for training for the PRU, development of policies, recommending legal reforms and formulating plans related to reducing violence and crime, conducting educational and media campaigns; (iii) conducting evaluations to assess the impact of the interventions implemented, during and after the program. Two additional national surveys were planned (*Realizing Safe Neighborhoods Survey*) to inform future policies and provide data against which program effects can be measured; (iv) Improving the overall institutional performance of MOHA through the development and implementation of a number of reforms, namely, (a) an overall Strategic Action Plan; (b) Annual Plans of Operations consistent with the Strategic Plan; (c) a new organizational structure including new job profiles to enable MOHA to respond to the mission and vision articulated in the Strategic Action Plan and achieve the goals and objectives defined in the Annual Plan of Operations, including new initiatives such as crime prevention and

community interventions; (d) an integrated human resource management system consistent with public service management systems with computer application, for performance-based evaluation of staff (and as part of this system, a comprehensive and sustainable training program aimed at improving efficiency and effectiveness due to increased or updated knowledge); (e) an internal audit system, based on modern internal control functions and risk analysis (in order to enhance, in the short-run, MOHA's internal audit capacity; an Internal Field/ Audit Officer will be hired to provide financial and procedural audit capability consistent with public sector procedures); (f) an integrated financial administration system consistent with national public sector systems and regulations, integrating budget, treasury, accounting and acquisitions functions supported by the Integrated Financial Management and Accounting System (IFMAS); (g) develop secure systems of processing, and producing national documents that promote transparency and improve efficiency of service delivery; (h) a communications and public relations strategy, to strengthen MOHA's image and its roles in relation to other national organizations; (i) rehabilitation of physical infrastructure of the MOHA and acquisition of IT equipment/capability; and (j) community development initiatives.

- 2.13. During the early stages of project execution, following a review of activities under this component, the GOG and the Bank agreed on a redefinition of the activities which resulted in a condensation of the scope of this component to reflect the following initiatives: (i) Development of a Strategic Plan; (2) Development of an Electronic Document System; (3) Development of an Internal Control System and the establishment of a CO and Injury Surveillance System to facilitate the development of evidence-based crime prevention policy.

COMPONENT 2. CAPACITY BUILDING AND MODERNIZATION OF THE GPF

- 2.14. This component aimed to transform the GPF from an incident-driven, reactive institution to one that relies on the analysis of patterns, incidents and problems in order to understand the characteristics and causes of incidents, which will ensure sustainable solutions.
- 2.15. The following activities were identified to give effect to the objective described above: the following: (i) An integrated crime information system; (ii) Comprehensive training scheme - professional standard of training and training the trainers- in: (a) investigation and detection of crime; (b) information management (how to record, handle and use the data in a proactive manner); (c) recruit training; (d) case management; (e) ethnic human rights and neighbourhood policing; and (f) strengthening of internal and external accountability mechanisms; (iii) strengthen the traffic department and develop a new urban traffic management plan which would include (a) proposals for revision of the legislation governing road safety including partnering with community groups and local government bodies; (b) training for the GPF to enforce legislation, educating the public on road safety; (c) implementation of traffic management standards, accident investigation and reconstruction. Other initiatives included – (iv) modernization of physical infrastructure such as the construction of a new crime laboratory (including equipment) and the construction of a new training facility (including IT equipment); (v) the rehabilitation and remodeling of police stations (excluding detention facilities) to improve service to citizens reporting crimes (especially in protecting identities and taking reports, for instance, in domestic abuse cases) and improving crime prevention capabilities. (vi) Technical assistance, equipment and software to improve the overall institutional performance of the GPF through the development and implementation of: (a) a new organizational structure; (b) a results-oriented planning model, integrated with budget operations and supported by ICT; (c) an internal audit model, based on modern internal control functions and risk analysis auditing consistent with public sector systems; (d) an integrated human resource management system; (e) a financing model consistent with national systems and regulations, integrating budget, treasury, accounting and acquisitions functions supported by a computer application;

(f) corporate programme and public education campaigns to strengthen its image and build public confidence; (vii) developing sustainable partnerships with communities.

- 2.16. The Review of this component undertaken by the GOG and the IDB resulted in the redefinition of the scope of the project to reflect the following outputs:
- (i) Implementation of a Comprehensive training programme for Trainers in GPF;
 - (ii) Establishment of an Integrated Crime Information System;
 - (iii) Construction of a crime (forensics) laboratory including equipment;
 - (iv) Remodeling of 18 Police Stations to ensure confidentiality of citizens making reports, especially in areas of domestic violence;
 - (v) Development of a Result Oriented Planning Model.

COMPONENT 3: COMMUNITY ACTION

- 2.17. The objective of this component was to implement social development interventions addressing crime and violence prevention in disadvantaged, low-income neighborhoods of Regions IV and VI. Provision was made for ten of the most disadvantaged communities to be engaged during the life of the project. The first five communities identified were: Port Mourant, Rose Hall, Annandale, Buxton and Sophia. Another five were later identified according to the established selection criteria: (i) size (between 3,000-17,000 residents); (ii) ethnic/racial groups' representation; (iii) demonstrated willingness to work across ethnic, racial groups; (iv) variance in crime and violence problems; (v) community assets. The program was designed to facilitate the empowerment of communities through the mobilization / engagement of residents and training of local Community Promoters for Citizen Co-existence. In addition, it was intended that further training would be provided to build core competencies directed towards crime and violence prevention.
- 2.18. The Component also made provision for community violence prevention services wherein *'a menu of prevention activities, in selected communities of Region 4 and 6, that address crime and violence problems, will be identified in community assessments'*. Three subcomponents were designed to give effect to the intent of this component, namely:
- (1) Mobilization of Communities and Building Social Cohesion.** Activities to be pursued include
- developing and implementing actions for engaging the community; conducting community assessments to identify violence problems and prevention assets in the community, including situational prevention rapid –impact projects; monitoring project performance; developing a cadre of citizen promoters for violence prevention and co-existence.
- (2) Violence Prevention Services.** (a) Implementation of a 'menu of prevention activities identified in the community assessments such as (i) factors leading to child abuse; delinquency and violent offending; intimate partner violence; (ii) situational crime prevention (such as the creation of safe community spaces; community gardens; exterior lighting, etc.; (b) Improving formal services provided by various sectors. The aim was to mobilize 'at risk' youth between the ages 14 to 25, providing four six-month training interventions designed to provide life skills (including violence prevention strategies) as well as a choice of either entrepreneurial or vocational training.
- (3) Strengthening community based multi-service centres.** Strengthening of existing underused or unused facilities to serve as hubs to house community activities.

C. Quality –AT-Entry Review (if Applicable)

There was no Quality-at-Entry Review conducted in this Program.

111. RESULTS

A. Outcomes

- 3.1. At the end of the execution of the CSP, it was expected that the emerging outcomes would contribute to the Programme's overall goal of ***"enhancing citizen security and coexistence by contributing to the reduction in levels of crime, violence and insecurity in Guyana"***. While the impact of the programme will be distinctly discernible in future years, some effects have already begun to emerge and have been captured in the *2013 Safe Neighbourhood Survey* as well as by the CO, one of the key outputs of this programme. This section examines the anticipated outcomes at the Goal and Purpose level of the programme's logical framework. The Table below replicates the targets set in the PPMR, allowing for easy assessment.

(a) PROJECT GOAL – EMERGING IMPACTS AT End of Project (EOP)

ASSESSMENT OF EMERGING IMPACTS	
GOAL: To enhance citizen security and improve peaceful coexistence among citizens by contributing towards the reduction of crime, violence and fear.	
Key Performance Indicator	Status at EOP (March, 2014)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> People's perception increased from Neighbourhood Index of 66.5 to 79.8 by the end of 2013. 	NOT ACHIEVED. Neighbourhood Index reflected a decline to 61.1 at December, 2013.
Reduction of the number of undetermined deaths / crimes ⁸ in Regions 4 and 6 from 35% to 15%	Work in Progress. Positive Trend. This indicator will be measured three years after Project completion, but at EOP, the number stood at 21.9%.

(b) Development Objective (Purpose)

ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVE (PURPOSE)	
DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVE (PURPOSE): To improve the formulation of evidence-based crime prevention policies through the strengthening of the MOHA and GPF.	
Key Performance Indicator	Status at EOP (March, 2014)
[PPMR: OUTCOME: THE CAPABILITIES OF MOHA AND GPF TO IMPLEMENT CRIME PREVENTIVE PROGRAMMES ARE STRENGTHENED]. This indicator <u>TO BE MEASURED 3 YEARS AFTER EOP.</u>	
Perception that GPF is not doing a good job preventing crimes in Region IV. KPI: From 34% - 26%.	TO BE MEASURED 3 YEARS AFTER EOP. Work in Progress. Negative Trend. 2013 SNS reported an increase to 43.1% for GPF.
Perception that GPF is not doing a good job preventing crimes in Region VI. KPI: From 36% to 25%.	TO BE MEASURED 3 YEARS AFTER EOP. Work in Progress. Negative Trend. 2013 SNS reported an increase to 46.4% for GPF.
Perception of insecurity decreased from 42% to 34% in Region IV, as measured by the fear index (not feeling safe on the streets of their community at night).	Work in Progress. Negative Trend. Perception of insecurity increased from 42% in 2006 to 52.9% in 2013 after an improvement to 34.4% recorded in the 2011 survey.
Perception of insecurity decreased from 42% to 39% in Region VI as measured by the fear index (not feeling safe on the streets of their community at night).	Work in Progress. Negative Trend. Perception of insecurity increased from 42% in 2006 to 50% in 2013 after an improvement to 29.4% in 2011.

⁸ These are two distinct categories of data. The Crime Observatory has been recording / maintaining data on undetermined crime related deaths.

OUTCOME: The social cohesion within communities and its crime preventive capacity is strengthened. THIS INDICATOR IS TO BE MEASURED 3 YEARS AFTER THE END OF THE PROJECT.	
Willingness of neighbours to get involved and help each other out in Region IV. KPI: From 68% to 75%	Negative Trend. 2013 SNS reported a decrease to 57.2% for Region IV.
Willingness of neighbours to get involved and help each other out in Region VI. KPI: From 76% to 83%	Work In Progress. 2013 SNS reported a slight increase of 76.7 % for Region VI , but well below projections.
OUTCOME: Skills, attitudes and behaviour indicators are improved. THIS INDICATOR IS TO BE MEASURED 3 YEARS AFTER THE END OF THE PROJECT.	
Persons with the ability to control their anger and avoid a fight in Region IV. KPI: From 56 % to 67%	Work In Progress. Partially Achieved: 2013 SNS reported increase to 64 % for Region IV, 96% of the target.
Persons with the ability to control their anger and avoid a fight in Region VI. KPI: From 43 % to 51%	Exceeded. 2013 SNS reported significant increase to 59.6% for Region VI, approximately 7% OVER the target.
Reformulation. Nil	
PMR Retrofitting. Indicate if and when the PMR was retrofitted and explain any changes resulting from this exercise. N/A	
Summary Development Objective (s) Classification (DO):	
[] Highly Probable (HP) [] Probable (P) [X] Low Probability (LP) [] Improbable (I)	
<p>Briefly justify DO classification, based on the degree to which planned targets were met, explaining the differences between planned and not achieved outcomes as well as any other relevant factors. Include references to evidence that can support these results.</p> <p>The original design of the Programme recognized that <i>impact of the interventions under the CSP cannot be fully determined before three years after project completion.</i> As a result of the implementation of an Integrated Crime Information System as well as an Electronic Document Management System (EDMS), improvements have been recorded in data collection and analysis. In addition, the structural and procedural reforms that are needed to complement the technological advances are now moving to operational stage. Examples include the Forensic Laboratory, the Strategic Plan for the GPF with initiatives that range from a new organizational structure to HR strategies, administrative processes, etc. Behaviour change is taking place. In Regions IV and VI, where the Programmes' Community Action Component (CAC), with its violence mitigating strategies at the individual, family and school levels were piloted, one indicator reveals that more persons are now able to control their anger. Due to certain negative trends identified, especially in the 2013 Safe Neighbourhood Survey, we have taken a more conservative approach at this time, classifying the Programme as having a low probability of achieving development objectives. In three years when the outcome indicators are updated, we will have more adequate evidence to either upgrade or reaffirm the development objective classification.</p>	
<p>COUNTRY STRATEGY. Given the results described above, briefly discuss how the project contributed to the Bank's strategy in the country.</p> <p>The Bank's Country Strategy (2002 -2006) sought to assist the GOG in confronting its major development challenges that included– (i) undertaking a comprehensive programme of public sector modernization and (ii) strengthening social programs given the current environment characterized by low economic growth and weak institutional capacity. Accordingly, the strategy's focus was to promote growth oriented programs and policies, which, <i>if reinforced by the strengthening of governance, security and justice</i>, public sector systems and social programs, would contribute to poverty reduction in Guyana. The subsequent strategy (2008-2012) also recognized security and institution building as key factors for achieving growth and development.</p> <p>Recognizing the need to assist the GOG in dealing with the issues of crime and violence, since they impacted citizens' quality of life as well as investor confidence in Guyana, the present operation was a strategic fit, as it aimed to strengthen the security sector by removing institutional constraints to stakeholder dialogue and participation while improving public sector capacity and service delivery. At EOP, capacity has been built in both MOHA and GPF, especially in the area of information technology. Citizens at the community level were engaged and enabled to participate in the determination of their community security and individual developmental needs</p>	

as well as solutions/interventions to address same. In addition, for the first time, community surveys allowed for the garnering of information relating to the ‘prevalence of aggressive and violence related behaviour at the family unit as well as the community level in the ten Regions of Guyana’. This provided citizens with a voice to state how they felt about several responses including the performance of state institutions. Such rich data will enable policy-makers to formulate interventions that are more responsive to the challenges faced by the several constituencies as the agenda for greater citizen security and cohesiveness is pursued.

B. Externalities

- 3.2. This project has had a number of positive ‘spin-offs’ for the beneficiary agencies – MOHA and GPF as well as the communities that were targeted for intervention and, by extension, the wider society as a whole. The very thrust of the operation – institutional modernization / transformation brought in its wake ‘fresh thinking’ and its technological emphasis enabled the exploration of new ways of capturing and organizing data to inform several strategic operations at the policy level.
- 3.3. **At the Technological level.** At the core of the wide range of benefits from a functioning Integrated Crime Information System (ICIS) are the several levels of enhanced /greater inter-agency partnerships between MOHA and other agencies in the security arena. The agenda of these interactions and the ensuing discussions and emerging decisions are now derived more from a base of timely empirical evidence. Additionally, a number of new structures/ mechanisms have evolved into strong and functioning operations. These include:
- (i) **National Computer Incidents Response Team** with the mandate ‘*to improving the security preparedness and response of the GOG through proactive security measures and information sharing mechanisms*’, this Unit which was approved by Cabinet, had staff trained in cyber security incident handling, and commenced its operations in August 2013. It will shortly be providing a wider range of services for government agencies, the business community and citizens at large.
 - (ii) **On-Line Crime Reporting system.** The Ministry in 2013 launched this initiative which allows citizens who possess cell phones, computers and other internet ready devices to directly and immediately report crimes to the GPF using these devices.
 - (iii) **National Drug Information Network.** The ICIS has also supported the formation of this network, the goal of which is to improve Guyana’s capacity in the formulation of drug policy, design and implementation of responses and programmes, and the evaluation of outcomes through the use of timely, valid, and reliable information. The network comprises representatives from (a) Treatment Facilities - Drug Demand Reduction Programme, MOH; Phoenix Recovery Project; Salvation Army Men’s Social Service ;(b) Law Enforcement Agencies – MOHA; Customs Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU); GPS; Guyana Defense Force (GDF); Food and Drug Department, MOH; (c) Psychiatric Facilities – Guyana Public Hospital Corporation (GPHC).
 - (iv) **Monitoring Payment of Traffic Ticketing through the ICIS.** The ICIS has allowed for the introduction of a system to monitor the processing of traffic tickets, so as to ensure payment by defaulters. Traffic tickets issued to drivers are now inputted into the system and this is followed by online reconciliation regarding payment of tickets. Defaulters can now be quickly identified and the necessary follow-up action taken by the Police.
- 3.4. **Other Positive Unexpected Effects**
- (i) **Supporting Science and Research at the University of Guyana.** Staff for the autonomous body has already been recruited and is in the process of developing a Work Plan as well as

Quality System that is based on the *ISO 17025 – International Accreditation Standards for Laboratories*. The team is working towards a July 2015 deadline to have the International Accreditation Body undertake an assessment of the facility, its policies and procedures as well as samples of its work. As a prelude to this milestone, the services of proficiency testing bodies will be engaged commencing in 2014. Provision has been made in the 2014 budget.

The present location, on land owned by the University of Guyana (UG) was secured under an MOU between the UG and MOHA. In exchange for permission to utilize the land, the MOHA has agreed and has included in the structure a separate section that houses a much needed science laboratory, fully equipped for the University. The entire facility is protected by a security swipe card system where security cards provided to UG users are programmed with restricted access in order to protect the integrity of the forensic laboratory operations. This extra facility which will serve students as well as faculty was not part of the initial design but is a much welcomed ‘additionality’ that will have widespread impact on the strengthening of research and technology at the national level. Operating protocols for the UG are being developed. Plans are also in place for forensic staff, as well as relevant faculty and laboratory assistants from the university to be trained shortly by the external suppliers of the laboratory’s specialized equipment.

- (ii) **Creation of Houses of Justice.** The project enabled Study Tours to Colombia and Jamaica by senior officials of MOHA as well as the PIU. The concept of *House of Justice* emerged as an innovation from Colombia and has been adapted to the Guyana context. MOHA has established (and is funding) a House of Justice programme in Regions 2 and 3 (5 in each region) from an overall target of 25. The concept introduces a novel approach to conflict resolution, by bringing together, institutions in charge of imparting justice and providing critical social services. It is envisioned to function as an integrated, multi-agency service centre that addresses pressing community social and justice needs. It will also improve access to conciliation and other critical government services by low-income people. A coordinator has been appointed and is working with the new entities in the regions.
- (iii) **Implementing a Safe Neighbourhood Concept.** Arising from the violence prevention activities that were undertaken in the 10 pilot communities in Regions 4 and 6, the Ministry has introduced the *Safe Neighbourhood Initiative* as yet another enterprise that contributes to its objective of enhancing citizen security. Cabinet has approved the Concept Paper. A core element of the initiative is the community road map which embodies criteria that must be met by each community in order to be designated a ‘**Safe Neighbourhood**’. The initiative has been introduced into the 10 communities and the ‘road maps’ have been agreed to by the Community Action Council (CACs) in the last months of the programme. These road maps identify the crime statistics of the communities and offer indicators for peaceful coexistence. It is planned that the implementation of this concept will be led by the CACs in collaboration with the neighbourhood policing groups as well as NGOs and faith –based organizations in the community. Staff members from MOHA continue to interact with community leaders sharing and utilizing information from the ICIS to track the progress of each community in meeting agreed peace targets. ‘*Safe Neighbourhoods in Progress*’ bill boards have been erected in the 10 communities. Logistical and administrative details to encourage and support the initiative are being developed.

3.3. OUTPUTS

IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS (IP)	
COMPONENTS (OUTPUTS)	
1. COMPONENT 1. INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING OF THE MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS Total Cost of Component: US\$3,191,800.00 IDB: US\$3,191,800.00 IDB Disbursement: Classification: HS [] S [X] U [] VU []	
KEY OUTPUTS INDICATORS	
Planned Outputs at EOP	Status At EOP (March 2014)
1.1. Integrated Crime and Violence information system (CO) implemented and surveillance system training completed. – Monthly Reports on crime and violence indicators produced	ACHIEVED. Reports on crime and violence indicators are produced monthly and utilized at the High Level Policy Committee of the CO, chaired by Minister, MOHA, with other members representing MOH, MOLHS&SS, MOLGRD, Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), GPF, Private Sector & Ethnic Relations Commission.
1.2. <u>Training in Data Analysis – 100% of MOHA Research Staff trained in statistical and policy analysis; 5 professionals trained in applied research & investigative skills</u> 1.3. .	ACHIEVED. 100% of staff trained in research methods, questionnaire design, policy development and analysis, data entry and analysis software, monitoring and evaluation. Training is ongoing. Trained Staff: 5 from the CO; 10 from the Policy Research and Statistical Unit; 5 from Minister's Secretariat; 1 from GPF; 1 GPHC. Survey personnel trained included UG students. Training was delivered by the PRU.
1.3. Formulation and Implementation of New Crime <u>Prevention and Intervention Strategies</u> . At least 5 targeted interventions implemented in selected communities related to risk factors identified by the CO.	EXCEEDED. The interventions were: (i) The Walk Against Crime; (ii) Stakeholder Forum to increase Crime Reporting; (iii) Stakeholder Workshop: 'Improving Suicide data Collection nationally'; (iv) Data Sharing of Serious Crimes with the Police; (v) Traffic Education and (vi) Increased Traffic Surveillance Programmes; (vii) House of Justice; (viii) Targeted Street Patrols – yielded results = reduction in crimes in the specific areas ⁹ ; (ix) 2009 Crime Prevention Conference; (x) Traffic Ticketing Information System
1.4. <u>Safe Neighbourhood Surveys</u> 2 victimization and attitudes survey implemented	ACHIEVED. These Surveys were executed in 2011 and in December 2013. Sample size was 1,500 respondents from all of the 10 Regions and 1061 from Regions 4 & 6 in the respective years. Information being used by CO.
1.5. <u>Strategic Action Plan</u> 80% of recommendations of new strategic plan implemented. 80% reduction in time spent on processing requests.	PARTIALLY ACHIEVED. A 5 Year Strategic Plan was completed and approved by Cabinet in 2013. A Strategic Management Department is now in place to manage the implementation which has commenced. The remaining recommendation will be executed under a new TC approved during 2013 (GY-T1107).
1.6. <u>Impact Evaluation (M&E)</u> <u>Implemented</u> 1 Evaluation	NOT ACHIEVED. M&E System Developed and accepted. PRU has conducted several evaluations e.g. (i) level of Awareness & Involvement of Residents CAC Component (May 2011); (ii) regular assessments of crime trends in CAC for semiannual reports; (iii) Indicators for IDB reporting requirements; (iv) Monitor specific aspects of CSP, however, none of which would likely be considered an impact evaluation in the strict sense of the term.
1.7. <u>MOHA Infrastructure Rehabilitated</u> (Head Office Building inclusive of new IT network.)	ACHIEVED. The Building in Brickdam completely refurbished, all defects have been rectified and has now been accepted. It is equipped with adequate new furnishings and computers etc. and staff have expressed their satisfaction. Networking has been completed, and staff oriented. In addition, an EDMS has just been installed, staff trained and inputting of files have commenced. A large amount of files are identified to be placed into the database. This Exercise is very time consuming.
Briefly explain differences between planned and actual outputs (if applicable).	

⁹ Crime Observatory statistics

5 of 7 KPIs achieved, one of which was exceeded. With regard to the one KPI that was partially achieved, the anticipated level of implementation of the Strategic Plan was delayed since the development of the plan was postponed as a result of the mutual termination of the first consultancy to execute this activity (commenced in June 2009) in June 2011. The procurement process had to be repeated. The result of this situation led to a delay in the execution of the activity by approximately 18 months. The final Draft for the Strategic Plan under the new consultancy was submitted in November, 2012. The Plan was approved in early 2013 and work commenced with the establishment of the SMD to manage the implementation of the Plan in the second semester of 2013. In terms of the impact evaluations indicator, none of evaluations completed would likely be considered an impact evaluation in the strict sense of the term.

Restructuring. Indicate if this component was restructured (date and approval of managers). Briefly discuss the consequences of these changes. No restructuring but some changes to the scope of the TOR was requested by the GOG for the institutional strengthening of MOHA and GPF, since it was felt that a few of the initiatives were not required.

KEY OUTPUT INDICATORS

2. COMPONENT 2: STRENGTHENING OF THE GUYANA POLICE FORCE

Total Cost of Component: US\$ US\$11,494,474.64

IDB:US\$11,494,474.64

IDB Disbursement: Classification: HS [] S [X] U [] VU []

Planned Output [At EOP]	Status at EOP (March 2014)
2.1. <u>Integrated Crime Information System implemented</u> – <i>Monthly Reports on Crime indicators published</i> . [Original target: Data to be collected from 18 Police Stations]	PARTIALLY ACHIEVED The ICIS is operational in 39 police stations, 4 correctional facilities (NA, Timihri, Lusignan and GT Prisons) CANU ¹⁰ , Police Headquarters, GPHC and the Ministry of Home Affairs. The system allows for information exchange between GPF and DPP's Chambers; Magistrate Court, GPF, Guyana Revenue Authority, GPHC. This indicator is considered as PARTIALLY ACHIEVED as the dissemination of the crime information is restricted and only made available to the public in an annual summary report.
2.2. <u>Comprehensive Training Scheme Implemented</u> . All GPF's Rank and File staff trained in crime prevention, on human rights related to police activities, conflict resolution, anger management, relations with the public and the media; addressing domestic violence and child abuse cases. – 50 Police Instructors trained	EXCEEDED . 21 Training Modules were presented during 1 st semester of 2010. By the end of June, 2010, 24 Courses along with the Train-the-Trainer modules were delivered. These modules have enhanced the content and scope of the prior courses. They are now incorporated into the repertoire of course offerings and are being implemented in the standard training programmes for recruits and other levels of staff. 70 Police Instructors Trained in new modules ¹¹ .
2.3. <u>Police stations rehabilitated</u> 18 Police Stations	ACHIEVED . By 2012, all 18 Police Stations along the coastlands were rehabilitated.
2.4. All Traffic Department's staff trained in revised legislation by the end of the Programme. – 100%	ACHIEVED . Representatives from DPP Chambers and /or Bar Association conducted the necessary training at the Training School. The GPF Training Program was updated to accommodate the changes in Legislation ¹² .
2.5. <u>Crime Laboratory [Forensic Laboratory] built and operating. Equipped and staffed crime laboratory in operation.</u>	ACHIEVED . Final forensic equipment being installed. The lab was commissioned in July 2014, and the Staff is already recruited..
2.6. <u>New Training Facility constructed and operational</u> – <i>New modern facility with capacity to undertake all training for the GPF in place and operational</i>	ACHIEVED . Completed in 2012. In operation.
2.7. <u>Institutional Modernization of the GPF</u> - <i>A comprehensive Strategic Plan</i> - <i>A result-oriented planning model developed and implemented</i>	PARTIALLY ACHIEVED . The Strategic Plan is complete. Implementation has commenced with the appointment of ten persons in the last quarter of 2013, to staff the Strategic Management Department (SMD). Results –oriented Planning Model developed but not yet implemented.
2.8. Data Centre Built (1)	ACHIEVED . Completed in 2011. In operation.
2.9. Police Training Classroom Built (1)	ACHIEVED . Completed in 2011. In operation.
2.10. Traffic Management Plan	N/A . This product was not funded under the Programme.
2.11. <u>Communications and Public Awareness Plan Implemented</u> . – IT Equipment & Software For GPF Installed.	ACHIEVED . The Communications & Awareness Plan is in place. All related IT equipment and software purchased and installed.

¹⁰ Customs Anti-narcotics Unit – outside the scope.

¹¹ CSP Semi-annual Report: January – June, 2013 (August 15, 2013)

¹² Key Informants, GPF

Briefly explain differences between planned and actual outputs (if applicable).

The project realized approximately 80% of its target. The shortfall relates to two indicators – (a) Dissemination on a monthly basis of crime report and (b) The Strategic Plan, while approved could not realize 80% implementation of the recommendations as a result of delays experienced in obtaining the approval from key stakeholders as well as the recruitment of appropriate staff for the permanent SMD. This Unit became operable in the second semester of 2013 and work on the implementation of the Strategic Plan has recently commenced.

Restructuring. Indicate if this component was restructured (date of approval by Manager). Briefly discuss the consequences of these changes. N/A

Summary Implementation Progress Classification

KEY OUTPUT INDICATORS

3. COMPONENT 3: COMMUNITY ACTION COMPONENT

Total Cost of Component: US\$ US\$2,475,000. IDB:US\$2,475,000.

IDB Disbursement:

Classification : HS[] S[X] U [] VU []

Planned Output [At EOP]	Status At EOP (March 2014)
3.1. Situational control – rapid impact and violence reduction community projects implemented: - 30 (activities /Projects) implemented	ACHIEVED. 3 Projects were implemented in each of ten communities across regions 4 and 6 (Buxton/ Friendship; Annadale/Lusignan; Sophia; Agricola/McDoom; Plaisance; Rose Hall Town / Williamsburg; Port Maurant; Kilcoy/ Chesney/ Fyrish; Angoy's Avenue; Overwinning- Edinburgh
3.2. Socio-cognitive skills programme implemented (e.g. conflict resolution, coexistence promotion, anger management, parenting training, moral reasoning) - 5 socio-cognitive skills programs implemented per community.	ACHIEVED: Each community benefitted from five socio-cognitive programmes, namely: (i) Child Abuse Prevention; (ii) Domestic/ Intimate Partner Violence Prevention; (iii) Youth Violence Prevention; (iv) Personal Development (focused on Literacy & Numeracy) and (v) the Technical Vocational training. Individual members of Social Sector line Ministries supported these initiatives.
3.3. Violence Prevention Services and activities implemented – -1400 youth from Regions 4 and 6 trained in a vocational training course: School based violence prevention programmes - 500 teachers and children trained on violence protection - 20 partnerships (formal engagement of government and civil society) -100 trained adults as lay workers developing and implementing community action projects; - 100 trained youths as lay workers; developing and implementing community action projects;	ACHIEVED. 1377 youth were trained across Regions 4 and 6 each in one of 24 competency areas over the period 2011 -2012 at an approximate a cost of US\$868 per student, well within estimated costs. There were 898 females and 479 males. 141 trainers facilitated these courses which were held simultaneously across the communities in 3 rounds /batches of training. 4,948 teachers and children ¹³ across the Regions 4 & 6 participated in the violence prevention sessions in schools; At least 25 informal partnerships with GOG agencies, NGOs, Faith-based organizations were formed ¹⁴ . 338 persons were trained to sustain community action projects including adults and youth. The precise breakdown of this number was undetermined.
3.4. Multi-purpose community resource centres/ facilities rehabilitated: - 3 centres built/ rehabilitated and are operational.	PARTIALLY ACHIEVED- 66%. 2 Multi-Purpose centers were constructed at Kilcoy/Chesney and Angoy's Avenue. Both are in use at EOP. During the CAC, these facilities were used to accommodate the violence prevention sessions, literacy and computer classes and are being used as the venue for the "Arts" related activities – dance, drama etc. 1 Centre was not built since the CAC and residents were tardy in reaching consensus on this activity. Unutilized resources assigned to this component were reallocated to the Forensic Lab Component.

Briefly explain differences between planned and actual outputs (if applicable). Most of the Benchmarks were attained. The shortfall regarding the Multi-Purpose Centres was as a result of the length of time it took for CACs to identify their rapid impact projects, and MP Centres and, to come to consensus regarding their final choices. Since none of the other communities could identify a multi –purpose center, focus was therefore placed on executing the rapid impact projects in the time remaining for this component's execution.

Restructuring. Indicate if this component was restructured (date of approval by Manager). Briefly discuss the consequences of these changes. N/A

¹³ CAC- Final Project Report – December, 2012: page 76

¹⁴ CAC- Final Project Report – December, 2012: page 57

[] Highly Satisfactory (HS) [X] Satisfactory (S) [] Unsatisfactory (U) [] Very Unsatisfactory

3.5. (a) Project Costs - Summary

Approved Original Loan ('000)	Cancelled ('000)	Approved Current ('000)	Actual Expenditure ('000)	Available Amount ('000)	% Difference (Approved Current/Actual)
US\$19,800,000.00	US\$ nil	US\$19,800,000.00	US\$19,799,951.67	US\$48.33	0%

(b) Project Costs¹⁵ - Details (IDB's Contribution)

CODE	CATEGORY ('000)	APPROVED CURRENT ('000)	ACTUAL EXPENDITURE ('000)	% DIFFERENCE (ACTUAL VS. APPROVED CURRENT) ('000)
01000000	Administration	1,700,200.00	1,853,369.00	9%
02000000	Direct Costs	17,161,274.64	15,851,802.00	7.6%
02010000	Capacity Building - MOHA	3,191,800.00	2,761,850.00	13%
02020000	Capacity Building – GPF	11,494,474.64	10,670,708.00	7%
02030000	Community-Based Intervention	2,475,000.00	2,419,244.00	2%
03000000	Concurrent Costs	275,000.00	104,552.00	62%
03020000	Monitoring and Supervision	200,000.00	49,698.00	75%
03030000	Auditing	75,000.00	54,854.00	27%
04000000	Contingencies	0.00	0.00	0%
85010000	Pay Off PPF Loans	465,525.36	465,525.36	0%
85010000	Pay Off 1653/SF-GY	465,525.36	465,525.36	0%
87000000	Capitalization Charges	198,000.00	198,000.00	0%
87010000	F. I. V.	198,000.00	198,000.00	0%
87010000	F. I. V.	198,000.00	198,000.00	0%
88000000	Pending	0.00	0	-
	Total	19,800,000.00	18,473,248.36	7%

4. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

A. Analysis of Critical Factors

- 4.1. The results of the execution of this operation were influenced by a number of factors, some negative, others positive. The programme had a total extension period of 29 months, and while a time overrun may detract from the overall profile of the project implementation, several factors need to be considered in arriving at a final conclusion since this fact must be balanced with the tangible results at EOP. Key factors that influenced the final results of this operation are:

¹⁵ Financial Status as at May 19, 2014. SOURCE: Finance Department, PIU, CSP, MOHA

- (i) ***Delay in the execution of Component 3 – Community Action.*** The implementation of Component 3 was interrupted for just over eighteen months (**June 15, 2008¹⁶ – January 2010**) as the Government and the Bank renegotiated the specifics of the Action Plan for the CAC. Although there was no proposal to deviate from the objectives of the Component, the overall budget or even the mix of initiatives that were conceptualized at the design stage, the GOG believed that given the dynamics that existed in various communities, and the nexus with the crime situation in the country, in particular, those regarded as disadvantaged, the actions that should be pursued should go beyond sensitization and awareness activities. The request was therefore for a shift in emphasis to actions that would produce more tangible outcomes for the young beneficiaries, males especially, who were school drop-outs and were associated with the face of crime. CAC start-up activities were therefore suspended to enable a clearer definition on the specific activities and the adjustment of funds across the component with agreement from both the GOG and the Bank. This situation was resolved with the visit by a Supervision Mission from the IDB in December, 2009¹⁷.

4.2. ***Other significant delays.*** The other major delay (from February 2012 to April 2014) came about in the construction of the Forensic Laboratory. The delays associated with this facility were as follows:

- (i) The initial approved procurement method that was changed midstream in the process splitting it from a single turnkey contract (**bids came in with extremely high costs**) to three contracts that catered separately for a design, construction and supervision by an engineering consultant or firm, utilizing a competitive method. This decision resulted in a repeat of the procurement process with resultant delays amounting to almost 2 years¹⁸.
- (ii) Delays during execution of the Contract:
 - Shortage of specialized material resulted in sourcing outside of Guyana; because of its specialized nature it took a lengthy time for a supplier to be identified and then for the material to be shipped to Guyana;
 - Unacceptable performance by the contractor, and also, the supervising engineering consulting firm. In order to correct technical deficiencies, the PIU engaged support from the Work Services Group, MOW&C.
 - The delays in commencing the engineering works as well as the challenges that ensued resulted in further deferrals for dependent activities - UPS and ACs and Electrical Circuitry installation as well as the laboratory equipment.
- (iii) A Forensic Specialist had to be engaged from outside of Guyana to assist the GPF in defining the specifications for the laboratory equipment.
- (iv) In general, the process of reviewing consultants' reports / deliverables was cumbersome, and feedback from policy makers was not provided in the timeliest manner.

4.3. ***Political Will and Commitment.*** The achievements of this operation at EOP are largely attributable to the demonstrated commitment - at the political as well as the senior administrative level of the MOHA. The Minister was very visible, leading the innovations, the problem solving and lobbying for support at Cabinet as well as other government and public

¹⁶ CSP Semi-annual Report- January – June, 2009, p.17; CSP Semi-annual Report- July – D December, 2009, p.4

¹⁷ CSP Semi-annual Report- July – December, 2009, p.4

¹⁸ Decision taken to retender during 1st Semester in 2009 [CSP semi-annual report January–June '09]. Contract for the Construction of the Forensic Laboratory commenced in May, 2011 and was scheduled to be completed in May 2012 [CSP Semi-annual Report, Semester 1, 2011).

fora. Internally, such commitment was apparent in the monthly review meetings for both MOHA and GPF which were chaired by the Minister, the inclusion of budgets that ensured that the expenses associated with newly formed functions, mechanism and units, such as the Strategic Management Departments for MOHA and the GPF were provided for in the relevant Budgetary Estimates of Expenditure for 2013 and 2014.

- 4.4. ***Institutional Capacity.*** The governance structure in MOHA as well as that of the PIU were adequate throughout the period of project execution. The oversight capacity was bolstered from the inclusion of external stakeholders in the High Level Committee. At the operational level, the programme design, recognizing the significant portion of the operation which was IT and research oriented, had included two positions that reflected the desired level of expertise. These positions in the PIU were filled at the onset of the programme and this contributed significantly to the related outputs – the CO, the ICIS as well as the other supporting IT initiatives e.g. the EDMS at both agencies. It should be noted however, that the capacity of the country for data generation and dissemination remains at an inadequate level compared to that of Bank member countries.
- 4.5. The management and administrative levels at the PIU were also filled from the beginning with skilled and experienced personnel, especially in critical areas such as procurement and financial administration. In the programme management area, key informants reported that support came from the officers in the IT, CO and CAS as they consistently provided technical guidance and oversight over processes and outputs. Strong administrative support was also proffered by the incumbents of the administrative positions – the Executive Secretary, the Finance Assistant as well as the CAS Assistant. The group portrayed a strong sense of team spirit operating in their individual spheres yet supporting each other at the big events in the implementation calendar. However, an inappropriate relationship between the PC and a contractor under the CAC, perhaps due to a lack of adequate controls, resulted in the resignation of the PC in March 2013.
- 4.6. ***Monitoring and Evaluation.*** This was a critical element in influencing the outcomes of this project's implementation and is executed at several levels. The process depicted strengths as well as weaknesses. A key strength was the monthly meetings that were called by the Minister of MOHA with the principals of the PIU, the GPF and the PS. These sessions assisted greatly in keeping project activities moving. At these meetings, the PC shared updates regarding the current implementation. The weakness was that the agenda for the meeting was strongly influenced by the PC, and reviews were not necessarily managed from the basis of the current Annual Operations Plan (AOPs). Moreover, although financial reporting was at the macro level, in hindsight, intermediate processes did not have the benefit of MOHA's review.
- 4.7. ***Fiscal and Financial Management.*** A perusal of the audit reports from the approved independent audit firm – TSD LAL & CO.- over the period 2007 -2012 confirmed that the PIU performed in compliance with financial clauses of the Loan Contract and in keeping with standard accounting practices and policies. The requisite critical financial and other records were satisfactorily maintained, and all required reports were submitted to the IDB more or less at the stated deadlines. MOHA, in its role of the budget agency exercised financial prudence over project transactions in accordance with related policies and procedures. The PIU and the MOHA displayed capacity to respond to requests for mid- year reports as well as Annual Programme Performance Impact Reports. The PIU's performance more often than not, enabled the planned annual inflows of the Office of the Budget, necessary to meet the short term investment needs for the sector. Releases as well as disbursement endorsements were realized in a timely manner¹⁹ so that adequate and appropriate financing was generally available to advance the activities of the programme's annual operations plan. Timely reconciliation of the

¹⁹ PIU Staff; PCMD, MOF

programme's bank balances and the concomitant accounting and reporting practices employed were in compliance with Bank requirements and AG's regulations and aimed at supporting good public expenditure management in MOHA. These foregoing factors support the conclusion that the CSP contributed to the maintenance of sound fiscal and financial management.

- 4.8. **Resistance to Change.** The reforms in this programme were innovations, many of which were technologically driven. With regard to the GPF, routines were manually driven and many processes dated back to the 1960s. The old culture was firmly entrenched and the new ideas evoked much uncertainty and suspicion since masses of information that were hitherto the exclusive reserve of the Force, were now being placed in 'civilian' hands. Resistance was covertly expressed in long delays in the provision of feedback on proposals. From the beneficiary's perspective, public safety demands conflicted with the time needed to focus on the modernization process, thereby inhibiting the timeliest responses; this situation, it was claimed, was further compounded by the shortage of police staff. In other instances, the procurement process was delayed due to the late approval of the numerous Terms of Reference. These responses could well have been as a result of the absence of a project management culture that demands timely decision-making (since this was the first large, comprehensive effort of reform in the security sector with several initiatives running concurrently), coupled with the several conflicting priorities of senior officials from their day-to-day commitments within an institutional landscape that was filled with various demands from a multiplicity of constituents. At EOP, PIU staff confirms that buy-in was obtained at the level of the senior cadre of the GPF as a result of monthly meetings between the Minister, PIU staff and the GPF. There, progress was shared and benefits highlighted.
- 4.9. **Administrative Changes at Strategic Levels of the participating entities.** At various points in the execution of this project, key informants indicated that in a few instances, there were changes in strategic positions in both the PIU, in the position of PC, and at the senior policy level of the GPF. These changes contributed to project delays, since the new persons had to take some time to become acquainted with their new responsibilities, having to balance those with the demands of the project. Some informants believe that changes at the strategic level would have impacted on the direction and emphases on certain project activities since personal interest, preferences would dictate choices which in some instances, did appear to have brought some level of 'shifting' in emphases on specific initiatives. In a few instances, the perception is that 'champions' for certain reforms may have been lost.
- 4.10. **Design of the Violence Prevention Activities.** The structure of the CAC offered a mixture of violence awareness / education sessions, technical vocational skills training as well as facilities upgrades. The inclusion of a "sports" element further aroused the interest of communities. Despite several instances of initial reticence that bordered on suspicion and even overt rejection, the emerging benefits, together with the persistence communication processes that were led by the PIU and the CAC, influenced a change of mind that saw residents embracing the programme. Indeed, key informants stated that the technical vocational training courses, shunned at first, were later oversubscribed and that there was always a waiting list for each round of training. Three batches of training, instead of the targeted four were delivered since there was a time constraint. Final results strongly suggest that had the technical vocational training continued for another 'round', the target of 1400 would have been exceeded. The general perception at the level of residents in the community was that the programme offered something for everyone, those who were not trained still had the access to the facilities that were installed. This has led some CACs to continue their association, especially where members have been involved with other community improvement groups. The media campaign helped to carry the message and at EOP, several communities are appealing for similar interventions.
- 4.11. **Duration of the CAC.** Key informants agree that while the results of the CAC were successful, the time for implementation was too short, placing restrictions on associated activities which would

have added even more value to the overall outcomes. A few examples of the effect of this constraint was (i) the inability to forge formal relationships with social sector line ministries²⁰ which would have increased the quality of the output and fostered buy-in and commitment to future interventions; the ‘clashing’ of the violence awareness education sessions²¹ as they were conducted more or less simultaneously given the completion date for the intervention as well as the project; the inability to conduct tracer studies of trained youth after the course²².

- 4.12. **Strategy to attract and retain critical clerical level staff.** The institutional constraints of the GPF, very early in the implementation of the identified reforms, demanded a response that would enable the seamless execution of the ICIS, in particular, the populating of the database from police stations in real time. A decision was taken to recruit civilian data entry clerks on a permanent basis and in order to attract applicants; the strategy employed was to encourage young persons who were suitably qualified from communities with police stations. The recruitment process targeted as a first preference, youths who possessed EDMS at CXC. The data clerks²³ are being paid by the Ministry and technical supervision and guidance is provided by the IT Specialist, MOHA.

D. Borrower / Executing Agency (EA) Performance

Borrower / EA

[] Highly Satisfactory (HS) [**X**] Satisfactory (S) [] Unsatisfactory (U) [] Very Unsatisfactory (VU)

- 4.13. Project implementation suffered from several delays, arising from slow decision-making, resistance to change, lengthy procurement processes, and in some cases inept consultants and contractors. In some instances, these constraints were outside of the manageable control of the EA. While these challenges were disconcerting, the Ministry was able to pursue the project execution, as a result of strong leadership by the Minister who ensured that the progress was monitored continuously. The Ministry provided unstinting support to the PIU throughout the execution period and was very visible at the many programmed activities, helping in addressing problems on-the-spot. Engagement of sister ministries, private sector and faith based organizations assisted in problem-solving that was a regular feature in such a complex project. The weakness was limited to monitoring of the PIU at the micro level and this may have allowed for non-compliance with procurement procedures as the project neared completion.

4.14. Bank Performance

Bank's Performance

[**X**] Highly Satisfactory (HS) [] Satisfactory (S) [] Unsatisfactory (U) [] Very Unsatisfactory

²⁰ This was envisaged in the Loan Proposal and the Operations Manual.

²¹ The beneficiary target was the same for more than one of the programmes – Domestic / Intimate Partner Violence Prevention; Child Abuse Prevention; Youth Violence Prevention; Personal Development and the technical vocational skills training.

²² CAC – Proposed Action Plan

²³ The staff is likely to remain in these positions since the terms of employment are attractive. Although stationed at the local police stations, they are MOHA's staff and are employed under the contract gratuity system.

- 4.15. The performance of the Bank was deemed very satisfactory by all of the principal personnel in the EA as well as the PIU. Despite three changes in Team Leaders, those transitions posed few problems and there was a consistency in the approach which was to assist the GOG and MOHA in solving the several challenges that arose during the course of project implementation and ensuring that the project advanced. The Bank was accommodating as it sought to assist the GOG in finding solutions to issues without compromising its policies and procedures. There was a coordinated approach by the various specialists in the procurement and financial areas as well as the technical areas and this team approach allowed for discussions that revealed the various aspects of a problem. This allowed for the identification of solutions that were immediate and multi-faceted. Responses were usually prompt and this encouraged the PIU, in particular in the uphill task of delivering the project.
- 4.16. In addition, constant support provided by the CGY Operations Analyst for project supervision contributed to the successful execution, considering that no in-house Team Leader was based in CGY for the last 27 months of project execution.

5. Sustainability

A. Analysis of Critical Factors

- 5.1. At EOP, it is very probable that the many of the identified outputs from the implementation of this CSP project, certainly the Modernization efforts of MOHA and GPF will be sustained as a result of several factors that are listed below:

B. *Factors that favor Sustainability*

- 5.2. The **ongoing political will** which has contributed significantly to the status quo and which continues to be visibly demonstrated. Research has confirmed that a key imperative for sustained organizational change is strong political will, which provides leadership as well as fosters the enabling environment for change to be embraced. MOHA is not lacking on this dimension of change management.
- 5.3. The **establishment of Strategic Plans as well as staffed Strategic Management Departments** in MOHA and GPF are factors that indicate the commitment of these agencies to continue the modernization agenda. With expertise that is dedicated solely to this aspect of the reform effort, there is every likelihood that the future allocation of resources for developmental initiatives will be guided by the strategic priorities that have been approved, and that planned activities are more likely to remain on track.
- 5.4. It has been established through the literature on organizational behaviour that information technology has the potential to change an organization's structure, culture, politics, and work processes. The CSP **was technologically oriented** with the development of two large management information systems which have begun to change not only the work processes in the MOHA and GPF but have already forged information sharing electronic linkages with key agencies such as the GPS, the GFS, the DPP's Chambers, Magistrates' Court, the GPHC, CANU, GRA, Maritime Administration Department. These arrangements are formalized in MOUs, many of which are already in force while a few are about to be signed. Some agencies, while not electronically connected, are also contributing data into the ICIS. These changes are very likely to be sustained for the following reasons:
- (i) The heavy capital investment²⁴ and the resultant IT infrastructure which have changed work procedures and processes that actually restrict the paper driven culture, as well as

²⁴ Total Hardware and Software costs for MOHA were US\$559,945; for GPF cost is US\$677,454. **Source:** PIU –March 28, 2014

the command and control culture are being effectively utilized since extensive training has been undertaken and processes are documented in operating manuals.

- (ii) The ***harnessing of research and technology expertise, strengthening the institutional capacity of MOHA and GPF*** through the continued engagement of these two specialists -the IT Specialist and the Head of the CO under similar contractual arrangements which will attract and retain these specialist skills, given the external competition that exists.; the recruitment of Policy Analysts who are already functioning to support evidence-based policy analysis at both institutions; the recruitment, training and placement of permanent staff who are presently manning data entry points at police stations along the coastland; the existence of an MIS unit at each location to provide ongoing technical support to users of the system. This is supported by user and administrator's manuals.
- (iii) Institutional capacity building has been a key feature of this project. In addition to what has been done on the IT side, 70 Trainers / Police Instructors were identified and trained to continue teaching of ranks in the disciplines that have been highlighted earlier in this report.
- (iv) The introduction of EDMS at MOHA and GPF will transform the manual record keeping systems into an electronic repository of documents created by and received into the organizations. These systems will enable instant information dissemination across departments, ultimately eliminating, or at the least, significantly reducing paper dependency thereby contributing to greater efficiencies.
- (v) There is ***financial viability*** as this relates to the ability of the MOHA and GPF to support the operational phase of the products generated, since these costs have been included in the 2014 annual budget estimates. It is not anticipated that there will be significant reductions to these proposals since the budgets are generally accommodated by MOF, largely as a result of the sensitive and critical nature of the institutions' mandates. Service level agreements will be signed after budget approval with an IT firm which will respond to requests for repairs, maintenance and replacements. These agreements include quality standards e.g. repairs to be executed in 72 hours etc.
- (vi) ***Stakeholder engagement throughout the sector has strengthened*** and support for the ***technological changes endorsed*** as has been highlighted in the several inter-agency structures and initiatives which are in progress. These are driven by a common interest in the related information from the ICIS. This culture of enhanced / increased collaboration includes the private sector as well as faith-based organizations. At EOP, Guyana Telephone and Telegraph is partnering with MOHA to improve connectivity to connect all police stations across the country. That entity is considering the allocation to MOHA of a dedicated line to enable a wider reach. At the internal stakeholder level in GPF, in which there is resistance at some middle and junior ranks, there is still room for envisaging an encouraging future. New recruits will be presented with an environment where information technology is at the core of the organization's existence. This will be their institutional reality; they will be a part of the new dispensation.

5.5. ***Factors that place sustainability in the balance.*** Although the Literature confirms that the impact of social change is not immediately evident, early post intervention changes can be regarded as indicative of future change. The envisaged outcome was that youth exposed to the technical vocational skills training as well as the violence mitigating strategies would become ***'agents of change, active in promoting peaceful co-existence'*** as well as ***'to be able to function and participate in the economic aspects of community life, through access to life skills, business and vocational training'***²⁵. At the EOP, while there are several factors that are

²⁵ Component 3: Community Action – Proposed Action Plan (2010).

favorably inclined towards the sustainability of the highlighted outcomes, there are also others that, if not addressed, can reduce the potential benefits of this initiative. On the positive side, the following conditions auger well for sustainability:

- (i) The introduction of **the Safe Neighbourhood Concept can act as a catalyst** for the continuation of the violence prevention strategies. However, this is contingent on community leaders' willingness to continue to give of their time, post project, on a 'volunteer' basis. From assessments undertaken by the PIU as well as interviews conducted with a sample of CAOs during this evaluation, many CAC members have indicated that while they were willing to continue their association and involvement, a small stipend should be paid to members as an incentive.
- (ii) **PIU staff report that of the ten communities, only two of the CACs still are functioning** on a voluntary basis, albeit with a composition that is constantly evolving but continues to include representatives of other formal groups and organizations in the communities who were always involved in similar community activities. Some communities have organized small fundraisers to augment 'in kind' contribution towards the maintenance of the new facilities. Accordingly to the PIU, all of the new facilities obtained under the programme are being maintained.
- (iii) A key informant advised that **the Ministry will continue to provide technical support for the continuance of the 'Sports' element of the programme**, especially in the area of planning and will assist in the organizing of Inter-Regional Competitions. Provision has been made under the 2014 Community Policing Budget to support this assistance. Most of the key informants recognized that sustainability, for this CA component is a work in progress, which must be nurtured by the Ministry.
- (iv) While 338 persons were trained to sustain community action projects focused on violence prevention, according to the final reports from the consultants who executed training, several of these beneficiaries' capacity to function as trainers was questionable.
- (v) **75% of those trained are employed**, although not necessarily in the disciplines in which they were trained²⁶. It was suggested that from the overall intervention, they acquired enough 'socio-cognitive skills' to become 'employable'. In most cases, they are employed outside of their communities since jobs therein are not readily available but rather more opportunities may exist in other locations. **This emerging outcome²⁷ is consistent with, indeed, exceeds the level of employment that was envisaged** during the development of the Action Plan.
- (vi) For those unemployed since the project, 50% are females and have indicated that cultural values and norms have informed their decision not to work at all or not to work away from their villages because of their gender²⁸. Others are working occasionally in their homes (cosmetology²⁹). They choose not to work outside their homes since they are mainly single mothers of small children. In terms of the remaining unemployed, information from the PIU indicates that a few, unfortunately, have reverted to old habits and behaviours.

Sustainability Classification

²⁶ PIU staff interviews – March, 2014

²⁷ '.....at least 50% of 'at risk' youths will be viable agents of change.....increasing their involvement in viable, legitimate economic activities.

²⁸ - CAC: Proposed Action Plan, page 5

²⁹ Community Action Component: Final Project Report (2012)

²⁹ This competency area was oversubscribed (there was a reported 88 persons in one community who selected cosmetology); and is of concern to the implementers. Informants suggest that the choice stemmed from the weak academic base. The Minister is hoping that future interventions would be so designed to encouraged females to dream 'bigger' by introducing and 'selling' other occupational alternatives.

[] Highly Probable (HP)	[X] Probable (P)	[] Low Probability (LP)	[] Improbable (I)
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- (vii) In this first attempt, sufficient actions have taken place to embed the outputs of the reforms that were undertaken in MOHA and GPF. Their sustainability is highly probable. The outcomes from the execution of the CAC are discernible. Beneficiary communities as well as **other communities** have expressed a desire for a continuation / **replication of the programme**³⁰. These are key ingredients for sustainability but much more tangible support, in the form of financial resources and permanent dedicated structures / alliances are required to build on what has emerged if the initiative is to take firm root and the structures, processes, outputs and outcomes perpetuated.

B. Potential Risks

5.6. The potential risks to the sustainability of project outputs and early outcomes are as follows:

- (i) The technical specialists who are now still employed under the Programme are critical to the successful continuance of the new routines and facilities, especially in the IT and policy analysis domains. Should an agreement not be reached for their continued engagement with the MOHA and GPF for any reason, the furtherance of the momentum that now exists at EOP in both agencies can be seriously jeopardized.
- (ii) The emerging trend in Regions 4 and 6, whereby youths who were school drop-outs have discovered a future in which they can function in productive economic activities as a result of having benefitted from the technical vocational skills training from the CAC, has provided realms of possibilities for similarly disadvantaged youth. These expectations can however be frustrated if resources are not secured to continue this sub-programme in other communities throughout the regions.
- (iii) The present structure (from the CAOs to the CACs) that supports the violence awareness / education sub-programmes, can well disintegrate if no monetary support is provided to support the continuation of the initiative. While volunteerism should be encouraged, the socio-cultural and economic environment within these communities can weaken (as it already has in some instances) the resolve of those willing to continue to serve.
- (iv) The informal partnerships with representatives from social sector line ministries (MOH, MOE, MLHS&SS) can dissipate and the desired impact - the sustainability of shared responsibility for the maintenance of CAC's outputs and outcomes not realized unless these associations advance beyond the individual relationships reaching institutional policy levels where more tangible and deliberate collaboration can be established.
- (v) Any political or even administrative change in the present landscape of the security sector that reduces the depth of interest and passion for change/modernization may impact negatively on the pace and even the present priorities for reform.
- (vi) Any immediate escalation of crime /violence which is not matched with simultaneous violence prevention interventions that are ongoing in existing and new communities, can seriously diminish the emerging results of this project.
- (vii) Key informants agree that there still remain several covert but definite signs of resistance at lower levels of the organizations. If these are left unattended, the reforms that are now in progress as well as those identified in the Strategic plans can be undermined.

C. Institutional Capacity

5.7. As the project moves into the maintenance / operations mode, the institutional capacity exists in both MOHA and GPF to sustain and further develop the outputs from this intervention. The decision to continue the engagement of the technical staff from the project has been made; the

³⁰ Key informants from the Final Evaluation process – March, 2014

terms for new contractual arrangements for these officials are being worked out. At the broader institutional level, capacity building has occurred from the several training programmes offered in various competencies that were delivered to both staff and trainers alike. Organizational aides such as user /and administrator operations' manuals are in place and oversight mechanisms are working. Staff in the Strategic Management Departments is equipped with the requisite skills to manage the implementation of the Strategic Plans, and expertise in monitoring and evaluation now resides in staff within the PRU.

Additional project sustainability imperatives

- 5.8. **Immediate actions required:** The following actions are recommended for consideration to further strengthen sustainability:
- (i) The development of an Action Plan to assist CACs in maintaining the momentum of the violence prevention interventions in Regions 4 and 6. This will augment the efforts that are presently being pursued by the Ministry, eliminating the uncertainty about the future that exists in several communities.
 - (ii) The identification of resources to continue, at minimum, the Personnel Development programme, emphasizing literacy and numeracy, aspects which are desired by communities. This should be pursued with the MOE.
 - (iii) The formalization of partnerships with social sector line ministries with the aim of jointly rolling out the CACs, or portions of it to other communities.
 - (iv) Implementation of the GPF's Communication and PR strategy and accelerating the development of the similar initiative from MOHA's Strategic Plan.
 - (v) Expand the ICIS to include all Police Stations throughout the country.
 - (vi) The High Level Committee should consider commencing dialogue with the MOE with a view to advocating the inclusion of violence prevention education modules into the national school curricula, at every level of the education system. These modules should be core (compulsory) courses.

6. Monitoring and Evaluation

A. Information on Results

- 6.1 The design of this project was built from empirical data that spoke to the challenges in the sector, i.e. the deterioration in the environment during that period (2002 – 2006). Data from the GPF enabled a working appreciation of the social problem and the face/ profile of crime which pointed to youths who were between the ages of 14 – 25 and were school 'drop-outs'. The 2002 Census also provided enough pertinent data thereby enabling the development of indicators that would measure the mix of interventions geared to enhance the security environment including the major institutions therein, given the systemic institutional weaknesses that existed.
- 6.2 At the beginning of project execution, baseline data existed for most of the indicators in the logframe. A perusal of semi-annual reports generated by the PIU as well as the Bank's, PPMR for 2011 and 2013 confirmed that sufficient information / statistics was provided to enable the internal monitoring of the project as well as preparation of the mid-term evaluation and this report. This was made possible from the work that is being done by the CO, the ICIS as well as the reports from the Safe Neighbourhood Surveys. The continued garnering of information using, at a minimum, these mediums will ensure that adequate information will be available for an ex-post evaluation in 2017, should this be agreed upon by stakeholders.

B. Future Monitoring and Ex-Post Evaluation

- 6.3 The Loan Document for this programme does not stipulate an ex-post evaluation; however, this Loan Agreement had reposed the responsibility of monitoring and evaluating the Programme in the Policy and Research Unit of the MOHA. Staff has been duly trained and has executed a number of evaluations during the project execution. In addition, they have trained interviewers and data entry staff for the SNSs and also supervised those activities. The PRU therefore should have the capacity to conduct an ex-post evaluation for this programme.
- 6.4 Given the obvious nexus between the goal of this programme and the investment climate of the country, that demands a safe environment, an ex-post evaluation should be conducted three years after this PCR, i.e. the end of 2017. For ease of reference, the key outcome indicators to be measured at that point are:
- (i) Crime Victimization rate reduced from 21.3% to 17.3%.
 - (ii) People's attitude about their neighbours and their neighbourhoods increased from Neighbourhood Index of 66.5 (2006) to 79.8
 - (iii) Reduction of the number of undetermined deaths / crimes in Region 4 and 6 from 35% to 15%
 - (iv) Perception that GPF and MOHA are not doing a good job preventing crimes in Region IV. KPI: From 34% - 26%.
 - (v) Perception that GPF and MOHA are not doing a good job preventing crimes in Region VI. KPI: From 36% to 25%.
 - (vi) Willingness of neighbours to get involved and help each other out in Region IV. KPI: From 68% to 75%
 - (vii) Willingness of neighbours to get involved and help each other out in Region VI. KPI: From 76% to 83%
 - (viii) Persons with the ability to control their anger and avoid a fight in Region IV. KPI: From 56% to 67%
 - (ix) Persons with the ability to control their anger and avoid a fight in Region VI. KPI: From 43% to 51%
- 6.5 Data on these indicators is being compiled biannually in the *Safe Neighbourhood Surveys* – an initiative that commenced in 2006 when baseline information was garnered and was repeated in 2011 and 2013 under the auspices of the CSP. Related information on crime statistics is being collected and analyzed by the CO at the MOHA.
- 6.6 The ex-post evaluation should also assess:
- (i) the number of youths in Region 4 and Region 6, who benefitting from the violence prevention sessions as well as the technical vocational skills training, were subsequently able to become engaged in and sustained relationships in productive economic activities;
 - (ii) the degree to which crime has decreased in these two locations, including reports of child abuse, youth violence and domestic violence.

7. Lessons Learned

- (i) The Ministry of Home Affairs may experience time lapses between formulation and implementation of national policies, and these lapses should be factored in the execution timeline of future operations. Allocation of appropriate resources should be consistent with the scope and purpose of the proposed reforms and activities, to facilitate the sustainability of the reforms.

- (ii) Special attention should be given to promote the involvement of the local communities to actively participate in project activities, promoting buy-in and commitment as well as satisfied beneficiaries at the end of the intervention.
- (iii) In the execution of future projects, special care must be taken to carefully define the desired profile of the consultant or the firm charged with execution, since a clear understanding of the operating environment and of its constraints is absolutely essential if the contract is to be effectively discharged. Failure to do this can result in serious client / consultant dysfunction which can significantly delay the advancement of the related project activity.
- (iv) Projects that have significant infrastructure works should have an engineer within the structure of the PIU to ensure either directly or indirectly, the technical soundness of outputs in a way consistent with project design. Alternatively, for smaller projects, technical assistance should be sought from the local Ministry of Public Works which can provide the requisite technical oversight over the supervising consultant, to ensure that the activity finishes on time and in adherence to sound engineering standards.
- (v) The EA must enforce its oversight responsibility over the PIU in a structured and consistent manner throughout project execution. The approach should comprise monitoring methods that maintain ongoing surveillance on targets that are set in the AOP, supplemented by the Internal Audit Department, which should be used in a systematic manner to ensure that all operating and financial protocols are appropriately observed.
- (vi) Mechanisms should be put in place to ensure adequate checks and balances exist within the PIU. Specifically, no PIU staff member should simultaneously and solely be in charge of activities such as drafting of ToR, requesting price quotations, awarding contracts, and selecting and hiring the supervision for components of the programme.
- (vii) Project teams should support the PIU with the drafting and implementation of written procedures to guide the composition and functioning of evaluation committees, requiring minimum technical expertise for all members, requirement that award be made by a committee and not by an individual, and inexistence of hierarchical relationships among members of the committee.
- (viii) New programmes should consider promotion of citizen oversight mechanisms that might include: scheduling sessions with communities to inform them of the programme and establishing formal channels to actively involve civil society organizations and communities in monitoring and supervision of the implementation of works and provision of goods, including channels to report prohibited practices, irregularities or other implementation problems.
- (ix) In order to facilitate the employability of disadvantaged youth through life skills and technical vocation training, in future operations it would be useful to include activities related to career guidance as well as placement of graduates. This will improve the impact of such programmes, increasing the probability of the recipients becoming involved in lasting economic activities.
- (x) The conceptualization and delivery of Violence Prevention programmes must consider and promote formal alliances with social sector line ministries that are generally already working in these communities in similar areas and can bring their expertise to the process.
- (xi) A special effort should be made to ensure that indicators have sufficient data available at the time of the project's closing to be able to evaluate its effectiveness (likelihood to achieve development objectives).
- (xii) Due to the challenges of Crime and Violence data generation and the sensibility regarding its dissemination, future support by the Bank should assure that resources are available for

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necessary surveys and data gathering/consolidation and that a consensus exists regarding access to and dissemination of such data.

ANNEXES

ANNEX 1:

Project Cost Table

ANNEX 1: CITIZEN SECURITY PROGRAMME: PROJECT COST TABLE BY COMPONENT AND FUNDING SOURCE³¹.

CATEGORY ('000)		APPROVED CURRENT (REVISED BUDGET)			ACTUAL EXPENDITURE ('000)			BALANCE ON BUDGET ('000)			% BALANCE ON BUDGET		
		IDB	GOG	TOTAL	IDB[1]	GOG	TOTAL	IDB	GOG	TOTAL	IDB	GOG	TOTAL
1000000	Administration	1,700,200.00	500,000.00	2,200,200.00	1,853,369.00	570,225.90	2,423,594.90	-153,169.00	-70,225.90	-223,394.90	-9%	-39%	10.0%
2000000	Direct Costs	17,161,274.64	981,000	18,142,274.64	15,851,802	1,102,116.19	16,953,918.19	1,309,472.64	-121,116.19	1,188,356.45	7.6%	-12%	6.5%
2010000	Capacity Building - MOHA	3,191,800.00	177,000.	3,368,800.00	2,761,850	179,882.73	2,941,732.73	429,950.00	-2,882.73	427,067.27	13%	-2%	12.7%
2020000	Capacity Building – GPF	11,494,474.64	463,000.00	11,957,474.64	10,670,708	771,919.02	11,442,627.02	823,766.64	-308,919.02	514,847.62	7%	67%	4.3%
2030000	Community-Based Intervention	2,475,000.00	341,000.00	2,816,000.00	2,419,244	150,314.44	2,569,558.44	55,756.00	190,685.56	246,441.56	2%	56%	8.8%
3000000	Concurrent Costs	275,000	0	275,000	104,552.00	0	104,552.00	170,448.00	0	170,448.00	62%	0%	62%
3020000	Monitoring and Evaluation	200,000.00	0	200,000.00	49,698.00	0	49,698.00	150,302.00	0	150,302.00	75%	0%	75%
3030000	Auditing	75,000.00	0	75,000.00	54,854.00	0	54,854.00	20,146.00	0	20,146.00	27%	0%	26.9%
4000000	Contingencies	0	0	0.00	0	0	0.00	0	0	0.00	0%	0%	0
85010000	Pay Off PPF Loans	465,525.36	0	465,525.36	465,525.36	0	465,525.36	0	0	0.00	0%	0%	0
87000000	Capitalization Charges	198,000.00	719,000.	917,000	198,000.00	819,318.89	1,017,318.89	0	-100,318.89	-100,318.89	0%	-14%	-10.9%
	FIV	198,000.00	0	198,000.00	198,000.00	0	198,000.00	0	0	0.00	0%	0%	0
	F. I. V.		719,000.00	719,000.00		819,318.89	819,318.89	0	- 100,318.89	- 100,318.89	0%	-14%	-10.9%
88000000	Pending	0			0			0			0%		
TOTAL		19,800,000.00	2,200,000	22,000,000.00	18,473,248.36	2,491,660.98	20,964,909.34	1,326,751.64	-291,660.98	1,035,090.66	7%	-13%	4.7%

³¹ Financial Status as at May 19, 2014: Costs in US\$. The Citizen Security Programme received a supplementary provision (additional Funding) to cover the amount expended beyond US\$2.2 million which was originally budgeted for the GOG/Counterpart funds. REVOLVING FUND AT MAY 19, 2014: US\$522,268.21. SOURCE: CSP PIU- Finance Department.

Annex 2.

Minutes from the Exit Workshop

1. INTRODUCTION

The Exit Workshop for the CSP was held on April 7, 2014 at the Grand Coastal Hotel, Le Ressouvenir, East Coast Demerara. The objectives of the workshop, which was intended to be a participatory one, were to:

- Assess the results of the program in keeping with its key performance indicators and its contribution to the achievement of the Development Objective.
- Identify the challenges to the sustainability/ institutionalization of project outputs and early impacts and the critical actions needed to improve sustainability.
- Assess the appropriateness of the Project design as well as the project management practices that were employed.
- Identify lessons learnt that can be applied to the design of future similar projects.

1.1. The event comprised an Opening Session and this was followed by a Work Session that focused on the delivery of the Business of the day. In the case of the former aspect, this session, which lasted for approximately half-an-hour, was chaired by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Home Affairs, Ms. Angela Johnson. The main Speakers were the Minister of Home Affairs, Hon. Clement Rohee, and the Country Representative of the Inter-American Development Bank, Ms. Sophie Makonnen. Project Coordinator of the CSP, Mr. Anil Ramnath, gave the 'Appreciation'. This session was also graced with the presence of special Invitees from the wider public service. Both Speakers expressed satisfaction with the final results of the project execution, asserting that the project, notwithstanding its challenges, was a success. The Bank's representative shared with the participants the Bank's confidence as expressed in the recent approval of a Technical Cooperation Grant that will assist the Ministry of Home Affairs in strengthening the sustainability of some of the outputs from the present CSP operation, even as the preparation of a Second Project in the sector is in progress.

1.2. The Minister expressed his appreciation to the Bank for affording the Ministry the opportunity to participate in several information sharing fora held in other countries that were also pursuing citizen security programmes. These, he declared, had provided very useful insights into the several aspects of innovations which were being undertaken elsewhere and had assisted local implementers in the 'fleshing out' of some interventions that were subsequently introduced in the Guyana context. One such example was the Community Action Component that saw a similar programme being executed in Jamaica. Several elements were incorporated into the local program. Minister Rohee confirmed the utility of such opportunities for institutional sharing and learning across national boundaries. Another important point the Minister made was the absence of institutional coordination in the programme execution. He observed that the challenge of public safety and security was much more than a law enforcement concern, but that the sociological imperatives must be recognized and responded to in formal partnerships with the respective social sector line ministries. This social dilemma demanded a multi-sector approach.

1.3. Minister affirmed that the Community Action Component was highly successful and could be deemed the 'Flagship' of the operation since it placed the issue of sustainability firmly into the hands of residents of the piloted communities in Regions 4 and 6. A main concern, in hindsight, was the absence of a 'trainee placement' component, which left the securement of jobs after

training to the trainee amidst the ‘vagaries of the market economy’. The Minister also confirmed that the GOG and the Bank had agreed in principle, to a second round of Citizen Security reforms and charged the group to critically examine the present outcomes with a view to identifying the imperatives that should be included in future reform programmes so that an equally successful outcome could be realized.

2. WORK SESSION – GROUP EVALUATION

- 2.1. Following the departure of the main speakers and the special invitees, the Workshop proceeded into the business of the day – the participatory evaluation of the Programme. Participants totaled 46 and were from the MOHA, the GPF as well as representatives from the ten participating communities in Regions 4 and 6. Two representatives from the IDB – Stefano Tinari, Modernization of the State International Specialist and Derise Williams, Operations Senior Analyst also observed and participated in the day’s activities. The session was facilitated by Leila Parris, Consultant.
- 2.2. The participants were organized into three groups that each included representatives from the MOHA, the GPF and the ten communities. Community representatives comprised the Community Action Officers, the Community Action Council Members and a few of the students who benefitted from the Technical Vocational Training.

A. Methodology

- 2.3. The groups were required to deliberate on issues of (a) ***Project Results and their contribution to the Development Objective of the Programme;*** (b) ***Program Design, Implementation Challenges and Solutions employed;*** (c) ***Challenges to the Sustainability of Project Outputs and Outcomes, Lessons Learned and the Next Steps.*** Groups were invited to deliberate for approximately ninety minutes, and ‘guide questions’ were provided for each evaluation element so as to engender specific focus on the topics under consideration.
- 2.4. At the end of the period allotted for the evaluation, each small group presented their conclusions to the larger body. In this plenary session, the opportunity was provided for additional input from the other participants, thereby lending for additions and clarifications to the ideas that were presented, culminating with more or less consensus for the final conclusions that emerged.

3. CONCLUSIONS

The following are the key conclusions of the participatory evaluation process from the group of forty-six stakeholders:

3.1. Assessment of Project results and their Contribution to the Development Objective; Outstanding tasks

Component 1: Institutional Strengthening of MOHA

(a) Outputs and Outcomes

- ❖ Safer Neighbourhoods, as a result of policy and operational interventions which were formulated based on better statistics that are now being captured by the CO as well as the increased public awareness that resulted from these initiatives.
- ❖ As a result of the new CO and its analytical work, more information and statistics on crime became available to the key stakeholders in their various environments.

- ❖ The Safe Neighbourhood Surveys undertaken, as a result of the project, have enabled more informed policies as well as targeted interventions for the sector even as they provided a guide to 'safe areas'.
- ❖ A senior officer of GPF commented that the significant finding from all of the analysis points to the fact that there is a drastic reduction of crime since the implementation of this project. Representatives from the Communities confirmed this statement by affirming that despite the social challenges that exist, the reality for communities where the intervention was introduced was that crime levels have noticeably declined.
- ❖ The development of a new strategic plan that is responsive to the needs of the MOHA and the Sector was completed and implementation has commenced.

Component 2: *Institutional Strengthening of GPF*

- ❖ The modernization of physical infrastructure such as the construction of a Forensic Laboratory and a new training facility. The former will soon be commissioned while the latter is in full operation.
- ❖ The development of an Integrated Crime Information System (ICIS) which links key institutions in the justice and security sector, allowing for ready information sharing. This is an important result of CSP, since it provides statistical information that already has enabled the formulation of crime prevention policies; allowed for the mapping of crime which led to a better focusing of police personnel and other resources. It also provided information on the changing face of crime. Work in Police Stations/ districts are now better monitored and supervised.
- ❖ The remodeling of police stations improved the security for the handling of sensitive matters, such as crime reports by victims.
- ❖ Police Instructors were trained in modern training techniques, methods and subject matter. The Institution is left with capacity at that level and this knowledge is being filtered down.

Component 3: *Community Action*

- ❖ Skills Training was delivered to 'drop out' youths in the identified Communities. 1377 youths benefitted from the training. Participants were given a basis from which they can become engaged in economic pursuits.
- ❖ Some participants have started their own businesses, but although they have life skills, these are not being used in a number of instances.
- ❖ Other communities also benefited as several participants who graduated from the Technical Vocational training were able to get jobs in these locations and in so doing, are contributing to the development of these communities.

(b) Observations

Participants identified issues that they felt should have been addressed during the execution:

- All of the key agencies are not connected to the ICIS e.g. The Courts. This can impact on the desired effectiveness of the overall system.
- A number of youths who were trained in the technical vocational skills are still not yet employed.
- The Life Skills (Personal Development Skills) module was not linked to the Technical Vocational Skills Module with both elements offered as a 'package' to the participating youths. This, it was felt, is an area worthy of consideration since both skills are needed to enable effective functioning.

- In some technical courses, the complaint was that there were insufficient tools / equipment given the number of participating youths. In a few other instances, community council members felt that the quality of equipment could have been better.
- There was an attempt by the PIU to forge market linkages through the involvement of the community youths in the Guy Expo Exhibition. At this national event, youths from the various communities were able to showcase their handiwork. The anticipated economic response, however, did not materialize.
- The modern IT and physical infrastructure that now exist have raised the image of the GPF in the eyes of the Public.
- Some concerns were voiced in relation to the fact that although improvements at refurbished Police Stations have benefitted the public, nothing was done to improve the physical space for Police Ranks and this has been a source of disappointment to them. The workshop was reminded that the physical facilities for ranks was never in the design of the project, but rather is generally undertaken from the institution's capital budget resources.

(c) Recommendations

The following recommendations were offered by the participants;

- ✚ In the future, Life Skills (Personal Development Skills) and Technical Vocational Skills modules should be compulsory elements in violence prevention training offered at the community level. This would ensure a more 'rounded' outcome.
- ✚ Future skills training programmes for disadvantaged youth in communities should engage the Business Sector as a partner. This can increase the possibility of youths who are trained being gainfully employed at the successful completion of the respective programmes. Moreover, parents should be engaged at the mobilization / recruitment stage in order to better understand the programme's offerings and the anticipated outcomes, and consequently be in a position to encourage their children to complete the programme.
- ✚ Future Improvement projects should have a component with dedicated resources that speak to the less tangible, yet significant organizational characteristics such as culture and change management. These are important issues that can support or oppose change, factors that can be the determinants of whether or not there will be a successful and sustainable outcome.
- ✚ Behaviour change takes time and the time allotted to the execution of the Component three spanned just over 30 months. In order to realize sustained behaviour change, future projects should replicate the time frame for similar projects in other countries where the duration for such programmes is, at minimum, four years and in several cases, six years.
- ✚ In some communities, several community residents who were influential saw the project as a political move, and actively discouraged the young people from participating in the programme. With the passage of time, residents were able to ascertain that this assumption was not true. This realization came too late for them to benefit from the skills training. Timing of the introduction of initiatives is therefore very important, especially when it is a Government initiative and given the socio political undercurrents.

3.2. Program Design, Implementation Challenges and Solutions employed

The participants identified the strengths and weaknesses of the Project Design as follows:

Component 1: *Modernization of the MOHA*

Strengths

- The design allowed for both tangible as well as 'softer' improvements, hence the improved physical Infrastructure, as well as capacity building interventions.
- The design was flexible: while defining clear parameters, it allowed for the determination of specific initiatives by the beneficiary organization. The Ministry was therefore able to visit other contexts, examine 'best practices' in these countries and modify them to suit the local environment.
- The design allowed for consensus building at the community level as well as empowerment since the Community Action Councils decided, with input from residents, on the immediate rapid impact projects that should be advanced in the local programme.
- The attempt to inject a mentorship element was laudable. Where it was successful, balanced guidance was provided to the 'at risk' youth.
- The programme had indicated that a comprehensive plan for institutional reform should be developed from a participatory process with relevant stakeholders. This was achieved and the Ministry was able, with consultancy support, to craft a Strategic Plan for itself which is well thought out and conceptualized.
- The GPF fully participated in the project design for all aspects of its component.
- The technological advancements in GPF present a very significant transformation of these facilities. They are several IT Stations that are now fully equipped and relevant staff have been appropriately trained.

Weaknesses (in Design and Implementation Process)

- Initially, no alternative arrangement was made for staff during remodeling and this led to some measure of discomfort. However, this situation was corrected with the intervention of the Hon. Minister of Home Affairs, resulting in members of staff being located at places outside of the Ministry's complex when the work was under 25% completion.
- Terms of reference may not have been specific enough as well as there was possibly insufficient attention to detail during the evaluation of bids for the consultancy to develop the Strategic Plan. As a result, the consulting firm that came on board did not understand the local environment / dynamics and this ultimately resulted in the mutual decision on the part of the MOHA and the Firm to terminate the arrangement.
- The process was flexible enough to enable the sourcing of a local consultant who better understood the context and was able to complete the assignment to the satisfaction of the Ministry.
- In hindsight, the scheduling of some activities was not always of the best sequence. Timing in terms of sensitivity to environmental realities was not always factored into such decisions, leading to some degree of dislocation and dysfunction. Additionally, persons were generally not prepared for the changes and were, as a result, resistant.
- There was insufficient time allotted for the sensitization of GPF regarding the proposed changes, so as to achieve the required 'buy-in' in the desired time-frame.
- The Private Sector should have been more involved during the implementation of the CAC, identifying the employable skills that were desirable in the various communities.

This information could have been an input into the decisions that were made regarding the mix of competencies that were being targeted in the TVET interventions.

- The decision to have equal amount of slots for TVET opportunities across communities did not take into account the varying sizes of these communities. This approach presented an imbalance in terms of its offerings vis-a-vis the needs of each community.
- The CAS, while offering tremendous benefits to communities, especially in the area of the skills training for youth, did not provide for job placement.
- Inadequate support for the implementation of some Plans – e.g. the Traffic Management Plan – insufficient resources for operational activities.

Challenges

- The timely procurement of items – tools /equipment, to support CAC activities; there were several ‘hiccups’ along the way.
- Approximately nine months before the project ended, the Procurement Specialist was transferred to another project, since it was felt that most of the major procurement of the CSP had ended. The task then fell to the new Project Coordinator. This arrangement, coupled with the absence of an engineer, presented a tremendous burden to the Project Coordinator in the light of the responsibilities of that position.
- The Concept of Safe Neighbourhoods was not well understood by Communities. This idea, while understood in the classroom, should be broken down in such a format that would enable persons at the community level to better comprehend the model as well as their roles and responsibilities.
- Domestic Violence, Child Abuse and truancy were significant challenges in every community. However, the Life Skills training enabled recipients to better manage these issues. This was visible in the way these persons were now able to transfer their ‘growth’ from the exposure to the community situations, utilizing their newly acquired skills. The exposure also empowered beneficiaries so that they could better contribute to the efforts of the police resulting in improved management of crime.

Negative Influences

- In some instances, community organization and cohesion limited the reach of the programme since the shared perceptions of the CAC, which were not necessarily reflective of the true situation, influenced stakeholder acceptance.
- There could have been greater involvement in project execution of other Government Agencies whose core responsibilities were related to what the CAC was offering.

The MOHA/ GPF/ PIU Statutory meetings enabled the examination of these issues and the identification of appropriate solutions.

Observations

- In many cases, CAOs had no fixed offices and were working in ‘ad hoc’ spaces as these became available. This presented a measure of dysfunction regarding the optimum performance of these hardworking officials.
- Places were already allotted for the CAOs in existing offices; however, the project funds provided did not cater for office space.
- Linkages with other social sector agencies were few and where they existed, informal.

- Open communication is vital to continued success. Some persons were not completely informed and therefore not ready to participate in the programme. In some instances, the expectations of the reforms were too high.
- Some communities have implemented structures to maintain their Rapid Improvement Projects (RIPs). They have mobilized resources through fund raisers.
- Although one police rank was placed within each Community as part of the CAC, they did not participate in the various community consultations and activities as was envisaged. The arrangement proved to be ineffective. This is an area which can benefit from a fresh reconceptualization of the role of the GPF in future interventions.

Recommendations

- Establishment of more permanent offices for CAOs since this was an omission during the execution of the CAC. The CAOs took on a social role and should have been given a more permanent office space (not necessary a new structure). This may have resulted in the even more benefits to the process and the communities.
- The identification of office space for Community workers should be done in a controlled and structured way so as avoid a proliferation of offices in the communities with their attendant impact on costs.
- The CAO position was the focal point for the Community Action Councils as well as the residents. With the conclusion of the project their absence presents a gap that can pose a risk to sustainability. This key and pivotal position in the Community should be sustained.
- In such social programs such as the CAC, Inter-Agency Participation is of utmost importance. It should be compulsory for the relevant line agencies to be brought on board.
- The activities under the various components of a project should be thoughtfully and carefully sequenced.
- In addition to those facilities that have been modernized, the training facility for police recruits should be upgraded.

3.3.Challenges to sustainability of Project Outputs; Lessons Learned and Next Steps

The participants' conclusions, regarding the aforementioned topic, are as follows:

Sustainability

- The High Level Policy Committee provided meaningful support and guidance during the implementation process. This mechanism should be continued as it can positively influence the sustainability of the project's results. However, in the future functioning of this Body, alternates to the designated representatives should be persons with the necessary 'clout' / authority that will empower them to make decisions that are required at such a forum. In the absence of such authority, the anticipated outcomes from meetings will be stymied.
- In an institution such as the GPF, where there is a long entrenched culture, changes in the culture of that institution, as with any other similar ones, will take time. However, several levels of staff are now on board, inclusive of senior personnel and this will contribute to the sustainability of project outputs.

- At the community level, in the case of the CAC, a clear transfer of ownership coupled with follow-up mechanisms is essential for the continuance of the progress made in attitudes in the related communities. Transfer of ownership and continuance of the various violence preventions strategies could have been easier if crime prevention training, the literacy development, personal development and self-esteem training were implemented one year in advance of the skills training.
- Many of the targeted youths come from dysfunctional homes; hence, after completion of training there are no strong support systems in the home or the community to encourage the changed perceptions and attitudes. If this situation is left unattended, there is the real possibility that there can be a reversion to old habits putting the goals of safe communities in question.
- There is the danger of a loss of specialist skills/ personnel in cases where youths were trained but they have not been able to become involved in a related economic engagement.
- The time constraints that existed in the execution of the CAC resulted in the five violence prevention interventions running concurrently. This placed a burden on the persons in the community who were participants. In cases where they were registered for more than one intervention, clashes emerged. This clearly lessened the impact of the full benefits from these initiatives since participants had to choose between the competing opportunities.
- A survey has been done in the vulnerable communities, suggesting the inclusion of parents in training ventures for similar interventions. Such training should be at a different level. Such an approach should be considered since it has the potential of being useful in sustaining the changing values of the young people.

Risks

The following risks to the sustainability of the project's results were identified by participants:

- Misguided youths and persons who may be politically motivated can influence people who have been exposed to the violence prevention interventions, to revert to old behaviour patterns especially if the linkage between the youth and the CAC structures are not maintained. There is therefore need for further work to be done in these initial communities, especially in the area of mentorship. These youths need to be motivated. The idea was for educated youths to link up with the 'drop outs' trying to foster friendships or relationships in order to demonstrate to them another way of life.
- Parents who are guilty regarding various forms of violence can discourage their children from continuing along the path that was shown to them during the course of the intervention. This was demonstrated during the Child Abuse sessions as parents who were apparently uncomfortable with the information that was being shared suddenly stopped attending the sessions.
- The functioning of the community and the continued maintenance of the very philosophy of these anti-violence programmes can be negatively affected by changes in leaders (people in influential positions who were in favor of the programmes) for whatever reason.

Recommendations

- Collaboration with other social sector line agencies, such as e.g. MOE, MOLHS&SS should be formalized in a Memorandum of Agreement (MOU) so that with their newly found

ownership, the ensuing commitment becomes a shared responsibility with MOHA. This is particularly true for the CAC in which the awareness and TVET programmes were delivered.

- A structured 'Follow –up'/ monitoring and evaluation schedule to assess levels of sustainability and residual expertise from CAC's execution. The mechanism should allow for six monthly contacts with youths who have completed the Skills Training in order to monitor their status. Within such a time interval, relevant persons from MOHA should be able to contact all community students, as there is a data base of registered students with related contact information.
- There should be a continuation of the Personal Development training in a new Phase 2 (for approximately another 6 months) to help youths to implement / utilize skills in an economic setting.

Lessons Learned

The following lessons learned were identified:

- In programmes such as the violence prevention initiative, efforts should be made to ensure that there is a formal and timely transfer of the outputs and other related systems from the PIU to the Ministry so that any arrangements for further support at the beneficiary level can be identified and promptly carried out by the Ministry.
- In future interventions, especially where culture change is indicated, there should be realistic timeframes for project implementation. Sufficient time to formally prepare persons in the beneficiary agencies for the approaching changes that will emerge from the intended reforms will foster wider acceptance by the recipients. In addition, it would allow for the orderly execution of related project activities in sequential order. These factors collectively are likely to contribute to the optimum realization of anticipated project outcomes.
- An engineer dedicated to technical oversight should be employed in projects where there is a significant amount of infrastructure work, since close monitoring is required at every stage, in order to ensure the quality and timely delivery of such works.
- There is a disadvantage of not having a procurement office at the most critical moment (when infrastructure contracts are being closed out) and there is still residual procurement. The procurement specialist should continue in post until the project is completed.
- Protocols should be put in place for local counterparts to work along with external consultants so as to build and broaden capacity at the local level, even as they would be in a position to sensitize the entire process regarding the socio-cultural and political environment. Volunteers should also be mobilized to take up the mantle as is necessary. This would enable programmes at the local level to be more readily maintained.

Next Steps

- MOHA officials should meet with community leaders urgently to help them to develop a Plan of Action regarding a clear transition to the maintenance phase in order to ensure sustainability of the project outputs. Although it was reported that some communities are maintaining their facilities, several other community members have identified resource constraints as well as uncertainty about future operations.

- In the new CSP, provision should be made for a continuation of the work in CSP 1 at the following levels:
 - in the same communities, as this relates to the violence prevention strategies, so as to consolidate the present gains.
 - to other communities/ areas that are considered high risk and those that are classified as medium risk. In relation to the medium risk category, appropriate interventions should be identified /considered to prevent movement to the status of high risk.
- A system should also be put in place to facilitate the transfer of knowledge which was acquired by the youths in the programme to those who did not benefit from the interventions so that the multiplying effect can be realized.
- In a future project, the ICIS should be made fully operable by ensuring that the departments, agencies / institutions in the sector that are not yet linked become connected, as a priority e.g. the Traffic Department and the Courts.
- Resources should be made available to support the early implementation of the Traffic Management Plan.

List of Participants

	NAME	ORGANIZATION / DESIGNATION
		<u>Ministry of Home Affairs</u>
1.	Angela Johnson	PS, Ministry Of Home Affairs
2.	Floyd McDonald	Coordinator
3.	Clement Henry	Head Crime Observatory
4.	Floyd Levi	Information Technology Specialist
5.	Delon France	Director, Forensic Laboratory
6	Daniel Kumar	Policy Analyst, Crime Observatory
7	D. Pompey	Administrator, Community Policing Group
8	Shawn Coonjah	Coordinator, House of Justice
9	Kavitia Bhowani	Research Officer, MOHA
10	Daniel Griffith	Research Officer, MOHA
11	Sarita Mohanlall	Research Officer
<u>12</u>	Ovid Glasgow	MOHA
		<u>Guyana Police Force</u>
13	Ivelaw Whittaker	Public Relations Officer
14	Brian Joseph	Commander 'B' Division
15	Dale Alves	DCIO, GPF
16	Balram Persaud	Assistant Commissioner (Administration)
17	Lawrence Kissoon	Commander "C" Division
18	Paul Williams	Snr. Supt.
19	Edgar Thomas	Snr. Supt
20	Dion Moore	Supt.
21	Hugh Denhurt	Supt.
22	Clifton Hincken	Commander "D" Division
23	Maxine Graham	Snr. Supt. GPF
24	Miguel Hoppie	"B" Division
25	Rosanne Purnwasie	Strategic Management Dept. GPF
26	Mona Bynoe	SMD, GPF
27	Louis Dodson	Police Analyst (Police)
28	Leslie James	GPF
		<u>Representatives - Community Action Committees</u>
29	Natasha Corrica	Community Action Committee Member- Agricola/McDoom
30	Lorraine Higgins	Community Action Committee Member- Sophia
31	Anastasia Persaud	
32	I. Persaud	Community Action Committee Member – Angoy's Avenue, Berbice
		<u>Community Action Officers</u>
33	Michelle Brummell	Community Action Officer - Agricola/McDoom
34	Colin Marks	Community Action Officer - Sophia
35	A. Veerasammy	Community Action Officer - Kilcoy/ Chesney/ Fyrish
36	P. Rose	Community Action Officer - Angoy's Avenue, Berbice
37	Kimbolyn Patterson	Community Action Officer - Buxton

38	Sharon Trim	Community Action Officer - Overwinning / Edingburg
39.	Indrapattie Mittor	Community Action Officer – Rose Hall
40.	R. Schwjirs	Student - Kilcoy/ Chesney/ Fyrish
41	Taffara Ward	Student
42	Sharon McCaddy	Student
<u>PIU Staff</u>		
43	Anil Ramnath	Project Coordinator
44	Joan Craigen	Executive Assistant, CSP
45	Terrence Narine	Former Procurement Specialist, CSP
46	Vishraj Singh	Finance Administrator, CSP
<u>IDB Representatives</u>		
47.	Stefano Tinari	Modernization of the State Specialist
48	Derise Williams	Operations Senior Analyst
<u>Facilitator</u>		
49	Leila Parris	Facilitator
50	Beverly Wyles	Rapporteur

ANNEX 3:

Borrower's Evaluation

Ministry of Home Affairs

TEL. NO: 226-2444

FAX NO: 226-2740



6 BRICKDAM,
GEORGETOWN,
GUYANA.

27th May 2014

Ms. Sophie Makonnen,
Country Representative,
Inter-American Development Bank,
47 High Street,
Kingston,
GEORGETOWN.

Dear *Country Representative,*

RE: BORROWER'S EVALUATION – PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
CITIZEN SECURITY PROGRAMME

I am pleased to submit to the Bank the Borrower's Evaluation of the Project Completion Report in respect of the Loan Agreement No. 1752-SF/GY – 'Citizen Security Programme'.

With best regards,

Yours sincerely,

Angela Johnson
Permanent Secretary



**Inter- American Development Bank
Project Completion Report –
Borrower's Evaluation**

Project Name: Citizen Security Programme	
Executing Agency: Ministry of Home Affairs	
Borrower: Government of Guyana (GOG).	
Date of Project Approval: June 28, 2006	Date of Contract Effectiveness: January 31, 2007
Date of Borrower Evaluation: April 25, 2014	Date of Exit Workshop: April 7, 2014

Borrower Project Performance Ratings

Probability on Achieving its Development Objective(s):

☐ Highly Probable () Probable (P) ☒ Low Probability (LP) ☐ Improbable (I)

Project Implementation:

☐ Highly Satisfactory (HS) Satisfactory (S) ☒ Unsatisfactory (US) ☐ Very Unsatisfactory (VU)

Sustainability of Project Results:

☐ Highly Probable (HP) Probable (P) ☒ Low Probability (LP) ☐ Improbable (I)

Comments:

With the implementation of all activities completed on April 30, 2014, it is expected that the beneficiaries will make full use of the resources that would have been provided by the CSP.

Borrower Project Performance During Project Preparation

Please rate your own performance during Project Preparation:

☐ Highly Satisfactory (HS) ☒ Satisfactory (S) ☐ Unsatisfactory (US) ☐ Very Unsatisfactory (VU)

Comments:

Borrower Project Performance During Project Execution

Please rate your own performance during Project Execution:

[] Highly Satisfactory (HS) [☒] Satisfactory (S) [] Unsatisfactory (US) [] Very Unsatisfactory (VU)

Comments:

Added supervision and monitoring required

Bank Performance During Project Preparation

Please rate the Bank's performance during project preparation. Factors to be considered include the extent to which the Bank facilitated a participatory design, proposed adequate technical solutions to be the problems identified, and responded to the needs of the Borrower (timeliness, selection of instrument type).

[] Highly Satisfactory (HS) [☒] Satisfactory (S) [] Unsatisfactory (US) [] Very Unsatisfactory (VU)

Comments:

Bank Performance During Project Supervision

Please rate the Bank's performance during project supervision. Factors to be considered include technical assistance (including formal and informal training) to Executing Agency, timeliness of Bank response and the Bank's flexibility to respond to emergency situations during project implementation.

[] Highly Satisfactory (HS) [☒] Satisfactory (S) [] Unsatisfactory (US) [] Very Unsatisfactory (VU)

Comments:

Additional Suggestions for Improving Bank Performance

Additional comments / suggestions for improving Bank performance in the future.