

MEMORANDUM


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
DATE: March 29, 2006

TO: Loan Committee Members

THROUGH: Alicia S. Ritchie, Manager
Regional Operations Department 3

FROM:  Jorge Lamas, Project Team Leader
Social Programs Division, RE3

SUBJECT: GUYANA. Citizen Security Program (GY0071). Project Concept Document.



For consideration of the Loan Committee members, please find attached the Project Concept Document (PCD) for the above-referenced operation.

The Project Outline for this operation was published on the Internet on October 6th, 2004.

The CESI examined the PCD on January 27th, 2006 and had no observations.

The attached PDC does not contain confidential information.

Any questions regarding this operation may be addressed to Mr. Jorge Lamas, Project Team Leader (jorgel@iadb.org, ext. 1595).

c.c.: Christian Gómez Fabling, RE3/DEP
Michael Jacobs, SO3/CHF
Dora Currea, OD6/CHF
Project Team Members

MINUTES OF THE CRG

Citizen Security Program (GY-0071) Project Concept Document

March 17th, 2006

I. INVITEES

Alicia S. Ritchie (RE3/MGR); Christian Gómez-Fabling (RE3/DEP); Guillermo Calvo (RES); Camilla Gaskin-Reyes (a.i. DEV); Martin Stabile (DEV); Wanda Engel (SDS/SOC); Héctor Salazar (RE2/SO2); Juan Manuel Fariña (RE1/SO1); Laura Profeta (LEG); Dora Currea (RE3/OD6); Sergio Varas-Olea (COF/CGY); Marco Nicola (COF/CGY); Fidel Jaramillo (Asesor RE3); Elio Londero (Asesor RE3); Rafael Hernandez (Asesor RE3); Marguerite Berger (RE3/OD6); Arnaldo Posadas (RE3/SC3); Jorge Lamas (RE3/SO3); José Cuesta (RE3/SO3); Kristyna Bishop (RE3/SO3); Julio César Norori (COF/CGY); Diego Buchara (LEG/OPR); Erik Alda (SDS/SOC); Walter Soto (Consultor RE3/SO3); Alexandra Ortega (RE3/SO3); Rosario Londoño (RE3/SO3).

II. PARTICIPANTS

Michael Jacobs (SO3) who presided over the CRG; Jorge Lamas (SO3), team leader; Erik Alda (SDS); Alexandra Ortega (SO3); Diego Buchara (LEG); Arnaldo Posadas (SC3); Rosario Londoño (SO3); Elio Londero (RE3); Clark Sand (OD6). Sergio Varas-Olea (CGY), Marco Nicola (CGY) and Julio Norori (CGY) participated via videoconference. José Cuesta (SO3) acted as the secretary. Written comments were received from SO2, COF/CGY, DEV and OD6. They were discussed at the CRG and there are no pending issues.


III. ISSUES DISCUSSED DURING THE CRG

1. Clarification of Scope. The CRG requested that the new version of the PCD include a description of the additional areas of MoHA capacity building recently agreed with the GoG.

2. Budget . During the CRG it was agreed that the reimbursement of the PROPEF be included as a cost category, and a more detailed cost breakdown. Also the CRG requested a review of the amount assigned to the contingency category to be around 5%.

3. Sustainability. The CRG requested that the project team include in the project report an analysis of MOH budget to consider project sustainability including information systems, infrastructure and others proposed investments. A dialog on eventual increases of MOH resources allocation to assure project sustainability has been undertaken.

4. Region Selection. The project team described the criteria used for the selection of Regions IV and VI, which consisted of the following: (i) urbanity; (ii) largest perception of violence; (iii) main focus of violence; (iv) concentration of vulnerable population; (v) and based on those criteria, Government's request. The new PCD will enumerate these criteria.



5. Project links with on-going initiatives. The new PCD will specify how this program fits with other Ministries and donors' programs in related areas.

6. Logical framework. The CRG requested that the project team revise the logical framework in order to reduce the overall number of indicators; include midterm end of project indicators; and, to the extent possible, include outcome rather than output indicators. Project objective in Log Frame must be identical to the one indicated in the project description. The CRG asked the Country Office to assist the project team in the identification of improved logical framework indicators.

7. Operational manual. The project team informed that an operational manual is under preparation and a final draft will be agreed with the authorities during negotiations.

8. Risk Management. A careful risk management study using stakeholder analysis is being carried out and its conclusions will be incorporated in the project document. Meanwhile, the new PCD will deal in more depth with anticipated risks, with the assistance of the Country Office.


9. Improve evidence of the cost-benefit of interventions. The CRG requested that the project report include the strongest evidence possible supporting the selection of proposed components (as opposed to other design possibilities). The CRG also agreed to consider additional studies during the program that will help improve the understanding of the effects of the program as well as its effects on violence and crime reduction. It was also agreed to pursue a regional effort to systematize knowledge and methodologies regarding cost-benefit analyses of citizen security.

III. UNRESOLVED ISSUES.

None.

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the agreement on the considered issues, the CRG recommended the distribution of the amended PCD to the loan committee.



Sergio Varas-Olea
Representative, COF/CGY



José Cuesta
Secretary CRG



28 MW '06
Michael Jacobs
Division Chief, RE3/SO3

**Recopilación de comentarios para discusión en el CESI
en su**

Reunión CESI 04-06, del 27 de enero de 2006

GY-0071. Citizen Security Programme

- 1. Evaluación requerida:**
- 2. Próxima acción:**
- 3. Temas de impacto ambiental y social y acciones propuestas:**

SDS/ENV

No tengo comentarios a la operacion de la referencia.

RE3/EN3

EN3 no tiene comentarios para el CESI sobre el proyecto en referencia. No obstante, quisieramos mencionar que la segunda parte del párrafo 2.8 y el párrafo 2.9 son identicos.

PROJECT CONCEPT DOCUMENT (PCD)

GUYANA

MARCH 31, 2006

I. BASIC INFORMATION

Project name: Citizen Security Program

Project number: GY-0071

Date of Project Outline approval: May 20, 2005

Project team: Leader: Jorge Lamas (RE3/SO3); other member: Jose Cuesta (RE3/SO3); Julio César Norori (COF/CCO), Kristyna Bishop (RE3/SO3), Diego Sebastián Buchara (LEG) Erik Alda (SDS/SOC), Walter Soto (RE3/SO3) and Alexandra Ortega (RE3/SO3).

Borrower: Cooperative Republic of Guyana

Executing agency: Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA)

Financing plan:

IDB (FSO):	US\$	12,800,000
Local:	US\$	<u>1,420,000</u>
Total:	US\$	14,220,000

Tentative dates:

Analysis Mission:	II trimester 2006
Loan Committee:	II trimester 2006
Board:	II trimester 2006

SEQ/PTI: This operation does qualify as a social equity-enhancing project, as described in the indicative targets mandated by the Bank's Eighth Replenishment (document AB-1704). This operation does not qualify as poverty targeted investment (PTI) (see ¶5.4).

II. BACKGROUND

A. The rising concern on crime and violence

- 2.1 The GoG has requested Bank's assistance in developing a citizen security program that focuses on the prevention of crime and violence, with an emphasis on capacity building in both the public sector and civil society. The following section summarizes the general rationale for this approach before describing the current situation in Guyana.

- 2.2 In Latin America and the Caribbean, the Bank estimates the costs of crime and violence in a dismal range between 5%-10% of GDP.¹ Beyond economic costs, violence degrades the quality of life for many citizens inducing a vicious circle of physical and social disarray. At a more aggregated level, crime affects negatively the enabling environment of the economy and the social development of the country. The impact on economic growth is conveyed through dents on human capital accumulation, incomes, investment (both domestic and foreign) and productivity. More recently, there are convincing arguments that the link between violence and crime with underdevelopment is of greater strength in small states.² When small states are close to drug shipment areas, as it is the case of the Caribbean, their exposure to ramping crime and violence is increased.
- 2.3 In response to these concerns, the GoG has requested Bank's assistance in developing a program that emphasizes crime prevention, capacity building and community participation. Prevention has been long understood to be an investment³ that reduces substantial future expenditures in the following categories: anticipation of crime (security and insurance costs); consequences of crime (such as stolen property, physical effects on victims, and health services); and in response to crime (criminal justice systems).⁴ Prevention is also known to be a cost-effective intervention to deal with crime and violence vis a vis repressive or control measures. Studies measuring the return for each dollar spent on anti-violence programs in Canada, Netherlands, UK and US show that programs dealing with situational prevention measures and increasing community cohesion and participation are more cost-effective over control programs (with their ratio of benefits over costs exceeding 7 and 5, respectively)⁵. A study⁶ evaluating the cost-effectiveness of the repressive intervention in California known as the "Three-strikes" (with harsh sanctions to repeat-offenders) found that such measures as well as delinquent supervision came in last on a list of cost-effective interventions. That list was led by preventive interventions.

B. Characteristics of crime and violence in Guyana

- 2.4 Characterizing the phenomenon of crime and violence in Guyana faces a major obstacle given the lack of reliable, comprehensive and sustained data. At present, neither the Ministry of Home Affairs nor the Guyana Police Force have an appropriate information system that allows the registration, consolidation, and follow-up of reported crimes. They also lack the capability of formulating policies. In addition, the Ministry of Health does not have a surveillance system (that is a simple, cheap and relevant system that monitors a small set of variables on a regular

¹ Buvinic and Morrison (1999) "Technical Note: Violence Prevention". Washington DC: IADB.

² Easterly, W. and A. Kraay (2000). Small States, Small problems? Income, Growth, and Volatility in Small States. World Development, vol 28, n. 11; and Commonwealth/World Bank Joint Task Force (2005) "Toward an Outward-oriented Development Strategy for Small States: Issues, Opportunities, and Resilience Building".

³ National Crime Prevention Council Canada (1996) "Found Investment: Preventing Crime and Victimization"

⁴ UK's Home Office (2000). "The Economic and Social Cost of Crime". Home Office Research Study 217.

⁵ Fondation Docteur Philippe-Pinel (2004) "The Key to Safer Municipalities".

⁶ P. Greenwood, 1998. "Diverting Children from a Life of Crime: What are the Costs and Benefits?" .

basis) that tracks external causes of injuries and deaths. A well-designed integrated system would provide the Ministry with the necessary information to develop incidence-based preventive policies. Information on other categories of crime is also subject to serious technical difficulties such as underreporting or inconsistent reporting from different sources. In other cases, such as domestic violence, data are captured sparsely by different organizations. All these circumstances underscore the need for the establishment of a common unified system to improve data gathering, consistency and reliability and provide inputs for broad and informed preventive policy formulation.

- 2.5 Available data from police reports show that homicides rates in Guyana from 1974 (first year for which data are available) to 2001 have fluctuated around 10-15 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants except for peaks of 22 in 1983 and above 25 in 1991. Since 2002 rates have, nevertheless, increased to closer to 18 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants reaching 27 in 2003. This situation of high homicide rates is similar to the case of some Commonwealth Caribbean countries such as the Bahamas, the Bahamas, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Trinidad and Tobago.⁷
- 2.6 Moreover, there is a growing trend from 1974 to 2005 in the robbery and rape rates.⁸ Since 1998 robberies rose from 50-100/100,000 range to 150-200/100,000 range while rapes increased from 10-15/100,000 range to 15-20/100,000 range from 1997 onwards. However, the rates for larceny, burglaries and felonious wounding show a declining trend since the mid 1990s. A plausible explanation for the decline in these rates is that the citizens do not report these incidents to the GPF due to the lack of inappropriate response. Traffic injuries are also an important source of deaths and long-term disabilities and contribute to enhance the current sense of insecurity in Guyana. Over the last 10 years, the rate of traffic deaths has had an upward trend from about 16 to 24 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants. The authorities in Guyana have stressed the importance of dealing with this problem in the very short term, both to reduce road deaths and injuries and to provide the police and authorities with an opportunity to show rapid improvements in the security environment.
- 2.7 Based on the above national data on violent crimes, a profile of the perpetrator has begun to emerge: this individual is most often a repeat offender, who in 80% of the cases is between 14 and 30 years old, has dropped out of school, is unemployed or underemployed, or has low school performance. This individual is most often a male, but available data suggest that women also perform support functions.
- 2.8 An added dimension to the problem of violence in Guyana is the underlying, ethnic polarization between Guyanese of African, Hindu and Amerindian descent. In

⁷ Observers note that a rate of 20 per 100,000 inhabitants may be regarded as being high by Latin American standards and very high by Commonwealth Caribbean standards given the mean for the region is rarely above 10 per 100,000 (UN Office on Drugs and Crime, 2003 "Crime Trends in the Caribbean and Responses").

⁸ However, the rate for burglary, larceny and felonious wounding show a decline. A plausible explanation for the decline in these rates is that residents do not report these incidents to the GPF due to lack of appropriate response and lack of confidence in the police's ability to deal with these types of incidents.

addition, there is a culture of fear and mistrust, which detracts from collective efforts to build genuine pluralism and inclusion; and from efforts to find democratic and sustainable responses to the problem of violence and other important societal challenges. The lack of confidence between the communities of different ethnic background, has been attributed to the fear of violent crimes and racially motivated police brutality; harassment, beating and robbery, allegation of discrimination in education, employment and housing, noting also allegations of extra judicial killings⁹.

- 2.9 Specific Guyanese regions and sub-populations appear to be disproportionately impacted by violent crime and violence and are of special concern to policymakers and civil society. Levels of crime and violence in specific communities of Region IV and VI are high. Despite a paucity of data, specific localities, such as Buxton and Annandale are perceived to be among the main foci of violence by heavily armed criminals. Regions IV and VI have the highest numbers of children (145,258 and 57,739 respectively – out of a total national child population of 354,176, per the 2002 census) and adolescents in the population, groups that are at disproportionate risk for victimization and perpetration of various forms of violence.

C. Sector Institutional Constraints

- 2.10 The **Ministry of Home Affairs** (MoHA) is the institution legally responsible for the formulation of policies with respect to public order and safety and evaluation of the implementation of such policies, while assisting in the protection and maintenance of the country's social fabric. MoHA has a Planning and Research Unit with limited capacity to effectively address the problems associated with crime and violence. This diagnosis was corroborated by the Organizational Diagnostic Report ODR-51, elaborated by the Ministry of Home Affairs.¹⁰ Efforts are hampered by a lack of well-trained staff in the various disciplines and approaches required for the successful execution of a broad national strategy. The lack of a functioning policy capacity, combined with the absence of a formal program evaluation capacity limits the ability of the Ministry to assess its programmatic effectiveness. It also lacks the appropriate internal performance measurement system required to assess programmatic efficiency and limits organizational performance. There are as well other areas that the institution has required assistance for strengthening, among them, its organizational structure, its corporate system and its technological infrastructure.
- 2.11 Another widely acknowledged circumstance is the inadequate performance of the GPF in meeting the needs of the community to promote a safe environment. This is related to institutional aspects as well as a reliance on incident-driven, reactive approach instead of relying on the analysis of patterns, incidents and problems. The latter approach would allow working towards an understanding of the characteristics and causes of crime and violence. In terms of the institution's

⁹ UN Human Rights System (2003) "Thematic Reports: Racism and Racial Discrimination".

¹⁰ Public Sector Modernization Design Plan, Volume IV, Nov. 15th, 2002.

structure, organizational configuration, doctrine, training and police procedures, they have remained essentially unchanged since the 1960s. The GPF also lacks a human resource strategy that covers policies on selection qualifications, training, evaluation, promotion and personal development, as well as a modern human resources management policy. Moreover, improper police behavior is not adequately investigated because it lacks effective internal and external control mechanisms to control police abuses and charges of corruption. There is a need to implement accountability mechanisms that allow for transparent investigations of complaints. Furthermore, the institution has not included in its activities the use of new technologies that would allow for the appropriate collection and preservation of evidence so it could be presented appropriately to the courts. The GPF has received support in the past from the United States, Canada and the UK. However, this support was not coordinated and, as a consequence, opportunities to enhance the policing function have been lost through duplication or inappropriate development. The proposed program would develop a comprehensive training strategy that would coordinate all future training for the GPF.

D. Government Strategy and On-going Efforts

- 2.12 Guyana's National Development Strategy for 1996-2006 provides a policy framework, as well as courses of actions, to deal with the main economic and social challenges that would support efforts for achieving sustained economic growth. The overall goal of the strategy is to meet the expectations of the citizenry for a higher standard of living. To achieve this overall goal, the following national objectives have been established as preconditions: (i) rapid income growth through sustained economic growth; (ii) poverty alleviation/reduction by placing a special emphasis on raising the income of the poor; (iii) satisfaction of basic social and economic needs by providing access to basic services, education, and social infrastructure; and (iv) sustaining a democratic society through a more participatory approach in economic decision making and a more active role for local organizations in issues that affect their communities.
- 2.13 Although the reduction of crime and violence is not explicitly mentioned in the National Development Strategy, the GoG understands that the elaboration of an encompassing citizen security sector strategy is key. The proposed Program would take the citizen security strategy as a referenced framework and would support the design and implementation of preventive crime and violence policy, currently inexistent in the country. The Government of Guyana has outlined a plan that would involve relevant stakeholders in the implementation of crime and violence prevention and control measures. A key element of this plan is the establishment of a National Commission on Law and Order comprised of representatives of government, Parliament and civil society with the mandate to examine existing and proposed policies and to make policy recommendations to the President. Also, the MoHA would also coordinate the additional policy and actions that the National Commission would undertake. Other key elements refer to greater community involvement in crime prevention through the implementation of programs promoting civic responsibility and tolerance in interpersonal relationships; activities

promoting the protection of children and spouses from abuse and violence; promoting the use of neighborhood police; introduce a modern traffic control system; and strengthen law enforcement agencies. MOHA would present the evidence-based policy interventions that would be undertaken in the proposed program for information purposes.

- 2.14 In addition, the National Drug Strategy Master Plan 2005-2009 proposes a comprehensive, integrated and coordinated approach to control the level and penetration of drugs into society. The preventive actions (educational programs against drug use, media campaigns to promote drug use prevention, among others) oriented towards reducing drug use and traffic as a risk factor are also included as part of the strategy.
- 2.15 The Disciplined Forces Commission published in 2004 a report highlighting the issues affecting the capacity of the primary function of the Guyana Police Force of prevention and detection of criminal conduct. The report specifically mentioned that preventative measures by the GPF to deter crime had been either non-existent or ineffective, and called for support in modernizing the institution in that area. The report also called for the strengthening the capacity of the GPF in crime investigation in order to depend less on external sources and avoid delays in the processing of cases. The GoG has also initiated a reform process of the GPF to ensure it fulfils its mandate as specified in the Constitution, which has resulted so far in the elaboration of a strategic plan with the assistance of the Bank.

E. Bank's Sector Strategy

- 2.16 The Bank's country strategy is to promote growth oriented programs and policies, which, if reinforced by stronger governance, security and justice, public sector systems and social programs, will contribute to poverty reduction in Guyana. To assist with the challenge of improving security, the proposed program would develop a comprehensive approach that includes counteracting and controlling risk factors associated with crime and violence and by implementing community-based strategies. These strategies will undertake preventive interventions, with extensive community and youth participation (including educational campaigns to foster positive attitudinal change and promote peaceful coexistence); and by strengthening crime management capabilities at the national level (Ministry of Home Affairs and Guyana Police Force) by improving their capacity to develop appropriate public policies that reduce violence and promote peaceful coexistence.
- 2.17 The Bank has experience in other countries in the region in the area of crime and violence prevention and citizen security. The operations in Colombia and Uruguay have been completed and have yielded significant results, and key lessons from them have been included in the design of the proposed program. Some of the most effective interventions to reduce violence included: (i) the creation of an observatory for crime and violence; (ii) design of campaigns to deal with specific risk factors such as citizens' use of guns and alcohol consumption; (iii) actions to recuperate decayed urban spaces; (iv) neighborhood crime-monitoring committees

and creation of conflict resolution at the community level; (v) creation of special police stations to serve victims of domestic violence; and (vi) modernization and professionalization of the police force to work in collaboration with communities and proceed, based on evidence, to address crime and violence and to find new ways to engage communities that are hostile to police presence.

F. Program Strategy

- 2.18 Based on the above lessons and the specific context in Guyana (weak capacity of institutions, potential for community participation, and lack of a citizen security preventive strategy), the program constitutes a pilot phase covering urban communities in Region IV and VI. These two regions have high rates of crime and violence, high proportion of youth population, face key challenges with school dropout, single parent families, inadequate child care, lack of integrated community services and a significant exposure to crime and violence of youths at risk. The proposed project would prioritize areas of intervention as well as the number of communities in which it will intervene. Concretely, the project would strengthen the capacity of MoHA and the GPF by implementing an integrated information system to address critical gaps in knowledge and data analysis. Other areas to be strengthened refer to the formulation of evidence-based crime prevention strategies; and monitoring of interventions. Enhanced information would assist in the implementation of well-designed crime and violence prevention initiatives built on four inter-related pillars: (i) the incorporation of evidence-based developmental prevention strategies (such as socio-cognitive approaches) that address factors dealing to delinquency and violent offending; (ii) situational crime prevention strategies, which diminish opportunities for crime by modifying the situation in which offences occur and making the environment less conducive to crime; (iii) policy improvements enabling government and civil society to propose informed prevention initiatives in various sectors (health, education, private sector and law enforcement); and (iv) community strategies which involve joint ownership by local residents, government and civil society regarding crime and violence prevention in their own neighborhoods.
- 2.19 A comprehensive reform strategy for the reform of the criminal justice sector has also been developed, which aims at implementing actions that would make the justice system more trusted, accountable and accessible. This reform will be supported by the Bank's Justice Administration Programme (GY-L1009). Since the Guyana Police Force is a key institution in the justice system as a whole, given its role of prevention and detention of crime and the preservation of law and order, the Citizen Security Programme would contribute to the sector reform by improving the performance of the institution in crime prevention, strengthening its capacity to investigate crimes while protecting the human rights of citizens and by making the institution more accountable to the citizens.
- 2.20 Communities are increasingly viewed as a central institution for crime and violence prevention, an important component of the GoG strategy. The capacity to prevent serious violent crime in Guyana, as elsewhere, may hinge on the ability to help

reshape community life, at least in the most troubled communities. Families, schools, labor markets, retail establishments, police and corrections need to operate in and confront the consequences of community life – and much of the success and failure of these other institutions is affected by the community context in which they operate.

- 2.21 In Guyana, given the paucity and relative underdevelopment of governmental and formal civil society infrastructure, the community development component would take an added importance, and emphasizing a comprehensive, micro-local approach as a critical step. The proposed community action component would follow best practice guidelines,¹¹ consistent with the scientific evidence of concentrated risk factors, and would lead to recommendations to inform a flexible plan for reducing risk factors, increasing protective factors and enhancing citizen engagement.

G. Coordination with other donors

- 2.22 The project team met with UNICEF and UNDP in Guyana and identified a range of activities of potential importance for the proposed programme, offering opportunities for collaboration in varied areas of violence prevention. One important effort by UNICEF focuses on the needs of youth formerly in the justice system upon their return to their communities. UNICEF also has initiatives under development in parenting, home visitation, conflict resolution and policy interventions through peace education and a track record on evaluated approaches in developing lay-worker training for volunteer social workers and youth educators.
- 2.23 The Guyana Social Cohesion Programme (SCP) -- a UNDP administered programme – is a proactive response to build capacity for social cohesion and peace building at national, regional and community levels. The programme is oriented to the creation of safe spaces to explore ways forward (e.g. media round tables, workshop for political parties, ongoing discussions with key role-players); capacity building in conflict transformation, human rights, facilitation and process design; peace education workshops with youths and educators; and provides support for community based cohesion building initiatives; with a special focus on the prevention of racism, racial discrimination, and xenophobia. The SCP programme can complement the actions of the proposed programme at local and national levels provided that a mechanism for coordination is developed at MoHA.

III. THE PROGRAM

¹¹ National Crime Prevention Council (2000). “150 Tested Strategies to Prevent Crime from Small Cities, Counties, and Rural Communities: A Resource for Municipal Agencies and Community Groups”.

A. Objectives and Description

- 3.1 The goal of the program is to enhance citizen security and coexistence among Guyanese citizens, by contributing towards the reduction of levels of crime and violence and fear in Guyana. The specific objectives are to: (a) prevent and counteract risk factors and increase and promote protective factors in communities, families, and individuals at risk of violence and crime; (b) strengthen crime and violence preventive capabilities at the local and national levels and improving community interaction in the prevention of crime and violence; and c) strengthen social cohesion within communities.
- 3.2 To accomplish the stated objectives, the program will finance activities in the following three components: (i) capacity building at the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Guyana Police Force; (ii) development of evidence-based community-based preventive and restorative interventions with extensive community participation; and (iii) program management.

B. Structure of the Program

1. Capacity building of the MoHA

- 3.3 The component will strengthen the capacity of the Ministry in two related areas. First, this component will strengthen the capacity to gather and analyze data, and draw policy conclusions, as well as, strengthen the coordination and integration of related programs. To achieve this, the program resources component would finance technical assistance, training, computer equipment and software for the MoHA to: (i) implement an integrated crime and violence information system (Crime Observatory and surveillance systems of external causes of injuries and deaths) to monitor trends in crime and violence, facilitate information exchange, plan strategically, develop and evaluate public policy responses in Regions IV and VI. This system would improve the collection of data in a systematic manner from the GPF and Georgetown Hospital, which are the primary sources of data; (ii) applied training in statistical analysis and the methods for the identification of problems affecting the communities; (iii) development of strategies, policies and evidenced-based interventions that address key risk factors identified; (iv) educational campaigns to foster positive attitudinal change and promote peaceful coexistence would be part of this component; the campaigns will promote wider pro-peace themes and will cut across the program's other components at both the national and target community levels; (v) development of a dissemination mechanism for crime data and (vi) development of an impact evaluation system of the interventions implemented.
- 3.4 This component would also finance two national victimization, attitudes, cultural beliefs and norm surveys in order to gather the prevalence of aggressive behaviors and of other violence-related behaviors, personal attitudes toward aggressive behaviors, self-efficacy for alternatives to violence, perception of social institutions and the government, violence victimization both in the family and in the community

and generate information on victimization rates by type of crime. This information would complement the data generated by the Crime Observatory and would assist in the elaboration of strategies and policies mentioned in the above paragraph. The surveys will also provide key information to analyze the outcomes of the program.

- 3.5 The second area of support is oriented to improve the overall institutional performance of the Ministry through technical assistance, equipment and software to strengthen MoHA in the areas of organizational structure, planning model, internal audit, financial model, corporate image and management of work flow.

2. Capacity building and modernization of the GPF

- 3.6 This component will also support the reform and transformation of the Guyana Police Force from an incident-driven, reactive institution to one that relies on the analysis of patterns, incidents and problems in order to work toward an understanding of the characteristics and causes of incidents which will ensure sustainable solutions. To achieve this, the component will finance technical cooperation, equipment and rehabilitation of infrastructure that enables: (i) the implementation of a system of crime report updating; (ii) the strengthening of criminal investigation capabilities, including training (in-house training, teaching equipment and materials) and adequate equipment; (iii) the construction of a new crime laboratory to accommodate the new equipment; (iv) the training in human rights related to police activities, conflict resolution, anger management, relations between GPF and the public and the media; training in relation to domestic violence, trafficking and child abuse cases; (v) implementation of a traffic management plan; (vi) the development of a new organizational structure; (vii) integrated financial management system; (viii) human resource policy; (ix) strengthening in internal and external accountability mechanisms; and (x) the remodeling of training facilities; and (xi) strengthening in internal and external accountability mechanisms.

3. Community action

- 3.7 Training and technical assistance will be also provided on best practices on collaboration in violence prevention to respond to the needs of the community identified by the Crime Observatory, victimization surveys and community scans. This assistance will include the following areas:

- a) **Mobilization of communities.** Experts will be contracted to assist in the development, design and implementation of strategies for engaging the community; conducting assessments, providing technical assistance, training and assisting in developing context specific interventions for community engagement in the project communities; and monitoring project performance.
- b) **Capacity development at the local level** will be supported through training of lay voluntary workers to develop Community

Promoters for Citizen Coexistence, to address the shortfall of trained professionals equipped to meet basic violence prevention needs. Training on core competencies in violence and crime prevention, community organizing, basic crisis intervention, resident engagement, advocacy, fundraising and evaluation, and how to build local infrastructures of expertise for collective violence prevention activity will be provided by experts.

- c) **Community Violence Prevention Services.** Will finance a menu of specified crime and violence prevention and social cohesion activities in communities in Region IV and VI that address priority local violence and crime issues identified in the needs assessment: intimate partner violence, child abuse and neglect, youth violence and ethno-violence. It would also finance rapid-impact “quick win” projects designed to demonstrate quick and effective responses to community concerns and selected by the communities. Examples of these US\$5,000-capped projects are repairing play grounds and installation of street lighting.
- d) **Creation or strengthening existing community based multi-service centers.** These centers will serve as a central hub to house community activities, and will be housed in existing, or unused facilities.

4. Program Management

- 3.8 An additional amount of US\$1.5 million has been included in the program to support of the operation of the Program Implementation Unit (PIU). The PIU expenses include costs for personnel, equipment and other administrative expenses. It will also cover expenses related to the technical unit that will be in charge of the modernization of the GPF.

5. Concurrent Costs

- 3.8. The concurrent cost component includes the repayment of the PROPEF for US\$1 million, auditing and for the implementation of the monitoring and supervision system. An additional US\$ 0.3 million has been included for unallocated expenses.

6. Costs and Financing

- 3.9 The cost estimates for this project are summarized in the table below:

CATEGORIES AND COMPONENTS	%			
	IDB-FSO	LOCAL	TOTAL	TOTAL
DIRECT COSTS	9650	815	10465	73.6%
1. Institutional Strengthening of MoHA	2650	70	2720	19.1%
2. Institutional Strengthening of GPF	3000	255	3255	22.9%
3. Community-based Interventions	4000	490	4490	31.6%

ADMINISTRATION	1450	50	1500	10.5%
4. Administration	1450	50	1500	10.5%
CONCURRENT COSTS	1225	0	1225	8.6%
5. Concurrent Costs	1225	0	1225	8.6%
5.1. PROPEF	1000	0	1000	7.0%
5.2. Monitoring and Supervision	150	0	150	1.1%
5.3. Auditing	75	0	75	0.5%
UNALLOCATED	347	90	437	3.1%
Contingencies	347	90	437	3.1%
FINANCIAL EXPENSES	128	464	592	4.2%
Interests	0	337	337	2.4%
Commitment Fee	0	127	127	0.9%
F.I.V.	128	0	128	0.9%
TOTAL	12800	1420	14220	100.0%
% TOTAL	90.0%	10.0%	100.0%	

Amounts have been rounded up.

IV. PROGRAM EXECUTION

A. Borrower and Executing Agency

- 4.1 The Borrower is the Cooperative Republic of Guyana. The proposed executing agency is the Ministry of Home Affairs. The period of execution will be five years.

B. Program Implementation Unit

- 4.2 The Program Implementation Unit (PIU) at the Ministry of Home Affairs will be responsible for the technical coordination, administration, procurement and reporting to the Bank of corresponding project activities, as well as strengthening the Policy Research Unit. The PIU is currently implementing the Memorandum of Assistance for the Project Preparation and Execution Facility (MAPPE) for the Citizen Security Program, which is financing the designs and initial implementation of activities of the proposed program. It is envisaged that its current structure consisting of a coordinator. Change managers will be appointed to oversee the modernization of both components, including the coordination of both components into a cohesive national strategy and they will answer directly to the minister. The PIU unit will be comprised of a Coordinator (reporting to the Permanent Secretary of the MoHA) who will act as the project manager; information and technology specialist responsible for providing technical support regarding the implementation of the different information systems; community action specialist responsible for the coordination of the implementation of community action activities; financial administrator responsible for the financial administration of the Program; procurement specialist responsible for the acquisition of all goods and services; and administrative assistant to provide support to the PIU, and a monitoring and

supervision specialist responsible for the monitoring and evaluation of the respective components.

- 4.3 The responsibilities of the PIU would be as follows: (i) maintain separate and specific bank accounts for managing the Bank's loan and local counterpart funds; ii) submit timely disbursement requests and the corresponding justification of expenses; iii) implement and maintain adequate systems for the management of contracts and finances, and internal controls with respect to the management of the IDB and local counterpart funds, in accordance with the Bank's requirements; iv) prepare and submit Project financial reports required by the Bank, including the financial statements of the components of the Program under their responsibility. It is expected that annual audited financial statements would be prepared by an independent private firm contracted under Bank procedure; and v) maintain an adequate documentation filing system to support eligible expenses to be examined by the Bank and the external auditors.
- 4.4 A Policy Committee (PC) would be established and have the responsibility for the coordination of the strategic planning and policies for prevention and control of violence and unintentional deaths. Members of this committee are: Minister of Home Affairs; Police Commissioner; Minister of Health; Public Prosecutor; Minister of Education; Minister of Labour; Social Services; private sector representative; representative of Faith-Based Organizations and NGOs. The Minister of Home Affairs will chair the committee. The Policy and Research Unit of the MoHA, with support of the PIU, would act as the secretariat for the meetings.
- 4.5 In terms of sustainability, preliminary estimates of recurrent costs consist of US\$50,000 a year in salaries of personnel support of the Policy and Research Unit of MoHA; US\$ 20,000 in maintenance costs related to equipment; and US\$ 30,000 in maintenance of the infrastructure of the MoHA and the GPF installations. These costs would be included in the annual budget of MoHA and GPF (approximately 0.4% of annual recurrent expenditures of MoHA and GPF combined). The maintenance of the multi-purpose community facilities would be the responsibilities of the CDCs, jointly with the GoG, since there are government-owned facilities.

C. Monitoring and Evaluation

- 4.6 A comprehensive logical framework has been drafted (see Annex I) containing output and outcome indicators in order to facilitate a resolute commencement and sustainable execution of the programs. A system that contains baseline data, progress indicators, implementation strategies, implementation timetables, and criteria for targeting project resources is being developed to guide the effective implementation of each sub-component.
- 4.7 Monitoring and reporting of the implementation progress of the Program would be the responsibility of the PIU. The PIU would be responsible for preparing and

presenting semi-annual progress reports, documenting advances in project implementation, as well as, explanations in case of delays or non-compliance with objectives. The second semi-annual report of each year would also include progress in achieving the indicators of the logical framework.

- 4.8 Moreover, PIU will prepare a mid-term evaluation after the implementation of the program accomplishes the following: (i) the Crime Observatory has been operating for two years; (ii) GPF has elaborated a new organizational structure and revised its manual for internal and external accountability; (iii) community assessments are completed and a list of priorities identified by communities and MoHA. On the basis of this report, any needed adjustments on the program's components will be made. A final evaluation would also be carried out when 95% of loan resources are disbursed. The content of this evaluation would include project implementation performance and information regarding the outcomes of the implementation of each component. This evaluation would also be based on the indicators of the logical framework.
- 4.9 The PRU would be responsible for conducting impact evaluations. Loan resources would finance these evaluations, as well as training the staff of the PRU in this area and three victimization surveys that would provide data for the impact analysis (the first of these surveys becoming the Program baseline). Impacts on violence and crime would be estimated by the percentage of reduction in crime rates and the fear index (obtained from the victimization surveys) after comparing the areas participating in the Program and a control group consisting of areas not participating in the Program. The attribution to the Program would be likely to be based on the statistical method of difference-in-difference comparison of those indicators before and after intervention and between treatment and control groups.

V. DEVELOPMENT IMPACT

A. Benefits and Impacts

- 5.1 A first direct outcome of the program is the improvement the capacity of national and local level institutions to design and implement preventive policies and strategies regarding crime and violence. A second direct outcome of the operation is that it fosters participation of communities in crime and violence prevention, particularly in the areas of increased communication among community representatives, and ministries; stronger engagement of community residents in identifying, discussing and carrying-out targeted interventions; and changed norms, attitudes and perceptions about violence.
- 5.2 Expected secondary or indirect outcomes from well-implemented crime preventive policies are the future reduction of crime and violence incidence in Guyana. Given the participatory and integrated approach with special attention to youth-at-risk and youth violence, these interventions should benefit disproportionately a highly vulnerable group and have multi-generational effects. Another expected indirect

outcome would be formation and/or accumulation of social capital among participating communities.

- 5.3 The quantification of these developmental benefits differs according to the nature of the benefits. Direct outcomes are easier to follow and measure. The program will monitor outcome as well as output indicators. Output indicators refer to the percentage of MoHA trained staff, the number of victimization and attitudes surveys collected, the number of completed monthly reports published by MoHA, the number of preventive policies implemented, the number of media campaigns implemented, or the number of police stations rehabilitated, to mention some. Outcome indicators refer to establishing instruments that favor the coordination of activities of community structures and the public sector (multipurpose centers, for instance); increased awareness against anti-social behavior, alcohol, drug-abuse; or a strengthened community leadership that understand the assets of the community and engage residents in addressing risk factors associated with crime. Indirect outcomes or impacts, however, are more difficult to attribute to the program itself vis a vis other interventions in the country. On social capital, the program will, nevertheless, collect information on the number of coordinated efforts in the participating communities, the number of new partnerships formed; the number of cross-ethnic community linkages; or the percentage of adults and youths trained in parenting, interpersonal and drug abuse prevention programs, to cite some.
- 5.4 **SEQ/PTI Classification.** This operation does qualify as a social equity-enhancing project, as described in the indicative targets mandated by the Bank's Eighth Replenishment (document AB-1704). This operation also does not qualify as poverty targeted investment (PTI).

B. Environmental and Social Impacts

- 5.5 It is expected that this program will have a significant positive social impact as it addresses both the direct effect of violence on vulnerable populations, particularly the poor and women, and the correlative effect on long term well being. By addressing both the direct and cumulative effects of crime and violence, this program will contribute to improving the social context for vulnerable populations and ensure that future generations are also protected.
- 5.6 This program will have negligent environmental impacts. The civil works activities financed by the project will be related to the new construction of facilities and rehabilitation or replacement of old and inadequate facilities and equipment with more modern and efficient ones. The construction of new facilities, as well as the rehabilitation or replacement of older facilities at the GPF and the Ministry of Home Affairs, will comply with the requirements established by the Environmental Protection Act of 1996. As a result, all procurement documents will include the necessary clauses requiring the compliance with the national legislation regarding environmental protection and mitigation of negative impacts related to the construction or rehabilitation of buildings.

VI. SPECIAL ISSUES AND RISKS

A. Risks

- 6.1 **Absorptive Capacity.** The main institutions involved in project activities are weak and do not have extensive experience in implementing programs similar in nature to the one proposed. This situation may constrain the execution of the proposed Bank program. The project will mitigate this factor initially by contracting consultants to provide technical assistance during the preparation and continuing through implementation. Secondly, the project will focus institutional strengthening directly to transfer of knowledge to the local counterparts in MoHA and GPF, in order to enhance the sector's absorptive capacity in the short to medium term. Moreover, the project will seek the introduction of performance-based incentives for key staff in the PIU, which is based on a model being developed by the COF/CGY for use in Bank's programs.
- 6.2 **Coordination problems.** A good deal of the success of the program lies on the effective coordination between MoHA and GPF efforts. Flaws in that coordination may result in compartmentalized actions with sub-optimal outcomes. To mitigate this risk, the program specifically delimits the functions of each institution and identifies the PIU at MoHA as the coordinating mechanism. Also, it cannot be over-emphasized the importance of a constant and close follow-up of the development of the project by the Country Office to reduce this risk.
- 6.3 **Sustained community participation.** Violence-stricken communities are also those more likely to be hostile and mistrusting of police services. That results in the risk of low community participation. The project mitigates this risk by having communities participating in the design, implementation and assessment of interventions in which the police will also be involved.

B. Project Preparation and Action Plan

- 6.4 In addition, a MAPPE under the PROPEF is financing further designs and initial implementation of activities in the following areas: (i) implementation of a pilot project in Georgetown (Region IV) of the information system that will monitor trends in crime and violence, facilitate information exchange, plan strategically and formulate appropriate policy; (ii) design and implementation of activities that are considered priorities to reform and strengthen the Guyana Police Force in the areas of problem-oriented policing, crime prevention, human rights related to police activities, conflict resolution, anger management, relations between GPF and the public and the media; (iii) design of project monitoring and evaluation system; (iv) implementation of community victimization and attitudes survey of 1000 respondents; (v) implementation of community scans to determine the required preventive interventions; (vi) preparation of an Institutional Capacity Assessment

System (ICAS) and risk analysis evaluation; and (vii) support the establishment of a PIU at the MoHA.

- 6.5 The above activities are required for the proper dimensioning of the respective components of the proposed program. Consultants have been identified for each of the above components and they have been contracted. The results of the studies are expected to be available at the end of the second quarter of 2006. As a result, the analysis mission is expected to take place in the second quarter of 2006.

GUYANA
Citizen Security Programme
(GY-0071)-
PRELIMINARY LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

Objectives	Indicators	Means of verification	Assumptions
Goal To enhance citizen security and improve peaceful coexistence among citizens by contributing towards the reduction of crime, violence and fear.	- Improvement in well-being indicators of the Guyanese population as a result of the reduction of crime and violence.	Statistics produced by the Crime Observatory Victimization and Attitudes Surveys	Political commitment to improve citizen security is not affected by elections.
Purpose To improve the formulation of evidence-based crime prevention policies through the strengthening of the MoHA and GPF.	<i>By the end of the Project</i> -Perception of security is increased (Reduction from XX% to XX% in the fear index in the population in the areas participating in the programme). -X % reduction in the number of undetermined deaths/crimes.	PIU reports PIU reports Statistics produced by the Crime Observatory	Political, economic and social conditions do not deteriorate.
To promote preventive and protective practices through community participation.	-X% of improvement in skills, attitudes and behaviour indicators obtained from the Victimization and Attitudes Survey. Such indicators will concretely refer to: a) community norms; b) interpersonal violence behaviour; c) coalition building.	PIU reports Victimization and Attitudes Survey	Political, economic and social conditions do not deteriorate.
Component 1. Strengthening of MoHA i. Integrated crime and violence information system implemented (Crime Observatory) and surveillance system training.	<i>By the end of Project</i> -Monthly reports by MoHA on crime and violence indicators published by third quarter 2007. -100% of MoHA research unit staff trained in data collection and formulation of policies. -X% reduction in the number of deaths/crime with identified perpetrator	- Annual reports from PIU. - Project reports and documentation - MoHA human resource development report - Project reports and documentation - Statistical Catalogue Published - Data management manual published	- Continued commitment of MoHA and GOG

Objectives	Indicators	Means of verification	Assumptions
	<i>-Mid-term:</i> Crime observatory has been operating for two years.	- Statistics produced by the Crime Observatory	
ii. Training in data analysis	-100% of MoHA research unit staff trained in statistical analysis and formulation of policies	- PIU annual reports	
iii. Formulation of prevention and interventions policies	-At least 5 targeted interventions implemented in selected communities related to risk factors identified by the Crime Observatory.	- PIU annual reports	
iv. Effective mechanism for broad based dissemination of crime data implemented	-MoHA website functioning by third quarter 2007 with monthly updates. Quarterly bulletins published starting fourth quarter 2007	-Website functioning - Bulletins available in public domain	
v. Campaigns to foster positive attitudinal change and promote peaceful coexistence implemented	-At least X media campaigns implemented related to risk factors detected by the Crime Observatory - % of improvement in indicators related to attitudes to violence	- PIU annual reports - Victimization and attitudes survey	
vi. Development of an impact evaluation system	-An evaluation system in operation -X reports on published	- PIU annual reports	
vii. Victimization and attitudes surveys	-2 victimization and attitudes surveys implemented	- Report on victimization surveys	
viii. Institutional strengthening of MoHA in the areas of organizational structure, planning model, internal audit, financial model, corporate image and management of work flow.	-X of recommendations of new organizational and financial structure implemented -Implementation of annual planning and audit. -X% reduction in the time spent on processing requests	- PIU annual reports	
Component 2. Strengthening of the Guyana Police Force.	<i>By the end of Project</i>		
i. Updated Crime reporting information system implemented	Monthly reports by GPF on crime indicators published	- GPF bulletins and PIU annual report	Police hierarchy and GoG commitment to implement GPF modernization

Objectives	Indicators	Means of verification	Assumptions
			No re-arrangement of the institutional relation between MoHA and GPF the elections
ii. Criminal investigation training implemented	X% of Criminal investigation staff trained on new procedures -X% reduction in the number of deaths/crime with identified perpetrator.	- GPF bulletins and PIU annual report - Statistics produced by the Crime Observatory	
iii. Crime laboratory built and operating	Equipped and staffed crime laboratory in operation	- GPF bulletins and PIU annual report	
iv. Training in crime prevention, on human rights related to police activities, conflict resolution, anger management, relations with the public and the media; addressing domestic violence and child abuse cases	100% of rank and file staff trained on crime prevention, human rights protection, conflict resolution, anger management and handling of domestic violence and child abuse.	- GPF bulletins and PIU annual report	
v. New organizational structure designed and implemented	-X of recommendations on new structure implemented Mid-term evaluation: new organizational structure implemented	- GPF bulletins and PIU annual report	
vi. Integrated financial management system implemented	-X reports of the new financial, budget and planning system published	- GPF bulletins and PIU annual report	
vii. Human resource policy implemented	- Statutory regulations regarding recruitment, promotion and retirement published	- GPF bulletins and PIU annual report	
viii. Internal and external accountability mechanisms strengthened	-Procedures manual of revised control mechanism published. -XX% of Internal Control Office staff trained on new procedures Mid-term evaluation: internal and external accountability mechanisms revised	- GPF bulletins and PIU annual report	
Ix Police Stations rehabilitated	-X police stations rehabilitated	- GPF bulletins and PIU annual report	
Component 3 Community Action	By the end of project	-	No escalation in the level of violence delay the execution of the program
Situational control- rapid-impact and violence reduction community projects implemented	-X projects implemented - Reduction from XX% to XX% in the	- PIU annual reports	

Objectives	Indicators	Means of verification	Assumptions
	reduction of fear index in the population in the participating communities.		
Socio-cognitive skills programs implemented (e.g. conflict resolution, coexistence promotion, anger management, parenting training, moral reasoning)	<p>-X% of adults and XX% of youths trained and implementing socio-cognitive approaches</p> <p>-X% improvement in practises related to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) conflict resolution b) anger management <p>-X% improvement in the perception of trust towards community organizations and public institutions</p>	<p>- Victimization and attitudes surveys</p> <p>- PIU annual reports</p>	
iii. Increased resident participation and empowerment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - X residents developing and implementing community action projects - X partnerships (formal engagement of government and civil society) - X% increased in indicators of interpersonal trust and participation in community organizations <p>Midterm evaluation: community assessment completed and priorities identified by communities and MoHA.</p>	<p>- Victimization and attitudes surveys</p>	
School based violence prevention programs	-X children and teachers trained on violence prevention.	- PIU annual reports	
Rehabilitation of multi-purpose community resource centres	-X centres built and operational	- PIU annual reports	
Short term rapid impact quick win projects implemented	X quick win projects implemented	- PIU annual reports	

**CITIZEN SECURITY PROGRAMME
(GY-0071)**

ESTIMATED COSTS OF PREPARATION

1. MISSIONS		
Orientation Mission	3 persons	US\$5,500
Analysis Mission	4 persons	US\$7,500
Negotiation Mission	3 personas	US\$5,500
TOTAL		US\$18,500
2. ADMINISTRATIVE RESOURCES		
Team Leader	8 weeks	
Team Members	12 weeks	
Project Lawyer	4 weeks	
3. CONSULTANTS		
1. Crime Observatory	10 weeks	
2. Strenghtning of GPF	12 weeks	
3. Community Interventions	12 weeks	
4. Realizing Safe Neigh. Surv.	12 weeks	
5. PPIU Coordinator	12weeks	
TOTAL		US\$18,500