



Project Completion Report

PCR

Project Name: Information and Communication Technology Project

Country: Jamaica

Sector/Subsector: Science and Technology/ Information and Communication Technology

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Project Number: JA-0116

Loan Number (s), TC(s): 1438/OC-JA

CRG Date:

Final Approval Date of PCR:

PCR Team: Principal Author and Members: Francisco E. Vieira (SCL/SCT) and Janet Quarrie (CCB/CJA)

Acronyms and Abbreviations

CAP = Community Access Point

CITO = Central Information Technology Office

CJA = Office of the IDB in Jamaica

FSL = Fiscal Services Limited

GOJ = Government of Jamaica

HEART/NTA = HEART (Human Employment and Resource Training Trust) Trust / the National Training Agency

ICT = Information and Communication Technology (or Technologies)

LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean

MCST = Ministry of Commerce, Science and Technology

MEMT = Ministry of Energy, Mining and Technology

MICT = Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Technology

MITEC = Ministry of Industry, Technology, Energy and Commerce

MMT = Ministry of Mining and Telecommunication

NGO = Non-Governmental Organization

PEU = Project Executing Unit

SCL/SCT = Division of Science and Technology of the Social Sector Department, IDB

TC = Technical Cooperation

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I. Basic Information

BASIC DATA (AMOUNTS IN US\$)							
PROJECT NO: JA-0116	TITLE: Information and Communications Technology Project						
Borrower: Government of Jamaica Executing Agency (EA): Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Technology (MICT)	Date of Board Approval: 11/27/2002 Date of Loan Contract Effectiveness: 06/25/2003 Date of Eligibility for First Disbursement: 03/23/2004						
Loan(s): No related operation Sector: Science and Technology	<u>Months in Execution</u> * from Approval: 85 * from Contract Effectiveness: 77						
Lending Instrument: Investment/Specific Investment Operation	<u>Disbursement Periods</u> Original Date of Final Disbursement: 25 June 2008 Current Date of Final Disbursement: 25 June 2010 Cumulative Extension (Months): 24 Special Extensions (Months):						
	<u>Loan Amount(s)</u> * Original Amount: US\$ 17,000,000 * Current Amount: US\$ 8,500,000 * Pari Passu (if applicable): 46.06%						
Poverty Targeted Investment (PTI): No Social Equity (SEQ): Yes	<u>Disbursements</u> * Amount to date: 100 (%) <u>Total Project Cost</u> (Original Estimate): US\$ 23,000,000 <u>Redirectioning</u> Has this Project? Received funds from another Project [] Sent funds to another Project [] N/A [X]						
	<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>To/From Project Number</th> <th>From Sub-Loan Number</th> <th>Amount</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	To/From Project Number	From Sub-Loan Number	Amount			
To/From Project Number	From Sub-Loan Number	Amount					
	* Current amount (adjusted for redirectioning): \$8,500,000						
	<u>On Alert Status</u> Is project currently designated "on alert" by PAIS: No If yes then why is the project on alert (DO , IP Ratings and/or relevant PAIS indicators): Comments on relevance of "on alert" status for this project (if applicable):						

Summary Performance Classifications				
DO	[] Highly Probable (HP)	[X] Probable (P)	[] Low Probability (LP)	[] Improbable (I)
IP	[] Highly Satisfactory (HS)	[] Satisfactory (S)	[X] Unsatisfactory (US)	[] Very Unsatisfactory (VU)
SU	[] Highly Probable (HP)	[X] Probable (P)	[] Low Probability (LP)	[] Improbable (I)

II. The Project

a. Project Context

The Information and Communications Technology Project was designed in 2001 with the overall objective of contributing to Jamaica's readiness for the networked world, in the public and private sectors, and in civil society, in order to increase competitiveness, diversify exports and expand productive employment. The purpose of the project was to reduce transaction costs, and to increase Information and Communication Technology (ICT) use in the private sector, public sector and civil society.

The rationale of the project was as follows: i) the project would try to capitalize on the expertise of Fiscal Services Limited (FSL), a limited liability company under the Ministry of Finance, to augment the use of electronic forms for import-export activities and other taxes, while at the same time increasing that agency's mastery of certain technologies; ii) because of the nature of its work, FSL interacted with many other governmental institutions and, as such, it was assumed that the project could offer the conditions for an initial "e-government" effort that would spread later on; iii) if that was to happen other agencies would have to be able to incorporate ICT resources into their daily activities and to do so proficiently; therefore some training (for current and future potential employees) was considered necessary; iv) if new online services were available to be offered by GOJ then citizens would need to have access to ICT devices to use such services, and public sites, similar to "Telecenters" or Cybercafés, would be an option. Finally, v) with some initial "e-government" activity and changes in the telecommunication sector already underway, GOJ would need an instance of coordination, some policy making and responsibility over the digital agenda effort, and CITO (Central Information Technology Office) was to be created as part of the loan.

The MICT was considered the proper place for CITO at that time (2002); HEART/NTA was a natural partner for training human resources due to its mission and experience; and it was decided to place the public sites under the responsibility of a NGO which had activities throughout the country. The project inputs were technical assistance, training funds, computer equipment and software.

The loan contract was signed on June 25, 2003 but no disbursements occurred until July 26, 2007 when GOJ signed a contract amendment. In 2004 GOJ had requested the Bank to re-scope several operations due to economic constraints in the country, and the loan for the project was reduced by 50% to US\$8,500,000. The request was approved by the Manager in Memo COF/CJA/2311/2004 dated 17 December 2004. In the new version, Components were reduced as follows: Component 1 (Strengthening of MICT) from US \$2,200,000 to US\$ 1,620,000; Component 2 (e-Government) from US\$6,800,000 to US\$4,740,000; Component 3 (Community Outreach) from US\$2,600,000 to US\$500,000; and Component 4 (Human Capital Development) from US\$ 3,100,000 to US\$355,000 (**Amendatory Contract doc. LEGIII/JA-916806-07 dated July 26, 2007**).

Among the significant changes generated by this reduction were: (i) the e-procurement study would no longer be financed; (ii) the number of Community Access Points were reduced from 60 to 10, and the implementation responsibility and correspondent costs, were transferred to the Project Executing Unit at MICT; (iii) training would be offered only to GOJ staff directly involved with the new online services; (iv) some criteria for the implementation of CAPs were eliminated; (v) a re-engineering of GOJ revenue processes was to be done; and (vi) funds for ICT training were eliminated.

When the project document was created, the Ministry responsible for ICT was referred to as the **Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Technology (MICT)**. That Ministry has undergone several names changes since 2003 due to changes in portfolio responsibilities: from MICT to **Ministry of Commerce, Science and Technology (MCST)**, then to **Ministry of Industry, Technology, Energy and Commerce (MITEC)**, to **Ministry of Energy, Mining and Telecommunications (MEMT)**, to **Ministry of Mining and Telecommunications (MMT)**.

Due to the many changes, some with unrecorded consequences or indicators, the best starting point for this PCR is the Mid-term Evaluation Report, which identifies some new indicators for project implementation. These indicators are used in the "Implementation Progress" section of the PCR. Table 1.1 from the Mid-term Review Report highlights these indicators.

In December 2009, the Bank made a decision in consultation with GOJ to reimburse the amount of US\$2,000,365.94 spent mainly in equipment purchase and training for Component 2 since the bidding process had been concluded and the purchase was destined to improve FSL activities, as prescribed by the project. At the same time most of the activities under the re-scoped project were already concluded and had not required the planned resources from the Bank, justifying even more the recognition of those expenses, leading to a higher than expected disbursement for Component 2. The Bank contracted the services of a consultant to review the procurement process of the Executing Agency to ensure that they were in line with Bank's policies. The funds were disbursed on December 16, 2009.

The project expired on June 25, 2010 and therefore the Project Executing Unit was disbanded. Queries under the project are currently being handled by the Office of the Prime Minister.

b. Project Description

i. Development Objective(s)

1. To promote enhanced efficiency and access, thereby reducing transaction costs and increasing ICT use in the private and public sectors, and in civil society.

There is no change in the development objectives with the 2007 contract amendment and project reformulation - just the entire project was re-scoped, some Components' activities were removed and eventual quantifiable targets were changed accordingly. From 2008 on PPMRs reflect the new scope of the project.

ii. Components *(original with comments on the re-scoping)*

Component 1: Strengthening of the Ministry of Industry, Commerce, and Technology (MICT).

Resources from the project were to be used in preparing MICT to take a leading role in the execution of the loan, to monitor and audit the project. A Project Executing Unit was to be financed, and additionally, MICT was to create a central ICT authority for the country and to revise telecommunications regulation. Short term consultancies to create an information system to monitor the project were contemplated. With the re-scoping, the Component was redefined to keep PEU and to include some training for MCST staff on ICT and telecommunications issues. In early 2008, with various changes in the institution itself, telecommunications was not directly contemplated by the project anymore although some of the foreseen activities were carried out by other government instances.

Component 2: E-Government

Resources were to be used to put a group of fiscal agencies online, to provide web enabled transactions to certain key trade agencies; and to support the establishment of an e-Procurement system. This last activity was removed with the reduction of the project in 2007.

Component 3: Community Outreach

Originally resources would finance the establishment of 60 Community Access Points (CAP) countrywide, to be managed by an NGO selected in an open process. With the re-scoping the number of CAPs was reduced to 10 and were to be installed by the Executing Agency,

equipped with 5 computers with software, networking cabling, networking and administration software, and a once a year meeting for CAP staff was to be financed. Original resources of this Component were reduced by 85%, and the executing Agency assigned PEU to do the task.

Component 4: Human Capital Development

Resources would provide scholarships to Jamaicans in general, and to government employees in particular, to pay for certain ICT training programs. The Component was re-scoped to support training of GOJ staff involved in online services to be provided by the Government. Original resources were reduced by 88.5%.

c. Quality -At- Entry Review (if applicable) [N/A]

Quality -At- Entry Review

☐ Highly Satisfactory (HS) - 1 ☐ Fully Satisfactory (S) - 2 ☐ Less than Satisfactory (LS) - 3 ☐ Unsatisfactory (U) - 4

III. Results

a. Outcomes

ACHIEVEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES (DO)				
Development Objective(s) (Purpose)		Key Outcome Indicators		
1. To promote enhanced efficiency and access, thereby reducing transaction costs and increasing ICT use in the private and public sectors, and in civil society.				
Classification: LP				
		Planned Outcomes		Outcomes Achieved
Baseline Project		Intermediate	End of	
1.1B Agencies online: 0 (2002)		1.1I: 4 (2007)	1.1E: N.A.	1.1: ____ (date)
1.2B Web transactions: 0 (2002) (*)		1.2I: N.A.	1.2E: 70%	1.2: N.A. (2010) (*) % satisfied users
1.3B Yearly users of CAPs: N.A. (2010)		1.3I: N.A.(2007)	1.3E: 1,500	1.3: N.A. (29 CAPs installed by 2010)
1.4B HR trained: N.A. (**)		1.4I: N.A.	1.4E: 90	1.4: (**= public employees in key agencies)
Reformulation.				
[X] Board approval on 19 April 2007. Components 1 and 2 had little change; Component 3 budget was reduced by 85%; Component 4 budget was reduced by 88.5%. D.O. has not changed. Contract Amendment LEGIII/JA-916806-07, dated 26 July 2007.				
PPMR Retrofitting. Indicate if and when the PPMR was retrofitted and explain any changes resulting from this exercise.				
[] N/A				
Summary Development Objective(s) Classification (DO):				
[] Highly Probable (HP)	[X] Probable (P)	[] Low Probability (LP)	[] Improbable (I)	
Comments: The systemic approach originally used to design the project was abandoned as parts of the activities were cancelled, changed or reduced. Therefore, the expected impact was diminished. The CITO office, for example, never achieved the consolidation planned by the project and the training of GOJ staff was at a much smaller scale than originally planned. The sum of all these reductions will lead to just a partial achievement of the project's development objectives.				

Country Strategy. One of the objectives of the IDB Country Strategy was to promote an improved environment for long-term private sector led growth. Two key elements necessary to achieve the objective are to increase productivity and competitiveness and to reform the regulatory and institutional framework affecting business environment. This project directly supports increases in productivity and competitiveness, and would also support reforms of the legal/regulatory environment in ICT activities to provide adequate incentives for private sector participation.

b. Externalities

Two positive externalities could be observed, and when asked about were confirmed by people in agencies not related to the project: a) due to the success and impact of Component 2, GOJ decided in 2009 to redesign its taxes system and to automate it, complementing the set of tax processing systems provided by the project; b) the number of CAPs implemented, which was well above expectation, created a “culture of CAPs”, demonstrating the importance of such sites and generating the will to expand its number. Ministry continues to receive requests for CAPs according to the criteria and methodology established by PEU for the project.

The main negative externality was the frustration generated by the failure to create a central ICT authority and to do reform work in the telecommunications regulation, as expected by stakeholders in government and in the private sector. These are areas in which Jamaica still lags behind some countries in the LAC region and that would benefit from Bank support as they are also in line with Jamaica’s Vision 2030 National Plan.

c. Outputs

IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS (IP)				
Components (Outputs):				
1.Component 1: Strengthening of MCST Total cost of Component: \$ 2,560,000 Counterpart: \$ 940,000 IDB: \$ 1,620,000 IDB Disbursement: 100%				
Key Output Indicators:				
Planned Outputs			Outputs Achieved	
Baseline*	Annual/Intermediate	End of Project		
a) ICT fully implemented in agencies of 3 sectors of government 1.1B: N.A. (2002) 1.1I: N.A. 1.1E: 3 (2010)			1.1: 3 sectors: Education, Finance, Agriculture (February 2008) (*)	
b) Establishment of institutional arrangements for new regulatory framework : 1.2B: N.A. (June 2003) 1.2I: Finished (June 2005) 1.2E: N.A.			1.2: Partially accomplished (February 2008)	
* (if applicable)			(*) it is hard to measure the direct influence of the project and of MCST in the implementation of ICTs in these three sectors, except for Finance due to the presence of FSL, as they had planned to modernize their infrastructure and executed very well its part of the project. In Education, one can say that the loan motivated the e-Learning project to install computers in 190 schools and have teachers and students using ICT resources; and to have curriculum material bought and/or developed by the University of Technology. Some investment was made to design the national Universal Access Fund as well.	

Briefly explain differences between planned and actual outputs (if applicable).

- a. Governance framework for a single telecommunications regulator is still debated by authorities of Jamaica;
- b. CITO had a difficult start and then lost its capacity (human and financial) to coordinate the process; it still needs support to consolidate in the role of central ICT policy making and monitoring entity.

[] N/A

Restructuring. Indicate if this component was restructured (date of approval by Manager). Briefly discuss the consequences of these changes. **In the 2007 re-scoping Component 4 (Human Resources) was basically merged into this Component, and aimed at just MMT (Ministry of Mining and Telecommunications) staff. Training would be in computer skills and telecommunications issues. Formal Memo of approval by Manager could not be located in projects documents. Later, in mid-2009 with the second extension, the Component became totally dedicated to the training of Help Desk and client service personnel for the various tax systems being implemented.**

Additionally, this Component paid for: (i) consulting work which led to the creation of the e-Transaction Act, accompanied by a public information and education campaign, the purchase of equipment to assign public keys to transactions and the necessary training (all this is under the Trade Board presently); (ii) consulting services to revise the country's ICT-Telecom policy and make recommendations to the Ministry; (iii) salaries and general functioning of the PEU.

[] N/A

2.Component 2: E-Government

Total cost of Component: \$ 6,620,000

Counterpart: \$ 1,880,000

IDB: \$ 4,740,000

IDB Disbursement: \$ 4,740,000

Key Output Indicators:

<u>Planned Outputs</u>			<u>Outputs Achieved</u>
<u>Baseline*</u>	<u>Annual/Intermediate</u>	<u>End of Project</u>	
a) 70% filers online indicate satisfaction:			1.1: Systems fully implemented by mid-2010, but no formal users' survey has been done.
1.1B: 0 (June 2003)	1.1I: N.A.	1.1E: 70% (June 2010)	As a consequence of this effort, GOJ decided to revise and automate all its tax collection system, an effort concluded in the beginning of 2010. Systems financed by the Loan are now part of the overall tax collection and processing system.
b) HEART transactions 10% electronically by 2008			2.1 Yes. November 2009
2.1B: N.A. (June 2002)	2.1I: N.A.	2.1E: 70% (end 2010)	
c) e-Gov Component on track per work plan agreed by MEMT and FSL			3.1: Yes. Inland Revenue and TAAD in November 2009
3.1B: N.A. (June 2002)	3.1I: N.A.	3.1E: fiscal agencies online	3.2: Yes. JAMPRO in June 2009
		3.2E: trade agencies online	
* (if applicable)			

Briefly explain differences between planned and actual outputs (if applicable).

[X] N/A

Restructuring. Indicate if this component was restructured (date of approval by Manager). Briefly discuss the consequences of these changes.

YES: Component was re-scoped in 2004, with budget reduced from US\$ 6,620,000 to US\$ 4,740,000

[] N/A

3. Component 3 Community Outreach

Total cost of Component 2: \$500,000

Counterpart:

IDB: \$500,000

IDB Disbursement: 100%

Classification: HS

Key Output Indicators:				
Planned Outputs			Outputs Achieved	
Baseline*	Annual/Intermediate	End of Project	End of Project	
Community Outreach portal in place				
1.1B: N.A. (2002)	1.1I: N.A. (2006)	1.1E: N.A. (2010)	1.1 16 (25Dec2009)	
10 sites by End of Project ("informal" objective)			Achieved: 29 sites	
* (if applicable)				
Briefly explain differences between planned and actual outputs (if applicable).				
c. Difference was positive, i.e. more CAPs were set up than planned after the re-scoping, although the CAP Portal was never developed.				
[] N/A				
Restructuring. Indicate if this component was restructured (date of approval by Manager). Briefly discuss the consequences of these changes. YES; approved in the June 2007 re-scoping. A total of \$2.1 million was cancelled, and indicators were reviewed to reflect NUMBER of CAPs installed instead of number of people trained. Impact: reduction to 10 CAPs during remainder of project. A final number of 16 CAPs was actually reached, with 13 more in the GOJ pipeline for after project conclusion. The main change was to replace NGO coordinating the Component by the Project Executing Unit within the MCST. Automatically decisions and purchases begun to be done according to public administration processes. Formal approval by Manager could not be located in projects documents. [] N/A				
(In case of more components, create new row and complete.)				
4.Component 4: Human Capital Development Total cost of Component: \$ 355,000 Counterpart: IDB: \$ 355,000 IDB Disbursement: 100%				
Key Output Indicators:				
Planned Outputs			Outputs Achieved	
Baseline*	Annual/Intermediate	End of Project		
Government staff trained for Help Desk and Client Services				
1.1 B N.A.	1.1I: N.A.	1.1E: 70 (2009)	1.1 N.A.	
* (if applicable)				
Briefly explain differences between planned and actual outputs (if applicable). See next field.				
[] N/A				
Restructuring. Indicate if this component was restructured (date of approval by Manager). Briefly discuss the consequences of these changes. YES; training was <u>not</u> to be for citizens at large (so, no longer applies the original idea of funding scholarships) but rather to those identified in a consultancy aimed at proposing a re-engineering of the revenue processes in GOJ, in particular personnel involved in the help desk and on-line governmental services. Basically, resources would be used for activities under the re-scoped Components 1 and 2. [] N/A				
Summary Implementation Progress Classification: [] Highly Satisfactory (HS) [] Satisfactory (S) [X] Unsatisfactory(U) [] Very Unsatisfactory (VU)				

d. Project Costs

Total Project Cost - Planned (US\$000)		Total Project Cost - Actual (US\$000)		% Difference							
(Reproduce cost table)		(Reproduce cost table)									
No.	Category Name	Original Budget (IDB)	Original Budget (LC)	Rescoped Budget (IDB)	Rescoped Budget (LC)	Total Project Cost - Actual (IDB)	Total Project Cost - Actual (LC)	Difference (IDB)	Difference (LC)	% Difference (IDB)	% Difference (LC)
1	Strengthening of MCST	2,200,000	1,500,000	1,620,000	940,000	1,507,864.52	1,481,666.98	-112,135.48	541,666.98	-6.92	57.62
2	E-Government	5,000,000	1,900,000	4,740,000	1,880,000	6,421,732.43	4,716,590.37	1,681,732.43	2,836,590.37	35.48	150.88
3	Community Outreach	2,600,000		500,000		110,936.86	110,866.36	-389,063.14	110,866.36	-77.81	
4	Human Capital Dev	3,100,000	100,000	355,000		0.00		-355,000.00	0.00	-100.00	
85	Payoff 1426/OC-JA	0		155,528		155,528.09		0.00	0.00	0.00	
87	Interest	1,600,000		800,000		303,938.10		-496,061.90	0.00	-62.01	
87	Inspection fee	170,000		85,000		0.00		-85,000.00	0.00	-100.00	
87	Credit Fee		200,000		200,000			0.00	-200,000.00		-100.00
98	Contingencies	2,330,000		244,472		0.00	5,803.09	-244,471.91	5,803.09	-100.00	
	TOTAL	17,000,000	3,700,000	8,500,000	3,020,000	8,500,000.00	6,314,926.80	0.00	3,294,926.80	0.00	109.10

(*) LC = Local Counterpart

OBS: final AFS was not completed at the time of preparation of the PCR and would be adjusted, if necessary to shed light on any financial Management aspects that was identified there in as material or significant or as advised by the Financial Management Specialist for the Office.

IV. Project Implementation

a. Analysis of Critical Factors

Positive Factors: a) despite all changes in the executing agency, in the Project itself, and in the resources planned for the project, among a few key stakeholders in Jamaica there was always an interest to advance with the Components; b) creativity was abundant in the PEU and other stakeholders in order to advance the project; c) e-Transaction Act was created and implemented under the supervision of the Trade Board; d) Component under responsibility of FSL was carried out very proficiently; e) there were positive spillover effects of the loan (ex. Other tax collection was automated). Considering the major reductions in Components 1 and 4, and the successful completion of Components 1 and 3, the implementation of the loan can be considered satisfactory, although in more time than initially planned.

Negative Factors: (a) the re-scoping of the project caused it to lose its systemic approach to the objectives when Component 4 all but disappeared and Component 3 changed its executing focus from NGO to official agency; (b) the changes in the executing agency; (c) the lack of support to the original CITO and its responsibilities in the project and to its own mission, which was directly related to the project; (d) many changes in interlocutors in GOJ; (e) the long time to process bidding of equipment.

b. Borrower/Executing Agency Performance

Borrower/Executing Agency			
<input type="checkbox"/> Highly Satisfactory (HS)	<input type="checkbox"/> Satisfactory (S)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Unsatisfactory (U)	<input type="checkbox"/> Very Unsatisfactory (VU)

Due to the number of changes in the agency responsible for the project, the execution many times had very lax supervision, leaving entirely to the PEU the interaction with the Bank, several strategic decisions, etc.

c. Bank Performance (section completed by the Office of the Prime Minister)

The Bank provided a high degree of participation in the Project from Project Initiation to Close down. The PEU (Project Execution Unit) of the Ministry, the executing agency, engaged the Bank in identifying requirements and actions for Project monitoring and execution when necessary. The execution of the Project was closely monitored by the Bank and significant guidance was provided in ensuring that all the rules of the Bank were adhered to. This helped to build stakeholder confidence and acceptance, particularly in the execution phase of the Project.

There was close monitoring of the procurement aspects of the Project. A synergistic partnership with the Bank ensured successful Project execution. The Bank provided critical guidance when requested, and in a timely manner. The Bank's team was very responsive and supportive of requests for reviews and responses to project-related issues and displayed reasonable flexibility in responding to emergency/urgent situations which arose from time to time. It is therefore fair to say that throughout the Project execution, the Bank was reliable and highly responsive to the needs/demands of the project, which allowed for ease and effective execution of the project.

Bank Performance

☐ Highly Satisfactory (HS) ☒ Satisfactory (S) ☐ Unsatisfactory (U) ☐ Very Unsatisfactory (VU)

V. Sustainability

a. Analysis of Critical Factors

The main strength behind the sustainability of results will be the reputation of FSL as an efficient service provider and the fact that several taxes collection processes have been automated, leading GOJ to work on having a completely automated tax system. In this sense, the benefits and impact of Component 1 will be permanent to the country. As for Component 3, the CAPs will always depend on the financial model to be followed. They have the potential of becoming self-sustainable by generating their own funds and, if well managed, be able to afford maintenance and equipment replacement.

b. Potential Risks

As many activities were transferred to GOJ, the sustainability of the results will depend on resources allocated in the national budget, and in times of economic difficulties the risk increases. Due to the advantages of an automated tax system the results of Component 2 have a greater chance of receiving support in the years to come. Products of what was Component 1 depend on policy definitions still lacking from the part of GOJ as for some time now the country has been discussing several aspects of a national ICT policy.

c. Institutional Capacity

As indicated before, the overlapping of responsibilities and the lack of a properly structured central authority in the ICT policy making sphere is cause for concerns. Furthermore, any effort by individual agencies can count only on limited human resources; never achieving the scale and impact that a national plan was meant to achieve. The Vision 2030 plan assigns to CITO that central coordination role. Arising from the Electronic Transaction Act a Certification Authority was named and established to regulate certification service providers. This office now operates under the umbrella of the Trade Board.

Sustainability Classification SU:

☐ Highly Probable (HP) ☒ Probable (P) ☐ Low Probability (LP) ☐ Improbable (I)

VI. Monitoring and Evaluation

a. Information on Results

The PEU has turned over to the Office of the Prime Minister the data on investment in equipment, implementation of CAPs and other activities. FSL has done an initial, yet informal, survey of users' satisfaction with the new tax filing systems; an effort that is to be done in the future by the Tax Administration authority. Project leader suggests that Office of the Prime Minister prepare a short brochure with information on project's results.

b. Future Monitoring and Ex-Post Evaluation

The Loan Contract establishes that the Executing Agency shall carry out and submit to the Bank, at the end of 2 years after the date of last disbursement, an ex-post evaluation report on the results of the project. Eventually additional Bank's actions in the country, will contribute to the monitoring of results and expansion of the impact generated by the Loan,

VII. Lessons Learned

Project Design: The project was originally designed to advance ICT culture on many fronts. To mitigate risks the approved project contemplated execution by an experienced governmental training agency (HEART Trust/NTA), a NGO selected through a public and transparent process (not selected), a limited liability technology company (FSL) owned by the GOJ and the consolidation of a central authority (CITO) which would coordinate the process while at the same time would learn from and be strengthened by this coordination. The estimated results would be the modernization of some governmental processes, trained human resources inside and outside government, public access to ICT facilities in many points of the country and an agency in condition to propose policy and to lead Jamaica into the knowledge economy. Although it did not seem complex to execute perhaps the project design overestimated the capacity of governmental agencies to implement all prescribed actions and to coordinate among them. With the benefit of a retrospective view, one may say that prior to beginning execution the Bank should have done an institutional assessment of agencies' capacity to implement the project. This key component of any project design seems to have been missing.

With the re-scoping of the project only two of the expected results were maintained after 2007. At that point the Bank should have prepared a detailed plan of action for the remainder of the project life, with a new Log Frame. This failure was corrected in mid-2008 when a new procurement plan was developed and identified activities for 2008/09 and function as the "action plan" for the remainder of the implementation. This, however, did not make up for the lack of a log-frame, which would have identified baseline indicators and expected results.

Bank and Objectives Not Achieved: (a) There was lack of firm action on the part of the Bank to deal with CITO losing its original mission and capacity to carry out its assigned responsibilities. That office was the only institutional mechanism to be created by the project, i.e. the project was not adding bureaucratic instances to government, and, more important, was to be the coordinator of all future endeavors in the ICT sector in Jamaica. It would be the natural interlocutor, in the ICT sector, for future loans and grants from the Bank. More than one of the project's objectives the constitution of such an agency would provide Jamaica with the mechanism to coordinate, develop and implement policy directed at fostering a knowledge economy. Bank (both HQ and Representation) could have monitored closely and frequently the creation and initial activities of CITO to guarantee its consolidation with this proactive perspective.

(b) Telecommunications regulation, a topic considered relevant by the Bank and by the country, should have been the subject of a separate TC. The idea of leaving it to the newly created CITO proved to be not viable since CITO itself was yet to be organized and then become operational.

Client's Procedures: The long time taken for approval of framework contracts (purchase of equipment in ICT must take into consideration a very dynamic process of constantly updating the available technology) has shown that it would be more efficient to have the client agreeing on the advantages of this approach from the beginning instead of treating the purchase as another activity in the government pipeline for procurement. Additionally, the opportunity lost in terms of preparing human capital for the country is yet to be evaluated. Certain ICT programs were created in the last few years and students graduated from colleges and universities with ICT

majors; but as reflected in the discussions during the Exit Workshop, there is not a proper match between the output of such programs (areas of specialization) and the demand by the labor market. At the time of the re-scoping Bank should have had a more firm position in terms of keeping part of the original Component 4 to ensure the proper training of human resources.

Annexes:

2. Minutes from the Exit Workshop **(Annex I)**

3. Others (*Please list*)

Annex II – List of Agencies Online

Annex III – A sample of applications being used by GOJ Agencies

MINUTES FROM EXIT WORKSHOP
Loan 1438/OC-JA – Jamaica ICT Loan
Kingston, October 19, 2010.

Attendees:

Douglas Edwards and Dyon Woolcock – representing FSL
Carl Morgan and Douglas Webster – representing Trade Board
G. Michael Thorney – representing ADA
Marie McKenzie – representing CITO
George Wright – representing Tax Administration
Richard Gordon – former Project Unit Manager
Gary Campbell – representing the Office of the Prime minister
Reynaldo Thompson – representing PIOJ
Julian A. Belgrave (Acting Representative – CCB/CJA), Janet Quarrie (Operations Sr. Analyst. CCB/CJA) and Francisco E. Vieira (Project T.L. SCL/SCT) - representing the Bank

Loan Amount: US\$ 8,500,000.00

Board Approval:	27 November 2002
Date of Contract Effectiveness:	25 June 2003
Date of Eligibility for First Disbursement:	23 March 2004
Expiration date:	25 June 2010

Minutes:

1. The meeting was opened by Julian Belgrave, CJA Representative a.i., who thanked all participants for coming and stressed the importance of the workshop for the Bank in terms of the lessons it could provide for future action;
2. Next, Francisco E. Vieira (SCL/SCT), Project Team Leader, addressed the objectives of the meeting and the PCR process for the conclusion of the operation;
3. Participants agreed unanimously that all results should be measured according to the re-scoped value and activities of the loan. Total loan amount was reduced in 50% from its original figure, and some Components were drastically reduced. (see PCR);
4. It was informed by the Bank that after the re-scoping a new Logical Framework had not been prepared for the loan, and therefore such an instrument was not available to monitor the project execution. When SCL/SCT became responsible for the execution (Q3-2008) all the resources had been committed to the procurement of equipment, in a “Framework Agreement Contract” mode suggested by CJA. Unfortunately it had taken two years for the framework contract to be developed and approved by the country, creating further delay in the project. Now, with the lesson learned from the experience, the framework contract method would seem recommended to projects like this;
5. Lack of execution capacity from the part of the Ministry responsible for the project, and the number of changes that the Ministry went through during the execution period, created a vacuum in which the Project Executing Unit (PEU) had to implement the project, many times led to act as if it were the authority in charge;

6. It did not become clear what use was given to consultants report with proposals for the development of a new telecommunications policy, although almost US\$ 100,000 was committed and paid;
7. It is consensus that the country still needs support to consolidate a centralized ICT policy making and supervisory entity. T.L. informed this issue was also discussed with the previous CJA representative as a possible Technical Cooperation for 2011, and all participants considered a welcome measure at this point;
8. It was agreed that FSL achieved all the objectives it had expected with loan support. The next steps will be the continuation of technical training to face new challenges; it was also agreed that FSL would check to see if tax system was set up to facilitate the use by disabled persons;
9. It was agreed that the Loan had a very positive impact in disseminating an “e-Government culture” among the various agencies of the country’s government. As a direct result of the loan Tax Authorities re-designed the national tax system to automate it and several agencies went on line. A list with a sample of these agencies is in Annex II of this document;
10. It was agreed that the results achieved were compatible with the re-scoped amount of the loan, and the project will have a continuing impact in the mid-term horizon;
11. The Office of the Prime Minister has committed to fill out its session of the PCR Report, the only remaining item to finish the document.

Francisco E. Vieira (SCL/SCT)
Project Team Leader
November, 2010

Annex II

- medusa.agc.gov.jm.
- jamaicatax.gov.jm.
- ocr.gov.jm.
- courtofappeal.gov.jm.
- mojhq.gov.jm.
- pstu.gov.jm.
- janaac.gov.jm.
- ceatajamaica.gov.jm.
- creatajamaica.gov.jm.
- bwa-jamaica.gov.jm.
- donateblood.gov.jm.
- jamaicagazette.gov.jm.
- bloodbank.gov.jm.
- pmc.gov.jm.
- jcdc.gov.jm.
- healthinfo.gov.jm.
- roadfund.gov.jm.
- nlj.gov.jm.
- anandaalert.gov.jm.
- elandjamaica.gov.jm.
- vision2030.gov.jm.
- jddb.gov.jm.
- portinspection.gov.jm.
- rep.gov.jm.
- mem.gov.jm.
- mysc.gov.jm.
- cdf.gov.jm.
- jncunesco.gov.jm.
- jfll.gov.jm.
- pcj.gov.jm.
- sdf.gov.jm.
- bglc.gov.jm.
- pcoa.gov.jm.
- nsep.gov.jm.
- nsepjam.gov.jm.
- hajl.gov.jm.
- admingen.gov.jm.
- agc.gov.jm.
- agd.gov.jm.
- ati.gov.jm.
- arp.gov.jm.
- assp.gov.jm.
- auditorgeneral.gov.jm.
- broadcastingcommission.gov.jm
- bankofjamaica.gov.jm.
- csjp.gov.jm.
- agc.gov.jm.
- arp.gov.jm.
- assp.gov.jm.
- auditorgeneral.gov.jm.
- bankofjamaica.gov.jm.
- boj.gov.jm.
- cabinet.gov.jm.
- cac.gov.jm.
- cacjamaica.gov.jm.
- cda.gov.jm.
- cg.gov.jm.
- clarendonpc.gov.jm.
- chemicalsafety.gov.jm.
- cito.gov.jm.
- consumer-affairs.gov.jm.
- consumeraffairscommission.gov.jm
- consumeraffairsjamaica.gov.jm
- culture.gov.jm.
- dgtaxadmin.gov.jm.
- dgtax.gov.jm.
- ecc.gov.jm.
- e-jamaica.gov.jm.
- edunet.gov.jm.
- entertainment.gov.jm.
- fid.gov.jm.
- fisheries.gov.jm.
- fla.gov.jm.
- forestry.gov.jm.
- fscjamaica.gov.jm.
- fspid.gov.jm.
- highway2000.gov.jm.
- industry.gov.jm.
- ird.gov.jm.
- j-cib.gov.jm.
- jacustoms.gov.jm.
- jadsc.gov.jm.
- jamaica.gov.jm.
- jamaicatax-online.gov.jm
- jamaicaconference.gov.jm
- jamaicandiaspora.gov.jm.
- jamaicapost.gov.jm.
- jamstats.gov.jm.
- japarliament.gov.jm.
- jard.gov.jm.
- jcaa.gov.jm.
- jamaicancoffee.gov.jm.
- jatax.gov.jm.
- jcf.gov.jm.
- jdf.gov.jm.
- jipo.gov.jm.
- jftc.gov.jm.
- jrc.gov.jm.
- jls.gov.jm.
- jmb.gov.jm.
- jrs.gov.jm.
- ksac.gov.jm.
- kingshouse.gov.jm.
- kingshousejamaica.gov.jm
- ksacorp.gov.jm.
- landval.gov.jm.
- manchesterpc.gov.jm.
- mct.gov.jm.
- mcst.gov.jm.
- men.gov.jm.
- metoffice.gov.jm.
- metservice.gov.jm. I
- mgd.gov.jm.
- miic.gov.jm.
- memt.gov.jm.
- micys.gov.jm.
- mlge.gov.jm.
- mlgeintranet.gov.jm.
- mle.gov.jm.
- mlss.gov.jm.
- mii.gov.jm.
- minlab.gov.jm.
- minesandgeology.gov.jm.
- mit.gov.jm.
- mlgcd.gov.jm.
- mlgycd.gov.jm.
- mme.gov.jm.
- mmt.gov.jm.
- mnsj.gov.jm.
- mmth.gov.jm.
- mns.gov.jm.
- moa.gov.jm.
- moatrade.gov.jm.
- mof.gov.jm.
- moh.gov.jm.
- mohe.gov.jm.
- moenv.gov.jm.
- mohpermit.gov.jm.
- moe.gov.jm.
- moec.gov.jm.
- moey.gov.jm.
- moeyc.gov.jm.

- moeycassistance.gov.jm.
- moj.gov.jm.
- mos.gov.jm.
- mot.gov.jm.
- nphl.gov.jm.
- psra.gov.jm.
- mpm.gov.jm.
- mfaft.gov.jm.
- millenniumja.gov.jm.
- mitc.gov.jm.
- mput.gov.jm.
- mtec.gov.jm.
- mtw.gov.jm.
- mhwww.gov.jm.
- mwh.gov.jm.
- nepa.gov.jm.
- nerha.gov.jm.
- ncc.gov.jm.
- ncst.gov.jm.
- nhdc.gov.jm.
- nhf.gov.jm.
- nht.gov.jm.
- nswma.gov.jm.
- nif.gov.jm.
- nla.gov.jm.
- nwa.gov.jm.
- oca.gov.jm.
- ocg.gov.jm.
- opd.gov.jm.
- opm.gov.jm.
- osc.gov.jm.
- onr.gov.jm.
- our.gov.jm.
- pab.gov.jm.
- pica.gov.jm.
- pca.gov.jm.
- procurement.gov.jm.
- pioj.gov.jm.
- portmore.gov.jm.
- rada.gov.jm.
- reb.gov.jm.
- rgd.gov.jm.
- rpd.gov.jm.
- rwsl.gov.jm.
- jis.gov.jm.
- sc.gov.jm.
- sdc.gov.jm.
- serha.gov.jm.
- sespassistance.gov.jm.

- srha.gov.jm.
- stcatherinepc.gov.jm.
- skillsreturn.gov.jm.
- sma.gov.jm.
- statinja.gov.jm.
- taad.gov.jm.
- tad.gov.jm.
- tasd.gov.jm.
- tef.gov.jm.
- tradeboard.gov.jm.
- tollauthority.gov.jm.
- tourism.gov.jm.
- tpdco.gov.jm.
- uafcl.gov.jm.
- werha.gov.jm.
- wra.gov.jm.
- wrha.gov.jm.

INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY PROJECT (JA0116)

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

Quality Risk Review (QRR)

A. QRR PROCESS

The PCR was distributed to QRR requesting comments on Wednesday January 5th, 2011. Comments received, as well as further actions, have been documented in this Summary of Results and Procedures. No presential meeting was held.

B. Not Resolved Subjects:

NONE

C. COMMENTS:

Name/Dept.	Subject	Comments	Answers
Hyung Jung Lee / LEG	Section I Basic Information	The total project cost is indicated as US\$23 million. Perhaps would be useful to note as reference for the reader in this section that in addition to the loan amount, this includes a local counterpart of US\$6 million.	The total cost is US\$ 14.5 million. Counterpart value incorporated to PCR document.
	Section II The Project:	a) In page 2, fourth paragraph, the reduction of the loan amount is explained. However, I missed seeing the justification or explanation of the reasons, although I see the explanation of what the modifications were. I'd recommend including for full background information for the reader.	Suggestion incorporated in the PCR document.
		b)I found in section III multiple references to reformulation approved by the Board in 2007. I'd recommend including the general explanation of such reformation in section II.a, as well when the description of the operation's other modifications are explained.	Suggestion incorporated in the PCR document
		c)In page 3, second paragraph, a reference is made to certain reimbursement of expenses. I'm understanding this fact is relevant to be explained here. Thus, I'd suggest explaining at least under which component was this made.	Suggestion incorporated in the PCR document
		d)About the third paragraph in page 3 as well, it is written that the Executing Agency was disbanded. Being the Executing Agency the MICT (as multiple times modified), I am reading right that it no longer exists? Or is it intended to state here that the executing unit in such Ministry has been disbanded?	Yes; PCR text has been corrected.

Name/Dept.	Subject	Comments	Answers
	Section III Results:	a)In section III.c., under component 2, was this component not restructured? I had understood from the description of this component in section II.b.ii. that it was indeed modified from the original design	Suggestion incorporated in the PCR document
		b)Same section, under component 3, the explanation of the restructuring states that a total of \$2.1 million was cancelled. Is this in addition to the 2004 reduction by 50% explained in section II? I'd suggest clarifying.	It is the same. The request for re-scoping dated 2004, the new contract (amending the original), dated June 2007.
	Section IV Project Implementation	a)Under the subsection b, although partially understandable from the references to the Executing Agency's performance in other parts of the documents, I'd consider it to be useful providing some explanation of why the Borrower/Executing Agency's performance is unsatisfactory.	Suggestion incorporated in the PCR document
		b)Under subsection c of Bank Performance, a comment of form, the two lines above the block for the qualification is repetitive of the content of the block.	The intention was to replicate the comment received from the Office of the Prime Minister. PCR document has been corrected, as per suggestion.
Janet Quarrie CCB / CJA		What would have been the main reasons behind the delay between approval of the project and first disbursement; and what are the lessons learnt as a result of this delay?	<p>It seems to have been due to reasons internal to the client. Unfortunately our systems have no register of this neither has CCB/CJA. If one looks at the calendar the last two information lead to that conclusion::</p> <p>Approval: November 27, 2002</p> <p>Signature: June 25, 2003</p> <p>Eligibility: March 23, 2004</p> <p>Re-scoping: December 17, 2004 (approval)</p> <p>New contract signed: June 2007</p>
		Given that the project was extended, shouldn't the date of the End of Project Indicators be updated to reflect the Project's actual date as a result of the extension?	Suggestion incorporated in the PCR document

Name/Dept.	Subject	Comments	Answers
		We note that despite the project being re-scoped that the indicators were not updated to reflect changes of the re-scoping. As a result, the Output Indicators and Output Achievements do not appear to be coherent	This is because a new LogFrame was not prepared when the re-scoping took place. Project Executing Unit used one it had created as guideline but which was never approved by CCB/CJA.
		Despite Component 2 being reduced after the re-scoping; the final financial table indicates that the expenditure here has exceeded the original allocation by some US\$1.6M. The report should indicate what accounts for this overrun."	Suggestion incorporated in the PCR document

Name/Dept.	Subject	Comments	Answers
		In regards to the comments made at the end of the section "Achievement of Development Objectives, on page 4, it would seem that the Summary Development Objectives classification as "Probable" does not reflect these comments, and may need to be revised.	Not so; the Objectives were not quantitative but rather to begin to change a culture. And this seems to have been somewhat achieved by the project. For this reason it is considered "partial achievement" in the Comments section of III.a.1
		In regards to the "Establishment of Institutional Arrangements for New Regulatory framework", 1.2 of Implementation Progress, on page 5; given that this output was partially accomplished in February 2008, what was the status of this output at the end of the Project in 2009?	The information of February 2008 reflects an accomplishment date as well as the status of the Output at the end of the project.
		Kindly clarify the meaning of "informal objective" mentioned under Planned Outputs, 1.1B on page 7.	This was a number that PEU was working with and, again, because of lack of LogFrame it was not an official number for CCB/CJA.
		In regards to section (c) on "Explanation between planned and actual outputs on the top of Page 7, we would recommend that the word "initially" be removed and the words "after the re-scoping" be added after the word "planned" for clarity	Suggestion incorporated in the PCR document
		The Project Cost Table only reflects the loan amounts and should be revised accordingly since there was substantial local counterpart contribution.	See updated information on table "Project Costs" of the PCR.
		In regards to the Lessons Learnt stated on page 10; please clarify since the way it is written conveys the idea that the new Procurement Plan replaced the required revised Logical Framework.	Suggestion incorporated in the PCR document

		Notwithstanding the Satisfactory Performance classification given by the Executing Agency, the Country Office Jamaica holds that supervision of this project was not consistently satisfactory	In total agreement. In several parts of the PCR one finds criticism on the way the Bank managed this loan.
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Name/Dept.	Subject	Comments	Answers
Rafael Anta SCL/SCT	Sección de descripción de proyecto	El componente 1 menciona que el tema de telecomunicaciones quedó por fuera, aunque en diferentes partes del PCR se menciona que telecom es un tema importante para GOJ, donde tienen varios temas pendientes en la parte regulatoria, y también menciona algunas actividades de telecom financiadas por el proyecto. Sugiero revisar el texto para ser consistente con los mensajes	Suggestion incorporated in the PCR document.
	Sección de Resultados	Veo que varios indicadores de outcomes y de outputs no tienen resultados (N/A) y hay poca precisión en los valores de algunos indicadores de outputs. Además, en la sección Bank Performance, se menciona “the execution of the project was closely monitored by the Bank ...”. Si esta afirmación es cierta, creo que deberías disponer de datos de progreso de las diferentes metas en cada componente. ¿La sección de resultados se va a quedar así o estás esperando algún informe de evaluación final que te permita llenarlos?	Bank Performance is an evaluation by the client with regards to the relationship with the Bank and the way we have proceeded during the life of this Project. It is not team leader’s opinion. One perceives that after 2008 the project has Indicators that were N/A before. That was the 2002-2008 period in which Bank’s management of this project was very relaxed and record keeping poor.
	Outputs achieved del componente 1	Mencionas “Some investment was made to design the national Universal Access fund” y “consulting to revise the ICT-telecom policy and make recommendations”. Puedes contarnos un poco mas cómo está este fondo? (existe y funciona, o se quedó en el nivel de propuesta?) y con las recomendaciones al Ministro, qué pasó?	The Fund has existed since 2005 and has invested J\$ 2.4 billion since then, mainly in the e-learning national program. Resources come from a levy on international calls to Jamaica. It is managed by the Universal Access Fund Limited, an entity of GOJ, headed by a Minister in the Office of the Prime Minister. The recommendations resulted in the e-Transaction Act.
		Sería muy importante incorporar datos sobre el uso de los CAPs (tienes datos sobre si están vacíos, medio-llenos o llenos; qué aplicaciones utilizan mas, qué servicios ofrecen, etc).	The Ministry was advancing with some surveys last October. I can check what they have available now.
	En la sección de Bank Performance	Se menciona “A synergistic partnership with the Bank ensured successful project execution” pero en la sección de outputs, el progreso de la implementación se clasifica de “Unsatisfactory”. No es esto una contradicción?	No; this is the evaluation from the Office of the Prime Minister with regards to Bank’s work. I have tried to clarify it in the PCR document.

		Existen datos de cuantas personas/empresas (y % sobre el total) utilizan los servicios on-line del Automated Tax System? Esto ayudaría a dar sentido al valor del proyecto.	Initial surveys (although done in a very simplistic way by FSL) indicate <u>satisfaction</u> of 75% of the users of the Tax System. It certainly is not measuring adoption of the automated systems; this is one of the tasks not completed by GOJ.
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Name/Dept.	Subject	Comments	Answers
		Cómo es posible que después de ejecutar este proyecto, se mencione que el Rep y el TL han discutido la posibilidad de preparar una propuesta para apoyar la regulación de telecomunicaciones. Si este es un tema tan importante (que no dudo que lo sea), por qué no se incluyó entre las actividades del préstamo? (aunque no en el diseño, se hubiera podido introducir desde el 2008)	Because since then, as stated in the PCR, the country has been discussing the adoption of a single regulator. During the period there was change in government and it seemed more appropriate to advance with automation of agencies.
Carlos Guaipatín SCL/SCT	Project Context	It would be very helpful to have more information about the reformulation of the scope of the project: what were the criteria used to decide which activities were affected? If the “re-scoping of the project made it lose its systemic approach” (Pg. 8), what was the new rational?	Suggestion incorporated in the PCR document
	Externalities (Pg. 5):	I think that you should add more information about the two positive externalities. How do we know that the redesign of the taxes system and the number of CAPS were due to the project?	Suggestion incorporated in the PCR document
	Bank Performance	It is just difficult to believe that “the Bank was reliable and highly responsive to the needs/demands of the project, which allowed for a ease and effective execution of the project”. I think that it would be good – in terms of lessons that can improve our work – to be more auto-critical in a constructive way. I am pretty sure that the original design was not very realistic and that during the execution we made important mistakes.	This section provides the feedback from the client government, and was prepared by the Office of the Prime Minister. It is not a self-evaluation on the part of the Bank; although this is not required in a PCR it can be found in many parts of the document..
	Lessons Learned	On Pg.10 it is presented as a lesson learned that “the Bank should have done an institutional assessment of agencies capacity to implement the project”; I don’t think this is a lesson learned but a huge mistake on the Bank’s part. In Annex I it is said that “after the re-scoping a new Logical Framework had not been prepared for the loan” which I think was another serious mistake	Both were mistakes, which can provide lessons, particularly for complex, innovative projects in small countries.

	Sustainability	I would suggest elaborating more on the impact of the project on the institutions and human capital. It would be good If after all we can demonstrate with numbers and facts that intuitions and human capital were indeed strengthened	This is not the case. The PCR document tries to show that the Human Resources preparation was all but abandoned, and that a central, strong agency for ICT policy making and coordination is still lacking. Resulting from direct demands from this project and/or from the expansion of the tax system and other initiatives, individual agencies are trying to train people and ‘modernize’ themselves. Recently the Bank approved the GovNet project, which will fund the planning of the governmental intranet with its necessary training.
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