



Project Completion Report

PCR

Project Name: Ennery-Quinte Agricultural Intensification Project

Country: Haiti

Sector/Subsector: Environment, Rural Development and Disaster Risk Management

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Project Number: HA-L1009

Loan Numbers: Initial loan 1646/SF-HA, converted into the grant 2390/GR-HA on October 9, 2010, pursuant to Resolution DE-109/10 of the Board of Executive Directors, as part of measures concerning debt relief for Haiti.

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

AIBVEQ	Association Inter-communale du Bassin Versant d'Ennery-Quinte Ennery-Quinte Inter-Communal Watershed Association
BCP	Bureau de Coordination du Programme Program Coordination Unit
BID	Inter-American Development Bank
CIAT	Commission Interministérielle pour l'Aménagement du Territoire Inter-ministerial Commission for Territorial Planning
CNIGS	Centre National d'Information Géo-Spatiale National Geospatial Information Center
CNM	Centre National de Météorologie National Meteorological Center
DDAA	Direction Départementale de l'Agriculture Artibonite Regional Agricultural Services Bureau for Artibonite Department
DPC	Direction de la Protection Civile Civil Protection Directorate
MARNDR	Ministère de l'Agriculture, des Ressources Naturelles et du Développement Rural Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development
MDE	Ministère de l'Environnement Ministry of Environment
PNAP	Programme National d'Alerte Précoce aux Inondations National Flood Early Warning Program
SNRE	Service National des Ressources en Eau National Water Resources Service



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I. Basic Information

BASIC DATA (AMOUNTS IN US\$)	
PROJECT NO: HA-L1009	TITLE: Ennery-Quinte Agricultural Intensification Program
Borrower: Government of Haiti Executing Agency (EA): MARNDR	Date of Board Approval: 20 July 2005 Date of Loan Contract Effectiveness: 28 July 2005 Date of Eligibility for First Disbursement: 13 December 2005
Loan(s): 2390/CR-HA	Months in Execution
Sector: Environment, Rural Development and Disaster Risk Management	* from Approval: 111 * from Contract Effectiveness: 111
Lending Instrument:	Disbursement Periods Original Date of Final Disbursement: 28 July 2010 Current Date of Final Disbursement: 31 October 2014 Cumulative Extension (Months): 51
	Loan Amount * Original Amount: US\$ 27,105,000 * Current Amount: US\$ 27,105,000 Local Counterpart * Original Amount: US\$ 295,000 * Current Amount: US\$ 295,000
Poverty Targeted Investment (PTI): Yes Social Equity (SEQ): Yes Environmental Classification: C	Disbursements * Amount to date: US\$ 27,094,932 (99.96%) Total Project Cost: US\$ 27,400,000
	Redirectioning Has this Project? Received funds from another Project [] Sent funds to another Project [] N/A [x] On Alert Status Is project currently designated "on alert": No

Summary Performance Classifications				
DO	[] Highly Probable (HP)	[X] Probable (P)	[] Low Probability (LP)	[] Improbable (I)
IP	[] Highly Satisfactory (HS)	[X] Satisfactory (S)	[] Unsatisfactory (US)	[] Very Unsatisfactory (VU)
SU	[] Highly Probable (HP)	[X] Probable (P)	[] Low Probability (LP)	[] Improbable (I)

II. The Project

a. Project Context

The project was designed after the destructive flooding of the plain and city of Gonaïves in 2004, which resulted in more than 3.000 deaths and economic losses of US\$ 265 million ¹. It was framed within a larger intervention aimed at agricultural intensification in the Artibonite department, one of the areas with higher agricultural potential in the

¹ Le cyclone Jeanne en Haïti: dégâts et effets sur les départements du Nord-ouest et de l'Artibonite : approfondissement de la vulnérabilité. BID, CEPALC, MINUSTAH, PNUD, 2005.

country. Project's guiding principle was a close articulation between commercial, agronomic, environmental and social components aiming at agricultural intensification and watershed protection.

The thrust of the decades of IDB financed projects with the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development (MARNDR) was construction of infrastructure especially irrigation, with limited or negligible effective investment in watershed protection, producer or water-user association strengthening, or effective linkage either to agricultural R&D or to market opportunities. When the Ennery-Quinte Agricultural Intensification Program methodology was developed and presented in dialogue with the MARNDR authorities during the mid-1990s, it met with heavy resistance. When a window of opportunity appeared in 1998, the design proceeded and the IDB Board approved the original PIA/Ennery-Quinte in January 1999. Another abrupt change occurred in the political situation and the project was frozen and never signed. When the PIA/Artibonite project was approved in 2003, it abandoned many of the key PIA/Ennery-Quinte elements particularly regarding watershed management. When a new administration entered in 2004, they chose to return to Ennery-Quinte with the original PIA/Ennery-Quinte approach.

However, during the first four years the project encountered several obstacles that affected its implementation: natural disasters, limited capacity for execution of contracted firms, and an unfavorable political context. As early as 2008, successive hurricanes Hannah and Ike caused considerable damage to irrigation infrastructure and to experimental plots used for agricultural extension. The 2010 earthquake and cholera outbreak caused further delays in execution. The project was also implemented during a period of political tension and instability between 2005 and 2010.

After having redefined its mechanisms for intervention in 2010, project activities were more efficiently implemented until 2014.

b. Project Description

i. Development Objective

The general objective of the Program is to increase the income of households in the Ennery-Quinte project zone, while reducing the risk and severity of further flood and mudslide damage in the Gonaïves area. The operation will allow the beneficiaries to intensify and diversify their agricultural production in a sustainable manner in the Ennery-Quinte watershed.

ii. Components

The program was articulated around four components:

1. Agricultural Intensification and Market Linkage

This component aimed at disseminating improved farming practices for annual crops, developing of agricultural input supply markets as well as post-harvest value chains (storage, packaging and marketing). It also included activities for intensification of perennial crops, fruit and lumber, in the plains.

2. Watershed Management and Flood Protection

Decentralized watershed management committees were to be created and become functional, infrastructure built for water and sediment retention (micro dams, rock walls,

and cisterns), perennial cover on hillsides extended, a hydrological monitoring system installed, and ecologically sound animal husbandry practices were to be developed and disseminated.

3. Rehabilitation and Management of Six Small-Scale Irrigation Systems

This component was aimed to rehabilitate physical infrastructure of six irrigation systems and establish functional water users associations.

4. Community Mobilization and Implementation Coordination

This component aimed at providing logistical support to the Ministry of Agriculture's regional unit in the Artibonite department, and at strengthening the technical and organizational capacity of its field technicians.

III. Results

a. Outcomes

ACHIEVEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES (DO)	
<p>Developpement Objective</p> <p>Increase household income in the Ennery-Quinte region while reducing the risk and severity of damage due to flooding and landslides in the Gonaives region</p>	<p>Key Outcome Indicators</p> <p>Initial outcome indicators were defined as follows :</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Gross farm income 2. Gross revenue per hectare 3. Economic losses incurred during natural disasters 4. Loss of life incurred during natural disasters <p>Gross farm income at the end of the project could not be calculated due to the diversity of farming conditions and sources of revenue in the project area. It was possible to estimate the increase in gross revenue per hectare only by comparing results for specific crops between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, without taking into account associated crops in the mixed crop systems.</p> <p>Loss of life and property can only be compared if there are similar climatic events during the project period, which was not the case. The project did not monitor disasters and their impacts due to the lack of adequate methodology.</p> <p>The program's monitoring and evaluation system (M&E), particularly the indicators and means of measurement, were not rigorously designed at the time of project formulation and start-up, and baseline and mid-term evaluation were of very poor quality (weaknesses of M&E and consulting firms). These circumstances made the final evaluation more complex.</p> <p>The original indicators initially referred to a simple before-after dimension, which is not suitable to evaluate project impacts. A new methodology had to be developed at the end of the project in order to establish a reasonably viable counterfactual, using random selection of non-beneficiary farmers with similar characteristics to those of beneficiary farmers, in the same area. This evaluation yielded the results presented below.</p> <p>Following reasonable assumptions, this final evaluation calculated an Internal Rate of Return at end of project of 16%.</p>
1. Classification: S	

Planned Outcomes at End of Project	Outcomes Achieved/Comments
R1.Increased production and profitability of crops and reduction of post-harvest losses, on an environmentally sustainable way.	
Original indicators and targets (initial logical framework)	Final indicators and results (final evaluation)
30% increase in yields of main annual crops (maize, beans, sorghum)	Irrigated maize : increase of 11% for beneficiaries, compared to non-beneficiaries in the same area. Maize on rain-fed slopes : increase of 76% for beneficiaries Irrigated beans : increase of 55% for beneficiaries Beans in rain-fed humid mountains : increase of 157% for beneficiaries Irrigated sorghum : increase of 86% for beneficiaries Sorghum in rain-fed dry mountains : increase of 29% for beneficiaries
Plantain yields increase, going from 12 to 14 TM/ha	Data not available
Revenue from beans increase, going from 6.620 to 8.606 HTG./ha.	The increase in value added for the beneficiaries in the irrigated plains is 17,183 HTG/ha. The increase in value added for the beneficiaries in the humid mountains is 20,172 HTG/ha
Revenue from maize increase, going from 507 to 660 HTG/ha.	The increase in value added for the beneficiaries in irrigated plains is 2500 Gourdes/ha. The increase in value added for the beneficiaries in the humid mountains is 9,500 HTG/ha. The increase in value added for the beneficiaries in the dry mountains is 1,509 HTG/ha
Revenue for sorghum increases, going from 266 to 346 HTG/ha.	The increase in value added for the beneficiaries in the irrigated plains is 6,923 HTG/ha. The difference in value added is negative for beneficiaries in the dry mountains : - 1112 HTG/ha
Production of Francisque mangos increases, going from 124 to 149 dozen of fruit per producer per year	Top-grafting activities were initiated late in the project cycle and it is too early to define the results of this activity.
Production of avocados increases, going from 33 to 47 dozen fruit per year	Project did not produce grafted avocados.
Production of citrus increases, going from 17 to 20 dozen fruit per producer per year	Project did not produce grafted citrus.
Area with three cropping cycles per year goes from 342 to 450 carreaux	Data not available
Post-harvest losses for main crops are reduced by 10%	Average post-harvest losses for maize for beneficiaries with improved storage facilities is 8,8% compared to 19,4% for non-beneficiaries. Average post-harvest losses for beans are higher for project beneficiaries than for those using traditional storage techniques 6,1% compared to 3,2%. Average post-harvest losses for sorghum for beneficiaries is 3,3% compared to 0% with traditional techniques. New storage techniques using air-tight steel drums were not mastered by farmers
R2. Assets protected (road network, real estate, irrigation infrastructure, soils)	
Volume of sediment retained by protective infrastructure	70,736 m3
15,305,200 m3 of water retained by storage and protective infrastructure	Data not available

1955 ha protected by erosion control infrastructure	3,000 has.
<p>PPMR retrofitting. The products of PPMR/PMR have been adjusted when a new implementation strategy has been designed in 2009, and started to be implemented early 2011 after earthquake recovery.</p>	
<p>Summary Development Objectives (DO):</p>	
<p><input type="checkbox"/> Highly Probable (HP) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Probable (P) <input type="checkbox"/> Low Probability (FP) <input type="checkbox"/> Improbable (I)</p>	
<p>Program results are mixed :</p> <p>The technological packages promoted by the project resulted in substantial increases in yields and value added for maize and beans, with or without irrigation. For sorghum, increases in yields have only been observed in irrigated conditions.</p> <p>Results for storage of crops were not as positive. Traditional storage methods gave better results for beans and sorghum. Significant improvements were obtained for maize through the methods promoted by the project, based on the improvement of traditional storage.</p> <p>Results for top grafting of mangos appear potentially promising but could not be measured. According to the ex-ante economic analysis of the PIA/EQ and to field qualitative observations, the returns to investments in fruit trees could be some of the highest, an engine of high returns to producer income with substantial positive externalities for watershed management and even for the prospective of increasing the carrying capacity for livestock in this farming system. The lack of qualified technicians for grafting avocados and citrus caused these activities to be abandoned by the project, although training could have been organized with entities such as ORE.</p> <p>The supply chain for inputs was not developed in a sustainable way. Farmer groups could not gather sufficient funds to run the operation and provide members with the required inputs. The fertilizer market is also disrupted by frequent shortages at the national level and the vast majority of farmers cannot afford the increased cost of quality seeds without subsidies from the program.</p> <p>It was decided to limit investments in marketing and processing as the market and production costs for the products had not been thoroughly investigated.</p> <p>Erosion control infrastructures retained large volumes of sediment and the area protected by these structures is superior to the expected results, and interesting results have been observed in soil erosion prevention and water retention where investments combine infrastructure and adoption of sustainable farming practices. However, a more detailed technique should have been used to measure the impacts of these watershed protection infrastructures.</p> <p>The early warning system was installed but problems of theft and vandalism were experienced on several sites. Maintenance capacity and recurrent operation costs of this high-tech system tried to be addressed through the operations 2389/GR-HA and ATN/MD-13623-HA, but the handling by the Ministry of Agriculture is still a concern .</p> <p>It was not possible to estimate the additional area with three crop cycles per year in the small-scale irrigation systems. In spite of significant improvements in irrigation infrastructure, sedimentation and illegal tapping remain a problem and may reduce water availability during the dry season.</p>	
<p>Country Strategies</p> <p>The program was consistent with country strategies defined during the implementation period (Interim Strategies for 2005-2006, 2007-2011 and 2011-2015 strategy). The project is in line with national agricultural policy which stresses the necessary linkage between investments in irrigation infrastructure and watershed management, along with support to producer groups to improve access to services for intensification (water, fertilizer, seeds), improved market conditions, and increased access to credit.</p>	

b. Externalities

Construction of cisterns and micro-dams included in component 2 also allowed local craftsmen to acquire new skills that are potentially useful for future interventions in the region. In addition, cisterns allow women and children, who traditionally have to invest several hours per day in transporting water, to make a more productive and less tiring use of their time.

c. Outputs

IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS (IP)		
Components (Outputs):		
1. Agricultural Intensification and Market Linkage		
Total Cost of Component 1:		US\$ 4.355.000
Total Cost of Component 1 (after transfer of categories):		US\$ 3.994.594
Counterpart:		US\$ 0
IDB:		US\$ 3.994.594
IDB Disbursement:		US\$ 3.989.675
Disbursement Percentage:		99.9 %
<u>Classification:</u> S		
Planned Outputs		Achieved Products
<u>Baseline</u>	<u>End of Project</u>	
1.1 N/A	1.1E -3 technological packages disseminated	1.1 6 technological packages disseminated
1.2 N/A	1.2E 3 multi-service centers built and equipped	1.2 3 multi-service centers built and equipped
1.3 N/A	1.3E 3 packing and marketing centers built and equipped	1.3 0 packing and marketing centers built and equipped
1.4 N/A	1.4E 35 drying and storage structures built	1.4 678 drying and storage structures built
1.5 N/A	1.5E 463.800 successful additional trees and grafts in the irrigated plains	1.5 403.000 successful additional trees and 6.200 grafted trees in the irrigated plains
<p>Several thousand farmers benefited from extension and inputs related to the promoted technological packages (practical training sessions, field visits, participation in crop intensification trial and demonstration plots, agricultural inputs...). Over a period of five years (2008 to 2012), over 3.500 farmers participated in these activities.</p> <p>Providing plantain shoots was one of the activities that brought about the highest revenue per hectare within this component. Although results have not been rigorously measured, estimated value added for irrigated plantain banana is 400,000 HTG./ha.</p> <p>Although the packaging centers were not built because of weak producers' organizational capacities, some equipment such as corn mills, was installed in some multi-service centers. To set up the centers, several workshops and training sessions involving members and leaders were organized. Over 6.000 farmers benefited from the services of the centers initially set up as agricultural input stores and later transformed into multi-service centers.</p> <p>The project did not build cemented drying platforms as initially planned but instead distributed 260 tarpaulins for drying crops. 350 small silos and steel drums were provided and 68 « colombiers » (traditional silos) were improved.</p> <p>Activities aimed at extending and improving perennial crop production generated an important part of the incremental revenue generated by the farmers thanks to project support. The final evaluation estimates the survival rate for planted trees at 70%. The number of successful grafts could not be properly estimated.</p>		
<p>Restructuring. Project activities have been restructured by products when a new implementation approach has been adopted and when PMR methodology has been introduced. This change improved the performance of project management. The discrepancies between the initial estimated budget and the actual cost are mainly due to strategic choices during project implementation based on project execution path and updates of unit costs according to detailed studies.</p>		

2. Watershed Management and Flood Protection

Total Cost of Component 2:	US\$ 6.002.000
Total Cost of Component 2 (after transfer of categories):	US\$ 8.703.652
Counterpart:	US\$ 0
IDB:	US\$ 8.703.652
IDB Disbursement:	US\$ 8.702.141
Disbursement Percentage:	99.9 %

Classification: S

<u>Planned Outputs</u>		<u>Achieved Outputs</u>
<u>Baseline</u>	<u>End of Project</u>	
1.1 N/A	1.1E 1 functional Watershed Management Committee	1.1 1 functional Watershed Management Committee
1.2 N/A	1.2E 2.112.863 successful additional trees and grafts in the mountains	1.2 1.385.498 successful additional trees and grafts in the mountains
1.3 N/A	1.3E 12 hydrological monitoring stations installed	1.3 12 hydrological monitoring stations installed
1.4 N/A	1.4E 514 water storage structures built	1.4 515 water storage structures built
1.5 N/A	1.5E 1 technological package for raising animals in pens developed and disseminated	1.5 1 technological package for raising animals in pens developed and disseminated
1.6 N/A	1.6E 300 km of ravines equipped with gully plugs	1.6 253,5 of ravines equipped with gully plugs and 246 km of ravines stabilized

In order to set up the watershed management committee and make it functional, several workshops, visits, meetings, training sessions, open house events and radio programs were organized. 2011 and 2012 were the most productive years for these activities. Youngsters, schoolchildren, teachers, local elected officials and members of Congress participated in more than 120 events.

Approximately 2 million seedlings of fruit and lumber trees were distributed to 9.135 farmers, totaling 65% of the 14.000 farmers of the eight communal subdivisions in which the program was present.

Throughout the watershed, six (6) early warning stations, nine (9) rainfall data collection installations, three (3) hydro and precipitation stations and three hydrological data collection centers were installed on the 12 sites. Two (2) training sessions were held for technical personnel from the DDA-A, the BCP and Civil Protection personnel concerning data management and analysis. The system's database is housed by the Digicel telecommunications firm and a central server in France manages some operations. The system is linked to the National Flood Early Warning System developed by the operations 2389/GR-HA and ATN/MD-13623-HA.

382 cisterns for home rainwater harvesting were built. The project also innovated by building more than 130 micro-dams with cisterns for runoff collection in the ravines. The lessons learned from this activity were used to improve the technical and organizational aspects in the design of erosion control structures of other projects. Results in soil erosion prevention and water retention are better when investments combine infrastructure and adoption of sustainable farming practices.

Four (4) types of activities were carried out in relation to animal husbandry: raising farmer awareness in regard to damages caused by free ranging animals, training of technicians and farmers, distribution and planting of forage grasses and veterinary care. 536 meetings were held with a total of 10.384 participants, 74% of the farmers of the project area.

Restructuring. Project activities have been restructured by products when a new implementation approach has been adopted and when PMR methodology has been introduced. This change improved project management. The discrepancies between the initial estimated budget and the actual cost are mainly due to strategic choices during project implementation based on project execution path and updates of unit costs according to detailed studies.

3. Rehabilitation of 6 small-scale irrigation systems

Total Cost of Component 3: US\$ 8.559.000
Total Cost of Component 3 (after transfer of categories): US\$ 7,052,463
Counterpart: US\$ 0
IDB: US\$ 7,052,463
IDB Disbursement: US\$ 7.051.638
Disbursement Percentage: 99.9%

Classification: S

<u>Planned Outputs</u>		<u>Achieved Outputs</u>
<u>Baseline</u>	<u>End of Project</u>	
1.1 N/A	1.1E 6 small-scale irrigation systems physically rehabilitated	1.1 6 small-scale irrigation systems physically rehabilitated
1.2 N/A	1.2E 6 water user associations strengthened and functional	1.2 6 water user associations strengthened and functional

Within this component, 61.62 Km de of irrigation canals were rehabilitated or built with masonry walls. These works were executed mainly during 2012 and 2013. In addition to these 61 Km, 125 Km of canals were cleaned after the 2008 hurricanes. Over 500 irrigation structures were built or rehabilitated: intakes, plunge pools, aqueducts, control valves, etc. A total of 1628 hectares were provided with proper irrigation infrastructure and 1.961 ha were rehabilitated after the 2008 hurricanes.

Support services for the water user associations were only initiated in the month of August 2012 and continued until April 2014. An evaluation of the organizational structure of these associations was carried out and the service provider supported the organizations' in obtaining legal status and in organizing elections for executive officer positions.

Restructuring. Project activities have been restructured by products when a new implementation approach has been adopted and when PMR methodology has been introduced. This change improved project management. The discrepancies between the initial estimated budget and the actual cost are mainly due to strategic choices during project implementation based on project execution path and updates of unit costs according to detailed studies.

4. Community Mobilization and Implementation Coordination

Total Cost of Component 4: US\$ 4.163.000
Total Cost of Component 4 (after transfer of categories): US\$ 1.828.109
Counterpart: US\$ 0
IDB: US\$ 1.828.109
IDB Disbursement: US\$ 1.826.999
Disbursement Percentage: 99.9%

Classification: S

<u>Key Output Indicators</u>		
<u>Planned Outputs</u>		<u>Achieved Outputs</u>
<u>Baseline</u>	<u>End of Project</u>	
1.1 N/A (DDAA) strengthened	1.1E Regional Agricultural Services Bureau (DDAA) strengthened	1.1 Regional Agricultural Services Bureau (DDAA) strengthened

The project provided support in the form of training, material and equipment. The DDA Artibonite received four (4) motorcycles, two (2) pick-ups, two (2) electric generators. It was also able to increase its personnel by (1) Senior Agronomist, two (2) junior agronomist and one (1) junior engineer, will remain after project closure. DDA technicians also benefitted from several training sessions. They were trained in local development issues and in project design and management by GAFE (the local development service provider). The DDAA designed a project for construction of micro-dams in three (3) sub-watersheds. DDAA personnel also were engaged in monitoring activities related to watershed management, agricultural intensification and management of small-scale irrigation systems.

Restructuring. Project activities have been restructured by products when a new implementation approach has been adopted and when PMR methodology has been introduced. This change improved project management. The discrepancies between the initial estimated budget and the actual cost are mainly due to strategic choices during project implementation based on project execution path and updates of unit costs according to detailed studies.

d. Project Costs

Budgetary Category Number / Name	Initial amount approved (US\$)	Total amount approved after transfer of categories (US\$)	% Difference	Total amount disbursed (US\$)
Component 1: Agricultural Intensification and Market Linkage	4,355,000	3,994,594	-9%	3,989,675
Component 2: Watershed Management and Flood Protection	6,002,000	8,703,652	31%	8,702,141
Component 3: Rehabilitation of small-scale irrigation systems	8,559,000	7,052,436	-21%	7,051,638
Component 4: Community Mobilization and Implementation Coordination	4,163,000	1,828,109	-128%	1,827,000
Program Administration	2,330,000	4,406,667	47%	4,405,450
Audits	275,000	249,142	-10%	249,142
Evaluations	369,000	485,053	24%	484,534
Capitalization fees	1,052,000	385,343	-173%	385,343
Total	27,105,000	27,105,000		27,094,923

The discrepancies between the initial estimated budget and the actual cost are mainly due to strategic choices during project implementation made on the basis of project execution path and updates of unit costs according to detailed studies.

IV. Project Implementation

a. Analysis of Critical Factors

One of the main causes of delays in project execution was the uncertain quality of services provided by different field operators and civil engineering firms. Contracts were canceled or operators withdrew on three occasions. While the program started in 2006 and began generating products and results during its first years of operation, most activities were in fact initiated at the end of 2010 or the beginning of 2011, after the operational strategy was revised jointly by MARNDR and IDB and after earthquake recovery. Several engineering firms involved in the construction of irrigation infrastructure or cisterns did not honor their engagements in terms of deadlines, quantity and quality of work performed. A report from the executing unit states that at the beginning of the implementation period « the accumulation of delays in the tender process severely affects program implementation. No major constraints were identified: in most cases tenderers are not qualified, which leads to fruitless tenders and time wasted in the process of exchanges and analysis of submissions ». This issue has been and is being solved (in new projects) by the identification of competent companies and sometimes by the use of "force account" procedures to implement activities for which it's difficult to find companies (hillsides works for example).

Delays and quality in tender processes were mainly due to initial weak procurement capacity of the Executing Agency as well as the lack of competent firms on the market. This issue has been and is being solved by training, technical assistance and recruitment

of experienced staff since 2008-2009. This issue has also been solved through the creation of the Procurement Unit at MARNDR.

These difficulties were exacerbated by the occurrence of four hurricanes over the region between 2008 and 2011, which resulted in damages to irrigation infrastructure, and also by the logistical and organizational difficulties created by the January 2010 earthquake.

In spite of these problems, the quality of services provided by the three remaining operators at the end of the project (PRODEVA, Comité PROTOS-Haïti-AVSF and GAFE) helped attain some expected results related to agricultural intensification, organization of watershed management committees, and water user associations. Services provided by engineering firms towards the end of the program were satisfactory and this helped reach expected outputs in rehabilitation of irrigation systems. MARNDR's contribution in the construction of irrigation infrastructure was also a positive factor. However, delays incurred in the rehabilitation of infrastructures resulted in a late start of activities aimed at strengthening water user associations, and these activities could not really be aligned.

b. Borrower/ Executing Agency Performance

Borrower/Executing Agency			
<p>The Program Coordination Unit (BCP) provided administrative and fiduciary management of Program resources in accordance with norms and directives defined in the loan agreement. Hiring and procurement as well as monitoring of the 483 contracts signed were conducted in compliance with procedures established for implementation. The last audit report does not indicate non-compliance in procurement procedures. Experience gained with the PIA Ennery-Quinte program in the field of procurement can be useful in the implementation of other programs and projects aimed at strengthening state institutional capacity and may help in consolidating gains in management of public resources.</p> <p>However technical supervision could have been improved and intensified in order to provide better technical orientation to field operators and firms.</p>			
<input type="checkbox"/> Highly Satisfactory (HS)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Satisfactory (S)	<input type="checkbox"/> Unsatisfactory (U)	<input type="checkbox"/> Very Unsatisfactory (VU)

c. Bank Performance

Bank Performance			
<p>A major strength in implementation of this project was the availability and capacity of Bank personnel to engage in dialogue with the Borrower, reconsider with the BCP team the initial implementation strategy and react to unexpected situations. Bank personnel were also very present on the field. This allowed for a greater understanding of difficulties faced by the Project. To improve bank performance it is suggested that the Sector Specialist be assisted by technical personnel responsible for monitoring of technical aspects.</p>			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Highly Satisfactory (HS)	<input type="checkbox"/> Satisfactory (S)	<input type="checkbox"/> Unsatisfactory (U)	<input type="checkbox"/> Very Unsatisfactory (VU)

V. Sustainability

a. Analysis of Critical Factors

Sustainability of results achieved in the « agricultural intensification and market linkage » component is uncertain if adequate access to the inputs necessary to pursue application of the good practices and technological packages promoted by the project is not guaranteed. The combination of a short period for implementation of the new strategy and lack of a clearly defined strategy at the beginning resulted in the program not being able to provide proper assistance to farmers and their organizations in establishing sustainable input supply and agricultural services system in the area. In addition, the current state fertilizer subsidy system creates frequent supply shortages,

sometimes lasting several months. To address this issue, the new approach adopted to develop solvable agricultural input markets relies on the new strategy of the Agricultural Technology Transfer Program (HA-L1059). This program implements a "smart subsidies" mechanism based on the use of voucher to be spent by farmers in the hands of agricultural goods and services suppliers.

With regard to the « watershed management and flood protection» component, in spite of the significant results obtained through GAFE's activities, advances remain fragile. The watershed management committees and sub-committees are functional but need to be strengthened. Members of these structures still do not have a clear understanding of their role and responsibilities. Although the Departmental Directorate of Artibonite has been involved in these activities, handling of this activity after project closure is still weak.

Also, the quality of construction work performed on certain erosion control structures could compromise their durability as problems were observed in the quality of material used and in the dosing of mortar in some infrastructures. Problems of water infiltration and fissures were observed for certain micro-dams and cisterns. Micro-dams were also built in ravines with torrential flow where transport of solid material is excessive and a few have already collapsed. Lessons have been learned and integrated in new projects with regards to infrastructure dimensioning and positioning.

The hydro-meteorological monitoring installations have in some cases been vandalized and the maintenance capacity and recurrent costs of the system remain a concern. The annual cost for proper management of the system (servers, internet access, subscription for access to Iridium satellites, personnel) still has not been assumed by the Haitian authorities, although an additional technical cooperation has been mobilized (ATN/MD-13623-HA). Sustainability of the hydro-meteorological monitoring system also depends on the institutional reform (fusion of water and meteorological services) which is remains an important issue of the policy dialogue among the Ministry of Agriculture and the Bank, together with World Bank and the World Meteorology Organization (WMO).

Certain irrigation infrastructures are already affected by problems of sedimentation and illegal tapping of water through canal walls. The short 20 month period allocated to strengthening the water user associations (WUA) was insufficient and most do not have the necessary organizational and financial capacity to properly manage and maintain the installations. The design and rehabilitation of irrigation infrastructures should have been done in parallel with the strengthening of water users associations, in order for them to be fully involved in all steps. Efforts have been deployed in order to pursue technical assistance to WUA after project closure through an operation of the MARNDR financed by the International Fund for Agricultural Development; however this project suffered from suspension of disbursement and could not handle this activity. In addition, short-term activities (distribution of seeds) generally take the path on long-term approaches (organizational strengthening, infrastructure) at the Departmental Directorate of Artibonite.

b. Potential Risks

In spite of the progress achieved in social organization, in the absence of subsidies and without project personnel taking on certain responsibilities after the project closes, some of the activities initiated during the implementation phase may be affected. This could be the case for the supply of quality seed which had reached a substantial number of

farmers. It is unlikely that these more expensive seeds will continue to be purchased by farmers. Another difficulty is that bean seeds of the specific varieties that were distributed are not locally produced and must be imported from abroad, something that the multi-service centers do not seem to be able to carry out. The operations of the watershed management committees could be severely limited by a lack of funds. Latent conflicts exist within the water user associations and could affect their operations in the future if the regional agricultural services do not continue to provide support to these groups to guarantee proper transparency and mediation of conflicts. This also applies to the multi-service centers. There are also legal concerns as legislation on the transfer of irrigation management to local user associations has not been passed yet.

Finally, severe climatic events in the future may still cause heavy damage to irrigation infrastructure whose costs the water user associations will not be able to cover.

c. Institutional Capacity

The project strengthened the institutional capacity of the regional agricultural services (Direction Départementale de l'Agriculture de l'Artibonite) by providing substantial material support and through on-site training of personnel. This should help in guaranteeing some continuity in the activities developed by the program and to build upon what has been gained. The MARNDR has programmed allocations in its 2014-15 budget for continued support to the organizations that were created with the help of the project. However, it must be noted that the problem of public funding to maintain the early warning and hydrological monitoring systems remains and this could limit the impact of investments aimed at reducing losses in property and casualties in the event of high intensity rains.

Sustainability Classification :

<input type="checkbox"/> Highly Probable (HP)	<input type="checkbox"/> Probable (P)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Low Probability (LP)	<input type="checkbox"/> Improbable (I)
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VI. Monitoring and Evaluation

a. Information on Results

Monitoring activities and program results of the program was carried out by several entities and stakeholders at different levels :

- The Steering Committee at the central level;
- External supervision visits organized by IDB and the MARNDR;
- The Program Coordination Office (in Port-au-Prince and on the field);
- The service providers

The Steering Committee (Comité de Pilotage/CPP) was created by a memorandum from the Ministry of Agriculture (MARNDR) on January 30, 2004. It was presided by the Director General of Agriculture, or a representative, and made up of the Regional Director of the DDA/A (Direction Départementale Agricole de l'Artibonite), the Ministry's Director for Agricultural Infrastructure (DIA), a representative of the Directorate of Agricultural Value Chain Development of the MARNDR, a representative of the agri-business sector and two (2) representatives of farmer organizations in the Ennery-Quinte watershed. The Steering Committee met twice a year (every six months) and its mandate was to monitor project implementation and guarantee compliance of program objectives, calendar and budget.

Meetings of the CPP were preceded by field visits allowing members of the Steering Committee to meet with beneficiaries and directly observe program results. In addition to reports submitted to the CPP, field visits allowed for a better understanding of program outputs and the difficulties encountered during execution.

Internally, the program coordination unit (BCP) monitored program activities and outputs using tools that were designed for this purpose, such as the program monitoring and evaluation manual (annual work plan, etc.). Results of internal monitoring were consolidated and documented in the biannual reports submitted to the Steering Committee and the Bank.

However, monitoring reports showed certain discrepancies in regards to documentation and compilation of program outputs and results. These shortfalls in computing and presentation of outputs and results made it difficult to properly present program achievements and a consultant had to be hired at the end of the project to update the information.

A contract was signed with the EXPERCO International consulting firm, whose division responsible for this mandate was acquired by TECSULT International Limitée (later to become AECOM Consultant Inc.) to carry out monitoring and evaluation of the program. This firm was responsible for the baseline study and the mid-term evaluation report (approved during the first semester of 2012). The quality of both reports was poor.

In regards to methodology, it should be noted that the initial impact and outcome indicators proved difficult to measure, and the initial monitoring and evaluation plan was not rigorous enough and was not able to accurately measure program impacts.

VII. Lessons Learned

In relation to **agricultural intensification** and benefits accruing from **infrastructure improvements**:

- Agricultural extension activities: in spite of important achievements, the program's potential benefits were limited by the absence or lack of agricultural research. Extension activities for annual crops were based on the same « varieties » of sorghum, beans and corn in the different agro-ecological situations (irrigated plains, rainfed plains, humid and dry mountains). It would have been more appropriate to experiment and disseminate varieties more specifically adapted to the different local conditions.
- Development of perennial crops: the number of trees planted exceeded the initial goals set for the program. However, results would have been improved if the program had also promoted other fruit species (avocado, citrus) according to conditions prevailing in the different areas. The service providers did not have the specific know-how in top-grafting of these crops and training sessions should have been organized.
- Input supply chain: significant investments were made and some results were attained. However, these efforts do not seem to guarantee long-term availability of inputs in the area. The program built multi-service centers, but without an

adequate supply of services that would satisfy the needs and demands of the target population. A feasibility study and an analysis of the potential for financial autonomy of these structures should have been carried out before construction activities were undertaken.

- The problem of the cost of improved seeds and farmers' financial resources at time of planting was not addressed. Solvent demand for these seeds seems limited in spite of their potential benefits.

In relation to rehabilitation and increased productive use of the **irrigation systems**:

- The design and rehabilitation of irrigation infrastructures should have been done according to the original design, namely in parallel with the strengthening of water users associations, in order for them to be fully involved in all steps. Project design placed an emphasis on developing the participation and capability of WUA around the 6 irrigated perimeters to be rehabilitated. It was a lesson learned from innumerable small-scale irrigation projects worldwide that by making them an integral part of the process from the beginning favored optimal results and prospects for continuity of the WUAs to maintain the systems. The program supported the rehabilitation of six irrigation systems and helped set up functional water user associations on each rehabilitated system. However, rehabilitation work was completed only in the last years of the program. The rehabilitation phase should have been better articulated with activities aimed at increasing production and strengthening water-users associations. The short 20 month period allocated to strengthening the water user associations (WUA) was insufficient and most do not have the necessary organizational and financial capacity to properly manage and maintain the installations.

In relation to **watershed and natural resources management**:

- Watershed and natural resources management interventions in the Ennery-Quinte area were relatively successful but should be reinforced if long-term improvements are to be achieved. It is necessary to pursue efforts aimed at developing the capacities of the watershed and sub-watershed management committees in the area of mobilization and conflict resolution. Support is also needed to strengthen its organizational and financial capacity for long-term operation.
- Considering gains in value-added resulting from plantain cultivation and its environmental benefits, the program should have put more emphasis on this crop. Plantain being a high market value crop, it would have contributed to significant increases in revenue if planted in ravine bottoms where erosion control and water retention structures were built and would have increased soil depth. In regards to tree crops, the project highlighted the value of forest species for the sale of poles, of top-grafting of Francisque mangos which provide substantial revenue for farmers and also that of forage crops and plantain. Adoption of these crops and maintenance of erosion control structures seems more likely when the farmers' specific production goals are taken into account in designing extension programs. For certain species, the program could also have integrated direct seeding techniques developed by farmers in the neighboring Puilboreau area, which are less costly in terms of labor and monetary expenses.

- The project demonstrates the need to concentrate and better articulate interventions in specific geographical areas (micro-dams, erosion control measures, rehabilitation of irrigation canals) to generate stronger impacts instead of dispersing interventions throughout the whole watershed.
- In regard to micro-dams, it appears that site selection must be more rigorous and based on clearly defined criteria and priorities. Priorities should be established on the basis of risk, threats, and economic considerations. Improved supervision of construction sites is also necessary to guarantee quality of materials used, which is essential for the durability of these structures.
- Site selection criteria for cistern construction should be improved. Concentrating cistern construction in a limited number of areas is important and priority should be given to areas which have the best potential to make productive use of the water. Criteria for selecting beneficiaries should also be revised in order to reduce the risk of patron-client distortions.

VIII. Conclusion

Project's guiding principles were based on an innovative close articulation between commercial, agronomic, environmental and social components aiming at agricultural intensification and watershed protection, which contributed to foster this approach at the Ministry of Agriculture, by recognizing the close links among these elements.

Given the complex context (major climatic events in 2008, earthquake and cholera crisis in 2010, political instability, lack of competent service providers and firms), good results were generated in the fields of agricultural intensification and watershed management, particularly with regards to perennial crops, irrigation and social and infrastructure components of water basin management.

Even though monitoring and evaluation methodology was not as rigorous as the new tools nowadays used in Bank-financed development programs, it has been possible to estimate significant increase of gross revenue per hectare only by comparing results for specific crops between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. Measuring results in the reduction of impacts of natural disasters requires an adequate methodology which has not been used by the project, it is nevertheless expected that upstream watershed protection infrastructure that contribute to agricultural intensification in gullies will also reduce downstream solid and water flows. The flood early warning system may also decrease vulnerability of Gonaives' households.

The project therefore produced interesting outcomes; however it would have benefited from a better planning and geographical articulation of activities, in order to maximize impacts in fewer localities. Sustainability is a also major concern, since several elements still have to be handled by the MARNDR after project closure, particularly technical assistance to water users associations and watershed management committees, as well as recurrent cost of the flood early warning system.

This program allowed the MARNDR to learn several lessons which are now taken into account in its public investment programs, particularly those with the Bank with regards

to agricultural intensification and input market development, irrigation and watershed management.

Annex 1: Minutes of the Program Closure Workshop, Thursday September 25, 2014.

L'atelier a regroupé une quarantaine de personnes. Pour la direction du Ministère étaient présents le Ministre de l'Agriculture, des Ressources Naturelles et du Développement Rural, le Directeur Général du Ministère, ainsi que le Directeur-général adjoint.

Les propos du Ministre ont rappelé le cadre difficile dans lequel le projet a démarré ses activités à la suite des catastrophes naturelles de 2004, dans une situation marquée par l'importante présence d'institutions humanitaires avec des approches et méthodes d'intervention parfois en contradiction avec celles du programme. Il a souligné les difficultés de départ et le caractère stratégique de la réorientation effectuée en 2007. Certaines auraient pu être évitées si le MARNDR avait été plus impliqué dans la conception durant la phase préparatoire. Il a affirmé l'intérêt du Ministère à poursuivre son appui aux actions de structuration sociale, telles que celles initiées par l'AIBVEQ et les CMS, et annoncé que des fonds avaient été prévus à cette fin dans le nouveau budget. Il a terminé son intervention en souhaitant que cette séance de restitution puisse être reprise en présence d'autres bailleurs afin de capitaliser sur les leçons apprises dans le cadre du programme, particulièrement en ce qui concerne les mécanismes de collaboration développés entre la BID et le MARNDR.

Les résultats de l'évaluation finale ont été présentés par Roosevelt Saint-Dic, consultant engagé par la BID pour une quantification plus précise des produits et pour l'évaluation économique, et par Josilien Edouard de la firme AECOM, chargée de l'évaluation finale.

Les questions et commentaires qui ont suivi ont porté principalement sur la durabilité des résultats et les mesures d'accompagnement nécessaires pour l'assurer après la fermeture du programme. La nécessité de poursuivre les actions d'appui aux associations d'irrigants, à l'AIBVEQ et aux instances de direction des CMS a été soulignée par plusieurs intervenants, y compris par les responsables d'organisations de producteurs présents. Divers intervenants ont fait ressortir le rôle central que devra jouer la Direction Départementale de l'Agriculture de l'Artibonite dans ce sens. Les dispositions à prendre pour faire aboutir l'avant-projet de loi sur le transfert de la gestion des périmètres irrigués a été discutée. La question de la prise en charge et de la pérennisation du système de suivi hydrologique a aussi été évoquée et un lien plus étroit avec les instances décentralisées de protection civile a été suggéré.

D'autres commentaires relatifs aux résultats, méthodes d'intervention et aspects méthodologiques de l'évaluation ont été enregistrés. Des intervenants ont mentionné l'intérêt d'une évaluation ex-post, d'une plus grande prise en compte des externalités et des méthodes d'appréciation des impacts hydrologiques. Sur le plan des modalités d'intervention et du dispositif administratif, on a évoqué le besoin de mieux articuler géographiquement les activités de protection des bassins versants et d'intensification agricole ainsi que l'impact positif des mécanismes de décaissement développés par le programme.

Autres notes :

Des résultats quantitatifs et qualitatifs positifs avec quelques nuances pour certains produits
Désistement d'un opérateur et résiliation du comité pilotage ont nui à l'efficacité du projet,

Difficultés de départ : Pas de phases préparatoires avec des études avant le démarrage, ni d'études techniques topographiques

Leçons apprises : Concentrer les interventions géographiques

Par exemple, l'utilisation du plan d'aménagement général pour finalement aboutir à un plan réduit ce qui permet d'avoir des résultats plus concrets.

De meilleurs résultats peuvent être obtenus si les choix sont faits avec plus de rigueur avec un travail de priorisation pour les travaux d'aménagement

Exemples d'impacts

- ✓ 6500 planteurs bénéficiaires d'intrants
- ✓ 47 Ha plantés de plantain pour augmenter de 16 millions HTG l'économie de la zone
- ✓ Plus de 30 Ha au PPI Larivière additionnel irrigué
- ✓ Accès à l'eau améliorée

Intensification et vulgarisation des aménagements

Utilisation de variétés pas vraiment nouvelles et utiliser en zone humide et sèche étant donné qu'il n'était pas possible de différencier les zones par manque de référentiel pour des interventions plus pointues

D'où la nécessité de mettre en place des fiches techniques par variété pour les fournisseurs d'intrants, etc.

Les Directions techniques ont besoin de plus de moyens

Arboriculture

Les résultats seraient meilleurs en intégrant d'autres espèces fruitières

« *Tree domestication* » = une stratégie à envisager pour des résultats beaucoup plus intéressants

Approvisionnement en intrants

Pas de base pour un accès plus facile aux intrants après le projet en terme de durabilité

Concept des CMS est utile, mais pas uniquement bâtiment. Il faut aussi une analyse de faisabilité pour les services qui manquent beaucoup et qui devaient être pris en compte avant la construction des infrastructures pour des résultats à long terme

Risque d'être perdu ---> appui additionnel à trouver pour les CMS

Colombiers : structure local plus utile que les drums qui sont alors utilisés pour autre chose

Commercialisation

L'identification du marché manque.

Il serait aussi nécessaire de différencier les produits pour exportation, par exemple pour les différents marchés visés

Organisation des planteurs : capacité à renforcer

Réhabilitation périmètres

Manque de dossier technique qui a entraîné des retards dans l'exécution.

Manque de liens et d'harmonie avec les associations d'irrigants lors du montage et lors des travaux

Besoin de renforcement de capacités des associations qui sont très jeunes

Aménagement BV et gestion ressources naturelles

Résultats économiques importants et aussi en terme de protection

Besoin de continuité pour pas perdre en durabilité
Renforcer et développer capacités AIBVEQ , des comités de Bassins Versants d'Ennery-Quinte
Beaucoup de ressources mobilisées mais pas avec des retombées économiques directes

Priorités à établir dans le choix des espèces

Conclusion

Malgré les difficultés et les contraintes d'exécution ---> un choix judicieux d'investir dans le programme Ennery-Quinte qui n'est pas fini et qu'il convient de continuer.

Propos du Ministre

- Contexte de démarrage après les événements de Gonaïves : un projet d'investissement dans une zone où se faisaient beaucoup d'interventions de projets humanitaires avec une logique d'interventions différente mais pour les mêmes bénéficiaires.
- La réorientation fut utile par rapport à la dynamique au moment de l'exécution.
- Au cours de la phase préparatoire, le MARNDR doit être beaucoup plus impliqué dans la conception, et pas uniquement être présent au cours de la phase de restitution par des consultants et prendre des décisions rapides. D'où 2 ans de délais, car il fallait tâtonner.
- La phase finale manque de maturité en terme d'accompagnement des CMS, des associations d'irrigants AIDEVEQ, d'où une enveloppe pour Ennery Quinte pour alcoologie et ds le budget 2015
- Restitution à faire avec les autres bailleurs : Modèle de projet et de gestion par la BID et le MARNDR. Un exemple à suivre car beaucoup de leçons sont tirées en terme d'appui à l'Etat haïtien pour le redressement de l'économie.

Débats – Questions/Réponses

M. Jean Baptiste, directeur PRODEVA

Des facteurs doivent aussi apparaître dans l'évaluation et augmentent les impacts :

- Micro retenues favorisent l'infiltration de l'eau
- Ralentissement des impacts aux Gonaïves
- Enrichissement en ressources sous-terrain

Rétention = aspect plus hydrauliques

Données avant à trouver pour mesurer et faire cette appréciation

Mais pas encore possible car des infrastructures mis en place à la fin du projet --> trop tôt pour des résultats statistique satisfaction

Les citernes contribués à la rétention d'eau et à l'enrichissement des ressources sous-terrain, mais pas éléments hydrologiques pour quantifier les impacts.

Bruno, BID

- Résultats intéressants obtenus dans les différents domaines
- Coordonner au mieux les activités en intensification agricole et protection des bassins versants
- Investissements éparpillés en début du projet puis recentrer vers la fin
- Garder pour l'avenir la durabilité AIDEVQ qui est un référentiel pour Haïti --- > Cette initiative doit être reproduite dans d'autres zones
- Durabilité des CMS, des associations d'irrigants et du système d'alerte précoce

DGA, MARNDR

- Durabilité transfert de gestion des périmètres irrigués aux associations : cadre juridique en vigueur permet pas de le faire. Besoin d'accélérer le dépôt de la loi au parlement?

Avant-projet de loi

Disponible mais entre l'exécutif et le législatif qui va porter?

Toujours bloquer au sein du MARNDR : Lobbying à faire au niveau des parlementaires

Responsable suivi évaluation, MARNDR

- Question de durabilité
- Gestion sociale
- Pas de chiffres pour le travail avec les associations
- Temps pour gestion BV et appui continue : Comment l'aspect gestion sociale et gestion BV à constituer. Préoccupation dans l'évaluation ?
- Beaucoup d'investissements qui ne sont pas encore valoriser dans le système en place : Pourquoi ne pas prévoir une évaluation ex post en bonne et due forme pour évaluer le changement de comportement par exemple ? Prévoir une évaluation ex post 5 ans plus tard par exemple?

Évaluation ex post plus précise en effet et même en terme de durabilité.

Une continuité du projet en conception pour l'exercice 2014-2015 et possibilité de prendre en compte l'évaluation ex post.

Erns Thomas, représentant du Directeur infrastructures agricoles

- Si un événement naturel comme le cyclone Jeanne survient, est-ce que l'impact sera techniquement diminué par rapport à avant aux Gonaïves?

Cyclone Jeanne : crue exceptionnelle qui survient chaque 50 ou 100 ans.

Diminution impact : Travail fait sur le terrain et autres corrections = pour pluie courant et moins exceptionnelle avec un impact réduit

Par rapport à maintenant, la sensibilisation est faite par le système d'alerte précoce et la

Direction protection civile = progrès dans ce domaine sur la population.

Stations mis en place pour collectées des informations.

Un travail est effectué dans les rivières. Ce qui permet d'être mieux armées pour faire face à ces situations. Toutefois, un seul projet ne peut pas tout faire.

DGA

- Lourd investissement pour système alerte précoce mais est-t-elle prise en charge? État de fonctionnement DDA Artibonite ou DPC Artibonite à prendre en charge ce système ?
- La mise en valeur des PPI après les investissements consentis ne démontrent pas des changements évidents ?
- Comité sous BV : garant des investissements
- Impact de la gestion BV : citernes utilité des rétentions d'eau capter l'eau en amont pour diminuer ruissellement? Impact?

Coordination entre DDA et projet en cours dans la zone importante pour les investissements.

Gestion systèmes alertes précoces = 2 ministères qui gèrent MICT et MARNDR

DG

- Intérêt du MARNDR de suivre les investissements en terme d'arboriculture : production de gols? Arbres?

Série Questions 2

Laurence Charleston

- Analyse bénéfice : questions externalités ? Retombées positives projet après 5 ans? Aspect économique même si pas quantifiable?

M. Buteau, chargé de missions

- Arboriculture : Qu'en est-il des planteurs? Organisations paysannes pour plus de superficie ou pas ?
- Approche par individu ou collectivité avec associations paysannes mais uniquement agriculteurs ?

Harry, Représentant CMS

- CMS et CCC (centre conditionnement et commercialisation) pour pérennité des CMS
- Pas de suivi des CC? Quid des ccc?
- Besoin de plus d'accompagnement pour les CMS : il faudrait injecter plus de ressources pour la durabilité
- Suggestion : Ministère doit passer par les CMS pour faire ses activités

Desjardins, représentant de la 4^{ème} section

Remarques :

- L'irrigation a augmenté grâce au PIA
- Curage des rivières à continuer
- Les citernes sont vraiment importants
- Plus de micro retenues pour faciliter les Gonaïviens

Sébastien

- Questions de la qualité des semences et des techniques ?
- Possibilité d'envisager l'utilisation des eaux retenues par les micro retenues en cas de sécheresse avec un système de pompage à envisager ?

Représentant du Consortium

- Question de phasage et d'articulation travaux d'agriculture et la formation
- Articuler l'accompagnement des irrigants
- Suivi de la loi au parlement ?

Garry de la DAF

- Beaucoup d'investissement en infrastructures
- Problème de pérennisation pris en cpte au départ q travers les composantes
- La dynamique ne repose pas uniquement sur les infrastructures mais aussi des ressources humaines.
- Renforcement des acteurs locaux
- Des éléments qualitatifs à prendre en compte aussi
- Actions au niveau des infrastructures doivent être faites avec les comités de gestion de BV



Banque Interaméricaine de Développement
Rapport d'Achèvement de Projet
Accord de don 2390/GR-HA
Evaluation de la Banque par l'Emprunteur

Nom du Projet: Programme d'intensification Agricole de Ennery-Quinte

Organisme/s d'Exécution (OE/s): Ministère de l'Agriculture, des Ressources Naturelles et du Développement Rural

Emprunteur: République d'Haïti

Date d'Approbation par le Conseil d'Administration:
20 juillet 2005

Date d'Entrée en Vigueur du Contrat de Prêt:
13 décembre 2005

Date de l'Evaluation par l'Emprunteur:
5 février 2013

Date Prévue pour l'Atelier de Fermeture du Projet:
Septembre 2014

Classification de la Performance du Projet par L'emprunteur

Probabilité que le Projet Réalise son/ses Objectif/s de Développement:

☒ Hautement Probable (HP) ☐ Probable (P) ☐ Faible Probabilité (FP) ☐ Improbable (I)

Exécution du Projet (PE):

☒ Hautement Satisfaisante (HS) ☐ Satisfaisante (S) ☐ Insatisfaisante (I) ☐ Très Insatisfaisante (TI)

Durabilité des Résultats du Projet:

☒ Hautement Probable (HP) ☐ Probable (P) ☐ Faible Probabilité (FP) ☐ Improbable (I)

Commentaires:

Performance Del'Emprunteur

Prière de qualifier votre performance globale au cours de la préparation et de l'exécution du projet:

☒ Hautement Satisfaisante (HS) ☐ Satisfaisante (S) ☐ Insatisfaisante (I) ☐ Très Insatisfaisante (TI)

Commentaires:

Performance de la Banque

Veuillez qualifier la performance globale de la Banque durant la préparation et l'exécution du projet. Les facteurs à prendre en considération comprennent la mesure selon laquelle la Banque a encouragé le recours à une dynamique participative pour la préparation du projet; a proposé des solutions techniques adéquates aux problèmes identifiés, a su répondre de façon opportune aux besoins spécifiques de l'Emprunteur (en termes de choix de l'instrument de prêt, d'assistance technique et de formation formelle et non formelle à l' Organisme Exécution), a fait montre de flexibilité en répondant à des situations d'urgence survenues en cours d'exécution. Vos commentaires seront ajoutés tels quels au PCR.

☒ Hautement Satisfaisante (HS) ☐ Satisfaisante (S) ☐ Insatisfaisante (I) ☐ Très Insatisfaisante (TI)

Commentaires:

Suggestions Additionnelles pour Améliorer la Performance de la Banque

Commentaires et suggestions additionnels pour améliorer la performance de la Banque dans le futur :

Tout projet devrait découler d'une phase de préinvestissement. Ce qui permettrait de démarrer avec des dossiers d'exécution disponibles.