



Project Completion Report



Modernización Servicios Sanidad Agropecuaria
BELIZE
Project Number: BL0003
Loan: 1189/OC-BL

Printed on : 2005-09-02 13:40:06

PCR



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General Information

1.1. Development Objective

- To strengthen the country's agricultural health system and provide a satisfactory and sustainable surveillance system for animal and plant diseases and food safety.

1.2. Basic Data

Project Name	Modernización Servicios Sanidad Agropecuaria		
Project Number	BL0003	Modality	PESP
Country	BL	Sector	AG
Date Approved	1999-07-14	Date Completed	2005-04-24
Executing Agency(ies)	MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES		
Loan Amount(s) (Original)	\$3,600,000.00		
Loan Amount(s) (Current)	\$3,345,545.00		
Loan Cumulative Cancellations	\$254,455.00		
Total Cost of the Project(IDB) (Current)	\$4,800,000.00		
Total Cost of the project(IDB) (Original)	\$4,800,000.00		



Loan Number(s)	Original Amount	Cancel Amount	Current Amount
1189/OC-BL	\$3,600,000.00	\$254,455.01	\$3,345,544.99

■ ■ Personnel

Name of all specialists in charge of the project at HQ

Name of all specialists in charge of the project at COF

Author of the Bank Memorandum

Author of the Borrower and Executing Agency Memorandum

NERIE SANZ

Position of the author of the Executing Agency Memorandum

GENERAL MANAGER, BAHA

■ ■ 1.3. Summary of Ratings

■ ■ 1.3.1. PCR Ratings

By Bank	Rating	By the Executing Agency	Rating
• Development Effectiveness (DO)		• Development Effectiveness (DO)	
• Project Implementation (PI)	S	• Project Implementation (PI)	
• Institutional/Organizational Development (IOD)	VR	• Institutional/Organizational Development (IOD)	
• Project Sustainability (PS)	P	• Project Sustainability (PS)	
• Executing Agency Performance (EXP)	S	• Bank Performance (BP)	




1.3.2. Last 10 PPMR Ratings (IP, AS, DO)

2000 Dec.	2001 Jun.	2001 Dec.	2002 Jun.	2002 Dec.	2003 Jun.	2003 Dec.	2004 Jun.	2004 Dec.	2005 Jun.
U	U	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H
P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P

IP = Implementation Progress , AS = Assumptions , DO = Development Obejctives

1.4. Project Timeline



Start up workshop date :

Mid-Term Evaluation date :

Exit workshop date :



■ ■ 1.5. Reference Documents

Country Strategy	
Country Strategy Update	
Sector Portfolio Review Report	
Country Portfolio Review Aide Memoire	
Administration Mission Aide Memoire	
PCR Annex - Documental Annex	



Bank Memorandum

■ ■ 2.0 Presentation of the project

■ ■ 2.0.1 2.0.1 The problems, the project and its context

A. The Modernization of Agricultural Health Services (1189/OC-BL) was approved in July 1999. It was a project first of its kind for Belize as it entailed the establishment of a new and autonomous institution- Belize Agricultural Health Authority (BAHA). It also required the passing of specific sets of regulation affecting the institution's operation as well as policies governing the human resources operation and development. This project is considered to be pivotal in advancing Belize's efforts at accessing new international markets and retaining traditional ones for its agricultural and marine products as well securing the borders and maintaining the health of Belize's agricultural product and services at a high level.

Prior to the establishment of BAHA, the quality and reliability of sanitary and phyto-sanitary services provided by the Ministry of Agriculture were subject to budgetary cuts and high level of staff turnover and generally inadequate lab facilities and shortage of equipment. The capacity for rapid response to client needs was always less than desirable due to bureaucratic processes inherent in the public sector.

The execution started off slowly due to the competing responsibilities of the General Manager of BAHA- that of managing the day-to-day operations of the Authority and that of managing the project. The execution progress improved when the Bank and BAHA agreed to dedicate the services of a staff member exclusively to the project coordination. By the end of the project, five laboratories had been upgraded and/or expanded, seven quarantine posts either established or improved and a new headquarters building for BAHA constructed. Training was continuous during the project execution.

The project was reformulated in 2001 to assist in Hurricane Iris emergency management particularly addressing the need for improved shelters in the southern region of the country. while the project was able to recover a portion of the US\$500,000 that was reallocated, counterpart funds had to be used to finance the access road to BAHA's headquarters. Today BAHA has moved from a reliance of 92 percent on government financial support in 2000 to 33 percent in 2005.

The project within Belize's loan portfolio was a small one but with high impact.

■ ■ 2.1. Results analysis (outputs, outcomes, and impacts)

■ ■ 2.1.1. Outputs attained

■ ■ 2.1.1.1. Output Indicators Analysis

■ Institutional strengthening of the Belize Agricultural Health Authority completed



Planned

By September 2003, the Belize Agricultural Health Authority legally established, designated health education activities carried out, new laws, regulations and agreements with participating institutions in place, training and technical assistance provided according to details set out in updated Log Frame and Initial Report.

Achieved


The Belize Agricultural Health Authority (BAHA) Act was passed in 1999, the various new laws and regulations are currently before parliament- these include the Plant Health Regulation and the Animal Health Regulation.

The necessary agreement has been signed with the Ministry of Health to facilitate cooperation and collaboration in matters relating to public health. The health education activities were successfully completed in 2004.

The training program and technical assistance was successfully completed in 2003. The various laboratories are equipped and the staff trained in their use.

Analysis

The planned targets for this component were achieved. There was a slight delay in the passing of the Plant and Animal Health Regulation but the Act has been successfully drafted and passed by the parliament.

-  Veterinary and microbiology laboratories set up and accredited, veterinary surveillance and processing plant inspection system expanded.

Planned

By June 2003, increases recorded in the number of samples analysed at the veterinary and microbiology food laboratories, the number of farms inspected and under control and the eradication campaigns in progress, based on details in updated Log Frame and the Initial Report.


Achieved

Between 2000 and 2003, there was an increase of 135 percent in the samples analysed at the microbiology food laboratory. There was however a 55 percent decrease in farm visits and inspection. In 2003, there was also a significant reduction in the samples analysed in the veterinary laboratories.

There has been since 2000 a consistent and continuous eradication campaign and surveillance for the following diseases among others: Vesicular diseases, Avian Influenza, Fowl Typhoid, Classical Swine Fever, Rabies etc.

Analysis

While the analyses conducted in the microbiology lab exceeded planned targets, the farm inspections and the samples analysed in the veterinary labs fell short of planned targets. In the case of the farm inspections, the number of farms inspected decreased as a result of the unwillingness of some shrimp farms to pay for the cost recovery as previous to the establishment of BAHA this service was provided free of cost by the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. The reduction in samples analysed at the vet labs in 2003 was mainly due to the rehabilitation works taking place at the labs during 2002-2003. It is expected that data for 2004 will register an increase.

-  Plant surveillance capacity expanded and services/facilities integrated with regional and international systems, through the construction and equipping of laboratories and upgrading of field services and inspection of nurseries and processing plants.



Planned

Increases in the number of field visits, diagnostic samples, quarantine of seeds and vegetative material and coverage of affected areas for certain plants, according to details set out in the Log Frame and the Initial Report, by June 2004

Achieved

While there were no increases in field visits, diagnostic samples and quarantine of seeds, the quality and level of inspection improved as a result of intensive training and better equipment.

Analysis

As was indicated earlier one of the main reasons for the decrease in inspection and the diagnosis of samples was due to the reluctance of some farmers to meet the cost recovery bill. The sustainability of BAHA depends on user fees and government subvention is limited to aspects of animal and plant health considered to be in protection of the public good.

- Quarantine and inspection capacity improved through construction of 3# international inspection facilities and rehabilitation of 6 # existing facilities.

Planned

By July 2003, all detection posts will have capacity to inspect all imported products and detect noncompliance of all products that do not meet import requirements.

Achieved

All quarantine facilities were constructed except two: La Union and Jalacte. In those that were constructed and rehabilitated (Big Creek, Santa Elena, Benque, Placencia) capacity to inspect all imported products and to detect noncompliance have been enhanced. These have been working successfully as is evident of Belize's ability to control and prevent outbreak or spread of plant and animal diseases normally spread through importation.

Analysis

The control and inspection facilities at the border have been enhanced through a comprehensive collaboration among customs, immigration and quarantine under a single border management facility. In the case of La Union and Jalacte, the construction of the posts were deferred due to no designated border points identified and the desire of government to take a holistic approach combining the facilities under one border management as was done in the western and northern borders.

■ ■ 2.1.1.2. Identification of achieved outputs

- The Belize Agricultural Health Authority established as a recognized and competent autonomous institution nationally and regionally with a highly trained staff and a newly constructed headquarters building with adequate facilities.
- Rehabilitated and upgraded and certified four labs: Veterinary Diagnostic lab and Plant Pathology and Entomology labs in Central Farm; Food Safety Lab in Belize City; and the subsidiary Vet lab in Orange Walk all with an improved capacity to conduct diagnostic testing, veterinary surveillance and plant inspections.



- Six existing quarantine facilities were rehabilitated with the establishment of two new port control points at San Pedro and Placencia. The number of quarantine officers increased from 17 to 38 and a 24-hour service is now in place at the northern border with Mexico.
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■ ■ 2.1.2. Project outcomes and impacts

■ ■ 2.1.2 Objectives



To strengthen the country's agricultural health system and provide a satisfactory and sustainable surveillance system for animal and plant diseases and food safety.

1. Phytosanitary and sanitary situation known by September 2003.

2. By September 2003, the prevalence of bovine brucellosis in the dairy herd, hog cholera, bovine rabies and other diseases mentioned in Log Frame eliminated or reduced to the levels shown in Log Frame

3. The Belize Agricultural Health Authority legally established and fully staffed, land and other physical assets transferred and the staff adequately trained and equipped by December 2003.

■ ■ 2.1.2.1. Outcome Indicators Analysis

A. The phytosanitary and sanitary situation is known in Belize through the capacity channeled into BAHA under the project. They are able to detect the existence of disease and to launch a campaign for the control or/and the eradication of pests and diseases.

Bovine Brucellosis, hog cholera, bovine rabies are virtually non-existence and any signs of outbreak is immediately put under control for eradication.

BAHA is a legally established and recognized autonomous fully staffed institution with its own land and other physical assets.

■ ■ 2.1.2.2. Identification of intermediate outcomes and initial impacts

A. BAHA is recognized and respected as a competent and autonomous health authority in the region. Already there has been an increase in cross border collaboration in the control and fight against pest and diseases. There is also an increase in demand for BAHA's services beyond Belize's borders by both private and public entities.

■ ■ 2.1.2.3. Identification of future outcomes and impacts

A. Potential future outcomes include the expansion of export opportunities for Belize as a result of elimination of trade barriers associated with phytosanitary and sanitary restrictions.

■ ■ 2.1.2.4. Analysis of assumptions (from outputs to outcomes)

A. For the maintenance of some of the outcomes already achieved for example the knowledge of the phytosanitary and sanitary situation in Belize, the sustainability of BAHA is critical. This includes that the government continues to assist financially with the aspect of plant and animal health considered to be in the interest of public good and that the private sector increase their willingness to pay for the services offered by BAHA.



■ 2.1.2.5. Pilot question No. 1 (Optional). Distribution of the project benefits within the target population

A. No inequalities have been observed.

■ 2.1.2.6. Pilot question No. 2 – (Optional). Adverse effects of the project

A. No unintended adverse effects were identified.

■ 2.1.2.7. Pilot question No. 3 – (Optional). Contribution to the achievement of national / sectoral targets / Country Strategy

A. One of the national goals of Belize is the expansion and the diversification of international markets for Belizean exports. This operation is contributing to this goal as is evidenced by the certification by the EU for the importation of Belizean farm shrimps to Europe during the course and as a result of this operation.

The operation also furthers the Bank's strategy of supporting agricultural and agribusiness development in Belize particularly as they relate to trade and commercial expansion.

■ 2.1.2.8. Pilot question No. 4 – (Optional). Project changes in response to changes in the context / environment

A. In 2001, Belize was struck by Hurricane Iris and given the fiscal difficulties experienced by the government during that period, it became necessary to restructure the operation to allow resources to be directed at hurricane rehabilitation efforts. Some US\$500,000 was reallocated to Hurricane Iris disaster relief efforts. Adjustments had to be made in the operation by prioritizing remaining activities and reducing the scope of some activities such as the headquarters building and deferring other activities such as the management information system which had to be included in a regional project managed by OIRSA.

The restructuring of the project however provided benefits to the poorest region of the country in terms of rehabilitated and therefore more secure hurricane shelters.

■ 2.1.2.9. Recalculation of the Internal Rate of Return (IRR)

A.

■ 2.1.2.10. Recalculation of other cost analysis indicators

A.

■ 2.1.2.11. Rating of project effectiveness in terms of the development objective (DO)

Bearing in mind the analysis in sections 2.1.1. and 2.1.2., rate the attainment of the project development effectiveness in terms of the development objective

☐ Very Effective (VE)

☒ Effective (E)

☐ Marginally Effective (ME)

☐ Ineffective (I)

A. A new autonomous institution-Belize Agricultural health Authority has been established that has allowed Belize to control, manage and determine the phytosanitary and sanitary situation in the country. An institution with the capacity to obtain certification for the expansion of trading opportunities for the country through the elimination of phytosanitary and sanitary barriers to trade has been established. Facilities to determine and diagnose threats to food safety and hence threat



to the health and well-being of the Belizean people have been enhanced through this operation.

The prevalence of bovine related diseases, Hibiscus Mealybug, rabies etc have been reduced and the general well-being of Belizean livestock and plants has been enhanced.

2.2. Implementation Analysis

2.2.1. Project's performance measurement

2.2.1.1. Elements for monitoring and evaluation

1. Problem analysis	Low ① ② ③ ④ High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A
2. Intervention Strategy	Low ① ② ③ ④ High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A
3. Identification of expected outcomes and impacts	Low ① ② ③ ④ High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A
4. Identification of expected outputs	Low ① ② ③ ④ High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A
5. Indicators of expected outcomes	Low ① ② ③ ④ High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A
6. Indicators of expected outputs	Low ① ② ③ ④ High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A
7. Baseline for expected outcomes	Low ① ② ③ ④ High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A
8. Baseline for expected outputs	Low ① ② ③ ④ High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A
9. Assupmtions from outputs to outcomes	Low ① ② ③ ④ High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A
10. Monitoring Plan	Low ① ② ③ ④ High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A
11. Procurement Plan	Low ① ② ③ ④ High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A
12. Schedule of Investments	Low ① ② ③ ④ High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A

2.2.1.2. Critical factors analysis in the project design

A. Postive Factor

It was important that a condition in the loan agreement was the transfer of all necessary assets from the Ministry of Agriculture to BAHA. Difficulties would have been experienced in the exercise had not this been stipulated in the agreement.

Negative Factors



There was not sufficient consultations during project preparation between the Bank's project team and a wide cross-section of the Ministry of Agriculture technical personnel to allow sufficient familiarity with the technical details of the project and to allow the setting of more effective and reliable indicators for outputs and outcome.

The project did not anticipate a project executing unit and hence the early life of the operation was plagued with delays and divided attention by the management of BAHA who had to also focus on their day to day surveillance and inspection work with the existing staff on board. While the project may not have required a separate project management unit, it needed the dedication of a staff personnel to coordinate the day-to-day execution of the project.

■ 2.2.1.3. Lessons learned for the project design (adopted measures)

- A.** With regards to project management and the absence of a PEU, a decision was taken in 2002 to dedicate the services of a staff exclusively to this operation. This improved coordination and the execution of key activities. This decision was a collaborative one between the Bank and BAHA utilizing resources provided by COF/CBL to hire the services of a consultant to accelerate execution and then transferring the coordination to a BAHA staff personnel after a period of six months.

■ 2.2.1.4. Lessons learned for the project design (alternative measures)

- A.** For future operations, more time should be dedicated to effective consultation with a wider cross section of staff in the executing agency to allow for better familiarity and involvement with planned activities. This could have contributed to better and more reliable indicators for the measurement of outputs and outcomes. Some of the indicators seem to focus more on quantity of work done with regards to inspections and farm visits, samples tested in the laboratory when quality of work may have been more appropriate. For example, in a small country, sample tested is not expected to increase as samples are a proportion of a population.

It should be noted that however that shortly after project appraisal there was a change in administration in the Belize Government which may explain the reason for a lack of continuity in the Ministry responsible for the project.

■ 2.2.1.5. Available information during project implementation

Establishment of processes and mechanisms for data gathering and data analysis (sources of data, responsibilities, periodicity and characteristics of the information)

Low ① ② ③ ④ High ☐ N/A

Data gathering for the outcomes base line

Low ① ② ③ ④ High ☐ N/A

Data gathering for the outputs base line

Low ① ② ③ ④ High ☐ N/A

Data gathering, data analysis and reporting of information on available resources (inputs) and undertaking activities

Low ① ② ③ ④ High ☐ N/A

Data gathering, data analysis and reporting of information on project outputs and their contribution to the achievement of expected outcomes

Low ① ② ③ ④ High ☐ N/A

Data gathering, data analysis and reporting of information on project outcomes and impacts and their contribution to sectoral and national goals

Low ① ② ③ ④ High ☐ N/A



■ ■ 2.2.1.6. Critical factors analysis for performance measurement during implementation

- A.** The project had a slow start as focus was not established due to preoccupation of staff with routine assignments such as surveillance and field inspections. There were also difficulties experienced in inter-agency collaboration particularly with the Ministry of Finance who delayed disbursement processes and the Ministry of Agriculture who attempted to impose control over the day to day management of the agency.

On the positive side, COF/CBL in collaboration with BAHA established a monthly progress meeting to assess project implementation status and to ensure the necessary focus on project execution. Additionally, resources from the country office budget were used to hire the services of a consultant in order to accelerate execution.

■ ■ 2.2.1.7. Lessons learned during project implementation (adopted measures)

- A.** As was previously indicated, a mechanism developed in collaboration with the EA was to have monthly progress report meetings in addition to semestral progress report to determine the extent to which the outputs were being met.

Additionally, with the encouragement of COF/CBL, meetings directed at familiarization of the staff with the project activities were intensified after 2001.


■ ■ 2.2.1.8. Lessons learned for the implementation (alternative measures)

- A.** There should be an allocation for the development of capacity to gather and process data for the development indicators and resources should be assigned within the operation for the gathering of baseline data.


■ ■ 2.2.2. Factors affecting project implementation (according to PPMR)



Factors affecting project implementation by time period reported in the PPMR



Factors affecting project implementation by frequency of occurrence in the PPMR





■ ■ 2.2.3. Analysis of factors affecting output delivery and outcome achievement

■ ■ 2.2.3.1. Identification of negative factors to produce outputs

- A.** One of the factors was the absence of a BAHA personnel exclusively dedicated to project execution so as to dedicate the required time and energy necessary to deliver the project outputs on time. Perhaps more appropriately, the services of a staff member of BAHA was not dedicated to project coordination initially which made execution weak and rather slow.

There was a delay in the design and construction of the quarantine buildings due to the need to synchronize the construction with the border management agency which facilitated the customs and excise, immigration and police departments. Additionally, the two new border point quarantine facilities were not constructed due to no designated border crossing identified by the government.

The need to reformulate the operation to accommodate the rehabilitation efforts resulting from Hurricane Iris had an effect of reducing the level of activities by US\$500,000. This reallocation of this sum from BAHA to Hurricane Iris largely impacted negatively on the construction of the BAHA headquarters building by reducing the scope of the works and deferring the construction of the access road to limited counterpart funds. The project on the other hand contributed to the rehabilitation and retrofitting of at least six hurricane shelters in the poorest region of the country thus improving the security of at least 2000 people who otherwise would be susceptible to danger associated with storms and related disasters.

■ ■ 2.2.3.2. Identification of positive factors to produce outputs

- A.** BAHA was able to cut cost on construction as a result of effective collaboration with the Ministry of Works who agreed to supervise the construction of the laboratories and offices. Additionally, collaboration between the country office and the executing agency resulted in the recovery of some resources previously lost to Hurricane Iris emergency response enabling the construction of a new office building for BAHA.

There was an improvement in project management when there was a change in BAHA's Managing Director. A senior personnel was dedicated full time to the management of the project and hence the project execution accelerated.

Collaboration with and assistance from the regional agency OIRSA helped to complement and support activities under the operation particularly those that had implications for the region such as quarantine, surveillance, training etc.

■ ■ 2.2.3.3. Identification of negative factors for the achievement of outcomes

- A.** There is still at least a thirty-three percent dependence on government to meet BAHA operational cost hence in a tight fiscal situation such as was prevalent during the project execution disbursement of counterparts delayed the delivery of some services. However, it must be noted that the objective of the project was never to have 100 percent sustainability for BAHA as some services will always remain public sector responsibility for the public good.

To maintain the desired outcome of keeping Belize free of diseases such as hog cholera, swine fever, avian influenza, bovine buccellosis etc, a factor that negatively affect outcome is the openness and extensiveness of the Belize border particularly with Guatemala that encourages smuggling and high levels of informal trading in plants and animals.

Another factor is the reluctance of some farmers to meet the cost recovery bill for services provided by BAHA. In such cases, BAHA is unable to extend these services and thus exist some loopholes in the control and management system.



■ 2.2.3.4. Identification of positive factors for the achievement of outcomes

- A. The level of cooperation and collaboration with OIRSA and IICA in complementing activities such as training and surveillance have added positively to achieving project outcomes.

The recognition by government of the importance of supplementing BAHA's budget to provide for the public good that the private sector support will not meet was and continues to be important.

■ 2.2.4. Analysis of project management and lessons learned

■ 2.2.4.1. Management Analysis

- A. To alleviate the problem of the absence of a PEU, COF/CBL agreed to dedicate some resources to employ the services of a retired BAHA personnel who was part of the original staff at agriculture during the project preparation phase and who had extensive knowledge of the project. While this was done after two years into the project, it improve project execution;

In the absence of a project launch in 1999, upon taking up assignment in 2001, the new BAHA Managing Director conducted a complete orientation to the technical staff on the project activities.

After having lost some resources to Hurricane Iris Rehabilitation works, towards the end of the project skilfull negotiation and collaboration among COF/CBL, Ministry of Economic Development and BAHA resulted in the recovery of about US\$150,000. that facilitated the construction of the BAHA Main offices in Belmopan.

■ 2.2.4.2. Lessons learned on project management (alternative measures)

- A. Ensure that extensive consultations are conducted during project preparation. That a project orientation be conducted to kick-off a project such as this that has a very important institutional strengthening component. Most of all ensure that provisions be made for either a PEU or program coordinator particularly when establishing a new institution that has routine service oriented functions to perform.

A thorough analysis of the pros and cons of reformulating projects of critical national importance and with programs underway be done.

■ 2.2.4.3. Rating project implementation (IP)

Rate the project implementation considering the above management analysis and the obtained project outputs in the expected quantity and quality, reasonable timeframe, and reasonable costs

☐ Very Satisfactory (VS)

☒ Satisfactory (S)

☐ Unsatisfactory (U)

☐ very unsatisfactory (VU)

A.

■ 2.3. Sustainability Analysis

■ 2.3.1. Institutional / Organizational Strengthening(IOS)



2.3.1.1. Areas strengthened or improved by the project

Strengthened / Improved	Yes	No	N/A	Level		
				Nat	Reg	Loc
1. Legal and regulatory framework	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. Procedures, manuals, operational guidelines	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3.1. Top-level managerial capacity	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3.2. Mid-level managerial capacity	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3.3. Information systems capacity	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3.4. Performance measurement (M E capacity)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3.5. Service delivery	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. Functional structure and organization	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5. Planning	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6. Budgeting / Financial management	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7. Intra- / Inter-sectoral coordination	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
8. Intra - / Inter-organizational coordination	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
9. Staffing / human resources development	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
10. Procurement	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
11. Self-evaluation, auditing and accountability	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

2.3.1.2. IOS achieved by the project in the country

- A. The establishment of a nationally and regionally recognized, respected and competent autonomous agricultural health authority equipped with staff and facilities.

2.3.1.3. IOS achieved by the project in the Executing Agency

- A. A well-trained and competent staff equipped with modern diagnostic and food safety laboratories as well as new regulations and manuals to provide the necessary services.

2.3.1.4. Rating the project's contribution to the Institutional / Organizational Strengthening (IOS)



Rate the extent in which the project contributed to the institutional / organizational strengthening in the Borrowing Country and the Executing Agency

☒ Very Relevant (VR)

☐ Relevant (R)

☐ Partially Relevant (PR)

☐ Irrelevant (I)

- A.** The project had an institutional strengthening component and thus the expectation that a competent institution with trained staff and all the enabling regulations and manuals and lab facilities would have been established. the fact that such an institution has been established indicates the relevance of project to country's institutional and organizational needs.

2.3.2. Project sustainability

2.3.2.1. Scope of project sustainability

- A.** The sustainability of the project's outcomes relies on the sustainability of the institution called BAHA. At the present moment, BAHA is 67 percent sustainable. It relies on government for 33 percent of its operating cost. An aggressive program to re-orient the private sector to pay for services provided by and available at BAHA needs to be conducted to increase the institution's sustainability and independence. As has been pointed out in other sections of this report, the objective was not necessarily to have BAHA 100 percent sustainable as there will always be services provided for the public good which is the responsibility of the state.

The level of cooperation with regional institutions such as OIRSA and IICA also needs to be maintained and increased to enhance sustainability

2.3.2.2. Basis for sustainability analysis

1. EA's top management support to the project	Low ① ② ③ ④ High	<input type="checkbox"/> N/A
2. Legal and regulatory framework	Low ① ② ③ ④ High	<input type="checkbox"/> N/A
3. Organizational preparedness and capacity	Low ① ② ③ ④ High	<input type="checkbox"/> N/A
4. Inter-organizational coordination	Low ① ② ③ ④ High	<input type="checkbox"/> N/A
5. Availability of financial resources	Low ① ② ③ ④ High	<input type="checkbox"/> N/A
6. Key personnel	Low ① ② ③ ④ High	<input type="checkbox"/> N/A
7. Resources for maintaining the infrastructure	Low ① ② ③ ④ High	<input type="checkbox"/> N/A
8. Support from project beneficiaries	Low ① ② ③ ④ High	<input type="checkbox"/> N/A
9. Support from national government	Low ① ② ③ ④ High	<input type="checkbox"/> N/A

2.3.2.3. Root-cause analysis of factors affecting negatively the project sustainability



- A. The problem of some potential private clients such as farmers being reluctant to pay for services that were once provided free of cost by the government may reduce the potential for BAHA to generate the much needed operating revenues.

Sustainability may also be negatively affected if the government continues to experience severe fiscal difficulties thus affecting their annual subvention to BAHA.

2.3.2.4. Root-cause analysis of factors contributing positively to the project sustainability

- A. The services offered by BAHA is one that is critically important for the maintenance of the agricultural health of the country;

There are no restriction legally imposed on BAHA for the generation of revenues through alternative means. BAHA has been able to venture beyond the Belizean borders to provide technical assistance and consultancy services to clients requesting their services.

2.3.2.5. Lessons learned on sustainability (adopted measures)

- A. Through the project provisions were made for the establishment of user fees for BAHA's services. These were supported with accompanying legislations.

2.3.2.6. Lessons learned on sustainability (alternative measures)

- A. While not an alternative measure but perhaps an additional measure would be to seek government support for a mandatory inspection and or service fee through appropriate legislation in the interest of the public good. This would be directed at those reluctant to pay but important that they receive services. Alternatively, a system of incentive should be developed that ties local sales and exports of agricultural products to BAHA's certification.

2.3.2.7. Sustainability action plan

- A. Conduct an aggressive campaign and promote the services offered by BAHA to potential clients; lobby the government for appropriate legislation to enforce mandatory payments for services in the interest of the public good. Increase the provision of technical assistance on a consultancy basis to similar but inexperienced institutions in the region.

The Bank can assist in the provision of technical assistance to BAHA to prepare a business plan aimed at enhancing its capacity to promote its service and improve its financial management and administration.

2.3.2.8. Rating project sustainability (S)

Considering the previous analysis and the probability to implement the Sustainability Action Plan, rate the probability for the sustainability of this project during the next three (3) years:

☐ Very Probable (VP) ☒ Probable (P) ☐ Low Probability (LP) ☐ Improbable (I)

A.

2.4. Executing Agency Performance

2.4.1. Executing Agency performance in key areas



1. Participation and quality of its contributions during project design

Low ① ② ③ ④ High ☐ N/A

2. Organization for project execution (Executing/Coordinating Unit's staff, infrastructure, coordination, communication, etc.)

Low ① ② ③ ④ High ☐ N/A

3. Coordination and Integration of the Project Coordination/ Execution Unit with the Executing Agency

Low ① ② ③ ④ High ☐ N/A

4. Establishing a monitoring and results framework (baseline data, systems, procedures, data analysis and reporting, etc.)

Low ① ② ③ ④ High ☐ N/A

5. Executing/Coordinating Unit's management capacity

Low ① ② ③ ④ High ☐ N/A

6. Timeliness in the fulfillment of Bank's policies, procedures and contractual clauses

Low ① ② ③ ④ High ☐ N/A

7. Financial management (securing counterpart resources, disbursements, etc.)

Low ① ② ③ ④ High ☐ N/A

8. Timeliness and efficiency for procurement of goods, works and consulting services

Low ① ② ③ ④ High ☐ N/A

9. EA top-level management's leadership, ownership and support to project execution

Low ① ② ③ ④ High ☐ N/A

10. Effort to secure project sustainability

Low ① ② ③ ④ High ☐ N/A

2.4.2. Lessons learned on organization and management of the PCU (adopted measures)

- A.** The project/BAHA had an enthusiastic and willing staff and when under the appropriate leadership performed competently in the execution of the project activities. Therefore a measure adopted due to the absence of a PEU was the dedication of a senior personnel exclusively to oversee and coordinate project execution.

The designated project manager and managing director of BAHA in 2001 conducted orientation sessions for the staff to familiarize them with the project activities, objectives and goals.

2.4.3. Lessons learned on organization and management of the PCU (alternative measures)

- A.** Make provision for the services of a project coordinator rather than have the project managed by the managing director of a newly established institution.

2.4.4. Rating the Executing Agency performance (EAP)

Based on the above performance assessment made in this section, on the achieved project results, as well as on the Executing Agency's efficiency during project implementation, rate the Executing Agency performance:

☐ Very Satisfactory (VS)

☒ Satisfactory (S)

☐ Unsatisfactory (U)

☐ very unsatisfactory (VU)

- A.** given the original design of the project, the executing agency did a good job of adjusting its personnel and approach to the execution of activities. It dedicated a competent staff member and did the necessary orientation and counterparting to recover lost time and resources.



■ ■ 2.5. Foundations for the Ex-post Evaluation

■ ■ 2.5.1. Provisions for ex-post evaluation

 1. Does the Loan Agreement require an ex-post evaluation for this operation?

☐ Yes

☒ No

 2. What will be its schedule?

Start up date :

Submission date :

 3. Who are the responsible parties for carrying out the evaluation?

☐ Bank

☐ Borrower

What is the estimate of the costs involved (USD\$) : \$0.00

 4. How the cost involved will be financed?

☐ Bank loans funds

☐ Borrower financing

☐ Other Source

A.

■ ■ 2.5.2 Analysis of the ex post evaluation capacity

A. The loan agreement and the program do not contemplate an ex-post evaluation for this project.

■ ■ 2.6. Other lessons learned and recommendations

■ ■ 2.6.1. Additional lessons learned and recommendations

- Perhaps a more comprehensive analysis should have been done during project preparation to examine factors that could contribute to the financial sustainability of BAHA. These could have included some surveys among potential clients to determine willingness to pay for services previously provided free of cost by the government.





Executing Agency Memorandum

■ ■ 3.1. Executing Agency Memorandum

■ ■ 3.1. Executing Agency Memorandum (Section of the PCR written by the Borrower / Executing Agency)

Executing Agency Memorandum



PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT – PCR

Executing Agency Memorandum

Submitted to the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)

(Date of submission)

The ability of this report to reflect project results at completion, foster sustainability of projects benefits and capitalize on lessons learned depends on the participation of the Borrowing Institution, the Executing Agencies, and the project beneficiaries in the preparation of this report.

Therefore, your contribution as author of the Executing Agency Memorandum will be of great value to the extent that project implementation knowledge and experience, the analysis of information on results and the views of beneficiaries can be transmitted objectively and independently.

Instructions to complete the Memorandum

To complete this memorandum, please bear in mind the following recommendations:

- ❑ Do not forget to complete the cover page and the box regarding basic data by providing the necessary information.
- ❑ It is very important that you review the PCR Guidelines that will be provided to you by the Bank's Country Office, in particular, the technical annex on "Practical guidelines to prepare the PCR". This annex includes guidance, tips and practical examples to assist you in completing the required information. Remember that the questions for the Bank and for the Executing Agency, as well as the appropriate numbering are the same, except for the first digit (for the Bank they start with number 2, i.e. 2.1.1.1., while for the executing Agency they start with number 3, i.e. 3.1.1.1.)
- ❑ Answer the questions in a concise manner. The desired length for each response is 10 lines maximum. Please do not exceed 15 lines per response. Should you need to attach important relevant information documenting project results, please use Annex 5, "Documental Annex". This optional material can be sent to the Bank's Country Office as a separate document (see PCR guidelines for a description of this annex).
- ❑ **Note:** This template takes a few minutes to save your information due to the buttons available to mark responses.

Project Basic Data
Project Name: Modernization of Agricultural Health Services
Project Number: 1189/OC-BL
Loan Number /TC:
Executing Agency: Belize Agricultural Health Authority (BAHA) / Ministry of Agriculture & Fisheries
Name of the Author of the Executing Agency Memorandum: Nerie T. Sanz
Position in the Executing Agency: Managing Director, BAHA

3. EXECUTING AGENCY MEMORANDUM

3.1 RESULTS ANALYSIS (OUTPUTS, OUTCOMES AND FUTURE IMPACTS)

3.1.1 Outputs attained. Description of project outputs by components and analysis of factors that influenced project execution.

3.1.1.1. Output Indicators Analysis. Complete the indicators of the outputs attained in this component using the same output indicators retrieved from the PPMR. Compare the indicators in the Achieved and Planned columns. If there is a significant gap between them, briefly explain the factors responsible for the gap.

PLANNED	ACHIEVED
Component a: Institutional Strengthening	Component a: Institutional Strengthening
(i) In the first six months of the project, the Central BAHA Office is integrated as a single service of agricultural health within MAFC Year 1 (after the disbursement of up to US\$ 120,000 with no special condition and assignment of local resources for at least US \$ 30, 000). Formal establishment of BAHA with its legal structure, Board of Directors and the Coordinating Committee in Operation	(i) BAHA with its Central Office and supportive legislation established; assumed responsibility for agricultural health; However Board of Directors was not established until a year after the project started, and remained relatively inactive during Y2. Explanation <i>-MAFC retained control. The then manager was answerable largely to the Minister of Agriculture and there was little interest in having a vibrant board in place.</i>
(ii) Training material prepared and distributed to producer associations (5); Agro-industries have installed HACCP-Fisheries (8); Milk Plants (2); Meat Slaughter Houses (2); Poultry (3).	(ii) BAHA was promoted through Radio interviews; displays at the Agriculture & Trade Show but the entire Agro-Industry with the exception of Fish/Shrimp were not interested in installing HACCP. At present only one (1) shrimp plant is HACCP certified. Explanation <i>- Most plants are small, marginally profitable & unable to support the cost of HACCP implementation. Exports are mainly CITRUS, SUGAR, BANANAS, with little need for HACCP</i>

<p>(iv) Agreements with: Ministry of Health, Ministry of Industry, Commerce; Public Service & Labor signed.</p> <p>(vi) All 14 international and 3 national consultants hired; 37 training candidates selected; training for 40 professionals, 35 technical and 60 producers completed</p>	<p>(iv) Agreement was never reached with Ministry of Health (MOH) on transfer of water laboratory (lab.) over to BAHA. Explanation <i>MOH chose not to hand over the lab. BAHA has since purchased equipment for its own water lab.</i></p> <p>Agreement on conditions of “transfer” of staff from Public Service over to BAHA is presently nearing completion Explanation <i>There was no legal precedent for “transfer” of public servants to a Statutory institution.</i></p> <p>BAHA has a good working relationship with Bureau of Standards, and the Head of the Food Safety Dept. presently serves on the Standards Committee.</p> <p>(vi) All international consultants with exception of Management & Operation of Soils Lab. were hired & have delivered the services stipulated.</p> <p>With respect to (wrt) National consultants-1 consultancy remain outstanding at time of this report.</p> <p>WRT Training-this was fully implemented</p>										
<p>Component b: Animal Health</p>	<p>Component b: Animal Health</p>										
<p>(i) Reports on Animal Health problems prepared by: Inspection posts, laborites, extension professionals, farmers, agro-industrial plants & exporters. Risk Analysis is prepared based on international disease status reports.</p> <p>(ii) In 2002 (Y4) the laboratories are in a sustainable level of operation: diagnostic samples increase from 60 to 4,290 samples (8,100 analyses); samples of presence of residues in products increases from 0 to 842</p> <p>(iii) In 2002 (Y4) the Food Microbiology Lab increases samples from 0 to 3,400 (21,200 analyses) Private sector (User Group) prepares the evaluation of operation</p> <p>(iv) By 2003 (end of project) surveillance coverage increases to 2,450 farms affecting medium, large & small farms. By 2003 the percentage of farms under control & eradication campaign increase to 90%.</p>	<p>(i) No formal reports are sent in by non-BAHA sources. Explanation <i>Formal reports are generated mainly from active surveillance conducted by the Department. Para-professional residents of various villages phone in verbal reports of any unusual occurrences.</i> This Dept. is very efficient in preparation of Risk Analysis based on international disease status reports.</p> <p>(ii) In Y4 the laboratories are not in a sustainable level of operation! Explanation <i>-Sample throughput in every single lab. is far less than estimated in the project document. Annual Report for end of 2003 show the amount of samples / tests to be as follows:</i></p> <p>(ii) & (iii)</p> <table border="0"> <tr> <td>LAB</td> <td>Annual Throughput 2003</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Animal Health</td> <td>1174 Lab samples (820 diagnostic)</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Food Microbiology</td> <td>1068 Tests</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Residue Testing</td> <td>150 Antibiotics, Pesticide Tests</td> </tr> <tr> <td>--“--</td> <td>12 Heavy Metals Tests</td> </tr> </table> <p>(iv) Surveillance is no way near 2,450 farms Animal Health surveillance covers a minimum of 40 farms weekly to bi-weekly. Targets another 425 farms/year in its Vesicular Stomatitis Surveillance & samples 12 farms every 4 months for Hog Cholera.</p>	LAB	Annual Throughput 2003	Animal Health	1174 Lab samples (820 diagnostic)	Food Microbiology	1068 Tests	Residue Testing	150 Antibiotics, Pesticide Tests	--“--	12 Heavy Metals Tests
LAB	Annual Throughput 2003										
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--“--	12 Heavy Metals Tests										

<p>(v) In 2001 (Y3) coverage of products reaches 80%. By 2002, controlled coverage reaches 100% of all agricultural inputs Coordinated activities with Pesticide Control Board (PCB)</p> <p>(vi) By 2001 (Y3) the laboratories will process 200 samples of veterinary drugs, biologicals, medicated feeds, fertilizers and pesticides.</p>	<p>Plant Health- Conducts continuous surveillance of imported Banana plants, citrus vegetative material, coconuts & vanilla. It has also conducted 2 surveys to verify Belize free of Citrus Canker & Citrus Leprosis Food Safety-334 Inspectors of Plant/Farms Medfly Control Unit-checks 1,300 traps weekly along main highways and ports of entry, totaling 64,320 service visits to traps/ year at a cost of \$175,000US/annum.</p> <p><i>There is no control & eradication campaigns with 90% of farms covered</i></p> <p>Explanation Some of the target diseases listed in the indicators are non existent or of extremely low prevalence. Need base line survey to establish prevalence if any. However, no funds for this.</p> <p>(v) In Y3 coverage of products did not reach 80% & in Y4 it is not 100%</p> <p><i>Explanation Residues lab was not functional until Y4; Although there is a sampling frame in place the question of who pays for the testing remains a deterrent only a few standards are in place & most standards are Voluntary. Testing is conducted only if export conditions demands this. (As can be seen from the number of tests listed above) There is presently in Y4 (not Y3) some control of imports of Veterinary Drugs with 31 Retail outlets registered and registration of all new products implemented. Vet Drugs Registration Unit & Pesticide Control Board coordinate their activities to promote safe use of inputs but residue testing to verify efficacy of the system is not in place.</i></p> <p>(vi) By Y3 the residue screening system processed –52 samples for chloramphenicol in connection with fresh shrimp export to Mexico.</p> <p>Explanation Reasons given in (v) above applies</p>
<p>Component c: Plant Health</p> <p>(i) Phytosanitary problems are reported by agro-industrial plants, laboratories, producers, & participating professionals. (Collection of information)</p>	<p>Component c: Plant Health</p> <p>(i) Formal reports are generated mainly from active surveillance conducted by the department. Agro-industry does not submit any formal Report to BAHA.</p>

<p>(ii) By 2001 (Y3) plant diagnostic laboratories are rehabilitated and are in operation, diagnostic results increase from 360 to 1,200 by 2002 (Y4) Income increase to US\$ 5,100 by Y4.</p> <p>(iii) By 2000 (Y2) post entrance quarantine station on seeds and vegetative material in operation. No. of samples increase from 315 (Y1) to 1,000 in (Y4) Income increase from US\$ 2,400 (Y1) to \$15,000 (Y4)</p> <p>(iv) By Y4 Phytosanitary campaign coverage is 100% of affected area, increasing from 15% in (Y1)</p>	<p>Explanation As with Animal Health, much of the reporting from outside BAHA is verbal communication between professionals in the existing health system of Sugar, Citrus & Bananas & those of Plant Health Dept.-BAHA.</p> <p>(ii) By Y3 the diagnostic labs were rehabilitated but bulk of equipment was not in place until September 03 (Y4). Number of samples tested year 4 (2003) not reported by Plant Health. It is known from Quarantine Report that 59 interceptions were submitted to the lab.</p> <p>Explanation - The country's production base is too small to generate the quantity of samples needed to keep the labs busy. In addition, all Plant Health Work countrywide is conducted by only a Director & 3 technicians + the department needs and entomologist</p> <p>(iii) By Y2 the post entrance quarantine station on seeds and vegetative material is in operation. No. of samples did not increase from 315 to 1,000. In fact in Y4 the number of samples totaled not more than a few.</p> <p>Explanation Number of samples overestimated by designer of project. Main imports are banana plantlets, citrus vegetative material, coconut & vanilla. These were quarantined on site and are checked monthly by farm visits.</p> <p>(iv) By Y4 the Phytosanitary campaigns comprise the papayas/ pepper farms in export certification program There is 100% coverage of these farms. There is no Sigatoka or Tristeza campaign. The PHMB program funded by OIRSA has expanded and is effective.</p> <p>Explanation The phytosanitary is limited to the 2 export crop- Papayas (912 acres) & Peppers- to US. Bananas have their own effective Sigatoka control program, and citrus has adopted root stock resistant to Tristeza.</p>
Component d: International Inspection & Quarantine	Component d: International Inspection & Quarantine
<p>(i) In 2001 (Y3) all Inspection Posts will detect non-compliance of products that do not meet import requirements at a 90% level and reach 100% by 2002 (Y4)</p> <p>(ii) Income from inspection, quarantine, licenses & incineration increase from US\$23,700 Y1 to</p>	<p>(i) In Y2 instead of Y3 all detection posts detect non-compliance of products that do not meet import requirement at a 100% level</p> <p>(ii) Income from inspection, quarantine, license & incineration amounts to US\$ 149,695 instead of</p>

\$108,700 Y4	<p>\$108,700</p> <p>(iii) 2 unplanned Port Control Point (PCP) established at Placencia and San Pedro.</p> <p>Explanation</p> <p>Early reorganization of quarantine into a separate department increased efficiency & focus.</p> <p>PCP at Placencia established with funding from IICA to counter Medfly incursions/ tourists</p> <p>2 planned Border Control Points at Jalacte & La Union were not established. Border dispute + lack of concurrent commitment from Customs/Immigration/Police prevented establishment of these new border control points.</p>
Component- e: Soils Laboratory	Component- e: Soils Laboratory
	<p><i>This component was not implemented due to:</i></p> <p><i>(i) the estimated throughput at the time would be the 700 samples sent out annually as compared to the estimated 5-6,000 sample per year required to make the venture feasible.</i></p> <p><i>(ii) this would compromise the quality that was presently received from laboratory aboard.</i></p> <p><i>(iii) national fee would have to be higher, less service would be provided and at a lower quality.</i></p>

3.1.1.2. Identification of achieved outputs. Bearing in mind the output indicators in the different project components, describe briefly the key outputs achieved by this project

a. Institutional Strengthening

- (i) BAHA with its Board of Directors is fully operational
Offices & laboratories are rehabilitated & equipped.
- (ii) New laws and regulations approved, although a number of additional regulations need to be drafted.
- (iii) Health education to producers, & use of sanitary control systems in the production chain implemented
However promotion of privatized veterinary clinic services no implemented

(iv) Agreements with participating institutions - Ministry of Health, Public Service not signed, but other agreements ie with OIRSA in place.

(v) Training & technical assistance plan prepared, approved & IMPLEMENTED

b. Animal Health Department

- (i) Veterinary surveillance equipped, the epidemiological surveillance integrated with the national regional, and international systems strengthened and operating efficiently

Ambulatory service for production animals has not been transferred to private veterinary service

(ii) The Central Veterinary Diagnostic Lab (CVDL) in Belize, the Regional in Central Farm and Orange Walk upgraded equipped and in operation. BAHA central office upgraded, expanded & operating efficiently. New BAHA central office 65% completed at the time of this report.

(iii) Food Microbiology Laboratory upgraded, expanded and operating with the participation of the advisory committee structured with producer representatives

Actually the entire CVDL complex in Belize City was converted to the lab and office for the Food Safety Department. This complex also houses the Vet Drug Registration Office. The lab has a Food Microbiology Lab (a bacteriology unit and a mycology unit), a Residue Lab, a Water Lab, Food Nutrition Analysis Component, and Aquatic Animal Disease Unit and a Food Processing Plant inspection component.

This exceeds by far the Food Microbiology Lab as a component of Animal Health Department

(iv) Inspection performance standard operation sanitary procedures and HACCP-rudimentary system in place- **but only one Shrimp Processing Plant HACCP certified & one major slaughter plant meets international standard.**

(v) Zoosanitary campaigns equipped and operating effectively- **only 2 campaigns Hog Cholera and Avian Influenza- no other campaigns.**

(vi)Registration and control veterinary drugs, biologicals and medicated feeds; office established, register all inputs used in agricultural production

(vii) Laboratories: Central Veterinary Diagnostic, Phytosanitary, Soils (**Soils lab not established**) & the regional labs accredited, (**Accreditation too difficult and expensive. Labs have Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) and quality assurance check in place, but no accreditation**) validate the drugs, biologicals & agro-chemicals

c. Plant Health Department

(i) Surveillance Unit equipped and national, regional and international system integrated – There is established surveillance for Medfly (MF) and Pink Hibiscus Mealy Bug (PHMB) (**There is regional integration but a more formal surveillance & reporting system is not forthcoming due to limited resources, staff & failure of project to provide financing for important baseline surveys. Surveillance is limited to diseases of regional interest supported by other institutions like OIRSA.**

(ii) The Plant Diagnostic Laboratory, built, equipped & in operation (**however operations may be limited by need of an entomologist to assist with diagnostics and production of control protocols.**)

(iii) The greenhouse for plant post-entrance control and the Entomologist Unit rehabilitated and operating efficiently.

(iv) Phytosanitary campaigns equipped and operating effectively in coordination with producers. This is limited to control measures for MF outbreaks or flare ups of PHMB & export certificate for papayas & peppers.

No other major phytosanitary campaigns conducted by Plant Health Department

d. International Inspection & Quarantine Department

(i) Port Control Point in Dangriga; Inspection Posts in Jalacte and La Union (no posts in Jalacte & La Union); Existing Inspection Post in Santa Elena (including cattle observation station), posts in Benque Viejo, Big Creek, Punta Gorda, Phillip Goldson Airport and Port Authority of Belize reconditioned & rehabilitated
New inspection posts established San Pedro & Placencia.

e. Soils Lab-

(i) Was not rehabilitated and equipped and is not in operation

3.1.2. Project outcomes and impacts. Description of the project results in relation with its Development Objective (DO or purpose in the project logical framework)

1. Apicultural Health System is strengthened and operational **but is not financially sustainable**
A permanent surveillance for **select** animal disease & select plant pests is in place & the level of prevalence and incidence is known.

2. Better control measures are applied: seafood products, aquaculture, meats are safe and wholesome;
(the situation in meats is at about 50% of that desired)
The quarantine system is operating efficiently & exotic diseases are prevented entry into the country.

3.1.2.1. Outcome Indicators Analysis. Complete the indicators of achievement in the development objective (outcome) using the same outcome indicators retrieved from the PPMR (key performance indicators). Compare the Achieved and Planned outcome indicators. If there is a significant gap between them, briefly explain the factors responsible for the gap.

PLANNED	ACHIEVED
<p>1. In 2001 (Y3) the phytosanitary and sanitary situation of Belize is known</p> <p>2. Based on prevalence indicator of Bovine Tuberculosis, reduce the prevalence coefficients through a control and eradication program by 90% in 2004.</p> <p>Verify the disease free status for Bovine Brucellosis and Hog cholera and maintain their free status on 100% farms</p> <p>Maintain Bovine Rabies free status through reactivation of the Vampire Bat Control Program in 100% of the premises</p> <p>In poultry, increase in vaccination coverage of Newcastle, IB & IBD from 10% to 100% of commercial farms by 2004</p> <p>In shrimp increase control of Taura Syndrome from 10% to 100% by 2004</p> <p>Control campaigns of Citrus Tristeza Virus (CTV) and Sigatoka in operation in coordination with private sector; by 2003 the campaign will have controlled the diseases and allowed a high productivity level in all affected areas.</p> <p>3. By 2002 banana and citrus farmers basing fertilizer application rates on laboratory soil analysis have increased to 100%, sugar cane to 30%</p>	<p>1. In (Y3) the phytosanitary and sanitary situation of Belize wrt to select key pests and disease is known</p> <p>2. No work done wrt active testing. Meat inspections at plants have not detected any case.</p> <p>No active testing for Brucellosis- Testing done for Hog Cholera-all tests negative;</p> <p>Rabies Free status impossible. Vampire Bat Control program reactivated & used to contain outbreaks</p> <p>These vaccinations remain at 10% carried out mainly on Breeder farms.</p> <p>Taura is endemic. Improved management & use of Taura tolerant strain from Mexico has decreased the prevalence of Taura to about 10%</p> <p>BAHA's input restricted to regulation of imported vegetative material</p> <p>Citrus and Banana continue to send some samples abroad for analysis.</p>

Factor responsible for the difference (if any):

Bovine Tuberculosis & Brucellosis- Profitability of Cattle industry too small, and production too disorganized to support countrywide testing, & no provision of project for baseline surveys

Hog Cholera- OIRSA funding provided for countrywide testing: however “declared free status” impeded by language barrier and delayed submission documentation, lack of funds for translations. Countrywide surveillance continues.

Poultry disease- Uneconomical to implement vaccination across the board

Tristeza & Sigatoka campaigns- Control of CTV and Sigatoka largely in hands of the associations who has own cadre of health professionals and an established control system in place
Private Enterprise

Fertilizer rates- tied to soils analysis- Soil Lab component was not implemented.

3.1.2.2. Identification of intermediate outcomes and initial impacts. Considering the achieved project outputs, to the extent possible, identify intermediate outcomes and initial impacts achieved by this project so far.

Intermediate outcome and the initial impact:

The concentration and integration of all agricultural health services under one umbrella of joint public sector and private sector oversight has worked well and provides a model for adoption by other countries

The agricultural health services have been strengthened by upgrading of all laboratories via acquisition of considerable equipment and the training of staff in field and laboratory techniques. This has strengthened the surveillance /testing capacity of the country and has allowed it to acquire List 1 Status for export Fish & Fishery products to the EU. This auger well for the acquisition of export markets for other products.

However, Belize has few products for export and the country’s agro-industry is too small to sustain the imposition, at the domestic level, the degree of surveillance and testing demanded at the international level as part and package of an enhanced agricultural health services.

A large portion of this testing and surveillance is of a “public-good” nature requiring financial support from the public sector that is sacrificed whenever austerity programs are introduced.

3.1.2.3. Identification of future outcomes and impacts. Considering the achieved outputs, identify expected future outcomes and impacts and describe how these outputs are critical towards the achievement of outcomes and impacts

The increased capacity and organization of the health services provides for rapid detection and analysis of pests and diseases and an efficient quarantine system, and ensures the safety and wholesomeness of agricultural products placed on the export market.

This is a direct result of the project

Agricultural health concerns are not likely to pose significant obstacles to trade, as the country has had a good agricultural health record. The project has provided the capacity to survey, analyze and document the status of any disease/pest of concern so as to satisfy international scrutiny.

Cost of production of agricultural commodities rather than health problems remains a primary concern, and the projected socioeconomic impact through project effects on sugar, bananas and citrus are unlikely to materialize. It is unfortunate that funds for the soils laboratory component were diverted elsewhere before acceleration of project implementation, since the reality is that with increasing competition, fertilizer use must be more

efficient if citrus, bananas & sugar- the main exports from Belize- are to maintain their share of the market.

BAHA now has considerable amount of equipment that can do analysis of plant tissue and water and there is no need to look at what tests, if any, these equipment could carry out as part of soil-plant-fertilizer analysis system, and as part of the environmental monitoring system conducted by other institutions, given that **these equipment will remain underutilized and the labs unsustainable.**

3.1.2.4. Analysis of assumptions (from outputs to outcomes). Identify the necessary conditions towards the achievement of the project outcome and explain why they are necessary.

1. All importing countries adjust their requirement with the international sanitary and phytosaintary health regulations of the World Trade Organization

This is necessary condition since it **theoretically** creates a level playing field and allows prices to dictate access to market.

In reality large countries dictate the rules and small countries lack the negotiating skills and resources needed to maintain even the small market access they presently have.

2. Farmers, fishermen and livestock producers increase their net income using the laboratory and health services and have successful increase of non traditional and traditional export commodities.

This is a major assumption that has not held true mainly because the traditional exports Sugar, Bananas and Citrus and Shrimp already had market access and did not face Health problems as barrier to trade.

The improved health services has helped shrimp exporters to maintain existing markets but even though the country has obtained List 1 Status with the EU for Fish & Fishery product the industry has not initiated additional exports to the EU.

Much of the country's remaining agricultural production is for domestic consumption and does not face the major disease problems the consultants assumed were limiting productivity ie TB, Brucellosis, Newcastle, IB, IBD, Rabies, Hog Cholera.

3.1.2.5. Pilot question No. 1 – (Under construction). This question is optional for operations with a PCR due date prior to February 1, 2005. Before this date, answers to this question will only be required for those operations selected in a pilot group for completing the full version of the PCR. Have you observed inequalities in the access of the target population to project benefits based on gender, location, ethnicity, rural/urban sector, income group or other reason? If so, what are the reasons behind them?

Large producers as well as smaller producers producing traditional export crops access health services through their association and these associations and the health professionals in them are not inclined to call on BAHA for assistance.

Small farmers are less capable of accessing the services because of their scattered location, lack of organization and inability to pay for the services

They depend heavily on over the counter purchases of health inputs to solve their problems.

However the present Veterinary Drug/Biological/Medicated Feed/Fertilizer registration system + regulation by Pesticide Control Board helps to reduce abuse of these inputs.

These trends developed because of the nature of agro-industry and the inability of previous agricultural health services to meet the needs of all the players at the same time.

3.1.2.6. Pilot question No. 2 – (Under construction). This question is optional for operations with a PCR due date prior to February 1, 2005. Before this date, answers to this question will only be required for those operations selected in a pilot group for completing the full version of the PCR. Were any unintended adverse effects produced by this project to the population or to the environment? If so, what measures have been taken?

The project portrayed the services as being financially sustainable based on severe exaggeration in estimates of laboratory samples to be processed as a basis for revenue generation.

This made GOB reluctant to continue providing the subvention required to maintain services essential for the “public good”.

Management has presented to GOB an analysis of the services BAHA provides and the cost associated with each. BAHA intends to recover its service fee from either the recipient or (in the case of services considered to be of a Public Good) from Central Government.

3.1.2.7. Pilot question No. 3 – (Under construction). This question is optional for operations with a PCR due date prior to February 1, 2005. Before this date, answers to this question will only be required for those operations selected in a pilot group for completing the full version of the PCR. The results of the project have most likely contributed to the attainment either of the established goals of the Borrowing Country’s sectoral or national strategies or to the indicators of the Bank’s Country Strategy. If this has been the case, specify which objective or result indicator the project has contributed towards and explain how and to what extent it does.

Project has contributed to greater acceptance of Belizean products on the export market as exemplified by the acquisition of List 1 status for export of fish & fishery products to EU.

The project has fostered the development and adoption of standards now being applied to products consumed locally.

The new quality of products has not necessarily contributed to increase in income of farmers. In fact the milk standard is now being revisited as the standards set are so high they threaten the small local industry.

Of more than 14 meat processing plants only one has met standards that are on par with international standards for the handling of fresh meats and the amount of testing re freedom from microbiological contamination and residues is still not fully in place.

However there is an increased consciousness and acceptance of the need for implementation of sanitary and phytosanitary measures that guarantees the wholesomeness of agricultural products.

The problem is that the degree of regulation and control applied is dependent on resources available and the profitability of the commodity being regulated.

3.1.2.8. Pilot question No. 4 – (Under construction). This question is optional for operations with a PCR due date prior to February 1, 2005. Before this date, answers to this question will only be required for those operations selected in a pilot group for completing the full version of the PCR. Where there any significant changes in the project context and in sectoral/national policies and/or development strategies? If so, explain how the project was adapted to respond to these changes.

Change in project context-the Soils Lab component was not implemented.

The project has not been able to compensate for this loss.

Increased efficiencies in production were projected for sugar, bananas, citrus, beef, grains etc from more efficient use of soil amendments, but this outcome no longer holds.

3.1.2.9. Recalculation of the Internal Rate of Return (IRR). If the project included ex-ante a calculation of the project's expected rate of return, what was the expected rate of return and what is the observed rate of return?

Not applicable

3.1.2.10. Recalculation of other cost analysis indicators. If the project included ex-ante any other economic evaluation estimates (cost-effectiveness, efficiency-efficiency and/or cost-benefit analysis), what was the expected indicator and what is the observed indicator?

The project based a great deal of its cost benefit analysis on the benefits of more efficient use of fertilizers based on soil analysis in citrus, bananas, sugar and pastures.
The soil lab component was not taken up as envisioned.
Benefits were also tied to the control of diseases that were absent or if present, had such a low prevalence that there was no significant impact on productivity.
There has been significant increase in production and productivity in farmed shrimp and fish, but the status quo in other agro industries has remained.

3.1.2.11. Rating of project effectiveness in terms of the development objective (DO). Bearing in mind the analysis in sections 2.1.1. and 2.1.2., rate the project effectiveness in terms of attainment of the development objective.

☐ Very Effective (VE)

☐ Effective (E)

☐ Marginally Effective (ME)

☐ Ineffective (I)

Explain your rating

X



3.2. IMPLEMENTATION ANALYSIS

3.2.1. Project's performance measurement

3.2.1.1. Elements for monitoring and evaluation. In a scale from 1 a 4 assess the quality of the following elements required for project monitoring and evaluation:

1. Problem analysis

Low ← ☐ X ☐ ☐ → High ☐ N/A

2. Intervention Strategy in response to the problem (rationale)

Low ← ☐ ☐ ☐ X → High ☐ N/A

3. Identification of expected outcomes and impacts

Low ← ☐ ☐ X ☐ → High ☐ N/A

4. Identification of expected outputs

Low ← ☐ ☐ ☐ X → High ☐ N/A

5. Indicators of expected outcomes

Low ← ☐ X ☐ ☐ → High ☐ N/A

6. Indicators of expected outputs	Low ← <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> X <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> → High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A
7. Baseline for expected outcomes	Low ← <input type="checkbox"/> X <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> → High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A
8. Baseline for expected outputs	Low ← <input type="checkbox"/> X <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> → High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A
9. Assumptions from outputs to outcomes	Low ← <input type="checkbox"/> X <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> → High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A
10. Assignment of responsibilities for data collection	Low ← X <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> → High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A
11. Project implementation plan	Low ← <input type="checkbox"/> X <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> → High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A
12. Procurement plan	Low ← <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> X <input type="checkbox"/> → High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A

3.2.1.2. Critical factors analysis in the project design. Considering the elements assessed above, describe which were the main factors (maximum 3) that had a major influence (negatively or positively) in the project performance measurement

1. Lack of adequate baseline against which to measure performance, especially with respect to expected outcome.
2. Inadequate project implementation plan that included selling to the perceived beneficiaries the components of the project that impacted them.

3.2.1.3. Lessons learned for the project design (adopted measures). Describe in a concise way what measures were adopted to improve the project design in those aspects related with performance measurement

The bank's attention was drawn to the deficiencies in assumptions and indicators.

Indicators were modified.

However assumptions made by designers of the project precluded adjustments required to establish base line database against which subsequent performance could be measured. This was particularly true once funds slated for soils lab were re-allocated.

The assumption, by designing consultants, that agro-base could/should bear the cost of the base line surveys and that the agro base was large enough to generate adequate revenues from laboratory testing for self sustainability were erroneous.

BAHA's management accessed funds from OIRSA & EU for Hog Cholera Testing; from Local Poultry Association for Avian Influenza testing; From OIRSA for Pink Hibiscus Mealybug control; from IICA & USDA-APHIS to install Inspection Post at Placencia to strengthen Quarantine and Medfly surveillance etc.

3.2.1.4. Lessons learned for the project design (alternative measures). Based on your experience in this project, describe in a concise way what alternative measures you recommend to improve project performance measurement in the design of future operations

Listen to the people on the ground and not be so locked into international agendas that you fund a project that becomes an economic liability to the country you propose to help. When the consultants designing the project visited Belize they refused to even consider the voiced concerns that the agricultural base could not generate their estimated samples or revenues.

3.2.1.5. Available information during project implementation. In a scale from 1 to 4 rate the level and quality of compliance of the following tasks that should be undertaken by the Executing Agency to obtain the necessary information for project performance measurement:

- | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|-----|---|--------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------------|---|------|------------------------------|
| 1. Establishment of processes and mechanisms for data gathering and data analysis (sources of data, responsibilities, periodicity and characteristics of the information) | Low | ← | <input type="checkbox"/> | X | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | → | High | <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |
| 2. Data gathering for the outcomes base line | Low | ← | <input type="checkbox"/> | X | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | → | High | <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |
| 3. Data gathering for the outputs base line | Low | ← | <input type="checkbox"/> | X | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | → | High | <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |
| 4. Data gathering, data analysis and reporting of information on available resources (inputs) and undertaking activities | Low | ← | <input type="checkbox"/> | X | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | → | High | <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |
| 5. Data gathering, data analysis and reporting of information on project outputs and their contribution to the achievement of expected outcomes | Low | ← | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | X | <input type="checkbox"/> | → | High | <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |
| 6. Data gathering, data analysis and reporting of information on project outcomes and impacts and their contribution to sectoral and national goals | Low | ← | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | X | <input type="checkbox"/> | → | High | <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |

3.2.1.6. Critical factors analysis for performance measurement during implementation. Considering the elements assessed above, describe which were the main factors (maximum 3) that had a major influence (negatively or positively) in the project performance measurement during its implementation

1. Inadequate data gathering, data analysis & consultation with perceived beneficiaries on agricultural health factors impacting on the major commodities comprising agro industry. It would appear that adequate data for economic analysis of project was lacking.
2. No provision of funds to conduct baseline surveys as to prevalence of key diseases and pests.

3.2.1.7. Lessons learned during project implementation (adopted measures). Describe in a concise way what measures were adopted to obtain the required information (in the expected quantity and quality) for the project performance measurement

The design of the project precluded the adoption of any measures as these required financing and or preliminary research and analysis.

The requirement was for more depth quantitative analysis of the profitability of the major agro commodities and the negative impact if any of these diseases and pests the project proposed to control. Beneficiaries would gladly buy in once shown these analyses.

The approach was to quickly put in place a regulatory body that would satisfy WTO export requirements.

3.2.1.8. Lessons learned for the implementation (alternative measures). Based on your experience in this project, describe in a concise way what alternative measures you recommend to improve project performance measurement in the implementation of future operations

Include more active participation of perceived beneficiaries.

This project was built on the need to upgrade regulatory infrastructure to satisfy WTO conditions without selling the project on the benefits of an improved agricultural health service.

Greater participation of beneficiaries would have provided more precise identification of outcomes expected, and would have provided base line information needed for future evaluation.

2.2.2. Factors affecting project implementation (according to PPMR)

(As useful information to answer section 3.2.3. it is advisable to review the factors affecting project implementation recorded in the PPMR. The Bank's Country Office should be able to provide this information).

3.2.3. Analysis of critical factors affecting project success

Critical factors affecting output delivery

3.2.3.1. Identification of negative factors to produce outputs. Describe which were the main factors (maximum 3) which affected negatively the implementation of project components and the delivery of products (outputs) in terms of quantity, quality and timeliness, and explain why

1. Lack of manager experienced in project management
2. Lack of Project Management Unit that could run with implementation and not become bogged down with day to day agricultural health emergencies.
3. Lack of commitment and support for the project by the executive of MAFC who were more concerned with imposing their control than with supporting the project in a positive way.

3.2.3.2. Identification of positive factors to produce outputs. Describe which were the main factors (maximum 3), which contributed positively to the implementation of project components and the delivery of products (outputs) in terms of quantity, quality and timeliness, and explain why

1. The constant monitoring and assistance provided by the IDB project specialist.
2. The decision of IADB to support the hiring of assistance to speed up implantation after the initial 2 years showed a slow rate of implementation

Critical factors for achieving project outcomes

3.2.3.3. Identification of negative factors for the achievement of outcomes. Describe which were, the main factors (maximum 3), which affected negatively the achievement of project outcomes and explain why

The agro-industry was not properly sensitized to the importance of the Modernization of Agricultural Health Project.

The transfer of the agricultural services out of the ministry created a fledgling institution with little acceptance or recognition especially by the major commodity associations who had their own agricultural health programs as well as secured export quota markets.

Even today, the major commodity associations-Sugar, citrus, bananas, do not formally report their health situation to BAHA.

Given that BAHA encompasses the "Competent Authority" and "Inquiry Point", BAHA is expected to be on top of the health situation in these industries.

However for these main exports, trade negotiations rather than health issues determined the current levels of

export so Agricultural Health is not priority.

3.2.3.4. Identification of positive factors for the achievement of outcomes. Describe which were the main factors (maximum 3), which contributed positively to the achievement of project outcomes and explain why

The Output of the project was delivered so it is natural for the outcomes to evolve, once the assumptions linking both output and outcome are valid.

Factors which contributed to outcome were:

- (i) The accelerated rate of project implementation in the last two years of the project allowed the generation of planned output.
- (ii) MAFC's preoccupation with accessing the EU market for fish & fishery products
- (iii) Financial support from outside institutions for surveillance work

3.2.4. Analysis of project management and lessons learned

3.2.4.1. Project Management Analysis. Identify and analyze the effectiveness of adopted measures to address the problems and capitalize on the opportunities related with the critical factor analysis and explain how they were put into practice

1. A PR Unit was hired to sell the service of BAHA to the beneficiaries, albeit this occurred late in project implementation.

Also, BAHA management solicited more active participation by the Board of Directors so that the representatives from the main commodities making up agro-industry could take on greater ownership of the project.

Finally, not having a clear understanding of the policy/implementation created difficulties between the senior management of the Ministry and BAHA. More recently much clarification on policy/implementation has facilitated a better understanding and functioning of the roles and responsibilities of both BAHA and MAF.

2. The Project capitalized on the Ministers preoccupation with the acquisition of access to EU fish/shrimp market and used this opportunity to establish a fully functional **Food Safety Department** (not in original project plans) and adoption of required regulations, sampling framework that gave better control measures on all agricultural food products.

3. The project lacked financial support for baseline surveillance and so senior management sought funding from regional institutions-OIRSA, IICA, USDA/APHIS and local associations BPA.

3.2.4.2. Lessons learned on project management. Based on your experience with this project, and considering the effectiveness of adopted measures mentioned in the project management analysis describe in a concise way what alternative measures you recommend to address the problems that may arise during the implementation of similar future projects

1. Make sure contingency funds are included in financing and that if funds are relocated they are used to further the objectives of the project. Projects are at best a desk top exercise with 1-4 years between preparation and implementation so the estimated funds will never be enough.

2. Situations change between project preparation & project implementation. Make sure all the intended beneficiaries are still on board when implementation finally starts.

3. Ensure early implementation. Start with a seasoned project. Manager & an implementation team that will not become bogged down with other day to day emergencies.

At start of project spend time with BOD & Senior Management breaking down project into components and identifying critical path to follow in implementation so that the BOD & the management team both understand the implementation plan and agree on benchmarks identified as indicators of progress in implementation.

Rating project implementation (IP)

3.2.4.3. Rating project implementation. Rate the project implementation considering the above management analysis and the obtained project outputs in the expected quantity and quality, reasonable timeframe, and reasonable costs

☒ Very Satisfactory (VS)

X Satisfactory (S)

☐ Unsatisfactory (U)

☐ Very Unsatisfactory (VU)

Explain your rating

Given the lack of progress in project implementation during the initial two years and change of 2 managers in as many years it is surprising that all outputs (with exception of central office now under construction) were delivered by end of project.

3.3. SUSTAINABILITY ANALYSIS

3.3.1. Institutional / Organizational Strengthening (IOS)

3.3.1.1. Areas strengthened or improved by the project. Identify those institutional / organizational areas strengthened or improved by the project, directly or indirectly, and indicate the level of influence (national, regional, local).

Institutional / Organizational Area	Yes	No	N/A	Level		
				National	Regional	Local
1. Legal and regulatory framework	X	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	X	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. Procedures, manuals, operational guidelines	X	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	X	<input type="checkbox"/>	X
3. Capacity						
3.1. Top management capacity	X	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	X
3.2. Middle management capacity	X	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3.3. Information Systems capacity	X	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	X	X	X
3.4. Performance measurement (M&E capacity)	X	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	X	X	X
3.5. Client-oriented service	X	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	X
4. Functional and organizational structure	X	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	X	X	X

5. Planning	X	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	X
6. Budgeting / Financial management	X	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	X
7. Intra- / Inter-sectoral coordination	X	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	X	X	<input type="checkbox"/>
8. Intra - / Inter-organizational coordination	X	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	X	X	<input type="checkbox"/>
9. Staffing / Human resources development	X	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	X
10. Procurement	X	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	X	X
11. Self-evaluation, auditing & accountability	X	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	X

3.3.1.2. IOS achieved by the project in the country. Describe the project's most significant contributions (maximum 3) to the institutional / organizational strengthening in the country.

1. The project set a precedent by facilitating the reorganization of the agricultural health services so that private sector became part of BOD responsible for oversight of the services.
2. The project provided for the update of parent legislation covering agricultural health.

3.3.1.3. IOS achieved by the project in the Executing Agency. Describe the project's most significant contributions (maximum 3) to the institutional / organizational strengthening in the Executing Agency. Compare the current situation with the situation before the project.

1. The project introduced use of protocols for services rendered, based on formal procedures developed by technical staff with input from client representatives & based on scientific principles, and established regulations
2. The project provided financial analysis of the services rendered as a basis for cost recovery.
3. The project provided training that increased the technical capacity of staff and provided the equipment that allows staff to use their training to provide a better service.

None of the above was in place pre-project.

3.3.1.4. Rating the project's contributions to IOS

X Very Relevant (VR)

☒ Relevant (R)

☐ Partially Relevant (PR)

☐ Irrelevant (I)

Explain your rating

The Agricultural Health Services pre-project, lacked technical capacity, adequate infrastructure, equipment and organization as well as legislative backing to provide regulatory services that could pass international scrutiny.

3.3.2. Project Sustainability

3.3.2.1. Scope of project sustainability. Through consultation with the Executing Agency, define what actions, services and/or outputs should be sustained, and for how long, to ensure the sustainability of the expected project's outcomes and future impacts.

Active surveillance with laboratory testing wrt to key diseases/pests that have significant adverse effects on food security and exports should be maintained until the cost is transferred to the beneficiary or until GOB

commits to financial responsibility for the maintenance of such service.

3.3.2.2. Basis for sustainability analysis. In a 1 to 4 scale estimate the probability of the existence during the first year after project completion (and the termination of Bank financing) of the following institutional and organizational settings, arrangements or resources in the country, needed to sustain the products, actions, services, outputs, outcomes and future impacts initiated by the project and described in 3.3.2.1.

Institutional / Organizational arrangements and resources	Probability
1. Executing Agency top management's support	Low ← <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> X → High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A
2. Policy, legal and regulatory framework	Low ← <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> X → High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A
3. Preparedness and organizational capacity	Low ← <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> → High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A
4. Inter-organizational coordination	Low ← <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> → High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A
5. Availability of financial resources	Low ← X <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> → High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A
6. Key personnel	Low ← <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> → High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A
7. Financial resources for infrastructure maintenance	Low ← X <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> → High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A
8. Project beneficiaries' support	Low ← <input type="checkbox"/> X <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> → High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A
9. National government support	Low ← <input type="checkbox"/> X <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> → High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A

3.3.2.3. Root-cause analysis of factors affecting negatively the project sustainability. Considering the estimates described in the previous question and the factors, which may affect the project sustainability, identify concrete reasons why the future impacts, immediate outcomes, products, actions and/or services described in 3.3.2.1. may not be sustainable, and explain why.

The BAHA Project is not financially sustainable and never will be!!

There have been 2 previous Agricultural Health Laboratory complexes funded through UK/EU AID programs, including the training of staff. Both complexes collapsed and trained staff have moved on.

The cause for all this inadequate financial resources to replenish reagents, upkeep buildings and provide for equipment replacement. This is in turn tied to the small production base, limited exports and the inability of the agricultural base to generate a volume of samples that would maximize the use of laboratory equipment and staff and generate service fees adequate to meet operational costs.

Even in larger countries institutions like BAHA are not self sustainable. Ask CFIA Canada!

The expected project OUTCOMES and FUTURE IMPACTS are unlikely to materialize once the institution folds.

The annual Operational cost of the services provided by BAHA presently amounts to \$1.7 M US

The institution presently generates only 38% of this operational cost as fees for services.

There must be continued indefinite support by GOB to meet the difference or the present institution will face a similar fate as the previous two ventures.

3.3.2.4. Root-cause analysis of factors contributing positively to the project sustainability.

Considering the previous analysis, and the factors, which may affect the project sustainability, identify concrete reasons why the future impacts, immediate outcomes, products, actions and/or services described in 3.3.2.1. may be sustainable, and explain why.

Project is not financially sustainable! Both IADB and GOB have been duped by false assumptions of designers. Consultancy provided on financial analysis of cost of services has established a base for the computation of fees.

The BOD has already approved the imposition of various service fees.

Revenue from service fees will help to maintain the operations of the institution but there will be indefinite need for government subvention to support BAHA if present project output is to translate into the outcome impact expected.

3.3.2.5. Lessons learned on sustainability (adopted measures). Based on your experience with this project, and considering the previous analysis, describe in a concise way what measures adopted in the project design and/or implementation were effective towards project sustainability, and explain how they were put into practice.

1. The cost analysis of the service provided through the international consultant was extremely helpful in establishing a fee structure for services.

2. The tight fiscal control and budget developed by management delivers the services without waste of resources.

(Note that despite this, deterioration has set in: equipment such as AC's and fridges that are out of order but can't be repaired has started to accumulate- these have ripple effect)

3. The breakdown for the first time of the services that are of a "public good" nature requiring GOB funding vs those which the cost should be borne by private industry allows for justification for cost recovery.

3.3.2.6. Lessons learned on sustainability (alternative measures). Based on your experience with this project, and considering the previous analysis, describe in a concise way what alternative measures you recommend during project design and/or implementation to improve the sustainability of future projects

The mismatch between the capital equipment & operational expense associated with the laboratory capability required to satisfy WTO vs occasional use of the facilities generated by the small production base precludes the inclusion of "workable measures" that would contribute to sustainability.

3.3.2.7. Sustainability action plan. Considering the previous analysis, describe the significant actions that the Borrowing Country and/or the Bank should undertake during the next year to ensure sustainability of future impacts, outcomes, products, actions and/ or services identified in 3.3.2.1.

The cost of maintaining a laboratory complex to verify wholesomeness of agricultural products is prohibitive and these laboratory complexes should be regional so that several countries can use them.

It is counterproductive for a small country to maintain a testing facility it uses only infrequently.

While small countries should manage their own quarantine and surveillance systems, economies of scale dictate that regional institutions such as OIRSA should take over these high capital investment facilities and provide a referral service to its member countries in the region.

The pooled contribution from each member country + fee collected for services provided would provide for better maintenance of such facilities.

3.3.2.8. Rating project sustainability. Considering the previous analysis and the probability of implementing the Sustainability Action Plan, rate the probability for the sustainability of this project during the next three (3) years:

☐ Very Probable (VP) ☐ Probable (P) X Low Probability (LP) ☐ Improbable (I)

Explain your rating

While the country will continue to benefit from the technical training, reorganization of services and a strengthened quarantine system the laboratory system will deteriorate due to lack of adequate sample throughput. The number of samples tested over the past six month when all systems and staff were in place can be used as a basis for annual estimates.

This level of laboratory testing cannot generate funds needed for replenishment of reagents and is barely adequate to keep laboratory staff on the cutting edge of testing and quality control.

3.4. BANK PERFORMANCE

3.4.1. Bank Performance in critical areas. Evaluate the Bank's performance in the following areas:

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1. Extent to which the Bank facilitated the project design in a participatory manner with the Borrower and Executing Agency | Low ← X <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> → High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |
| 2. Technical assistance and training as well as consistent follow-up provided so that the Executing Agency follow the Bank's policies and procedures | Low ← <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> X → High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |
| 3. Technical assistance and training provided to the Executing Agency to improve project management | Low ← <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> X <input type="checkbox"/> → High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |
| 4. Benefits of the Bank's supervision and assistance to improve project management | Low ← <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> X → High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |
| 5. Timeliness in the Bank's response to the needs of the Executing Agency during project implementation | Low ← <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> X → High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |
| 6. Bank flexibility to respond to emergencies during project implementation | Low ← <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> X <input type="checkbox"/> → High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |

3.4.2. Lessons Learned for the organization and operation of the PEU (measures adopted). Based on the project experience, identify the measures adopted in terms of structure, organization and processes of the Project Coordination/Executing Unit, as well as its interaction with the Bank, and the lessons learned. How were those measures put into practice?

Note the project called for the establishment of an executing unit comprised of General Manager, business manager, accounting assistant & secretary. However this unit quickly became swamped with the day to day emergencies of four departments and sixty+ staff that quickly grew to over 100.

Measures adopted included training provided to initial manager in project management workshop, the hiring of assistants to assist with preparing BID document, preparation of semestral reports and in implementing the training program.

Timeline for implementation should have been set from start of project implementation with establishment of critical paths so that delays would not escalate.

Having a financial controller knowledgeable in the bank's rules, conditions precedent and the protocol for the draw down of funds from the very start of project implementation is preferred.
Clearly the Project Executing unit was too small to carry out execution of project as well as supervise the execution of the agricultural health services demanded of the institute.

3.4.3. Lessons Learned for the organization and operation of the PEU (alternative measures).

Based on the project experience during its implementation, what do you suggest that the Bank do in future operations in order to support the improvement of the structure, organization and processes of the Project Coordination/Executing Unit and its interaction with the Bank in future operations?

Make sure a specific Project Executing Unit with TOR is set up

Make sure this team is trained as a group in the Bank's rules and regulations, and have this team produce the implementation plan and submit for banks approval.

Review them with the protocol for disbursement and reporting

Restrict the PEU's activity to project execution.

3.4.4. Ratings of Bank Performance. Based on 3.4.1., rate the Bank's performance in monitoring the project, taking into account the experience of the Borrower and your experience as Executing Agency during project design and implementation.

☒ Very Satisfactory (VS)

X Satisfactory (S)

☐ Unsatisfactory (U)

☐ Very Unsatisfactory (VI)

Explain your rating

The inexperience of PEU + the delay in implementation during the initial two years followed by the turn around that delivered almost all outputs in the remaining time left to the project is testament to the persistent monitoring of progress in planned activities provided by IADB's representative and the change in the PEU team.

3.5. FOUNDATIONS FOR THE EX-POST EVALUATION

3.5.1. Provisions for ex-post evaluation. Establish if this operation requires an ex-post evaluation according to the Loan Agreement. If applicable, provide the following information about the provisions taken (see agreements among the Bank, Borrower and Executing Agency in the Project Completion Workshop Aide Memoire):

Does the Loan Agreement require an ex-post evaluation for this operation?

☒ No ☒ Yes

What will be its schedule?

Start up date: DD MM YY

Submission date: DD MM YY

Who are the responsible parties for carrying out the evaluation?

☐ Bank ☐ Borrower

What is the estimate of the costs involved?

USD\$ []

How the cost involved will be financed?

☐ IDB Resources

☐ Borrower Resources

☐ Other Source

If financing comes from other source, please specify:

3.5.2. Analysis of the ex post evaluation capacity. Review the capacity of the Executing Agency, as well as its infrastructure and information systems to collect, review and report information on the achievement of future outcomes and impacts, and the main negative and positive factors that may affect this evaluation.



3.6. OTHER LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In addition to the lessons learned and recommendations recorded in previous sections of this report, this section offers users the opportunity to state the lessons learned and recommendation that may be helpful in the design and/or implementation of new projects.



Annexes 1A - IB

Annex 1A - Source of Financing (Amounts in millions of US Dollars)

Investment Category	Original				Actual				Gap as % of Original			
	IDB	Borrower	Other Sources	Total	IDB	Borrower	Other Sources	Total	IDB	Borrower	Other Sources	Total
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
1. IOS	.467433	.340948		.808381								
2. An Hlt	1.781907	.296532		2.051439								
3. P Hlt	.732260	.248153		.980413								
4. I. Quaran	.134645	.075832		.210477								
Etc.												
TOTAL	3.6	1.2		4.8								

Source of information:

From LMS: Columns (1) and (5)

To be completed by the author of the Executing Agency Memorandum: Columns (2) (3) (6) (7) (10) (11)

Annex 1B - Schedule of Investments
(Amounts in millions of US Dollars)

Years	Original				Actual				Gap
	IDB (1)	Borrower (2)	Other (3)	Total (4)	IDB (5)	Borrower (6)	Other (7)	Total (8)	(8)- (4) (9)
1									
2									
3									
4									
5									
6									
7									
N									
TOTAL									

Source of information:

To be completed by the author of the Executing Agency Memorandum: Columns (2), (3), (6), (7)



CRG Minutes

■ ■ 4.1. CGR Minutes (Proceedings of the Management Review Committee)

CRG Minutes



■ ■

Minutes PCR BL-0003



Annexes

■ ■ Annex 1A - Source of Financing (Amounts in thousands US\$)



To insert a new value, type the complete amount in each cell of the table (do not type it in thousand of dollars). Once the complete amount has been inserted, the system will automatically display it in thousands of dollars. Do NOT use commas, periods or decimal points. For example, to insert US\$175,000.00 type 175000. Remember to press the UPDATE button for changes make effect.

Category	Original				Actual				Gap			
	IDB	Borrower	Other Sources	Total	IDB	Borrower	Other Sources	Total	IDB	Borrower	Other Sources	Total
01.00 BAHIA Inst.Strength	\$346	\$305	\$0	\$651	\$439	\$829	\$0	\$1,268	26.88%	171.8%		94.78%
02.00 Animal Health	\$1,329	\$228	\$0	\$1,557	\$1,522	\$131	\$0	\$1,653	14.52%	-42.54%		6.17%
03.00 Plant Health	\$551	\$232	\$0	\$783	\$402	\$59	\$0	\$461	-27.04%	-74.57%		-41.12%
04.00 Internat. Inspect	\$360	\$253	\$0	\$613	\$415	\$170	\$0	\$585	15.28%	-32.81%		-4.57%
05.00 Soils Lab	\$98	\$69	\$0	\$167	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	-100%	-100%		-100%
06.00 Unallocated Cost	\$365	\$70	\$0	\$435	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	-100%	-100%		-100%
07.00 Hurricane Iris	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$284	\$0	\$0	\$284				
08.00 Financial Costs	\$551	\$43	\$0	\$594	\$283	\$35	\$0	\$318	-48.64%	-18.6%		-46.46%
	\$3,600	\$1,200	\$0	\$4,800	\$3,345	\$1,224	\$0	\$4,569	-7.08%	2%		-4.81%

■ ■ Annex 1B - Schedule of Investments (Amounts in thousands US\$)



To insert a new value, type the complete amount in each cell of the table (do not type it in thousand of dollars). Once the complete amount has been inserted, the system will automatically display it in thousands of dollars. Do NOT use commas, periods or decimal points. For example, to insert US\$175,000.00 type 175000. Remember to press the UPDATE button for changes make effect.

Years	Original				Actual				Gap
	IDB	Borrower	Other	Total	IDB	Borrower	Other	Total	
1	\$600	\$200	\$0	\$800	\$136	\$0	\$0	\$136	-83%



2	\$800	\$300	\$0	\$1,100	\$176	\$66	\$0	\$242	-78%
3	\$1,000	\$300	\$0	\$1,300	\$855	\$285	\$0	\$1,140	-12.31%
4	\$1,200	\$400	\$0	\$1,600	\$1,648	\$558	\$0	\$2,206	37.88%
5	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$530	\$315	\$0	\$845	
	\$3,600	\$1,200	\$0	\$4,800	\$3,345	\$1,224	\$0	\$4,569	-4.81%

■ ■ Annex 1C – Financial Information and Audited Financial Statements

■ ■ 1. Capacity of the Executing Agency

- A.** Although the executor had problems at the beginning of the project organizing the PEU, it managed to hire the accounting staff. The executor asked the Bank to provide support in searching an accounting and budget control system, in this respect the Bank provided an accounting program called "Quick Books" which was used until the end of the project. The PEU kept accounting, contracts and general correspondence files in order. During the bank inspection visits the information verified was normally available and the records and reports generally were updated. Also, during the visits the Bank learned that the disbursement request were supported by valid and enough documentation. Finally, there were basic internal controls but effective, and the personal was capable enough to manage all project transactions and produce the documentation required.

■ ■ 2. Accounting System and Internal Control

- A.** As indicated in the previous section, the executing unit had installed an accounting system which allowed to record all accounting transactions and keep a budget control, the executing unit also was able to prepare the necessary financial statements for internal purpose and for the external auditors annual reviews. The system allowed the accountants to prepare the financial information in a timely manner and a reliable way. In respect to the internal controls, the PEU had payment procedures in places, assets inventory, monthly bank reconciliations, the accounting procedures involved several people, etc. The internal controls were weak at the beginning of the project but the PEU was improving them each year and during the last two years of the project the Bank considered the internal controls appropriate.

■ ■ 3. Quality of the financial Information

- A.** The Bank feels satisfied and considers the information provided by the Executing Unit through different reports of a good the quality and enough to comply with the Bank requirements. The several Semiannual Progress Reports contained detailed and good quality information, and always shown the achievements and/or status of the targeted goals and objectives for the period. In respect to the financial information, such the audited financial statements, the data as well was presented in timely manner and the quality and quantity was enough to satisfy Bank's requirements.

■ ■ 4. Audited Financial Statements

- A.** The AFS were presented normally within the contractual periods or with just one to two months delayed. The basic information complied with the Bank's requirements.

■ ■ 5. Lessons learned

- A.** During the project design process, there should be some consideration for purchasing accounting systems for project accounting purpose. During the first year, the executing unit of this project had



several difficulties to get appropriate accounting programs to manage the project needs, the County Office then helped the executor by providing a basic accounting system.

The project launching workshop should include a section related to project accounting, payment and internal controls that should be considered and implemented the earliest possible once the loan contract or agreement is signed.

■ ■ Annex 2 - Final PPMR

[Last PPMR](#)

■ ■ Annex 3 - LMS Highlights

[LMS65 - Operation Portfolio Status \(operations assigned, portfolio events\)](#)

■ ■ Annex 4 - Exit Workshop Aide Memoire

[Exit Workshop Aide Memoire](#)




■ ■ Annex 5 – Documental Annex

[PCR - Documental Annex](#)



Pink Hibiscus Mealybug Distribution 2000-2004



**BELIZE AGRICULTURAL HEALTH AUTHORITY
ANIMAL HEALTH DEPARTMENT**

ANIMAL HEALTH MONITOR

FARMER	D/trict	LOCALITY	SPP	DIS	SAMPLE			LAB	SIZE			OBS
					rep	vis	sub		pop	cs	d	
1	Cy	Blackman Eddy	Eq	VS	5/2/5	7/2/5	-	NS	6	1	0	Mouth lesn-old 295368E 1905202N
2	Cy	St. Margaret	Bov	VS	7/2/5	7/2/5	7/2/5 R 11/2	POS NJ	43	3	0	Mouth lesn (ML) 329925E 188500N
3	Cy	Ontario	Eq	VS	8/2/5	8/2/5	11/2/5 R 17/2	POS NJ	3	1	0	ML 299029E 1905235N
4	Cy	Santa Familia	Eq	VS	8/2/5	8/2/5	--	NS	2	1	0	ML – pics 274873E 1903773N
5	Cy	UBC	Eq	VS	9/2/5	10/2/5	11/2/5 R 17/2	Neg 25/2	9	1	0	MHL, 28 bov 294886E 1893527N
6	Cy	Pilgrimage Valley	Bov	VS	11/2/5	12/2/5	22/2/5 R 25/2	NEG 03/3	46	1	0	ML, 3 eq, lab-18/2 282707E 1898845N
7	Cy	Selena	Bov	VS	14/2/5	14/2/5	--	NS	58	1	0	HL 289184E 1912474
8	Cy	Unitedville	Bov	VS	14/2/5	15/2/5	22/2/5 R 25/2	NEG 03/3	14	1	0	ML 294603E 1903894N
9	Cy	UBC	Eq	VS	16/2/5	16/2/5	--	Ns	4	2	0	6 bov, 35 sui 293277E 1892664N
10	Cy	Branchmouth	Bov	VS	17/2/5		---	Ns	15	5	0	ML, 2 eq 279460E 1900842N
11	Cy	Kendall	Eq	VS	16/2/5	17/2/5	---	Ns	40	2	0	ML, 800 bov 353015E 1859827N
12	Cy	Central Farm	Bov	VS	18/2/5	18/2/5	22/2/5 R 25/2	Pos NJ	42	1	0	TL, 3 eq, lab-18/2 285363E 1902895N
13	Cy	Branchmouth	Bov	VS	21/2/5	21/2/5	22/2/5 R 25/2	Pos NJ	10	1	0	ML 277393E 1898088N
14	Cy	Ontario	Eq	VS	23/2/5	24/2/5	---	Ns	10	1	0	HL 300539E 1905597N
15	Cy	Santa Familia	Bov	VS	23/2/5	24/2/5	R 04/3	POS NJ	4	2	0	ML 279737E 1901656N
16	Cy	Branchmouth	Bov	VS	23/2/5	24/2/5	R 04/3	POS NJ	10	1	0	ML, 6 eq 277627E 1902199N
17	Cy	Cristo Rey	Eq	VS	28/2/5	-	-	ns	7	1	0	ML 281929E 1894563N
18	Cy	Santa Martha	Bov	VS	25/2/5	-	-	ns	16	3	0	ML
19	OW	Shipyard C23	Bov	VS	15/3/5	15/3/5	R22/3 R 31/3	Neg	20	1	0	ML, 2eq, 8ov

Venezuelan Equine Encephalomyelitis Outbreak 2004
Horses

Locality	Date	Popn	Cases	Dead
Shipyard C40	18/08/04		(1)	(1)
Shipyard C40	14/10/04	3	1	0
Shipyard C4	14/10/04	2	1	0
Shipyard C15	27/10/04	9	2	0
Shipyard C10	28/11/04	18	1	1
Shipyard C8	01/12/04	9	1	1
Shipyard C40	07/12/04	3	1	0
Shipyard C13	13/12/04	4	1	1
Indian Creek C52	14/12/04	3	1	0
Shipyard C11	22/12/04		1	0
Shipyard C15	22/12/04		(1)	0
Shipyard C11	30/12/04	4	1	0
Indian Creek C51	31/12/04		1	0
Douglas	10/01/05	3	1	1

Avian Disease Monitor
Salmonella pullorum/Fowl Typhoid Surveillance

YEAR	BIRDS TESTED	COMMENTS
1998	29,774	From 1998 to 2002 all broiler breeders were tested
1999	40,089	
2000	38,426	
2001	44,288	
2002	49,866	
2003	8365	Beginning 2003, only 375 birds per broiler breeder farm were tested. Birds were also tested in Orange Walk
2004	6290	
2005	2590	

RABIES SURVEILLANCE(SUMMARY)

Table 1 Laboratory submissions 2000 – 2004

YEAR	NO. SAMPLES	NO. POSITIVE	SPECIES POSITIVE
1995	17	6	Dog, cat
1996	20	7	Dog
1997	31	19	Dog, cattle
1998	30	8	Dog, cattle
1999	45	10	Cattle, fox
2000	16	0	None
2001	20	2	Dog, cattle
2002	41	2	Fox, cattle
2003	24	2	Cattle
2004	41	4	Horse, cattle

Captures of Fertile Mediterranean Fruit Fly

YEAR	# OF FLIES
1990	3
1991	2
1992	0
1993	0
1994	3
1995	24
1996	6
1997	7
1998	14
1999	0
2000	0
2001	12
2002	24
2003	93
2004	0
2005	8

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Quarantine					
Export					
Phytosanitary Certificates	NA	1157	1291	1363	1263
Import					
Point of Entry	NA	10,183	5257	6555	6271
Aircraft	NA	5880	NA	4693	13677
Vessels	NA	1785	NA	2490	2157
Market	NA	329	261	243	163
Animal Health					
Export					
Veterinary Certificates	NA	20	17	18	NA
Import					
Import Risk Analysis	NA	NA	3	NA	NA
Foreign Facility Inspection	NA	0	1	4	9
On-farm quarantine	NA	11	23	14	19
Plant Health					
Export					
Certificates	NA	NA	NA	NA	151
Import					
Pest Risk Analysis	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Foreign Facility Inspection	NA	NA	NA	NA	2
Farm Inspection	NA	NA	NA	NA	8
Food Safety					
Export					
Sanitary Certificates	NA	NA	29	65	302
Veterinary Certificates	NA	NA	0	70	154
Import					
Foreign Facility Inspection	NA	0	1	0	7
National					
Processing Plants	NA	9	46	209	51
Meat & Poultry Slaughtering	NA	NA	97	83	754
Farm	NA	NA	NA	NA	70

EXIT MEETING
Modernization of Agricultural Health Services
1189/OC-BL

January 12, 2005

A project exit meeting was held on January 12, 2005 at the main offices of the Belize Agricultural Health Services (BAHA). In attendance were Nerie Sanz and Dr. Victor Gongora of BAHA and Harold Arzu of COF/CBL. The meeting served the purpose of reflecting on the achievements of the project, the lesson learned, implementation difficulties, solutions proposed for obstacles encountered and pending matters. Focus was mainly on pending matters so as to determine potential actions that the executing agency may take to further activities that were not completed for one reason or the other during project execution.

Pending Matters

Staff Transfer: A process that began during project execution pertained to the transfer of staff from the regular public service to the newly established institution called BAHA. The transition that had its difficulties was somewhat unprecedented in Belize. Hence there was no blue print to provide some guidance. The terms and conditions of employment for transferred employees are still being reviewed and some preliminary decisions have been made. For new employees BAHA will assume responsibility for pension and gratuity while those that were former employees of government, the public service will assume pension and gratuity applicable up to the time the transfer took place. The resolution of the problem was in great part due to the availability of a bargaining agent that negotiated on behalf of the staff. A consensus among the meeting is that in retrospect, matters pertaining to staff transfer upon the creation of the agency should have been an integral part of the project activities.

Transfer of Physical Assets: All the assets that were formerly in the possession of the Ministry of Agriculture and under agreement to be transferred to BAHA were all successfully transferred except for the Agricultural Show Grounds that continues to be under discussions with the Ministries of Finance and Agriculture. Currently 90 percent of the designated assets are now under the ownership of BAHA.

Quarantine Facilities: All the quarantine post scheduled for repair and upgrading were completed. Two new port posts in San Pedro and Placencia were designated under the project. However, two new border facilities at Jalacte in the Toledo District and La Union in the Orange Walk District were deferred due to no identified and designated border points. It is the understanding of the meeting that these will be constructed in collaboration with participating agencies namely Customs, Immigration and Police.

Laboratories: The management of BAHA pointed out that while the labs are functioning efficiently, at the present moment no provisions have been made for their maintenance. COF/CBL pointed out the urgency and importance of preparing a plan for the maintenance of

facilities to ensure the sustainability of service provision. In fact under the loan agreement, one of the obligations of the executing agency is to prepare periodic maintenance reports for submission to the Bank. The first such report is due at the end of the first quarter of this year i.e. March 31, 2005.

Information System: One of the activities that could not have been accommodated under the project due to insufficient funds was the establishment of the information system. However, as has been pointed out in the final PPMR, an agreement was made with OIRSA for the provision of that facility. The meeting informed and confirmed to the Bank that early this year work will commence on the system.

Training: Training of staff continues both at home and abroad. Oirsa and other regional organization continue to provide assistance in terms of short training courses in the region. Additionally, subsequent to the training of trainers conducted under the operation, local trainers conduct periodic training of staff.

Sustainability: BAHA's management indicated that the agency is currently 60 percent sustainable and relies on the government for 40 percent of its operating costs particularly as services in the interest of the public good need to be provided. At the present moment there is no action plan to work towards increasing the sustainability of the agency by exploring new revenue generating measures. COF/CBL however encourages BAHA to develop a plan for the gradual reduction of its dependence on public sector funding.

In relation to this, the meeting was informed that the legislation governing the operation of BAHA does not impose restrictions on activities that the agency may perform in an effort to generate revenues. Management indicated that opportunities exist in the area of consultancies examples of which had been tested out in South America. This could help to supplement revenues for the agency.

New Legislation: New regulations governing animal and plant health experienced some delays consistent with delays in the project execution. The new legislations have been successfully drafted and vetted by the solicitor general and is currently before parliament for consideration. It is expected that these will soon be passed. COF/CBL will continue to monitor the progress of these new regulations.

Ex-post Evaluation: With a limited budget that remained after the project was reformulated following Hurricane Iris, there were no funds available to conduct an ex-post evaluation of the project. However, BAHA indicated that a general evaluation of the agency has been included in this year's activities with financing to be requested from either OIRSA or IICA. While this evaluation will not focus exclusively on the Modernization of Agricultural Services Project, it will examine and review matters relating to achievements and execution of the project.

HAROLD ARZU
Operational Specialist COF/CBL