

PLAN OF OPERATIONS
SURINAME
FEBRUARY 2, 2005

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Project name:	Institutional Strengthening of Suriname’s Social Safety Net (SSN)		
Project number:	SU-T1008		
Team members:	Mario Sánchez, Project Team Leader (RE3/SO3); Antonio Giuffrida (RE3/SO3); Jennelle Thompson (RE3/SO3); Ian Mac Arthur (SDS/SOC); Kevin McTigue (LEG); Marcelo Pérez Alfaro (COF/CSU); and Ethel Muhlstein (RE3/SO3)		
Beneficiary:	Suriname		
Executing agency:	Ministry of Social Affairs and Housing (SoZa)		
Target Beneficiaries:	Beneficiaries of Suriname’s SSN		
Financing:	IDB (FSO):	US\$149,500	
	Local:	US\$ <u>15,000</u>	
	Total:	US\$164,500	
Objectives:	The goal of this program is to set up the basis for improving the institutional and organizational arrangement for a reformed SSN. Its purpose is twofold. First, it intends to assess the current institutional and organizational setting of Suriname’s SSN in order to develop a capacity building plan. Second, it aims at establishing a SSN Reform Strategy through a process of stakeholders’ consultation.		
Execution timetable:	Execution Period:	8 months	
	Disbursement Period:	12 months	
Special contractual conditions:	As a condition prior to eligibility of this TC, SoZa will designate a coordinator with Bank’s no objection, as described in ¶5.3.		
Exceptions to Bank policies and procedures:	There are no proposed exceptions to Bank policies or procedures.		
Environmental and social review:	There are no foreseeable environmental or negative social impacts occurring from the implementation of this TC.		

**Coordination with
other official
development
finance institutions:**

The major international donor in Suriname is the Netherlands, through the so-called Independence Treaty Funds. Dutch assistance was re-established after a period of low activity. The Netherlands and Suriname agreed to channel the last trench of these funds through a sector wide approach. Although the Social Safety Net Sector was not chosen as such, some of the activities involved in the Sector Plan for Health are related to the Health System for the poor. There is no other major development institution assisting the Social Safety Net Sector.

II. BACKGROUND AND JUSTIFICATION

A. Main issues

- 2.1 A social safety net (SSN) is defined as the array of social programs that guarantee a minimum level of well being to individuals and households affected by chronic poverty or transitory negative shocks. The Government of Suriname has placed assessing and strengthening its SSN system as a priority within its social development agenda. The rationale for such prioritization is straightforward under a scenario characterized by fiscal prudence on the one hand, and high poverty incidence (46% of households and 67% of individuals) and social vulnerability (due to high economic volatility) on the other¹. It is crucial for Suriname to deliver SSN services effectively, with adequate coverage, and in an efficient manner, in order to protect its chronically poor and vulnerable populations, and in order to promote development oriented investments by these populations.
- 2.2 It is widely recognized that institutional settings are key determinants of the quality of policymaking and of the efficiency of social services delivery. Therefore, it is crucial to rely on an adequate institutional and organizational capacity while reforming the delivery of SSN services. During 2004, the Bank financed *Suriname's Poverty and Social Safety Net Assessment* (SSNA) in order to help define specific actions of sector reform and Bank support. One of the recommendations of the Assessment was to strengthen the Ministry of Social Affairs (SoZa) technical capacities for policy-making, monitoring and evaluation, as the Ministry in charge of designing the welfare policy of the country, providing welfare services for the poor, and overseeing the policies for the elderly, the youth and the disabled. This Technical Cooperation represents a follow up of that recommendation by the Government of Suriname and by the Bank.

¹ *Suriname Poverty and Social Safety Net Assessment* (Pérez-Calle & Saavedra; IADB 2004, final draft).

B. Program rationale and consistency with Bank strategies

- 2.3 This Technical Cooperation is consistent with the Bank's country strategy in Suriname (GN-2080-1), the core of which is to support policy and institutional reforms in order to improve institutional and incentive frameworks. One of the five principal areas of strategic focus is human resource development and social inclusion. Within that strategic area, the Bank's strategy is to promote social inclusion by strengthening the SSN. The proposed program fits with this strategic goal as SSN programs are an essential element of human resource development and social inclusion. The proposed technical cooperation was included explicitly in the operational program updated in the last Programming Mission (November 2004).

C. Other initiatives complementary to this program

- 2.4 The Bank is supporting a wide array of actions that complement this operation. One of the main activities funded by the Support for the Implementation of the Health Sector Reform Program (1537/OC-SU) is the implementation of a beneficiary administration system, known as Beneficiary Information and Payment System (BIPS). The system will be introduced to allow for a continuously updated and automated list of persons eligible to receive free health care and as a management tool for other social benefits administered by SoZa, and eventually other ministries. BIPS will fundamentally change the way in which SoZa manages programs and will bring to surface valuable information for planning and evaluation purposes. BIPS implementation is scheduled to begin in March 2005. Another complementary activity of that Program is supporting the improvement of SoZa targeting mechanisms. That subcomponent seeks to expand the free health cards program of SoZa to all poor households, defined using the national poverty line, while simultaneously reducing the inclusion of non-poor households. Scorecards with clear criteria for eligibility will be introduced to improve the transparency of the health card awarding system. Additionally, a CT Intra ATN/SF-8951-SU was recently approved, to explore successful social protection systems in the region. The CT Intra will finance four SoZa high officials to look at experiences related to beneficiary administration systems in both Jamaica and Colombia.
- 2.5 Finally, the Bank will process a Technical Cooperation that will support the preparation of a pension reform program in Suriname. The pension system has a strong link to the SSN programs through the Old Age Pension System (AOV), which gives a flat allowance to every Surinamese over 60 years.

D. Value added of this program

- 2.6 As it has been discussed previously, it is well known that for any program, institutional and organizational factors cause service delivery failure and project implementation problems. This is particularly true for SSN interventions, given their multi-dimensional and multi-sectoral nature. The value added of this

program is twofold. First and as an immediate result, it will produce a picture of the institutional and organizational factors that currently hinder or facilitate SSN services delivery in a cost-effective manner. Second, the outputs of this TC will provide the basis and guidance for preparation of a program, including an indication of its appropriate size, which will aim at reforming the delivery of SSN services, in order to improve coverage, efficiency and effectiveness in the provision of SSN services in Suriname.

III. PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

A. Program goal and purpose

- 3.1 The goal of this program is to set up the basis for improving the institutional and organizational arrangement for a reformed SSN. Its purpose is twofold. First, it intends to assess the current institutional and organizational setting of Suriname's SSN in order to develop a capacity building plan. Second, it aims at establishing a SSN Reform Strategy throughout a process of stakeholders' consultation (both within and outside the government.)

B. Components

- 3.2 The Program is constituted by two components. The first component's products will be the *Institutional and Organizational Assessment* (IOA) and the *Capacity Strengthening Plan* (CSP). The second component will finance the development of the *SSN Reform Strategy* (RS). The sequencing of the products will be the following. Once the IOA is completed, the RS will be developed, and after that, having determined the scope of the reform, the consultancy that prepared the IOA will be in charge of resuming its work to finalize the CSP.

1. Component 1. Institutional and organizational assessment (US\$63,000)

- 3.3 During the first phase of this component, the IOA will be produced as a policy-dialogue document, which will include a background section where the general ethno-socio-political setting will be discussed, together with a description of the public and private sector administrative culture, general perceptions of social assistance programs, and a discussion of the current normative and administrative framework under which SSN programs operate. It will also discuss SoZa's institutional (rules of behavior, procedures, regulations, accountability, incentives, cooperation and coordination with other relevant actors) and organizational (human, financial and technical resources and leadership) capacity. The consultancy will also deliver baseline information on current costs of delivering SSN services, in terms of financial resources and time-consumed. It will discuss, as well, the extent of informal and privately provided SSN services, the current and potential state of community-based interventions, and the degree of overlapping with current publicly provided SSN services. Finally, it will include general recommendations on capacity strengthening activities necessary to foster

SoZa's role as a coordinator of Suriname's SSN, which will be discussed with SoZa's officers through a dissemination seminar.

- 3.4 As discussed in ¶3.2, the second phase of this component will be triggered by the completion of the RS. With a clear idea of the scope of the reform, the recommendations of the IOA will be complemented and/or adjusted, and the CSP will be formulated. The CSP will be presented to SoZa during a workshop.

2. Component 2 – Development of a SSN Reform Strategy (US\$61,500)

- 3.5 A key instrument to institutional capacity building is the development of medium and long term goals to orient policy-making, which embody a “vision” shared by key stakeholders. To that end, this component will finance a process of consultation and consensus building among government officials and other relevant stakeholders on the purpose and process of SSN reform, taking the conclusions and recommendations in SSNA and IOA as building blocks to produce the RS. Specifically, this component will finance a workshop with government officials and other key stakeholders, and a facilitator, who previously to the workshop will interview key participants, in order to understand the political economy of the consensus-building process. Annex 2 contains Terms of Reference for the workshop facilitator. The component will finance as well basic training to selected government officials in order to enhance their technical capacity as leaders in the development of the RS. Terms of reference for the technical training sub-component will be prepared by the project team in light of the findings and recommendations of the consultancy discussed in the previous section. It is expected that some of the topics for capacity strengthening will include: (i) poverty and vulnerability measurement and analysis, (ii) monitoring and evaluation of programs and services performance; (iii) strategic analysis; and (iv) Logical Framework methodology. This consultancy will also support the Government of Suriname while developing the RS, after the consultation process has been implemented.

IV. COST AND FINANCING

A. Summary cost table

4.1 Table 4.1 presents the program's summary cost table.

Concept	IDB	GOS	Total
Component 1: Inst. And Org. Assessment	63,000		63,000
Consultancy Fees	35,000		35,000
Travel	3,000		3,000
Per diem	5,000		5,000
Dissemination	20,000		20,000
Component 2: SSN Reform Strategy	61,500		61,500
Consultancy Fees	20,000		20,000
Per diem	1,500		1,500
Dissemination	20,000		20,000
Training	20,000		20,000
Counterpart Team (in kind)		15,000	15,000
Contingencies	25,000		25,000
GRAND TOTAL	149,500	15,000	164,500

B. Description and composition of financing

4.2 The total cost of the program is US\$164,500. The Bank would finance up to US\$149,500 of the costs of the project on a non-reimbursable basis from the net income of the Fund for Special Operations (FSO). The local counterpart of US\$15,000 represents in kind contributions related to the local costs for personnel and office facilities for project implementation.

C. Sustainability

4.3 This TC will complement to actions that SoZa is undertaking with Bank's support. BIPS implementation will begin in March 2004, and the activities related to this TC will reinforce those done in that context. It is worth to stress that both activities will involve SoZa permanent staff, which has participated along the entire project cycle.

4.4 The capacity of a program to modify relevant institutions and organizations in order to provide adequate incentives for service providers and beneficiaries is a critical element of sustainability. Building up such capacity is one of the purposes of this TC.

4.5 One of the main events that could affect sustainability is the national elections of May 2005, and the installation of a new administration by August/September

2005. However, during the preparation of SSNA it was perceived that reforming the SSN will continue being one of the top priorities in the social development agenda a new administration. Furthermore, the experiences of the Health and Education programs, in which the studies and the TC supporting the program definition began under one administration while the program was approved under a different one, show continuity of programs along different administrations.

V. EXECUTING AGENCY AND MECHANISM

A. Executing agency

- 5.1 The executing agency will be the SoZa, as the ministry that is actually managing the vast majority of social programs throughout the country.

B. Executing mechanism

- 5.2 Because of SoZa's weak institutional and organizational capacity, the Government has requested the Bank to execute this program on its behalf to facilitate the smooth implementation and execution of this TC (as per communication #D1578/04 of December 8, 2004 to COF/CSU). Following this request, COF/CSU will have basic responsibility and RE3/SO3 technical responsibility for the Program's execution.
- 5.3 For the Program's execution the Government will designate a Task Force as a counterpart for the consultancy services. The task force will be lead by a coordinator, who will be selected by the Government based on education level, knowledge of SoZa's programs, and technical capacity for program evaluation. The coordinator will be responsible for: (i) acting as counterpart of all TC activities; (ii) supporting the activities of consultants; (iii) ensuring the coordination and collaboration of SoZa departments with the consultants; (iv) reviewing the studies and consultancy reports; (iv) assessing project implementation together with COF/CSU; and (v) making decisions concerning the log-frame seminar and the team-building workshop. The coordinator's appointment should have the Bank's no objection, as a condition prior to eligibility of this TC.

C. Program implementation readiness

- 5.4 Given the execution mechanism proposed in the previous section, this TC will be ready to begin its implementation in financing the consultancies as described in ¶3.2 and ¶3.3, as soon as SoZa has designated a coordinator.

D. Execution period and disbursement schedule

- 5.5 The execution period for this TC will be of 8 months, with a disbursement period of 12 months.

E. Procurement

- 5.6 As requested by the Government, the Bank will conduct the process of selection, hiring and payment of the consulting firms.

VI. MONITORING AND EVALUATION

A. Monitoring

- 6.1 The implementation of the three consultancies to be financed by this TC has been designed in a logical sequence that will facilitate quality control. Moreover, Bank's approval of the technical quality of initial proposals and intermediate drafts will be included as conditions for disbursements for the consultancies.

B. Progress and final reports

- 6.2 The consultancy financed by the first component will produce a methodological proposal for the IOA and a preliminary draft of the IOA, a final draft of the IOA, and the CSP. The second consultancy will produce a Final Report containing the agreements reached during the workshop for approval by the Government of Suriname. Taking as inputs the SSNA, the preliminary draft of the IOA, and the Final Report on The Consultation Process, the Task Force will be responsible for the development of the RS, supported by the capacity-strengthening consultancy, which will deliver a preliminary report on the expected results of the capacity-strengthening activities, and a final report describing the process of development of the RS. These reports will be reviewed by the Bank and the Task Force and approved by the Bank. The Task Force will have a maximum of thirty days to produce comments and suggestions on a report, period after which, the Bank can consider a report as delivered.

C. Describe the evaluations proposed

- 6.3 During the workshops and seminars where the products of this TC will be presented to SoZa and other key stakeholders, participants' evaluations on the pertinence and quality of the products will be implemented. The IOA will produce both quantitative and qualitative baseline information, against which it will be possible to judge the impact of an institutional and organizational capacity strengthening.

D. Other auditing, financial management and reporting procedures

- 6.4 Standard Bank procedures for auditing, financial management of the resources and reporting will be followed.

VII. PROGRAM BENEFITS AND RISKS

A. Program benefits and developmental impact

- 7.1 This TC aims at providing an optimal institutional and organizational arrangement for a reformed SSN. Such arrangement is a *sine qua non* requirement to guarantee that Suriname operates a SSN that focalizes its interventions on the relatively poorer and more vulnerable, with adequate coverage, with minimal transaction costs, and which ultimately provides not only a safety net, but also a “spring-board” towards social development for its beneficiaries.

B. Target beneficiaries

- 7.2 SoZa, as the Ministry in charge of designing and monitoring the welfare policy of the country will be the targeted beneficiary institution of this TC.


C. Risks

- 7.3 The program’s risks are related to the coming elections in the sense of the continuity of the program. That risk is mitigated by the perceived—during the implementation of *Suriname’s Poverty and SSN Assessment*—consensus among main stakeholders on the need of streamlining the SSN, which this TC is designed to strengthen, and because of the implementation of the activities mentioned in Section II-C, which are also financed by the Bank and provide a solid base for the TC.


VIII. RECOMMENDATION

- 8.1 Mario Sánchez, as team leader of this project, recommends its approval and the use of resources from the Fund for Special Operations (FSO), for a total of US\$149,500, to finance this project.


IX. APPROVAL

Vo. Bo. 
Juan M. Fariña, SQ3/CHF

Date: 2/4/05

Vo. Bo. 
Dora Currea, OD6/CHF

Date: 4 Feb 05

Vo. Bo. 
Camille Gaskin-Reyes RE3/DEP

Date: Feb 11, 05

Approved by: 
Ciro De Falco, RE3/MGR

Date: FEB 11 2005

**SURINAME
INSTITUTIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRENGTHENING OF THE
SOCIAL SAFETY NET
(SU-T1008)**

**INSTITUTIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL SSN ASSESSMENT AND
CAPACITY STENGTHENING PLAN
TERMS OF REFERENCE**

1 BACKGROUND

- 1.1 A social safety net (SSN) is defined as the array of social programs that guarantee a minimum level of well being to individuals and households affected by chronic poverty or transitory negative shocks. The Government of Suriname has placed assessing and strengthening its SSN system as a priority within its social development agenda. The rationale for such prioritization is straightforward under a scenario characterized by fiscal prudence on the one hand, and high poverty incidence (46% of households and 67% of individuals) and social vulnerability (due to high economic volatility) on the other¹. It is crucial for Suriname to deliver SSN services effectively, with adequate coverage, and in an efficient manner; in order to protect its chronically poor and vulnerable populations, and in order to promote development oriented investments by these populations.
- 1.2 It is widely recognized that institutional settings are key determinants of the quality of policymaking and of the efficiency of social services delivery. Therefore, it is crucial to rely on an adequate institutional and organizational capacity while reforming the delivery of SSN services. During 2004, the Bank financed *Suriname's Poverty and SSN* in order to help define specific actions of sector reform and Bank support. One of the recommendations of the Assessment was to strengthen the Ministry of Social Affairs (SoZa) technical capacities for policy-making, monitoring and evaluation, as the Ministry in charge of designing the welfare policy of the country, providing welfare services for the poor, and overseeing the policies for the elderly, the youth and the disabled.
- 1.3 The Technical Cooperation *Institutional and Organizational Strengthening of the SSN* (SU-T1008) represents a follow up of the Assessment's recommendation by the Government of Suriname and by the Bank. The goal of the program is to set up the basis for an optimal institutional and organizational arrangement for a reformed SSN. Its purpose is twofold. First, it intends to assess the current institutional and organizational setting of Suriname's SSN in order to develop a capacity building plan. Second, it aims at establishing a SSN Reform Strategy throughout a process of stakeholders' consultation (both within and outside the government.) To that end, the TC will finance a consultancy for the development

¹ *Suriname Poverty and Social Safety Net Assessment* (Pérez-Calle & Saavedra; IADB 2004, final draft).

of *Suriname's SSN Institutional and Organizational Assessment* as well as an *Institutional and Organizational Capacity Strengthening Plan*.

2 CONSULTANCY OBJECTIVE

- 6.1 The purpose of this consultancy is twofold: (i) to assess Suriname's institutional and organizational capacity to design, implement, monitor and evaluate its SSN programs; and (ii) to produce a strengthening capacity plan based in order to provide an optimal institutional and organizational arrangement to implement a forthcoming SSN Reform Strategy.

3 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CONSULTANCY

- 6.1 Type of consultancy: Individual
- 6.1 Duration: 50 non-consecutive days (including one 15-days trip, and two 5-days trips to Suriname; and one 3-day trip to Washington, DC).
- 6.1 Place of work: Paramaribo, Washington DC, and place of residence.
- 6.1 Qualifications: Background in institutional analysis, inter-organizational analysis, and organizational development, who is familiar with the service characteristics of safety net interventions. Familiarity with the historical, political, social, and institutional context of the country is preferable.

4 ACTIVITIES

- 1.4 The consultancy will be carried out in two phases. During the first phase the assessment methodology will be designed, planned for and executed. It will produce a policy-dialogue document including recommendations for strengthening the institutional and organizational capacity to manage and evaluate the current setting of the SSN in Suriname (taking into account that a Beneficiary Information and Payment System will be functioning by March 2005), as well as recommendations of evaluation methodologies to measure impact on the development of strengthening institutional capacity. The policy dialogue document will be presented during a workshop seminar in Paramaribo.
- 1.5 The methodology to be utilized during the assessment should include qualitative research methods and qualitative analysis. It should also enable crosschecking and triangularization in order to assure objectivity, reliability and validity; and be participatory in order to create stakeholders ownership. The methodology (including collection instruments and a chronogram), which will be presented to and discussed with the project team in a seminar to be held in Washington, DC, should include at a minimum:
- a. Literature and document analysis (budgets, work and staffing plans, work reports, policy documents, etc.)

- b. Open interviews with civil servants (head quarters), in-field social workers, politicians, NGO leaders and researchers;
- c. Focus group discussions and individual talks with beneficiaries;
- d. Participatory observation.
- e. Evaluation methodologies to measure impact on development of strengthening institutional capacity

1.6 The scope of the Assessment should be the following:

SECTION 1 Background for the SSN institutional assessment.

- Ethno-Socio-political background.
- Administrative culture, including practices, shared views and value systems present in the public (central government and decentralized units) and private sector.
- How do people perceive social assistance in general? (entitlement vs. top-down culture of giving out benefits). Are there particular programs that are surrounded by stigma or that are (or are not) generally accepted?

SECTION 2 Legal, Policy and Administrative Framework

- Summary description of main SSN programs from *SSNA*.
- Relevant laws and regulations governing SSN programs.
- Relevant policy documents related to SSN programs.
- Budget formulation process within SoZa (only SSN programs). Is the budget used as a policy discussion and a planning instrument? What is the participation of SoZa Departments responsible for the programs in the formulation process?
- Analyze SSN programs within the financial administration process of Suriname: from beneficiary administration, and beneficiaries “pay roll” list, to the Ministry of Finance (*Ministerie van Financien*) and the Central Bureau of Mechanical Administration (*Centraal Bureau Mechanische Administratie*) and the Banking system / SoZa Payments Office (AUSV). How does that process work? Which are the costs associated? Administrative processes cost vs subsidy level.
- AUSV: what are they paying? Coastal Zone: Can SoZa rely more in the Banking System? AUSV costs vs banking system. The interior will always need a special system: how to make it more efficient?

SECTION 3 SOZA’s Institutional and Organizational Capacity

- Brief description of main organizations and ministries involved in policy, planning and delivery of SSN services and activities. To what extent their role and responsibilities overlap with SOZA’s?
- What is SOZA’s mandate (implicit and explicit)?

- Detailed SOZA's organizational structure (both at central and district level): organizational chart, staff and contracted personnel, their qualifications and skills. Are positions filled according to the organizational structure?
- Is SOZA over-staffed or under-staffed to meet the current workload (in terms of personnel and skills and qualifications)?
- Does SOZA have sufficient physical and financial resources to operate properly?
- Are resources spent according to budgets?
- What is the leadership model within SOZA?²
- Does intra-organizational communication and coordination function?
- Are responsibilities clearly allocated within SOZA?
- Describe the staff incentive system (salary, benefits, training, are they linked to qualifications, skills or performance?).
- Describe accountability mechanisms and standards for SOZA's staff.
- Describe relevant inter-ministerial relationships with SOZA, as well as its relationship with NGO's and other private actors. What is the nature of those relationships?

SECTION 4 Delivery of SSN services.

- For each SSN program, estimate costs and time necessary to implement each of the following activities:
 - i) Delivery structures, rules, procedures and processes.
 - ii) Provision of information about the program to potential beneficiaries.
 - iii) Application process.
 - iv) Screening beneficiary eligibility.
 - v) Process of accepting or rejecting an application.
 - vi) Processing recipients files.
 - vii) Intra-organizational financial transactions.
 - viii) Provision of benefits.
 - ix) Monitoring, supervision and evaluation.
 - x) Beneficiary voice mechanisms.
- Discuss supervision and administrative accountability procedures and standards at each level of the delivery process.

SECTION 5 Informal and privately provided SSN services.

- Extent of remittances and other informal and private SSN settings.
- To what degree private and informal SSNs compete or complement with formal public SSN programs?
- Are there identifiable organizations within the non-governmental sector that should be put "on board" in reforming the SSN?
- Describe the organizational and institutional capacity of the NGO sector

² For a typology of leadership models see Bass, Bernard, *Stogdill's Handbook of Leadership: A Survey of Theory and Research*, New York: Free Press, 1989; and Bass, Bernard, *From Transactional to Transformational Leadership: Learning to Share the Vision*, Organizational Dynamics, Winter 1990.

SECTION 6 Potential for community-based interventions

- What organizations exist within Suriname's communities?
- What is the nature of community leadership?
- What kind of self-help culture prevails?
- Is there a tradition of community-based services?
- How would you describe the level of social capital in the community?
- Has the community managed development activities before and what is the experience like?

SECTION 7 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- Section 1 and 2, and *Suriname's Poverty and Social Safety Net Assessment* should serve as a framework for the recommendations.
 - Describe the weaknesses and strengths of SOZA as coordination and executing unit for a SSN reform. Those weaknesses and strengths should be described as organizational (human, financial and technical resources and leadership), and institutional (rules of behavior, procedures, regulations, accountability, incentives, cooperation and coordination with other relevant actors).
 - How can problems be solved? How can we take advantage of strengths and potential synergies? Describe capacity strengthening activities necessary to foster SOZA's role as a coordination and executing unit for a SSN reform.
 - Is there a potential role for the NGO sector in participating in the reform and delivery of SSN services?
 - Is there a role on fostering community-based mechanisms for the delivery of SSN services?
- 1.7 The second phase of the consultancy will be triggered by the completion of the *SSN Reform Strategy* document, which will be the outcome of a consultancy to be implemented using *Suriname's Poverty and SSN Assessment* and the *SSN Institutional and Organizational Assessment* as building blocks. With a clear idea of the scope of the SSN Reform, the recommendations produced during the first phase of the consultancy will be complemented and/or adjusted as to formulate a *SSN Institutional and Organizational Capacity Strengthening Plan*, which will be presented during a seminar to be held in Paramaribo.

5 REPORTS

6.1 During the first phase of program the consultancy will produce:

- i. A methodological proposal for the SSN Institutional and Organizational Assessment to be delivered by electronic media, including a Power Point presentation.

- ii. A preliminary draft of the SSN Institutional and Organizational Assessment, for the Bank's review.
 - iii. A final draft of the SSN Institutional and Organizational Assessment.
- 6.1 During the second phase, the consultant will produce a *SSN Institutional and Organizational Capacity Strengthening Plan*.

6 COORDINATION

- 6.1 The consultancy will be supervised by Marcelo Pérez Alfaro (COF/CSU), Antonio Giuffrida (RE3/SO3) and Mario Sánchez (RE3/SO3).

**SURINAME
INSTITUTIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRENGTHENING OF THE
SOCIAL SAFETY NET
(SU-T1008)**

**SOCIAL SAFETY NET STRATEGY WORKSHOP
TERMS OF REFERENCE**

I. BACKGROUND

- 1.1 A social safety net (SSN) is defined as the array of social programs that guarantee a minimum level of well being to individuals and households affected by chronic poverty or transitory negative shocks. The Government of Suriname has placed assessing and strengthening its SSN system as a priority within its social development agenda. The rationale for such prioritization is straightforward under a scenario characterized by fiscal prudence on the one hand, and high poverty incidence (46% of households and 67% of individuals) and social vulnerability (due to high economic volatility) on the other¹. It is crucial for Suriname to deliver SSN services effectively, with adequate coverage, and in an efficient manner; in order to protect its chronically poor and vulnerable populations, and in order to promote development oriented investments by these populations.
- 1.2 It is widely recognized that institutional settings are key determinants of the quality of policymaking and of the efficiency of social services delivery. Therefore, it is crucial to rely on an adequate institutional and organizational capacity while reforming the delivery of SSN services. During 2004, the Bank financed *Suriname's Poverty and SSN* in order to help define specific actions of sector reform and Bank support. One of the recommendations of the Assessment was to strengthen the Ministry of Social Affairs (SoZa) technical capacities for policy-making, monitoring and evaluation, as the Ministry in charge of designing the welfare policy of the country, providing welfare services for the poor, and overseeing the policies for the elderly, the youth and the disabled.
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¹ *Suriname Poverty and Social Safety Net Assessment* (Pérez-Calle & Saavedra; IADB 2004, final draft).

relevant stakeholders on the purpose and process of SSN reform, taking the conclusions and recommendations in *Suriname's Poverty and Social Safety Net Assessment* and *Suriname's SSN Institutional and Organizational Assessment* as building blocks to produce a *SSN Reform Strategy*.

II. CONSULTANCY OBJECTIVE

- 2.1 The objective of this consultancy is to lead and facilitate the SSN Reform Workshop with the participation of government officials, other key stakeholders of the private sector and civil society, and the IDB.

III. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CONSULTANCY

- 3.1 Type of consultancy: Firm
- 3.2 Duration: 8 working days.
- 3.3 Place of work: Paramaribo.
- 3.4 Qualifications: 15 or more years of experience in negotiation and relationship management theory and practice with governments, private sector and civil society. Proven effectiveness in managing critical alliances and conflict prevention/resolution. Specialization in interest-based negotiation in development countries a must.

IV. ACTIVITIES

- 4.1 The Firm will carry on interviews with SoZa staff, other government officials, and other stakeholders participating in the SSN Reform Workshop, and prepare an agenda for the workshop.
- 4.2 The Firm will conduct all activities and issues related with facilitating the workshop.
- 4.3 During the workshop, the firm will aim at developing a common vision of the scope and goals of the SSN Reform among workshop participants, and to ensure strong commitment to that direction.

V. REPORTS

- 5.1 The Firm will submit a Final Report containing the agreements reached during the workshop for approval by the Government of Suriname and the Bank, once the consultancy work is completed. The final report and any relevant data or spreadsheets should also be delivered in electronic format.

VI. COORDINATION

- 6.1 The consultancy will be supervised by Alvaro Flores (LRN), Marcelo Pérez Alfaro (COF/CSU), and Mario Sánchez (RE3/SO3).