



New Technologies and Institutional Capacity Building in the Government of Haiti (HA-L1051, 2350/GR-HA) Project Completion Report (PCR)

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Electronic Links

1. [Development Effectiveness Matrix \(DEM\)](#)
2. [Final version of the Progress Monitoring Report \(PMR\)](#)

Acronyms and Abbreviations

Acronym	Name in English	Name in French
CDF	Comprehensive Development Framework	Cadre Juridique du Développement Durable
CDH	Country Department Haiti	Département de Pays Haiti
CONATE		Conseil National de l'Aménagement du Territoire et de l'Environnement
CSP	Customer Service Platform	Plateforme de Service Client
DAC	Development Aid Committee Criteria	Comité d'Aide au Développement
DG	Development Gateway	Serveur de Dev
EQ	Evaluation Questions	Questions d'Évaluation
FAES	Economic and Social Assistance Fund	Fonds d'assistance économique et sociale
GoH	Government of Haiti	Gouvernement d'Haïti
GTIC	Working Group on Information and Communication Technologies	Groupe de Travail sur les Technologies de l'Information et des Communications
HIGP	Haitian Integrated Government Platform	Plateforme Intégrée du Gouvernement Haïtien
HIRC	Haiti Interim Reconstruction Commission	Commission intérimaire pour la reconstruction d'Haïti
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank	Banque Interaméricaine de Développement
IGP	Integrated Government Platform	Plateforme intégrée du Gouvernement
IST	Information Systems and Technologies	Systèmes d'Informations et de Technologies
ITC	Information and Communication Technologies	(TIC) Technologies de l'Information et de la Communication
MCI	Ministry of Commerce and Industry	Ministère du Commerce et de l'Industrie
MEF	Ministry of the Economy and Finances	Ministère de l'Économie et des Finances
MENFP	Ministry of National Education and Vocational Training	Ministère de l'Éducation Nationale et de la Formation Professionnelle
MPAE	Methods and Procedures in Aid Evaluation	
NTGT	New Technologies and Government Transformation	Nouvelles Technologies et Transformation de Gouvernement
OMRH	Office of Management and Human Resources	Office de Management et des Ressources Humaines
PCR	Project Completion Report	Rapport de Clôture de Projet
RBM	Results Based Management	Gestion Axée sur les Résultats
UNPD	United Nations Development Programme	Programme de Développement des Nations Unies
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development	Agence des États-Unis pour le développement international
WB	World Bank	(BM) Banque Mondiale

BASIC INFORMATION (US\$ AMOUNT)

PROJECT NUMBER (S): HA-L1051 TITLE: NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING IN THE GOVERNMENT OF HAITI LENDING INSTRUMENT: GRANT COUNTRY: REPUBLIC OF HAITI BORROWER: OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER LOAN/GRANT: 2350/GR-HA SECTOR/SUBSECTOR: REFORM AND PUBLIC SECTOR SUPPORT
DATE OF BOARD APPROVAL: JULY 21, 2010 DATE OF LOAN/GRANT CONTRACT EFFECTIVENESS: SEPTEMBER 2, 2010 DATE OF ELIGIBILITY FOR FIRST DISBURSEMENT: DECEMBER 27, 2010
<u>LOAN/GRANT AMOUNT (S)</u> ORIGINAL AMOUNT: 3,000,000 CURRENT AMOUNT: 2,996,769.93 PARI PASSU: 100% IDB TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE/CONTRIBUTION MICROSOFT: 700,000 TOTAL PROJECT COST: 3,696,769.93
<u>MONTHS IN EXECUTION</u> FROM APPROVAL: 54 FROM CONTRACT EFFECTIVENESS: 53
<u>DISBURSEMENTS PERIODS</u> ORIGINAL DATE OF FINAL DISBURSEMENT: SEPTEMBER 2, 2012 CURRENT DATE OF FINAL DISBURSEMENT: JANUARY 30, 2015 CUMULATIVE EXTENSION (MONTHS): 29 MONTHS SPECIAL EXTENSIONS (MONTHS): <u>DISBURSEMENTS</u> TOTAL AMOUNT OF DISBURSEMENTS TO DATE: 2,996,769.93
<u>REDIRECTIONING</u> . HAS THIS PROJECT?: RECEIVED FUNDS FROM ANOTHER PROJECT [No] WHICH? [PROJECT NUMBER] SENT FUNDS TO ANOTHER PROJECT [No] WHICH? [PROJECT NUMBER]
EX POST ECONOMIC ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY: N/A EX POST EVALUATION METHODOLOGY: N/A DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS CLASSIFICATION: LOW ACHIEVEMENT

I. Introduction

- 1.1 Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) refer to the collection of tools that make it easier to use, create, manage, and exchange information. They also refer to the knowledge and utilization of tools, techniques and systems to serve a bigger purpose like solving problems or improving quality of life. Maximizing the impact of new ICT towards rendering governments and public administration more effective can contribute to good governance, transparency, efficient utilization of a country's resources, and better articulation of responses to citizens' demands towards the delivery of high quality government services accessible to all.
- 1.2 The *Government of Haiti* (GOH) demonstrated its desire to use ICTs to achieve higher performing government entities and public institutions by establishing in January 2009, a 21-member ICT Working Group, "*Groupe de Travail sur les Technologies de l'Information et des Communications*" (GTIC) with a mandate to:
 - I. Develop a strategic plan for ICT in Haiti; and
 - II. Provide to the GOH proposals for guidelines and recommendations on ICT related issues, especially with respect to e-government solutions to support efforts to both increase the quantity and improve the quality of public services to the population nationwide.
- 1.3 In December 2009, the Bank approved a technical cooperation (TC), New Technologies and Government Transformation (NTGT) (HA-T1122) to support the Haitian Government's agenda in ICT. After the massive earthquake in Haiti in January 2010, the TC resources were redirected to support the preparation and implementation of the grant New Technologies for Government Transformation in Haiti (HA-L1051), being evaluated in this document.
- 1.4 The grant was a response to the huge volume of resources pledged in reaction to the unprecedented destruction both in human life and infrastructure that resulted from the earthquake. There was a general recognition of the need for information systems that would eventually serve as a critical tool for the GOH in the reconstruction process. Without the proposed strengthening in national government information systems, there existed concern that international donors and other partners would create their own information systems followed by the development of uneven information management capacities across public agencies, facilitating the development of external and internal information silos.¹
- 1.5 The Bank approved on July 21, 2010, the grant New Technologies for Government Transformation in Haiti (HA-L1051) in the sum of US\$3 million.
- 1.6 The program's objective was to implement a technology platform and related applications to enable information sharing and collaboration among government entities, the Haiti Interim Reconstruction Commission (HIRC) and other partners, becoming a critical tool to lead the reconstruction effort while establishing conditions to strengthen the GOH's long-term institutional capacity. The program's specific objectives included: i) creation of core technology capacity, ii) creation of institutional capacity and governance procedures, iii) development of initial customized applications, iv) promoting citizen access to information and government services, v) design and initial implementation of a web-based common

¹ Project document *New Technologies for Government Transformation in Haiti* (HA-L1051).

dashboard to gather and aggregate information on the reconstruction process, and vi) identification of the inputs required to address sustainability of the Haiti Integrated Government Platform (HIGP), including its scale-up potential, and leveraging public management capacity across the GOH.

Component 1:

- 1.7 The focus of this component was on making operational the Haiti Integrated Government Platform (HIGP), an open technology platform to securely host government information systems and databases. The HIGP will be dimensioned to: i) provide basic administrative, communication and document management capabilities to GOH entities, ii) provide hosting capabilities in a secure environment, iii) make possible collaboration and data access/sharing among GOH entities, non-state partners, international donors, the private sector, the diaspora and Haitian citizens, and iv) provide tools to create new applications and/or secure interoperability of existing and future information technology applications. The activities include: i) securing remote hosting capabilities and making them available; ii) acquiring and installing the necessary hardware and software for the HIGP in the Primature, iii) identifying and uploading in a secure hosting environment existing critical information systems and databases, iv) developing at least three customized applications for the HIGP, v) producing training materials on the HIGP technology capabilities and applications, and vi) developing an HIGP maintenance plan that identifies necessary financial, technology and human resources.
- 1.8 The component also sought to create initial institutional capacity and define necessary governance procedures to install a Technical Secretariat of the Inter-Ministerial Committee (*Comité Interministériel sur le Technologies de l'Information*) in the *Primature*, which would scope, implement, manage, operate and maintain the HIGP and the related initiatives. The Technical Secretariat will lead the process of consultation with the HIRC and other relevant entities in the public sector to adjust and validate the HIGP design, and determine priority areas of intervention and prepare a roadmap with HIGP functionalities and applications development. It will also serve as the focal point for the relevant entities involved in the implementation of the program.
- 1.9 In promoting citizens' access to information and government services, the component would produce: i) a communication strategy to provide citizens and other relevant actors with information on HIGP capabilities and available services; and ii) brochures and promotional materials to provide information on available HIGP capacity.

Component 2:

- 1.10 This component included design of a web-based dashboard to gather and aggregate information on the reconstruction process for the HIRC. The dashboard would aggregate information generated by: i) the UNDP and the Development Gateway Aid Tracking Information System (ATS), ii) the activities described in Component 1, and iii) data generated by HIRC activities. The HIRC will use the common dashboard as a coordination and communication tool throughout the reconstruction process. Activities included: i) a workshop with key stakeholders to scope the content and collaborate on the design of the common dashboard, ii) development of data access modules and web services to access information from the ATS and HIGP and disseminate it through the dashboard, and iii) implementation of the dashboard.

Component 3:

- 1.11 This component was directed to: i) address sustainability of the HIGP, including its scale up potential and ii) leverage public management capacity across the GOH. The program contemplated undertaking an evaluation of the initial implementation of the HIGP to identify: i) areas in need of reform, ii) the next wave of applications to be developed, and iii) the capacity necessary to strengthen its institutionalization as a key government tool. An additional assessment will be undertaken to identify the scale up potential, including access to HIGP by sub-national levels of government, infrastructure and capacity needed to undertake such scale up and required resources and sequencing for implementation.

II. Project Performance

- 2.1 The assessment of the project's effectiveness contains the analysis of vertical logic, results achieved and attribution.

2.1 Effectiveness

- 2.2 The project's objectives as indicated in the project document are presented in the section immediately above. At the time of preparation of this document, approximately 30 months after the closing, it was not possible to document achievement of the project's goals.

a. An analysis of the Vertical Logic

- 2.3 The project was designed, in general, to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of Haitian Public Administration, made more critical due to the major destruction that resulted from the massive earthquake that struck the country on January 12, 2010. Government infrastructure and personnel were affected in a major way by the earthquake, weakening the government's existing deficient institutional capacity. In response to the seismic event, the international community pledged unprecedented amounts of financial support for immediate needs and for the country's reconstruction. To be able to effectively manage the aid resources, a major need identified was the existence of reliable information and the ability to manage such information. Due to the absence of such an information system, there existed fear that international donors would respond by creating their own systems, resulting in vertical silos of information in place for different initiatives. Similar disaster situations have shown that timely management of information and strengthening of government's capacity to lead reconstruction efforts are crucial factors of success.²
- 2.4 Though the project's design was coherent with the problem identified, it did not adequately identify and put in place plans to mitigate the risks that arose. A Technical Secretariat of the Inter-Ministerial Committee was created in the Primature, under the direct authority of the Prime Minister, which also served as the program's executing unit. The installation of the Technical Secretariat at the highest level of executive authority, in theory, should have contributed to a transversal impact within the GOH. Other key outputs such as the completion of an inventory of existing government systems (post-earthquake) and recovery of damaged systems, and provision of tools to create new applications and to secure their interoperability, complemented by training on HIGP technology capabilities and applications and a maintenance plan, all should have contributed to the project's objectives of the creation of the HIGP.

² *Post-Tsunami Aid Effectiveness in ACEH, Proliferation and Coordination in Reconstruction*, Harry Masyrafah and Jock MJA McKeon, Wolfensohn Center for Development at Brookings, Working Paper 6, November 2008, p. 35.

- 2.5 There is alignment between proposed products related to the objective of the creation of the Common Dashboard to access data on the reconstruction process. The conceptualization document was to be prepared with the participation of the GOH, UNDP team responsible for the Aid Tracking Information System (ATS), Office of the Special Envoy for Haiti and the HIRC staff. This tool would also incorporate information on the activities of NGOs and the private sector that would be collected through the ATS. The expectation was that the Common Dashboard would evolve, incorporating available data from other information systems.
- 2.6 The objective of the development of a Sustainable Institutional Capacity Building Roadmap, is supported through a handful of products including a sustainability and scale up plan for the HIGP, the roadmap proposal for public sector management development and the workshops to discuss and reach consensus on the proposal. The sustainability of the HIGP would be important due to its role in supporting management of expected sizable investments made as part of the reconstruction.
- 2.7 Though there existed vertical logic in the project's design, the difficulties that arose during implementation limited both the achievement of the products and, in turn, the project's results.
- 2.8 The project's design did not fully consider the numerous challenges that arose during the implementation and the insufficient response on the part of the GOH. The resources were limited and the time frame relatively short to realistically achieve the stated objectives. Institutional capacity was relatively weak, and the effort made to promote and facilitate information sharing and collaboration among different government institutions which lacked such a tradition was insufficient. It seems that inadequate plans were made regarding the recurrent costs that would arise from the program's investments in areas such as technical personnel, connectivity, hosting arrangements, software licenses and operation and maintenance. It was difficult to find evidence that web based applications went live, whereas others shut down shortly after going live, for example, after payments were not processed to cover hosting charges. There was minimal buy-in and commitment to use the Common Dashboard which resulted in it not becoming the tool that was imagined at the project's conceptualization to support coordination and information sharing of the reconstruction effort.

b. Results Achieved

- 2.9 The program's expected results were only partially achieved, and the building of the New Information Technologies in Haiti remains at an incipient stage. The establishment of a centralized Technical Secretariat within the Prime Minister's Office had limited success and disbanded when the resources dried up. There was a high turnover of the position of coordinator of the unit and access to those in authority in the Prime Minister's Office was at times difficult, generating delays in program implementation.³ The program had limited to no impact on institution building since: i) it did not tackle and integrate public administration reform from a comprehensive point of view; ii) it created a new unit for leading digital government instead of building capacity around existing actors; and iii) it seemed to be based more on a supply of outputs, primarily hardware and software, rather than on constructing partnerships with strong involvement of the central agencies and institutions of the government and their staff.

³ During certain periods of the implementation, every action had to be approved by the Primature's Secretary General, which frequently became a bottleneck.

- 2.10 The program was beneficial for certain ministries and governmental institutions. It assisted those institutions to better address certain web issues. However, the program did little to significantly strengthen the performance of ministries and government institutions. The facilitation of increased access and easy availability of information and the standardization of the procedures for communication within the public administration were not achieved.
- 2.11 There was never buy-in across the GOH for the implementation of the HIGP. Different ministries undertook their own initiatives without coordinating with the Technical Secretariat created and supported under the project.
- 2.12 The project did not resolve lack of clarity within the public sector as to the institutional responsibility for advancing the e-government agenda nor did it have much of an effect in responding to the limited capacity across the board.
- 2.13 There was room for improvement in terms of the indicators used to measure the project's results. Impact and outcome indicators in the results matrix of the PMR were repetitive and in certain cases could be classified more as outputs. In the project document, no specific impact indicators are listed though they were included in the PMR. See Table 1 below for a more detailed explanation.

Table 1
Changes to the Results' Matrix⁴

Section of the Results Matrix where change took place	Name of the change	Type of change	Reasons for change	Date of change	Date of change agreed with Executing Agency
Impact	The project document did not include any impact indicators. The project team incorporated impact indicators in the PMR that were adapted from the outcome indicators in the project document.		To incorporate impact indicators in the PMR.	At the time that the indicators for the results matrix were included in the PMR.	N/A
Outcome	Differences in the target number between the results matrix in the project document and the PMR for the indicator that states, <i>Number of Recovered Information Systems</i>	PMR indicates one system while the project document states 3	Indicator target number reflects updated information	At the time that the indicators for the results matrix were included in the PMR.	N/A
Outcome	Two outcome indicators included in the results matrix of the project document do not appear in the PMR: i) <i>Number of government information systems and/or databases uploaded into the HIGP (previously existed and under development)</i> and ii) <i>Common Dashboard combining access to information in the Aid Tracking System and the HIGP operational in use.</i>	These indicators were not transferred to the PMR.	Both outcome indicators are encompassed by similar, more general, indicators from the results matrix of the project document.	At the time that the indicators for the results matrix were included in the PMR.	N/A

⁴ The changes to the results matrix to be collected in this table refer to changes that are not made within the context of a project reformulation. A project that has been reformulated has a new results matrix that has been approved by the Board (see numerals 2.4 and 3.3b of the Project Completion Report Principles and Guidelines OP-1242-2 and numerals 6.6 and 6.7 of the Review of Progress Monitoring Report and Proposal of adjustments to be included in the convergence to the Sovereign Guarantee supervision platform OP-1072-1). Changes in impacts or outcomes section include: i) changes made to the impact or outcome statement; ii) adding an additional impact or outcome statement that relates to the project objective; iii) changes to the data associated to an indicator such as unit of measure, baseline value, baseline year, end of project target, means of verification; iv) adding or substituting a new indicator (which requires the information of all the indicators associated data); and v) eliminating an indicator. Changes in outputs section include: i) changes made to the output in the unit of measure, means of verification or end of project target; ii) adding or substituting a new output; and iii) eliminating an output.

Table 2
Results Achieved Matrix⁵

Impact/Indicator	Unit of Measure	Baseline value	Baseline year	Means of verification	Targets and Actual Achievement		Date when target was achieved
Impact #1: Recovery of information systems destroyed during the earthquake							
Indicator #1 Number of recovered information systems	systems	0	2010		Original Target value	2	2015
					Revised target value	2	
					Actual amount achieved	2	
Impact #2: Common dashboard to track reconstruction assistance							
Indicator #1 Common dashboard with the participation of at least 2 donors	dashboards	0	2010		Original Target value	1	N/A
					Revised target value	1	
					Actual amount achieved	0	
Impact #3: Number of government services for citizens or private sector entities available in the GOH portal							
Indicator #1 Number of government services available	Government service	0	2010		Original Target value	2	N/A
					Revised target value	2	
					Actual amount achieved	0	

⁵ Based on information included in the PMR, not the Results Matrix of the Loan (Grant) Proposal.

Outcome/Indicator ⁶	Unit of Measure	Baseline value	Baseline year	Means of verification	Targets and Actual Achievement		Date when target was achieved
Outcome #1: Government information systems and/or databases uploaded into the HIGP (previously existing and under development)							
Indicator #1 Number of recovered information systems	Information system	0	2010		Original Target value	1	2015
					Revised target value	1	
					Actual amount achieved	1	
Outcome #2: Common dashboard to track reconstruction assistance							
Indicator #1 Common dashboard on-line	Common dashboard	0	2011		Original Target value	1	N/A
					Revised target value	1	
					Actual amount achieved	0	
Outcome #3: Number of government services for citizens or private sector entities available in the GOH portal							
Indicator #1 Government services on-line	Government service	0	2011		Original Target value	2	N/A
					Revised target value	2	
					Actual amount achieved	0	

⁶ Based on information included in the PMR, not the Results Matrix of the Loan (Grant) Proposal. The indicators to measure the outcomes are almost identical to those indicators measuring the program's impact.

Outputs/Indicator ⁷	Unit of Measure	Baseline value	Baseline year	Means of verification	Targets and Actual Achievement		Date when target was achieved
Component #1: Haiti Integrated Government Platform							
Output #1 Inventory of existing government systems (post-earthquake)	report	0	2010		Original Target value	1	2015
					Revised target value	1	
					Actual amount achieved	2	
Output #2 Installation of the Technical Secretariat to manage the HIGP	personnel	0	2010		Original Target value	0	2015
					Revised target value	5	
					Actual amount achieved	9	
Output #3 Portal	portal	0	2010	Dialogue Note for Sector Policies, Haiti e-government and service delivery, July, 2014	Original Target value	0	2015 This product was replaced by the development of Web pages for each Ministry
					Revised target value	0	
					Actual amount achieved	1	
Output #4 HIGP infrastructure available installed	platform	0	2010	Dialogue Note for Sector Policies, Haiti e-government and service delivery, July, 2014	Original Target value	0	2015 The services being offered by the HIGP are: 1) domain name services to 83% of government agencies; 2) web site hosting, to 25%; 3) applications hosting, to 11%;
					Revised target value	0	
					Actual amount achieved	3	

⁷ Target values are based on information included in the PMR, not the Results Matrix of the Loan (Grant) Proposal.

							and 4) e-mail services, to 89%. In October, 2017, the equipment in the Data Center was not connected to the Internet so shared services were provided in cloud mode.
Output #5 Web-based applications to track reconstruction project execution	application	0	2010	Mission October, 2017	Original Target value	0	MapHaiti was to be completed for Fonds d'Assistance Economique et Sociale (FAES); as of October, 2017, it was not operative
					Revised target value	0	
					Actual amount achieved	1	
Component #2: Common Dashboard to Access Data on the Reconstruction Process							
Output #1 Conceptualization document	document	0	2010		Original Target value	0	2015
					Revised target value	0	
					Actual amount achieved	1	
Output #2 GIS-based Haiti map with layered data with HIGP information	map	0	2010	Mission October, 2017	Original Target value	0	MapHaiti was to be completed for Fonds d'Assistance Economique et Sociale (FAES); as of October, 2017, it was not operative.
					Revised target value	0	
					Actual amount achieved	1	
Component #3: Sustainable Institutional Capacity Building Roadmap							
	plan	0	2010		Original Target value	0	2015

Output #1 Sustainability and scale up business plan for HIGP					Revised target value	0	
					Actual amount achieved	1	
Output #2 Roadmap proposal for public sector management development	roadmap	0	2010		Original Target value	0	2015
					Revised target value	0	
					Actual amount achieved	1	
Output #3 Workshops	workshop	0	2010		Original Target value	0	2015
					Revised target value	0	
					Actual amount achieved	1	

c. An analysis of the Results Attribution

- 2.14 As indicated above, despite delivery of several outputs, the project's objectives were not achieved under this operation. Though seeds were planted to make progress in the achievement of project objectives, the project's design was overly ambitious given the existing conditions in the country at the time, and appears to have lacked adequate buy-in from the authorities. When the resources of the grant were exhausted, the Technical Secretariat in the Office of the Prime Minister gradually disbanded.⁸ Outputs, including at least one of the applications that was in the testing phase, became inoperative when payments were not made to cover the monthly hosting cost. The authorities either were unaware that the products funded under the project would require expenditures in operation and maintenance or they did not have or did not prioritize funding for these activities.

d. Unanticipated outcomes

- 2.15 There were no unanticipated outcomes.

2.2 Efficiency

- 2.17 No cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness evaluation was proposed as part of the project's design nor completed in preparation of this PCR.
- 2.18 The project suffered implementation delays beyond a relatively aggressive original 24-month disbursement period. The cumulative extensions totaled 28 months.
- 2.19 The original project design, consistent with the Bank's procurement policies and procedures, contemplated the direct contracting of Infusion Development LLC, whose software engineers collaborated closely with Microsoft's team for the development of the Customer Service Platform (CSP), an essential component of the HIGP. Additionally, Infusion engineers had experience of exceptional value in the development of the CSP solution in government environments.⁹ More than 50% of the grant resources were ultimately paid through direct contracting processes to Microsoft, Microsoft affiliates and Infusion. There was one other large contract for application design. In the case of the applications developed and financed, they either never became fully operative or were shut down during the startup phase when payments were not made to cover the hosting charges or software licenses.

⁸ Financing of this unit was extended through a IDB TC for a duration of seven months, after which the costs were not assumed by the GOH.

⁹ New Technologies and Institutional Capacity Building in the Government of Haiti project proposal (HA-L1051).

Table 3
Costs of the Project

Component	Output	Planned Total Cost (US\$) (year)				Revised Total Cost (US\$) (year)				Actual Total Cost (US\$) (year)			
		BID	Cofinancing (Microsoft in-kind)	Total	%	BID	Cofinancing	Total	%	BID	Cofinancing (Microsoft in-kind)	Total	%
1.	HIGP	2,150,000	700,000	2,850,000	77%					2,651,478		2,651,478	71.7%
	1.1 Inventory of existing government systems post earthquake									89,223		89,223	2.4%
	1.2 Installation of the Technical Secretariat to manage HIGP									475,635		475,635	12.9%
	1.3 Portal												
	1.4 HIGP infrastructure available installed									2,071,620		2,071,620	56%
	1.5 Web-based application to track reconstruction									15,000		15,000	0.4%
2.	Common Dashboard	370,000		370,000	10%					212,816		212,816	6%
	2.1 Concept. document												
	2.2 GIS- Based Haiti Map with layered data with HIGP information									212,816		212,816	6%
3.	ICB Roadmap	310,000		310,000	8.4%					13,782		13,782	0.4%
	3.1 Sustainability and scale up business plan for the HIGP												
	3.2 Roadmap proposal for public sector management development									13,782		13,782	0.4%
	3.3 Workshops to discuss roadmap proposal												
Sub-Total (Components)		2,830,000		2,830,000	95.4%								
Administration Expenses¹⁰		170,000		170,000	4.6%					118,695		118,695	3%
Microsoft in-kind¹¹											700,000	700,000	19%
Total (Project)		3,000,000	700,000	3,700,000	100%					2,996,770	700,000	3,696,770	100%

¹⁰ Interests, audits, incidentals, and other costs that are not related to outputs.

¹¹ These resources, representing a material 19% of the project budget, are presented separately from any of the project's components as the project team was unable to locate evidence in the Bank's files to document the distribution of how these services were provided. The planned in-kind contribution by Microsoft of goods (software licenses) was valued at \$400,000 and technical assistance and remote hosting capabilities had an estimated value of \$300,000.

2.3 Relevance

- 2.21 The project was consistent with the Bank's Haiti Country Strategies 2007-2011 and 2011-2015, specifically in strengthening governance and building institutional capacity. Additionally, the program was aligned with the Bank's effort to provide support to the GOH reconstruction efforts after the 2010 earthquake.
- 2.22 The project's design exceeded the country's existing institutional capacity, contributing to the challenges that arose. Equipment (hardware) financed under the project and a follow-on TC, destined for an eventual data center, is unconnected and remains in a storage facility. Though there was much support under the project for an application for electronic registration of businesses, certain enabling legislation had not been authorized at the time that it was piloted which at least partially contributed to the application's failure.
- 2.23 Though the project was relevant and consistent with the Bank's strategic development objectives, there were not available resources, or it was not a high enough of a priority for the GOH to take over once the funds under the grant were exhausted.

2.4 Sustainability

- 2.24 As already indicated, the project's objectives were not achieved. The creation of a project implementation unit within the Primature did not produce the project management and ownership needed. When it came time for the GOH to absorb costs associated with software licenses, hosting, storage and the payment for the services of the members of the PEU, the government did not adequately respond, and the little progress achieved under the project was quickly lost.
- 2.25 The project's execution structure did not contribute to its sustainability. In the case of the application for electronic business registration, representatives of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MCI) commented during the preparation of this report that they felt a lack of control over the work of the firm responsible for the application's development. The firm was sole sourced due to the company's familiarity with Microsoft's Customer Service Platform and its favorable experience in different Microsoft projects. The contract with the application developer, however, was controlled by the PEU in the Primature. MCI did not participate in the start-up of the project, and the ministry felt they had inadequate involvement in key project related decisions. The MCI staff responsible for the application lacked direct contact with the developers except for when they were visiting Haiti. The license was never purchased, and the software developed was lost. The contract with the developer was liquidated without the product going fully live. For finalizing the product and then making newly required adaptations, the developer proposed to charge a significant sum. This was not accepted by the MCI.
- 2.26 Hardware procured under the grant was incomplete when the project finalized. Even after additional hardware was purchased under a follow-on TC, the equipment remains unconnected in a storage facility.
- 2.27 The Bank assumed responsibility for all contracting and procurement for the project mitigating fiduciary risks identified in the project document but without resolving the challenge of project ownership.

III. Non-Core Criteria

3.2 Contribution to the Bank's Strategic Development Objectives

- 3.3 The program as designed would contribute to the strategic objectives and priorities of the Bank in the Updated Institutional Strategy 2010-2020 (AB-3008) and was aligned with the transversal objectives related to institutional strengthening and Rule of Law. Due to the difficulties highlighted earlier in this document, very limited contributions were made to the Bank's strategic development objectives.

3.4 Contribution to the Country Strategy Development Objectives

- 3.5 The program was consistent with the Bank's Haiti Country Strategies 2007-2011 and 2011-2015, specifically the objective of strengthening governance and building institutional capacity through efforts to diminish corruption, modernize the central government and promote administrative decentralization. The program was designed to contribute to the Bank's effort to promote support to the GOH reconstruction efforts while creating long-term capacity. As noted, there were limited contributions to the country strategy development objectives.

3.3 Monitoring and Evaluation

- 3.4 Monitoring of this innovative project, the first one financed by the IDB implemented by the Primature, contemplated an intensive schedule of missions by the project team and the use of the Bank's standard monitoring instruments detailed below.

i) M&E design

- 3.5 The M&E design contemplated i) quarterly progress reports; ii) a partial evaluation 12 months after the program's initiation; and iii) a final evaluation. The Bank planned for supervision missions every 6-8 weeks to monitor implementation and to support a planned rapid pace of execution.

ii) M&E implementation

- 3.6 16 supervision missions took place between August 2010, and August 2013, somewhat less frequent than in the initial M&E design. The quarterly progress reports contemplated in the M&E design were mostly waived. A final evaluation was completed.

iii) M&E utilization

- 3.7 It is unclear to the PCR team whether adaptations were made to the implementation plan based on the monitoring and evaluation of the project. As problems arose when the grant resources were exhausted, and the GOH did not step in to absorb costs related to operation and maintenance, the project team responded by seeking additional Bank resources rather than securing government commitment to meet the financial obligations.

3.4 Use of Country Systems

- 3.8 According to the project document, procurement of works, goods and services as well as contracting of consultants was governed by Bank Policies for the Procurement of Goods and Works and the Selection and Contracting of Consultants (GN-2349-7 and GN-2350-7), complemented by the Special procurement provisions to address the emergency caused by the January 12, 2010, earthquake in the Republic of Haiti (OP-387-1).
- 3.9 In practice, the contracting was done by the Technical Secretariat in accordance with these policies under the supervision of the Bank, and all payments were processed directly by the Bank. No revolving fund was established.

3.5 Environmental and Social Safeguards

- 3.10 According to the Safeguard Policy Filter and the Safeguard Screening Form, Policy Directive OP-703, the environmental and social safeguard classification of the program was category “C”, based on the likelihood of positive social impacts derived from strengthening of the capacity of government institutions and civil society to address issues of efficiency, transparency and accountability of GOH institutions.

IV. Findings and Recommendation

- 4.1 This section of the report, in which we identify specific lessons for the Bank’s future work in the sector and/or in the country, is organized around the following dimensions: i) vertical logic, ii) execution and budget, iii) overall experience with project management, iv) impact evaluation, and v) unresolved issues. The section concludes with a table of findings and recommendations or lessons learned from the project’s execution.

4.1 Vertical Logic

- 4.2 Any assessment of the design and the project’s vertical logic is heavily influenced by the fact that key outputs funded were not sustainable due to a lack of commitment by the government to the associated operation and maintenance costs. This may have been related to lack of clarity regarding these costs at the time of design or perhaps the need to prioritize the use of limited resources among numerous competing demands.
- 4.3 The indicators used to measure the project’s results, both impact (none were included in the project document) and outcome, could have been strengthened, distinguishing them from the output indicators.

4.2 Execution and Budget

- 4.4 The project took longer to implement than contemplated in the original design. Because of the delays, associated with weakness in the Technical Secretariat and the especially challenging time in the country post-earthquake, and the lack of sustainability, the project did not meet the need to develop and put in place an information dashboard on reconstruction projects that was to be of use for government institutions, donors as well as the Haitian public and others involved and/or interested in the reconstruction effort.
- 4.5 The direct contracting of firms to prepare the applications without a local partner contributed to the project’s lack of sustainability. The indirect and inconsistent communication between the firms and the respective ministries proved to be ineffective.

4.3 Overall experience with project management

- 4.6 Responsibility for the standardization/harmonization and integration of the technology platforms and management systems within the public sector is a responsibility formally assigned to the Office of Management and Human Resources (OMRH). As OMRH lacked necessary capacity, the project design called for the creation of a Technical Secretariat to support the Inter-ministerial IT Committee (Comité Interministériel sur le Technologies de l'Information) at the Primature. The Primature also lacked capacity and the institutional structure for the complex task of supporting the project's implementation. It was difficult to identify trained staff, there was an elevated level of rotation of the coordinator function. The structure created complicated communication between the ministries responsible for certain products and the providers contracted.

4.4 Impact evaluation

- 4.7 No impact evaluation was contemplated nor completed for this project.

4.5 Unresolved issues

- 4.8 The objectives proposed under the project were ambitious especially considering the capacity, structure, and readiness of the Haitian Public Administration.
- 4.9 Government transformation in Haiti through new technologies, the design and implementation of a new Integrated Technology Platform in government and the review of the legal framework required to fully incorporate new technologies to government processes and service delivery was a huge task. The development and implementation of ICT tools to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the Haitian public sector requires a better understanding of starting conditions (human, institutional, cultural, technological and budgetary), a more long-term strategy, commitment, a sustainability plan and funds that would accompany this effort for a more extended period.

Table 4

Findings and Recommendations

Findings	Recommendations
Vertical Logic	
<p>Finding #1. Though the program design responded logically to the identified problem, it may not have been a realistic solution for the country due to factors such as institutional capacity, level of sophistication of the technology, infrastructure, operation and maintenance costs and existence of public services.</p>	<p>Recommendation # 1. Project teams should carefully analyze whether a given solution that may have been effective elsewhere can successfully respond to identified problems and local conditions. The end users (government workers, citizens and firms) should have a central focus in the design, and the support that the information technologies offer should be aimed at the delivery of better services. The design should consider numerous factors including: ownership by the government and its leadership, institutional capacity and willingness of institutions to work together and share information, capacity to operate and maintain technological solutions and to absorb the corresponding costs, and the existence of necessary related services (such as reliable provision of electricity and internet services). Additionally, in the case of situations of post-natural disaster, the project team should take into account how this may affect the project's implementation.</p>
Execution and Budget	
<p>Finding #1. There was no well-developed communications strategy, despite the preparation of some brochures and promotional materials. As a result, several institutions were unaware of the services and support they could have received through the project.</p>	<p>Recommendation # 1. During a project's preparation, the team should consult and seek to involve a wide range of different stakeholders so that they are aware of the potential opportunities and can influence the project's design and implementation. At times, a project's communications can be strengthened through the contracting of a specialist to organize or advise on information dissemination.</p>
<p>Finding #2. There is no evidence that inclusion in the design of the project of firms and proprietary technologies to be used contributed to a more efficient and effective project.</p>	<p>Recommendation #2. To get the best quality and price, the procurement processes should, as a rule, be fully competitive. Even more so in cases like this where the starting point was practically a blank slate, i.e. technologically neutral. On the other hand, when budgets are particularly low and the volume of information to be managed is also small, open source technologies should be preferred. This is preferable for two reasons: it demands real capacity building for implementation and makes sustainability more feasible.</p>

Findings	Recommendations
Overall experience with project management	
Finding # 1. The lack of an IDB technical specialist based in the country limited the Bank's capacity to support the project execution unit, to be in close contact with other project stakeholders and to work to promptly solve problems that arose.	Recommendation #1. When working in new areas or sectors for a country and/or with institutions without project implementation experience (both of which characterized this project), the presence in country and regular contact of the Bank technical specialist and the other members of the project team with the project counterparts can mitigate execution problems that arise and facilitate better communication.
Finding # 2 The Technical Secretariat failed in its coordination role during the project's implementation due to institutional and legal issues in relation to its role, responsibilities and reporting relationships.	Recommendation #2. For eventual future work in this area, the Bank should seek a greater commitment from the counterpart and an institutional structure that facilitates more effective implementation. It is critical that the agency where the coordination unit is hosted have a reasonable level of autonomy, adequate budget, a competent technical team and the necessary political support.
Impact Evaluation	
Unresolved issues	
Finding #1. The GOH did not assume responsibility for operation and maintenance of products delivered under the project. There lacked institutional capacity, resources and interest to maintain the services (ex. web pages/portal and web based applications).	Recommendation # 1. Project design needs to emphasize sustainability and strongly factor in existing institutional capacity as well as cost to operate and maintain services developed. The project design should be realistic in identifying eventual operation and maintenance costs, and the Bank should expend efforts to secure compliance with contractual clause that the government allocate sufficient funds for operation and maintenance in the budget.
Finding #2. There was a lack of local participation in the software development resulting in a dependence on expensive international programmers to both develop and make adjustments to the applications.	Recommendation #2. An effort should be made, where feasible, to encourage participation of local companies/contractors to facilitate knowledge transfer as well as maintenance of the software product.