



# Project Completion Report

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## PCR

***Project Name: E-government and Knowledge Brokering Program***

***Country: Trinidad and Tobago***

***Sector/Subsector: Reform/Modernization of the State***

***Original Project Team: Frank Nieder (F13), Team Leader; Pablo Alonso (SC3); Rafael Anta (SDS/ICT); Vashtie Dookiesingh (CTT); and Juan Carlos Perez Segnini***

***Project Number: TT0056***

***Loan Number: 1808/OC-TT***

***Final Approval Date of PCR: May 9<sup>th</sup>, 2016***

***PCR Team: Dana King (ICS/CTT) and Alexa Khan (Consultant)***



## Acronyms and Abbreviations

CSS	Chief State Solicitor
CTB	Central Tenders Board
EA	Executing Agency
EGKBP	E-Government and Knowledge Brokering Program
GORTT	Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
LP	Loan Proposal
LSD	Lands and Survey Division
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MPA	Ministry of Public Administration
MPAI	Ministry of Public Administration and Information
MPSD	Ministry of Planning and Sustainable Development
PEU	Project Execution Unit
PMD	Program Management Division
PMR	Project Monitoring Report
PPRD	Project Planning and Reconstruction Division
PSIP	Public Sector Investment Programme
PSRIP	Public Sector Reform Initiation Programme
RM	Results Matrix
SC	Steering Committee
T&T	Trinidad and Tobago
WEF	World Economic Forum



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## I. Basic Information

BASIC DATA (AMOUNTS IN US\$)	
<b>PROJECT NO:</b> TT0056	<b>TITLE:</b> Electronic Government and Knowledge Brokering Programme
<b>Borrower:</b> Republic of Trinidad and Tobago	<b>Date of Board Approval:</b> November 29, 2006
<b>Executing Agency:</b> Ministry of Public Administration	<b>Date of Loan Contract Effectiveness:</b> March 16, 2007
	<b>Date of Eligibility for First Disbursement:</b> August 5, 2008
<b>Loan:</b> 1808/OC-TT	<b>Months in Execution</b>
<b>Sector:</b> Reform/Modernization of the State	* from Approval: 109 months
<b>Lending Instrument:</b> Investment Loan	* from Contract Effectiveness: 106 months
	<b>Disbursement Periods</b>
	<b>Original Date of Final Disbursement:</b> September 16, 2012
	<b>Current Date of Final Disbursement:</b> December 31, 2015
	<b>Cumulative Extension (Months):</b> 39 months
	<b>Special Extensions (Months):</b> 15 months
	<b>Loan Amount(s)</b>
	* <b>Original Amount:</b> \$28,000,000
	* <b>Current Amount:</b> 22,490,426.93
	* <b>Pari Passu :</b> \$7,000,000 at approval ; 2,038,440.00 actual
<b>Poverty Targeted Investment (PTI):</b> No	<b>Disbursements</b>
<b>Social Equity (SEQ):</b> Yes	* <b>Amount to date:</b> \$22,490,426.93
<b>Environmental Classification:</b> C	<b>Total Project Cost (Original Estimate):</b> \$35,000,000
	<b>Redirectioning</b>
	<b>Has this Project?</b>
	Received funds from another Project No
	Sent funds to another Project No
	<b>On Alert Status</b>
	<b>Is project currently designated "on alert" by PAIS:</b> Yes
	<b>If yes, then why is the project on alert:</b> The project is currently in alert due to the length of time that it has been in execution and the relative disbursement levels.

Summary Performance Classifications				
DO	<input type="checkbox"/> Highly Probable (HP)	<input type="checkbox"/> Probable (P)	<input type="checkbox"/> Low Probability (LP)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Improbable (I)
IP	<input type="checkbox"/> Highly Satisfactory (HS)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Satisfactory (S)	<input type="checkbox"/> Unsatisfactory (US)	<input type="checkbox"/> Very Unsatisfactory (VU)
SU	<input type="checkbox"/> Highly Probable (HP)	<input type="checkbox"/> Probable (P)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Low Probability (LP)	<input type="checkbox"/> Improbable (I)



## II. The Project

### a. Project Context

In 2002, the Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago (GORTT) approved **Vision 2020**, a national strategic development plan to propel Trinidad and Tobago (T&T) to developed country status by the year 2020. The GORTT identified weak public sector performance as a key constraint to Vision 2020's success. With support from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the GORTT undertook two initiatives to strengthen public sector efficacy and efficiency: (i) **fastforward**, a comprehensive National Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Plan approved in 2003 that aimed to transform T&T into a knowledge-based society through greater and more effective use of ICT; and (ii) the **Public Sector Reform Initiation Program** (1523/OC-TT; PSRIP), approved in 2004, to develop a long-term strategy for public sector reform.<sup>1</sup>

Following implementation of these initiatives, the GORTT recognized the need for "a more effective mechanism with more permanent effects to build institutional and human resource capacities."<sup>2</sup> To that end, in 2005, the IDB and the GORTT entered into a US\$1.5 million PROPEF loan agreement (1626/OC-TT)<sup>3</sup> to do preparatory work for the design of the **E-Government and Knowledge Brokering Program** (TT0056; 1808/OC-TT), referred to herein as "EGKBP", "E-Gov," or the "Program". Approved in 2006, the Program was designed to use a two-prong approach to improve the quality of public services. Under the first prong, the Program aimed to strengthen the GORTT's institutional and human capacities through promotion of knowledge transfer activities. Under the second prong, the Program aimed to strengthen the delivery (access, responsiveness, transparency, and accountability) of public services through the design and implementation of e-government<sup>4</sup> solutions. To finance activities under each prong, demand funds were established to which eligible GORTT agencies could apply for financing of relevant projects. A promotions campaign, to publicize the demand funds and encourage applications, was to be financed under a stand-alone component.

E-Gov's design included a complex implementation structure. A Project Executing Unit (PEU) was to be established within the Programme Management Division (PMD) of the Ministry of Public Administration and Information (MPAI). The PEU was to be composed of both operational (coordinator as well as implementation, legal, procurement, and financial specialists) and technical staff (one expert advisor for Knowledge Brokering and e-Government, each). MPAI's Public Sector Transformation and ICT divisions were to provide technical and coordination support, given their responsibilities for overseeing

<sup>1</sup> Both *fastforward* and the PSRIP financed studies to support GORTT decision making on how to move to a more modern public service and service delivery system. For additional information on the results of PSRIP, please see <http://www.iadb.org/en/projects/project-description-title,1303.html?id=tt0057>.

<sup>2</sup> EGKBP loan proposal (LP), pg. 3-4

<sup>3</sup> The PROPEF financed three preparatory projects including a legislative review, community access program, and the establishment of an electronic market place system.

<sup>4</sup> E-government is the application of ICT combined with process reengineering and measures to facilitate institutional changes (change management) in order to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of public institutions, both with regard to internal operations and the improvement of services to clients.

The initial diagnosis on the status e-government in TT revealed several constraints including (i) lack of capacity in most ministries to implement e-government solutions, (ii) little collaboration or coordination among Ministries in implementing cross-government projects, (iii) insufficient budgets to finance comprehensive e-government projects, (iv) limited focus on change management or process reengineering in proposed e-solutions, (v) lack of understanding and by extension support for e-government initiatives at decision making levels and (iv) lack of effective project management skills across Ministries. LP, pg. 6.

cross-governmental public sector strengthening and e-government initiatives, respectively. In addition, the PEU was to organize a panel of experts to provide technical assistance to: (i) demand fund applicants on the development of terms of reference and (ii) the PEU on the technical evaluation and supervision of financed projects. Two selection committees were to be established – one for each demand-driven fund and composed of MPAI and civil society representatives – to review and select applications for funding. Project execution teams were to be developed within each beneficiary agency to liaise with the PEU for implementation of Program-financed projects. Finally, the Program was to be coordinated with the **fastforward** Steering Committee (SC) as well as the PSRIP PEU, to ensure alignment of activities. An e-government strategy was to be funded under the Program as a matter of first order, to provide guidance upon expiration of the **fastforward** Strategy in 2008.

## **b. Project Description**

### **i. Development Objectives**

The Program's objective was to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of public services via the transfer of knowledge on international best practices (Knowledge Brokering) and via the expanded and more effective development and implementation of e-government solutions.

### **ii. Components**

E-Gov was comprised of three components: (i) Promotion of the Program (US\$200,000), (ii) Knowledge Brokering (US\$8.6M), and (iii) e-Government Solutions (US\$20.1M).

**Component 1** was to finance EGKBP-related awareness and knowledge-raising activities; including (i) the development of a promotion strategy, (ii) a series of tailored promotion seminars targeted to a range of audiences<sup>5</sup>; (iii) an initiation workshop; (iv) a Program website<sup>6</sup>; (v) meetings between the PEU and prospective participants; (vi) a newsletter; and (vii) a media campaign to publicize E-Gov and its results.

**Component 2** aimed to improve public sector institutional and human resource capacity through effective knowledge transfer. Knowledge transfer was to be promoted and facilitated by creating opportunities where staff could interact closely with experts in their field. Eligible activities included (i) contracting of expert practitioners from other countries to provide technical, policy or management advice as well as coaching and mentoring; (ii) secondments of staff to foreign institutions; (iii) establishment of relationships with international and regional professional associations; and (iv) the participation of public sector staff in technical and policy forums.

**Component 3** aimed to promote the timely design and implementation of effective e-Government solutions.

<sup>5</sup> Expected audiences included Ministers, Permanent Secretaries, the Human Resources Management Forum, the Chief Information Officers Forum, and Technical and Supervisory staff in Ministries and other institutions. These seminars were expected to be conducted at two points in the project lifecycle: (i) at initiation and (ii) two years after implementation, to share project results.

<sup>6</sup> The website was expected to include Program information, eligibility and participation instructions, information on best practices, updates on implementation and lessons learned, and information on how to use financed e-government solutions.



### iii. Project Implementation

The Program reached eligibility in August 2008, 21 months after approval by the IDB's Board of Directors. From the start, implementation did not go in accordance with project design. For reasons that are not clear, a full staff complement was never hired. Rather, Program execution was managed by an interim coordinator, at first, and then outsourced for a short time to a firm (funded with GORTT counterpart resources), before eventually being assumed by MPAl's PMD and managed as one of the several projects under its purview, including PSRIP. No full-time, dedicated personnel were hired by PMD to manage EGKBP. Instead, E-Gov's implementation was one of a series of tasks assigned to various PMD staff. The ICT Division never participated in implementation and only one meeting was held with the *fastforward* Steering Committee before its mandate expired in 2008. A follow-on e-government strategy was never developed or financed. In 2010, MPAl was re-named the Ministry of Public Administration (MPA) and responsibility for e-government was moved to the Ministry of Science and Technology. The promotions campaign was never conducted and, as a result, the Program had very little visibility for the entirety of its implementation.

Between November 2006 and September 2012, the original final disbursement date, approximately 6% of Program resources were disbursed. In September 2012, the Ministry of Planning and Sustainable Development (MPSD), the IDB's Focal Point within the GORTT, requested a two-year general extension to the Program's disbursement date. Accompanying the request was a list of identified, ready-to-go projects as well as a commitment to hire a complement of dedicated, full-time implementation staff. The general extension was granted. To facilitate project identification and approval, the Operations Manual was revised to eliminate the demand funds and rest sole authority for the approval of projects with the PEU. Between September 2012 and September 2014, PMD completed procurement for 22 projects valued at US\$22.3 million.

In September 2014, MPSD requested a one-year special extension to facilitate the execution of commitments under signed contracts and, concurrently, the cancellation of US\$1.04M in uncommitted resources. IDB approved the request. One month following the extension approval, the GORTT approved the 2014/2015 budget, under which E-Gov was provided an allocation insufficient to cover more than six months' worth of payments owed under existing contracts. The lack of fiscal space resulted in an inability to pay vendors for approximately 5 months. Over this period, several vendors opted to stop work pending payment and the Program ground to a halt. A supplemental budget allocation was approved in late July 2015. However, given the delay, vendors did not complete work before closure of the fiscal year, and MPA was unable to complete all projected payments before the Program's final disbursement date.

PMD staff members from 2012-2015 dedicated tremendous amounts of time and passion to implementing the Program. Despite their best efforts, the Program was stymied by the lack of a strong, higher-level champion within MPA and MPSD. Nevertheless, due to the PEU's efforts, almost the entirety of uncommitted resources was allocated during the two-year general extension period and approximately US\$19 million was disbursed over the one-year, Special Extension period.



### III. Results

The Program's Results Matrix (RM) was approved in 2008<sup>7</sup>, during implementation, and had a number of deficiencies: baseline data required to track indicators was not collected for all expected outcomes<sup>8</sup>, outcome indicators were not clearly aligned with the expected outputs<sup>9</sup>, and no outputs were designated for Component 1.

With the exception of preparing the IDB-required Semi-Annual Reports, the PEU conducted no monitoring activities. In large part, this was due to the fact that the Program was dormant for 5 of its 8 years of implementation. In the same vein, although the loan proposal provided for the conduct of evaluations of each Program-financed project<sup>10</sup>, no evaluations were conducted due to the fact that most projects' completion coincided with the end of the Program. Further, completion of three projects was extended post-Program closure, due to payment delays.<sup>11</sup> As such, it is difficult to determine how individual projects may have contributed to improvements in service delivery.

As part of the IDB's supervision activities as well as the preparation of this Project Completion Report, site visits were conducted of a number of Program-financed projects. These site visits provided anecdotal feedback on how EGKBP-financed projects have contributed to significant improvements<sup>12</sup> at beneficiary agencies:

- a) Design and Implementation of an Asset Management Solution for Parliament has contributed to improved functioning of the Parliament through improved tracking of files, inventory of records and documents, improved access to records by staff and Parliamentarians; Online registry accessible by Members of Parliament contributing to a 60% reduction in the use of paper. A positive, unintended outcome has been the use of principles of asset management to transform other processes and procedures<sup>13</sup>.
- b) Upgrade of Hansard Production System for the Parliament of TT has contributed to a reduction in time to produce an unrevised Hansard report from 3 days to 3-4

<sup>7</sup> When the Program was approved, the IDB did not require results matrices as part of project documentation.

<sup>8</sup> Panel surveys on public perception of Government service delivery were to be scheduled annually; however no surveys have been conducted since 2010.

<sup>9</sup> For example, the indicator related to "users of public services (education) satisfied with the final outcome" does not appear to have a relevant contributing output, unless one identifies "the supply, implementation and support for an integrated management system for MPA Scholarship Division". Given that such an intervention would apply to a very small group of stakeholders in the education sector, it is highly unlikely that it could be said to have contributed to improved perceptions of education delivery in Trinidad and Tobago.

<sup>10</sup> See LP, pg. 23.

<sup>11</sup> The three projects - *Upgrade of Cadastral Management Information System* for Lands and Surveys Division, and, for MPA, *Provision of Business Process Management Support in the Public Service* and *Human Resource System Modernization* – are expected to be completed by June 2016. As there will be no loan resources available to make final payments, there is a minimal risk that the projects' completion will be further delayed.

<sup>12</sup> A number of IT infrastructure projects completed during implementation were never fully operationalized. An excellent example of this is the project *Design and Implementation of an Enterprise Geographical Information System for the Ministry of National Security*, which will facilitate coordination and collaboration among key security agencies by allowing data from the Police Service, Fire Services, Immigration and Office of Disaster Preparedness to be shared within the same system. Though the project was completed, the extent to which agencies actually utilize the data in decision making and for program/policy development remains to be seen as the system was not rolled out before Program closure.

<sup>13</sup> A comprehensive evaluation of this project could provide evidence of efficiency gains to date.





- hours. Users, including citizens, can access the Hansard Calendar online and select particular sessions and/or contributions as needed. This upgrade has transformed the Parliament-to-citizen interface.
- c) Conduct of an Aerial and Lidar Survey for Lands and Surveys Division (LSD) contributed significantly to updating the Division's maps. The last survey was conducted in 1994 and should have been updated every five years. The new survey maps are already being used by key agencies including the Ministries of Housing, Works and Drainage, Planning, Finance (Valuations Division) as well as numerous state agencies including WASA, T&TEC and Petrotrin, among others.
  - d) The supply and installation of an unmanned aerial vehicle mapping system and terrestrial laser scanner for LSD contributed to updating TT's cadastral mapping. Although a digital mapping project was completed in 2005, interoperability with the new mapping information has been a challenge.

#### **a. Outcomes**

As approved, the RM outcome indicators were only loosely aligned with the Program's outputs and activities. Additionally, a number of outcome indicators lacked baseline information. To facilitate monitoring, the Results Matrix was revised in 2014. Outcomes lacking baseline information were removed from tracking from the RM and Project Monitoring Report. Outcome indicators drawn from international ratings that were no longer used were also removed from tracking or, where feasible, revised.



## ACHIEVEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES (DO)

Development objective:	Principal Outcome Indicators:	
<b>Public perception of public services is improved (efficiency)</b> Classification: I	<b>Expected Outcomes:</b>	<b>Achievement</b>
	(a) Percentage of users of prioritized public service (education) satisfied with the final outcome <i>Baseline: 70% (2008)</i> <i>End of Project: 73%</i>	(a) 73% (2010). This indicator was not tracked after 2010.
	(b) Percentage of users of prioritized public service (health) satisfied with the final outcome <i>Baseline: 34% (2008)</i> <i>End of Project: 35%</i>	(b) 23% (2010). This indicator was not tracked after 2010.
	(c) Users of prioritized public services (overall service delivery modernization) say service got better over the past 5 years <i>Baseline: 28% (2008)</i> <i>End of Project: 30%</i>	(c) 17% (2010). This indicator was not tracked after 2010.
	(d) Scoring on the WEF indicator for "e-government readiness" <i>Baseline: 0.17 (2005)</i> <i>End of Project: 1.08</i>	(d) 3.65 (2009). This indicator was not tracked after 2009.
	(e) Scoring on the WEF indicator for "government usage of ICT" <i>Baseline: 0.68 (2005)</i> <i>End of Project: .38</i>	(e) 3.04 (2009). This indicator was not tracked after 2009.
	(f) Interactive services provided <i>Baseline: 5 (2008)</i> <i>End of Project: 9</i>	(f) This indicator was never tracked.

**Reformulation.** N/A

**PPMR Retrofitting.** No.

### Summary Development Objective(s) Classification (DO):

[ ] Highly Probable (HP)      [ ] Probable (P)      [ ] Low Probability (LP)      [X ] Improbable (I)

Insufficient information was collected during project implementation to determine whether outcomes were achieved. For indicators (a), (b), and (c), the GORTT was to conduct a MORI survey on an annual basis in order to report on outcome progress. However, MORI surveys were discontinued after 2010 and no other instrument was used to gather the relevant information. The WEF no longer collected information on indicators (e) and (f) after 2010. In 2015, four (4) indicators were removed from tracking in the Project Monitoring Report (PMR) - average cost per user is reduced, average time required to complete a public service transaction for prioritized public services is reduced, transactional services delivered online, and users of interactive services increased – as no baseline data was ever collected and no end-of-project target set.

It should be noted that, given that almost all Program-financed projects were commenced and completed in the last 12 months of the Program's execution, it is unlikely that they would have contributed to a significant change in the outcomes by Program end. Further, in general, there appears to have been a lack of alignment between outputs and outcomes. As such, it is unclear whether, even if the outcomes were achieved, their achievement could have been attributed to the delivery of the project outputs. For this reason, a more accurate classification for the Development Objective would be "inconclusive". As this is not an option, the Project Team has selected "improbable".

**Country Strategy.** The Program's objective and activities were aligned with the Country Strategy (GN-2335), which was effective from 2004-2007 and subsequently updated once in 2008 (GN-2477) and again through 2010 (GN-2570). That Country Strategy called for, among other things, promotion of public sector modernization to increase efficiency and effectiveness, and to upgrade capacity. The Program was also aligned with the public sector management priority area of the 2011-2015 Country Strategy (GN-2638).



## b. Outputs

A list of EGKBP-financed outputs financed is included in Annex VI. The RM specified generic outputs (“projects”) only for Component 2 and 3. As the Program was intended to use a demand-driven fund mechanism to select and finance projects, RM outputs did not specify exactly the projects to be financed.

IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS (IP)	
<b>Component 1 : Promotion of the Program</b> – No outputs were specified for this component	
<b>Component 2 : Demand Driven Projects for Institutional Strengthening implemented<sup>14</sup></b> Total original estimated cost: US\$ 8.565M <i>Counterpart:</i> US\$6M <i>IDB original financing amount:</i> US\$2.565M IDB disbursement: US\$5,943,509.50 Classification: S	
Key Output Indicators:	
<u>Planned Outputs</u>	<u>Outputs Achieved</u>
5 eligible projects approved and funded [includes interactive services online, and online transactional services]	11 outputs approved and implemented (2015)
Briefly explain differences between planned and actual outputs. N/A. No specific outputs were planned due to the selection of projects post-approval based on demand.	
Restructuring. N/A	
<b>Component 3 : Demand Driven Projects for Human and Organizational Capacity strengthening through e-government solutions<sup>15</sup></b> Total original estimated cost: US\$20.119M <i>Counterpart:</i> US\$1M <i>IDB:</i> US\$19.119 M IDB Disbursement: US\$12,658,839.42 Classification: HS	
Key Output Indicators:	
<u>Planned Output</u>	<u>Outputs Achieved</u>
2 eligible projects approved and funded [includes interactive services online, and online transactional services]	11 eligible projects approved and implemented (2015)
Briefly explain differences between planned and actual outputs. N/A. No specific outputs were planned due to the selection of projects post-approval based on demand. The Results Matrix was revised in 2014 to specify that outputs had to be “approved and <b>implemented</b> ”, rather than “approved and <b>funded</b> ” as originally planned.	
Restructuring. N/A	
Summary Implementation Progress Classification:	
<input type="checkbox"/> Highly Satisfactory (HS) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Satisfactory (S) <input type="checkbox"/> Unsatisfactory(U) <input type="checkbox"/> Very Unsatisfactory (VU)	

<sup>14</sup> This component was originally titled “Knowledge Brokering”

<sup>15</sup> This component was originally titled “E-Government Solutions”.



### c. Project Costs

Source of Financing (US\$)				
Investment Category	Approved		Actual	
	IDB (1)	Local (2)	IDB (3)	Local (4)
<b>Component I</b> Promotion of the Program	2,565,000	6,000,000	0	0
<b>Component II</b> Knowledge Brokering	19,119,000	1,000,000	6,261,240.65	823,600.43
<b>Component III</b> E-government Solutions	3,038,000	0	15,077,598.24	91,084.68
Program Management	200,000	0	135,259.35	374,414.63
Evaluation	435,000	0	0	7,881.66
Auditing	150,000	0	134,773.81	292.91
PROPEF	970,000	0	881,554.88	0
Contingencies	1,523,000	0	0	0
<b>Total Cost</b>	<b>28,000,000</b>	<b>7,000,000</b>	<b>22,490,426.93</b>	<b>1,297,274.31</b>
<i>Source:</i> Adapted from Cost and Financing Table of the Loan Proposal 1808/OC-TT				

Total Project Cost - Planned (US\$000)	Total Project Cost - Actual (US\$000)	% Difference
US\$35,000,000	US\$22,490,426.93	36%

**Briefly explain any differences.** A total of US\$5,509,573.07 in uncommitted loan resources was cancelled in two parts: in 2014 US\$1,048,428.56 and US\$4,461,144.51 in 2015 upon project expiration. Approximately 18.5% of the expected counterpart contribution (US\$7,000,000) was provided and, as such, the bulk of Program activities were financed with loan resources.

In September 2014, the Bank granted a one-year Special Extension and, concurrent with the extension, approved a Budgetary Transfer of US\$5,975,415 to Component II to Component III. This was necessary as the cost of e-government solutions vastly exceeded the estimate at approval, whereas the cost of Knowledge Brokering and Promotion components came in significantly under budget. More detail may be found in the Special Extension request Model 8. In September 2015, the IDB approved an extension to the last disbursement date to December 31, 2015 to facilitate final payments due under contracts in execution. The Special Extension request was a result of internal government delays in the approval and release of funds necessary to make final payments under contracts. These delays protracted the disbursement schedule by several months.

## IV. Project Implementation

### a. Analysis of Critical Factors

Implemented over an eight-and-a-half year period, the Program's execution was negatively impacted by a number of factors. A brief summary of the factors considered critical to effective implementation is presented below.

**Demand-driven fund:** A defining characteristic of the E-Gov's design was the use of demand-driven funds to allocate Program resources. The rationale for adopting this mechanism was to ensure strong project ownership by beneficiary institutions; to facilitate participation by a wide range of public institutions; and to enable adaptability to facilitate implementation. Though sound in theory, the demand-driven approach was not effective in practice for two reasons: (i) the non-establishment of Selection Committees to evaluate and prioritize projects and (ii) the failure to implement the promotion activities necessary to raise awareness of and interest in the funds among Government Ministries.



It is not clear why the Selection Committees were never established nor the promotions campaign developed and implemented.<sup>16</sup> Given the PEU's difficulties with coordination, it is not clear that the Selection Committees would have been effective even if implemented as designed. The Program's low profile, due in large part to the failure to engage stakeholders through the Committees and campaign, was cited in several reports as an impediment to implementation and to demand for Program resources.

**Absence of overarching e-Government strategy:** For the first year of implementation, the Program was to be guided by the *fastforward* national ICT strategy and operated under the ambit of the *fastforward* Steering Committee. Following expiration of *fastforward* in 2008, the coordination and implementation framework for the Program was to be guided by a follow-on e-Government Strategy, to be prepared and financed under the Program. However, the Program reached disbursement eligibility just as the Strategy and its implementing structure expired. Efforts to develop a follow-on, national e-government strategy were not commenced until mid-2014<sup>17</sup>; when nearly all projects to be financed under the Program had already been approved.<sup>18</sup> In the absence of an e-Government strategy, the PEU had no underlying strategy to guide project selection or to garner wider attention or stakeholder support.

**Project management capacity:** MPA's limited project management capacity posed an ongoing<sup>19</sup> challenge to Program implementation. The loan proposal (LP) identified this risk. Proposed mitigation strategies included the hiring of a full-time complement of operational staff along with resources to attract and retain high-quality, technical experts. For reasons that are unclear, a fully staffed PEU was never established and no expert services were ever contracted to provide technical guidance to Program implementation. Chronic understaffing, the frequent departure of staff responsible for carrying out key functions (such as financial management and procurement), and the lack of dedicated personnel ensured that the Program did not have the staff complement necessary for effective project management. In spite of the constraints, the achievements of the last three years of Program implementation are directly attributable to three Project Managers (Muriel Lezama, Joy Lange-Syriac, and Pernel Roberts), who worked tirelessly to ensure that the projects moved forward even when they were not given the support required and their part-time assignment to the Program. Indeed, their work was the deciding factor in the Program's success and is a testimony to the importance of engaged PEU staff.

<sup>16</sup> E-Gov's Operations Manual was revised in 2013, immediately following approval of the two-year general extension. To address the non-existence of Selection Committees and to fast-track implementation, the PEU adopted a first-come, first-serve process; whereby any submitted proposal would be selected so long as it was (i) in line with the overall Program objectives and (ii) sufficiently developed (implementation plan and team) to commence immediate implementation. In 2012, the promotions campaign concept was replaced with a direct outreach approach by the PEU, wherein various GORTT agencies were directly approached, advised of the availability of funds, and requested to submit "ready-to-go" projects.

<sup>17</sup> A project status report from 23 June 2014 noted that Expressions of Interest for the E-Government Strategy were collected on 29 May 2014.

<sup>18</sup> The 2010 mid-term evaluation report noted the drawbacks to the 'laissez faire' approach to vertical project selection and the need for "...a more comprehensive approach that facilitates the progressive integration of technology solutions with management re-structuring initiatives, public policy changes and complementary adjustments to the regulatory and legislative frameworks." The report also advocated the use of Program resources to finance the necessary technical work to support completion of required sectoral and ministerial strategic plans. See also Griffen and Baptiste, "Consultancy Support for the Advancement of the Public Service Transformation Agenda" (2010), available in Annex VI.

<sup>19</sup> See project semestral reports 2012, 2013 and 2014; Griffen and Baptiste (2010)

**Governance and oversight:** The LP included several mechanisms<sup>20</sup> to ensure high-level oversight of the Program's implementation and coordination. There is however limited evidence that these mechanisms were operationalized. Based on available documentation, the Program's Steering Committee only convened once. The ICT Division that was supposed to provide technical input during evaluation of e-government proposals was never involved in the process.<sup>21</sup> Proposal selection committees were not established and the proposal assessment process foreseen at inception was never applied.<sup>22</sup> The agility, cross-governmental coordination, and commitment required to implement the governance structures foreseen in the LP were beyond the capacity of MPA to implement without a high-level champion. With the movements in portfolio and personnel, the Program failed to secure such a champion and languished as a result. Instead, the PEU became the locus of all Program action and decision-making.

#### **b. Executing Agency (EA) Performance**

In accordance with the guidelines for the preparation of this report, this section reviews and assesses three aspects of EA performance: (i) Risk Management, (ii) Project Performance and Results Monitoring, and (iii) Corrective Action. It is important to note that the deficiencies and issues raised below are not indicative of the performance of individual PEU staff. Indeed, PEU staff from 2012-2015 gave herculean effort to ensure that the Program, despite its slow start and chronic problems, delivered more than the expected outputs within only 3 years.

**Risk Management:** The Loan Proposal identified a number of risks – GORTT technical and project management capacity to effectively carry out the Program, lack of demand for program resources, sustainability of project benefits, and the emergence of silo projects – as well as related mitigation measures; many of which are mentioned above. None of the proposed mitigation measures were implemented. As new risks arose during implementation, the PEU did not have the staffing levels necessary to effectively manage them.

**Grade:** Very Unsatisfactory

**Project Performance and Results Monitoring:** Prior to 2012, there was little sustained implementation effort and, as a result, project performance was dismal. Given the project management and RM deficiencies as well as the lack of actual activity to monitor, there was also little emphasis on results monitoring during implementation. Efforts were made following 2012 to more effectively engage MPA's Monitoring and Evaluation Unit in project implementation but, ultimately, were not successful<sup>23</sup>.

**Grade:** Very Unsatisfactory

**Corrective Action:** The failure to take corrective action from 2007-2012, despite numerous reports and recommendations, was potentially the single most important contributing factor to poor project implementation. Starting in June 2012, the PEU and IDB began an aggressive effort to take corrective action, which included a re-design of

<sup>20</sup> These included the establishment of a Project Steering Committee, technical support from the ICT Division and the Public Sector Transformation Division, oversight by the *fastforward* National ICT Plan Committee, Selection Committees to evaluate project submissions, a panel of experts, quarterly reporting by the PEU, quarterly meetings between MPA and the IDB, Annual Operating Plans, Comprehensive Annual Reviews, Individual project evaluations, and mid-term and final Evaluations.

<sup>21</sup> The ICT Division was very closely involved with the three PROPEF-funded projects.

<sup>22</sup> It should be noted that the Operations Manual for the Program was revised in 2013.

<sup>23</sup> IDB PMR Jan- June 2014.





project implementation methods to facilitate the use of project resources for intended purposes. From June-September 2012, an aggressive outreach campaign was conducted and, following approval of a two-year general extension in September 2012, the Operations Manual was revised to implement operational mechanisms more suited to the existing context. Nevertheless, the failure to timely identify and take corrective action had a strong negative impact on the Program's implementation.

**Grade:** Unsatisfactory

Executing Agency			
<input type="checkbox"/> Highly Satisfactory (HS)	<input type="checkbox"/> Satisfactory (S)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Unsatisfactory (U)	<input type="checkbox"/> Very Unsatisfactory (VU)

### c. Bank Performance

The Borrower completed a [Borrower Evaluation Survey](#) in which the Bank's performance was qualified as Satisfactory. The Bank's strength was described as "almost always willing to listen, to meet, to discuss and to help;" while the weakness was the imposition, "at times [of] unreasonable timelines and requests."

Bank Performance			
<input type="checkbox"/> Highly Satisfactory (HS)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Satisfactory (S)	<input type="checkbox"/> Unsatisfactory (U)	<input type="checkbox"/> Very Unsatisfactory (VU)

## V. Sustainability

The Program did not establish the e-Government or knowledge-brokering governance structures and frameworks included in its design. As a result, there is nothing in place to allow for sustained, cross-governmental coordination or management of e-government and knowledge-brokering activities upon Program closure. Instead, the Program's sustainability will rest on the capacity of each beneficiary agency to sustain the individual initiatives financed; and that, in turn, on the existence of a champion within each beneficiary ministry for the financed project. Most projects were completed within the last six months of Program implementation. Further, the Program's closure coincided with national elections that ushered in a new administration and a reduction in the number of Government ministries. These factors may affect the individual projects' sustainability - in terms of resources made available for maintenance and upgrade, adequacy of follow-up related to consultancy reports, and the availability of an internal champion – but in what way is not yet clear.

### a. Potential Risks

In addition to the general risk discussed above, there are four principal risks to E-Gov's sustainability.

**User resistance to new systems:** The LP recognized the need for change management strategies to be built into e-government project proposals, making this an eligibility criterion for project selection. Unfortunately, as the criterion was not applied, many of the projects did not include change management strategies. On a positive note, several beneficiaries noted the need for change management strategies and indicated that these would be developed to ensure user uptake.

**Resources for maintenance and continuous upgrade:** Given the range of EGKBP-financed hardware solutions, resources will need to be budgeted for their maintenance and upgrade. Failure to ensure that these systems are adequately resourced will



negatively impact outcomes that might otherwise be achieved. Further, it is important to appreciate the relevant changes in back office processes that are required to support electronic solutions in the short-, medium- and long-term,

**Adequacy of follow-up related to consultancy reports:** The value of the consultancy reports and trainings financed under the Program will rest, ultimately, on their implementation and use. Several of the beneficiary Ministries experienced significant personnel changeover following completion of the financed activity; which may affect the likelihood that the financed input will be useful for increasing capacity. Nevertheless, there are examples of the Program funding reports that were used – namely the Port Rationalization Study and the Health Master Plans – that have spurred action and from which recommendations are being implemented.

**E-government Strategy and governance:** The e-Government Strategy that was to be financed under the Program has yet to be completed. This Strategy, as well as the definition of GORTT institution responsible for leading e-Government<sup>24</sup>, will be critical to ensuring that the Program-financed projects have on-going benefit and contribute to the broader e-Government agenda necessary to achieve the expected outcomes of the Program.

#### b. Institutional Capacity

The institutional capacity constraints that dogged the Program throughout implementation, and which are discussed at length above, persisted until its closure. For this reason, it is of low probability that there is sufficient institutional capacity within the Executing Agency to ensure sustainability of the Program's achievements or outputs.

#### Sustainability Classification (SU):

<input type="checkbox"/> Highly Probable (HP)	<input type="checkbox"/> Probable (P)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Low Probability (LP)	<input type="checkbox"/> Improbable (I)
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## VI. Monitoring and Evaluation

As discussed in Section III, no monitoring or evaluation was conducted during Program implementation with one exception. In large part, this was because there was no activity for the majority of the Program's execution. As of Program closure, there is little information on results. This is due to two reasons: (i) the vast majority of projects were completed as E-Gov closed, making it difficult to know the outcome of any individual project and (ii) data collection on outcome indicators, which was to be collected on a regular basis throughout project implementation, was never conducted. It is recommended that the GORTT commission individual project evaluations, as proposed in the LP, to support reporting on the Program's outcomes within the context of the National Performance Framework.

## VII. Lessons Learned

**Implementation effectiveness/fidelity to design:** The EGKBP was not implemented as designed. The overarching policy and governance frameworks meant to guide project

<sup>24</sup> Though the Ministry of Science and Technology assumed much of the e-Government portfolio previously managed by MPA, it is not clear that the unit responsible for this portfolio has assumed responsibility for the broader e-Government agenda setting and implementation.



implementation – namely the e-Government Strategy<sup>25</sup>, Steering Committee, Selection Committees, monitoring and evaluation (M&E) frameworks and structures – were never operationalized; the promotions campaign was never conducted; and the PEU was never effectively established. No effective corrective action was taken by either the IDB or the GORTT until late 2012, at which point the Program's implementation structure was significantly revised to facilitate execution fast-tracking. It was noted in the Exit Workshop that there was "an obvious disconnect between design and implementation on the part of the IDB partly due to the fact that the team that designed the operation was not the same team that led implementation."

**Lesson learned:** The variance between the Program-as-designed and the Program-as-implemented was significant. The lack of a promotions campaign and an IT Strategy caused uncertainty among potential beneficiary ministries as to the Program's vision and purpose (if aware of its existence); as well as protracted project identification and strategic incoherence in project selection. The variance makes it difficult to assess the Program based on the expectations at inception or to determine whether the methods piloted – such as use of a demand-driven fund – would have worked if implemented as designed. Nevertheless, it does suggest that implementing a cross-government project in TT is quite difficult if not led by a ministry with (i) the power to compel other ministries to act and (ii) a strong champion to drive the project forward. For the IDB, ensuring continuity in project supervision staff may improve implementation effectiveness and fidelity to design. The success of the 2012 corrective actions in jumpstarting implementation demonstrates that projects can be resuscitated even after years of inactivity. Nevertheless, the resuscitated project may meet different context and conditions than those at project approval. Flexibility in re-design to accommodate the new context and conditions may exacerbate variance from design.

**Implementation Efficiency:** Weaknesses in high-level supervision, project management capacity, and cross-governmental coordination each contributed to significant implementation delays. Of the three areas, cross-governmental coordination most negatively impacted implementation efficiency. Program design contemplated the need for such coordination in the Program's substantive and governance aspects; and it became clear during execution, that it was also critical to E-Gov's operationalization. The three key processes that required significant cross-governmental coordination were budget allocation, procurement, and payments processing. MPA did not establish relationships at the technical and decision-making levels to facilitate the Program's prioritization for resources (financial and human) from the other ministries it needed to work with to complete these processes.

- **Budget allocation:** The Project Planning and Reconstruction Division (PPRD) of the MPSD oversees preparation of the Public Sector Investment Program (PSIP), under which capital investment projects such as the Program receive annual budget allocation. Budget allocation is necessary to commence procurement as well as to make payments under contracts. In late 2012, MPA began to move more aggressively to implement the Program. However, it failed to establish the relationship with PPRD to facilitate assignment of a budgetary allocation necessary to implement. The failure to secure the necessary allocation resulted in serious procurement and project implementation delays. In the final 10 months

<sup>25</sup> The e-Government Strategy in effect at Program approval, *fastforward*, expired shortly after Program eligibility. Though a PROPEF was approved to support Program design and implementation start up, for reasons that are unclear, it did not finance development of an e-Government strategy to replace *fastforward*.

- of Program implementation, the PEU was unable to make payments for approximately 5 months due to lack of budgetary allocation.
- *Procurement:* Most Program procurements were above the authorization level of the Permanent Secretary of MPA and, as such, were processed by the Central Tenders Board (CTB) and the Chief State Solicitor's (CSS) office. The time required to complete these procurement processes was on average 12-16 months. Based on interviews with PEU staff, the length of the procurement processes was due to understaffing of the PEU, CTB, and CSS; as well as difficulties coordinating with relevant technical personnel at beneficiary agencies for input on preparation of the procurement documents and proposal evaluation.
  - *Payments processing:* To process payments, MPA first required a 'release of funds' from the Ministry of Finance. Coordination between the PEU and MPA's Finance Dept, as well as between the latter and the Ministry of Finance, was suboptimal and resulted in protracted payment processes that prevented timely vendor payment or loan disbursement.

**Lesson learned:** In designing projects for implementation in T&T, the length of time required to execute cross-government processes should be anticipated. Effort must be made from the project design to involve technical and decision-making stakeholders from the Ministries of Planning and Finance, in particular, to ensure that there is ownership, awareness, and buy-in necessary to ensure timely project implementation. When reviewing requests for extensions, the Bank would be wise to ensure that the GORTT has anticipated all the budgetary processes and approvals necessary to utilize remaining resources so as to ensure their utilization within the extension period.<sup>26</sup>

**Monitoring and Evaluation:** Although the LP made significant provision for M&E, none of the mechanisms were operationalized. Both the EA and the Bank bear responsibility for this. On the Executing Agency side, systems for monitoring and data collection were not developed, staff was not assigned, and resources for individual project evaluations were not allocated to each project as intended. On the Bank side, additional attention should have been paid to these matters as well as to ensuring the project had an adequate evaluation framework. Outcome indicators in the original logical framework, many of which were relevant to the project's objectives, were replaced by a Results Matrix that was not sufficiently aligned to the EGKBP. Indeed, the Results Matrix should have both aligned the expected outputs with the expected outcomes and also been developed with consideration of the feasibility of measuring the established indicators throughout the life of the project.

**Lesson learned:** Greater attention needs to be paid to the development of M&E frameworks that are clearly aligned with the project's goals and objectives. EAs must be required to show evidence that systems have been established to collect baseline data as well as facilitate systematic data collection throughout the life of the project.

<sup>26</sup> The Program received (i) one General Extension and (ii) two Special Extensions, under which all uncommitted resources were cancelled and remaining resources could be used only to make payments under existing contracts. With both the extension types, the GORTT struggled to effect the cross-Ministry mobilization necessary to timely use Program resources.

