



INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT – PCR

Bank Memorandum

Project Name: Hurricane Rehabilitation and Disaster Preparedness Project

Project Number: BL-0015

Loan Number: 1211/OC-BL

Table of Contents

Executive Summary

1. General Information

- 1.1. Development Objective
- 1.2. Basic Data
- 1.3. Summary of Ratings
- 1.4. Project Timeline
- 1.5. Reference Documents

Bank Memorandum

- 2.1. Results analysis (outputs, outcomes, and impacts)
 - 2.1.1. Outputs attained
 - 2.1.2. Project outcomes and impacts
- 2.2. Implementation Analysis
 - 2.2.1. Project's performance measurement
 - 2.2.2. Factors affecting project implementation (according to PPMR)
 - 2.2.3. Analysis of factors affecting output delivery and outcome achievement
 - 2.2.4. Analysis of project management lessons learned
- 2.3. Sustainability analysis
 - 2.3.1. Institutional / Organizational Strengthening (IOS)
 - 2.3.2. Project sustainability
- 2.4. Executing Agency Performance
- 2.5. Foundations for the Ex-post Evaluation
- 2.6. Other lessons learned and recommendations

Annexes

- Annex 1A - Source of Financing (Amounts in thousands US\$)
- Annex 1B - Schedule of Investments (Amounts in thousands US\$)
- Annex 1C – Financial Information and Audited Financial Statements

Executive Summary

The Hurricane Rehabilitation and Disaster Preparedness Project (HRDP) represent the first major planned intervention post-independence in response to disaster threat in Belize. It also represents one of the most significant collaboration between two regional banks (IDB and CDB) and the Government and the single biggest investment made by the Bank in Belize.

Prior to Hurricane Mitch, disaster emergency management was handled in an ad hoc fashion from the Office of the Prime Minister. With the advent of Mitch, this group known as the National Emergency Organization (NEMO) was activated and operated from makeshift headquarters in the office of the Prime Minister in Belmopan. Under the circumstances, NEMO performed in a commendable manner, but this event clearly demonstrated that disaster preparedness faced major challenges. There was no disaster legislation that established NEMO as a duly constituted authority, including its role and mandate, as well as the responsibilities of other public sector entities, in the context of a sound National Disaster Plan.

The threat posed by Hurricane Mitch in 1998 exposed Belize's vulnerability to disaster and revealed the institutional weakness particularly in the coordination and management of preparedness, relief and mitigation efforts. A new government had recently been installed and there was a general climate of enthusiasm for new investment and economic activity. However three to four years into project execution, the government began experiencing fiscal difficulties resulting mainly from high levels of spending and mounting debt-servicing obligations.

Early execution difficulties associated with project management and coordination problems resulted in delays and an 18 months extension of the operation. During the extension period some planned project activities were either deferred or canceled by the government in response to a tight fiscal policy. Some activities planned under CDB co-financing were also deferred. The total cancellation was less than what is displayed in the LMS 1 Report (\$4.1 million) as the final figure includes interest payments equivalent to US\$1.4 million. Additionally, the adverse impact of the cancellation was lessened through the infusion of some \$0.5 million from the Modernization of Agricultural Health Services Project to respond to emergency needs in southern Belize particularly for the retrofitting of shelters. This allowed for the rehabilitation and construction of more shelters for that region than was originally planned.

While collaboration between the IDB and CDB in the coordination of project activities was somewhat less than adequate. Stronger synergies could have resulted in greater efficiency and effectiveness in supervision. Collaboration appeared to be strongest during crisis situations and perhaps geographical distance might have had an impact. The fact that both Banks identified two different executing agencies for the same project indicates some policy differences perhaps not addressed during the design phase. Issues such as the partial occupation of the NEMO building could have been easily resolved had their been stronger coordination between the two banks.

Sustainability of project outcomes remains of concern mainly for two reasons. The Government has not developed a strong culture within the various institutions for maintenance and is not usually considered as a priority evidenced by budgetary allocations. Over the past three years the Government of Belize has been facing severe fiscal difficulties and has been pursuing a tight money policy that will no doubt reduce the already limited allocations to maintenance. Close monitoring of the various maintenance plans will be critical to ensure that the authorities remain cognizant of the importance that the Bank attaches to this contractual requirement. The Bank, in the medium term, will need to develop a strategy to address this problem as it seems to surface in various projects containing infrastructure works and institutional strengthening components across sectors and countries.

The sustainability of the investment in drainage made in Belize City will be adversely affected by the inability of the Belize City Council (BCC) to embrace the institutional strengthening activities planned in the project. Future projects of this nature will need to carry out during the design phase a thorough analysis and evaluation of the capacity of such agencies to effectively receive strengthening within the project's framework and time. Engagement of local authorities up-front is critical for successful execution.

General Information

1.1. Development Objective

The objective of the operation is to reduce Belize's vulnerability and improve its response capacity to natural disasters.

1.2. Basic Data

Project Name: Hurricane Rehabilitation and Disaster Preparedness Project

Project Number: 1211/OC-BL

Loan/TC number: BL-0015

Executing Agency: MINISTRY OF BUDGET PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT,
ECONOMIC, INVESTMENT AND TRADE

Loan Amount(s) (Original): \$21,333,000.00

Loan Amount(s) (Current): \$17,601,196.66

Loan Cumulative Cancellations: \$3,731,803.34

Total Cost of the Project (Current): \$29,608,196.66

Total Cost of the project (Original): \$33,340,000.00

Author of the Bank Memorandum: Harold Arzu

Loan approval date: 20 October 1999

Mid-term evaluation date:

Exit workshop date: June 15, 2005

1.3. Summary of Ratings

1.3.1. Last 10 PPMR Ratings (IP, AS, DO)

| Year | 2000 | 2001 | 2001 | 2002 | 2002 | 2003 | 2003 | 2004 | 2004 | 2005 |
|-------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Month | Dec. | Jun | Dec | Jun | Dec | Jun | Dec | Jun | Dec | Jun |
| IP | S | U | S | S | S | S | S | S | S | S |
| AS | L | H | H | H | H | H | H | H | H | H |
| DO | P | P | P | P | P | P | P | HP | HP | HP |

IP = Implementation Progress, AS = Assumptions, DO = Development Objectives

1.4. Project Timeline

Start up workshop date:

Mid-Term Evaluation date:

Exit workshop date: May 12, 2005

1.5. Reference Documents

Country Strategy

Country Portfolio Review Aide Memoire

Administration Mission Aide Memoire

PCR Annex

Bank Memorandum

2.0 BACKGROUND

The Hurricane Rehabilitation and Disaster Preparedness Project was approved in October 1999 and the loan contract signed in November 1999. This operation was co-financed by the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) and the Government of Belize (GOB). The overall objective of the project is to reduce Belize's vulnerability and improve its response capacity to natural disasters. Specific aims include the prevention of deaths and injuries and the mitigation of material losses in times of natural disasters. This program was inspired by the passage of Hurricane Mitch in 1998 that ravaged Central America killing thousands and causing widespread damage to property and infrastructure in the region. While Belize escaped the direct impacts of Mitch, the emergency situation associated with the storm pointed to the need for immediate improvements in the management of preparedness, relief and mitigation activities.

The disaster management and mitigation challenges for Belize in 1998 were grouped into two major components: Institutional- including community preparedness and networking and secondly, infrastructure, i.e. the availability of reliable structures to prevent the loss of lives and to mitigate damages.

Prior to Hurricane Mitch, disaster emergency management was handled in an ad hoc fashion from the Office of the Prime Minister. With the advent of Mitch, this group known as the National Emergency Organization (NEMO) was activated and operated from makeshift headquarters in the office of the Prime Minister in Belmopan. Under the circumstances, NEMO performed in a commendable manner, but this event clearly demonstrated that disaster preparedness faced major challenges. There was no disaster legislation that established NEMO as a duly constituted authority, including its role and mandate, as well as the responsibilities of other public sector entities, in the context of a sound National Disaster Plan.

The National Disaster Plan, the main guideline for public and private sector action, was woefully inadequate to establish the needed welfare protection for Belizeans in time of disaster. All indications are that the Disaster Plan was not well understood and it was neither an administrative nor an operational document. Other aspects that need to be considered in the National Disaster Plan were the development of a list of critical personnel and the safeguarding of public records.

Prior to Hurricane Mitch the Government had designated (about 600 buildings) to be used as local shelters in case of emergency. These structures were schools, churches, public buildings, and community centers. A post-crisis analysis indicated that many local shelters did not meet the minimum standards to withstand hurricane winds nor the accompanying rainfall. Lack of emergency preparedness and clear assignments on who should manage shelters created serious challenges in terms of management and coordination among conflicting mandates and authorities.

During Mitch, storm surges were the greatest threat to the coastal areas especially Belize City. Historically, ninety percent of the fatalities resulting from a hurricane are due to drowning caused by a storm surge. Belize City has a flat and low-lying topography, and some areas are below mean sea level, characteristics that make it a particularly vulnerable and hazard-prone area.

Under this operation seven new regional shelters were constructed and 218 existing shelters were retrofitted of which 169 were reinforced to withstand at least a category three hurricane. Water and sewage systems were retrofitted and expanded in Belmopan, new canals were constructed and drainage infrastructure were improved in Belize City. Additionally, two public piers were repaired and reinforced in Caye Caulker and San Pedro.

The operating center for NEMO was constructed and the enabling legislation for its operations was passed. The Disaster Management Plan was prepared and approved and IT and communication equipment installed at NEMO's headquarters. NEMO staff at its headquarters and the districts received the necessary training in disaster prevent and management. Technical support for improved maintenance delivery to the Ministry of Works was successfully completed.

Some of the planned activities under this operation that were not completed include the construction of two regional shelters, one in Toledo and the other in Belmopan. The improvement to the National Building Standards was deferred and the institutional strengthening of the Belize City Council (BCC) was not completed. These activities were not successfully

completed due to either the austerity measures taken by GOB in response to fiscal difficulties or inherent institutional and political constraints as was the case with the BCC.

Some of the challenges during project execution include competition for a limited number of consultants and contractors for construction as this operation had to compete with housing programs carried out by both the public and private sectors. Towards the latter part of execution, GOB had to make difficult fiscal decisions that adversely affected the availability of adequate resources for execution. Challenges for the future include GOB's will and capacity to complete the activities that were deferred and to devote the financial and human resources critical for the sustainability of the investment made under this operation

During the course of project execution, Hurricane Keith struck in 2000 and Hurricane Iris in 2001. The former presented the opportunity for synergy through the swapping of activities. Drainage works originally planned under this project were transferred to the ERF- Hurricane Keith which helped to accelerate execution. In the case of Hurricane Iris, the Hurricane Preparedness Project and the Modernization of Agricultural Services Project were reformulated to provide much needed emergency assistance to southern Belize following the hurricane. The emergency works focused mainly on the repair and retrofitting of damaged hurricane shelters under accelerated procurement procedures.

Some of the lessons learnt from this operation center around institutional capacity. The institutional capacity of a country is stretched when several infrastructure projects are conducted simultaneously. In instances where this can be anticipated appropriate measures should be taken to avoid delays in execution. In areas where the commitment of a beneficiary is critical for the successful execution of a specific activity, a thorough assessment of its capacity to honour commitments should be done as a condition prior to making financial commitments to such activities.

2.1. RESULTS ANALYSIS (OUTPUTS, OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS)

2.1.1. Outputs attained Description of project outputs by components and analysis of factors that influenced project execution.

2.1.1.1. Output Indicators Analysis Complete the indicators of the outputs attained in this component using the same output indicators retrieved from the PPMR. Compare the indicators in the Achieved and Planned columns. If there is a significant gap between them, briefly explain the factors responsible for the gap.

Component One: Mitigating Vulnerability:

Seven (7) out of nine (9) regional hurricane shelters were constructed by June 2004. Two shelters were deferred by GOB due to fiscal measures taken by Government in 2004 and 2005.

218 out of 264 buildings were retrofitted with 169 out of the 218 local shelters retrofitted and reinforced to withstand at least a category three hurricane by June 2004.

4500 meters of new canals and 4000 meters of drainage infrastructure were improved (dredged/re-profiled) in Belize City by December 2003.

Water and sewage works included five (5) generator huts constructed with fencing; retrofitted roof of BWSL treatment plant in Belmopan; installed filtration equipment and 1 generator.

Piers (2) repaired and reinforced in Caye Caulker and San Pedro by December 2002

Component Two: Institutional Measures for disaster management capacity:

Legislation for the operations of NEMO was enacted by September 2000.

The Disaster Management Plan was completed and approved by June 2004.

Since 2003, at least one Testing and Drilling Exercise has been conducted annually.

Some 2,500 persons have been trained by NEMO in disaster mitigation and management.

The National Emergency Operating Center (NEOC) (10,581 sq. ft.) was completed, occupied and operational by December 2003.

NEMO partially staffed with legislation enacted in September 2000.

Enforceable building codes legislation was not completed due to deferral by GOB resulting from fiscal measures.

Component Three: Support to Long Term Sustainability:

The Maintenance Policy of Ministry of Works study was conducted and completed in May 2005.

The institutional strengthening of the BCC including the preparation of a 5-year business plan was attempted but not successfully completed. The required improvements and plans were not embraced by the BCC and the political will to reorganize the institution did not exist.

2.1.1.2. Identification of achieved outputs Bearing in mind the output indicators in the different project components, describe briefly the key outputs achieved by this project

Seven new regional hurricane shelters were constructed; 218 local shelters were retrofitted and reinforced; the Belmopan water and sewage system was expanded, over 4,500 meters of new canals and 4,000 meters of drainage infrastructure were constructed and/or improved; two piers were repaired and reinforced. NEMO was formally established, strengthened and its headquarters constructed. NEW IT and telecommunication equipment were installed. Ministry of Works received institutional strengthening for maintenance.

2.1.2. Project outcomes and impacts Description of the project results in relation with its Development Objective (DO or purpose in the project logical framework)

2.1.2 Objectives

Project Objective

The general objective is to reduce the vulnerability of the country to natural disasters, primarily hurricanes.

1. 33,000 persons have access to adequate shelters by 2004.
2. Nine kilometers of Belize City adequately drained by 2003.
3. Local population able to take refuge within 36 hours of notice of an imminent hurricane.
4. There is a reduction in loss of life and property due to storms and natural disasters.

2.1.2.1. Outcome Indicators Analysis Complete the indicators of achievement in the development objective (outcome) using the same outcome indicators retrieved from the PPMR (key performance indicators). Compare the Achieved and Planned outcome indicators. If there is a significant gap between them, briefly explain the factors responsible for the gap.

30,000 persons have access to adequate shelters as a result of the construction of new shelters and the retrofitting of existing ones. It was originally estimated that at 33,000 persons would have access to new shelters. Two regional shelters were deferred due to GOB austerity measures. Nine km of new drainage and canals have resulted in an increase the drainage time in Belize City by about 40 percent. More canals and drains were constructed in Belize City due to Hurricane Keith Emergency Reconstruction Project. Drills and tests conducted by NEMO indicate that the population is able to take refuge within 36 hours of notice of an approaching hurricane.

While there has not yet been an opportunity to provide evidence of the reduction of lives and properties from storms, it is anticipated that based the outcomes discussed above, reduction in loss of lives and properties should be a natural result.

2.1.2.2. Identification of intermediate outcomes and initial impacts Considering the achieved project outputs, to the extent possible, identify intermediate outcomes and initial impacts achieved by this project so far.

Intermediate Outcome

The state of preparedness of NEMO has been tested during the interim due to Hurricane Keith (2000) and Iris (2001). In each case NEMO's response capability before and after the storms showed marked improvement. This was evident through the response time and efficiency.

Institutional capacity in disaster management has increased as well as public awareness of and preparedness for possible hurricane strikes. There has been increase in the sense of responsibility by schools and communities for the need for maintenance of hurricane shelters. The project has

helped to increase the capacity of local consultants and contractors in the design, supervision and construction field.

2.1.2.3. Identification of future outcomes and impacts Considering the achieved outputs, identify expected future outcomes and impacts and describe how these outputs are critical towards the achievement of outcomes and impacts.

Future Outcomes

The state of enhanced disaster preparedness will lead to an increased sense of security and stability for increased social and economic investment in the country. There is also the possibility for Belize to take the lead in disaster preparedness initiatives in the region.

Future Impacts

There is the potential for the increased sustainability of public investment resulting from enhanced maintenance capability of the Ministry of Works.

2.1.2.4. Analysis of assumptions (from outputs to outcomes) Identify the necessary conditions towards the achievement of the project outcome and explain why they are necessary

The necessary resources for NEMO to operate and remain in a high state of preparedness are allocated by GOB. The drainage system in Belize City is adequately maintained and the hurricane shelters are maintained to adequate standards.

2.1.2.5. Pilot question No. 1 (Optional) Distribution of the project benefits within the target population

There are inequities observed in the case of Toledo where the regional shelter was deferred due to fiscal constraints. Also in Belize City it was decided not to engage in any significant retrofit of local shelters due to the vulnerability of the area to storm surges.. Toledo and Belize City have pockets of high poverty rates. It must be noted however, that in the case of Toledo it was not as a result of project design..

2.1.2.6. Pilot question No. 2 – (Optional) Adverse effects of the project

Potential impact points to the increased burden on GOB's recurrent budget for maintenance based on the new stock of investment in new infrastructure.

2.1.2.7. Pilot question No. 3 – (Optional) Contribution to the achievement of national / sectoral targets

Country Strategy

The project contributes directly to country's national strategy particularly as it relates to the development of hazard plans, improvement of the emergency communication network, construction of canals in Belize City and regional shelters throughout the country.

2.1.2.8. Pilot question No. 4 – (Optional) Project changes in response to changes in the context / environment

There were changes in the government's fiscal policies that resulted in the deferral of construction of two regional shelters and an institutional strengthening activity- Preparation of National Building Standards.

Also during the execution of the project, two hurricanes hit Belize that resulted in the reformulation of the project by shifting certain resources to emergency activities in Toledo following Hurricane Iris and swapping of infrastructure works (drainage) in Belize City following Hurricane Keith.

2.1.2.9. Recalculation of the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) If the project included ex-ante a calculation of the project's expected rate of return, what was the expected rate of return and what is the observed rate of return?

In the absence of adequate data and the lack of clarity in the methodology used to derive the original ERR it would not be prudent to attempt to recalculate the observed return. Actually, the ERR as contained in the files is solely based on planned investment in Belize City. Most of the investments under this operation were made outside of Belize City.

2.1.2.10. Recalculation of other cost analysis indicators If the project included ex-ante any other economic evaluation estimates (cost-effectiveness, efficiency-efficiency and/or cost-benefit analysis), what was the expected indicator and what is the observed indicator?

N/A

2.1.2.11. Rating of project effectiveness in terms of the development objective (DO) Bearing in mind the analysis in sections 2.1.1.and 2.1.2., rate the attainment of the project development effectiveness in terms of the development objective.

☐ Very Effective (VE) ☒ Effective (E) ☐ Marginally Effective (ME) ☐ Ineffective (I)

(Explain your rating)

This project set out to provide security to Belize and Belizeans through the provision of adequate hurricane shelters, reducing the potential impacts of flooding in Belize City, increasing the response capacity of NEMO and strengthening local capacity for monitoring and maintenance. The project has met the objective of providing adequate shelter, NEMO has been strengthened and outfitted with the requisite communication equipment, tests have shown that mobilization of the population in times of emergency has become more efficient. The overall recession of floods in Belize City has increased and based on the improved infrastructure provided by this operation and the enhanced state of disaster preparedness, it is anticipated that in the event of disasters such as hurricane there would be a reduction in the loss of lives and properties.

2.2. IMPLEMENTATION ANALYSIS

2.2.1. Project's performance measurement

2.2.1.1. Elements for monitoring and evaluation In a scale from 1 a 4 assess the quality of the following elements required for project monitoring and evaluation:

| | |
|---|--|
| 1. Problem analysis | Low ← [] [] [] [4] → High [] N/A |
| 2. Intervention Strategy in response to the problem (rationale) | Low ← [] [] [] [4] → High [] N/A |
| 3. Identification of expected outcomes and impacts | Low ← [] [] [3] [] → High [] N/A |
| 4. Identification of expected outputs | Low ← [] [] [] [4] → High [] N/A |
| 5. Indicators of expected outcomes | Low ← [] [] [3] [] → High [] N/A |
| 6. Indicators of expected outputs | Low ← [] [] [] [4] → High [] N/A |
| 7. Baseline for expected outcomes | Low ← [] [2] [] [] → High [] N/A |
| 8. Baseline for expected outputs | Low ← [] [] [3] [] → High [] N/A |
| 9. Assumptions from outputs to outcomes | Low ← [] [2] [] [] → High [] N/A |
| 10. Assignment of responsibilities for data collection | Low ← [] [] [3] [] → High [] N/A |
| 11. Project implementation plan | Low ← [] [] [] [4] → High [] N/A |
| 12. Procurement plan | Low ← [] [] [] [4] → High [] N/A |

2.2.1.2. Critical factors analysis in the project design Considering the elements assessed above, describe which were the main factors (maximum 3) that had a major influence (negatively or positively) in the project performance measurement.

Positive factors

The project had a comprehensive implementation plan and procurement plan. While not a part of the project design, the incidence of two storms during execution allowed for the measurement of NEMO's responsiveness.

Negative factors

This operation which was co-financed by the CDB, had two executing agencies- the Ministry of Economic Development (MED) and the Ministry of Works (MOW). This did not allow for effective coordination and sense of ownership as the executing unit had to rely heavily on the

Bank for support. The executing agency role was more often than not limited to oversight related to budget and personnel control.

2.2.1.3. Lessons learned for the project design (adopted measures). Describe in a concise way what measures were adopted to improve the project design in those aspects related with performance measurement.

MED was not in the position to collect and analyze critical data to determine the performance of the project. Constant meetings between the Bank and the executing unit resulted in the decision to house critical data collection relating to hurricane shelters and response time within NEMO and maintenance data within MOW. Additionally, joint periodic revision of the project's performance data ensured that they remain realistic throughout the execution period.

2.2.1.4. Lessons learned for the project design (alternative measures). Based on your experience in this project, describe in a concise way what alternative measures do you recommend to improve project performance measurement in the design of future operations.

Title: Availability of resources for data collection

Conclusion: The timely collection and use of data to measure performance will be improved if resources are provided as a separate cost item in the budget, to be met from the financing.

Explanation: No resources were provided for the collection of performance data at the outcome level. Many executing agencies are not yet fully sensitized to the need to put additional resources from their own budgets for data collection. Especially where counterpart resources are limited, they are unable to give the necessary priority to data collection and analysis.

A decision should be reached during loan negotiations for the co-financiers to agree on a single executing agency and to place this responsibility within an institution whose overall function best reflects the activities planned under the operation.

2.2.1.5. Available information during project implementation In a scale from 1 to 4 rate the level and quality of compliance of the following tasks that should be undertaken by the Executing Agency to obtain the necessary information for project performance measurement:

1. Establishment of processes and mechanisms for data gathering and data analysis (sources of data, responsibilities, periodicity and characteristics of the information) Low ☐ ☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ → High ☐ N/A

2. Data gathering for the outcomes base line Low ☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ → High ☐ N/A

3. Data gathering for the outputs base line Low ☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ ☐ → High ☐ N/A

4. Data gathering, data analysis and reporting of information on available resources (inputs) and undertaking activities Low ← [] [] [] [4] → High [] N/A

5. Data gathering, data analysis and reporting of information on project outputs and their contribution to the achievement of expected outcomes Low ← [] [] [3] [] → High [] N/A

6. Data gathering, data analysis and reporting of information on project outcomes and impacts and their contribution to sectoral and national goals Low ← [] [2] [] [] → High [] N/A

2.2.1.6. Critical factors analysis for performance measurement during implementation

Considering the elements assessed above, describe which were the main factors (maximum 3) that had a major influence (negatively or positively) in the project performance measurement during its implementation.

The constant and direct contact between the Bank and the executing unit allowed for the adoption of relevant intervention measures in time as potential problems are anticipated.

The presence of a project implementation plan helped to ensure that there is constant revision of the relationship between activities and outputs under the operation.

For the output level, the normal reporting requirements of the loan, as well as the supervision contract, include provisions for periodic progress measurement and reporting.

2.2.1.7. Lessons learned during project implementation (adopted measures) Describe in a concise way what measures were adopted to obtain the required information (in the expected quantity and quality) for the project performance measurement.

The responsibility for data gathering relating to quantity and quality of shelters and the state of preparedness and responsiveness to disasters during execution was assigned to NEMO. The beneficiary of the institutional strengthening for maintenance was primarily MOW. Contractual requirements indicate that MOW continues to present to the Bank Maintenance Reports several years post project. Hence a decision was taken to house a section of the MIS relating to maintenance within this ministry.

2.2.1.8. Lessons learned for the implementation (alternative measures). Based on your experience in this project, describe in a concise way what alternative measures do you recommend to improve project performance measurement in the implementation of future operations.

The standard procedures for measurement of output are adequate for the purpose intended. For the measurement of outcomes, the Executing Agency should see to it that the necessary data continue to be collected. However an appropriately selected agency (in this case NEMO and MOW) would best equipped to measure and analyze other aspects of performance related to impact of the project.

2.2.2. Factors affecting project implementation (according to PPMR)

2.2.3. Analysis of factors affecting output delivery and outcome achievement

2.2.3.1. Identification of negative factors to produce outputs Describe which were the main factors (maximum 3) that had a negative influence on the implementation of project components and the delivery of products (outputs) in terms of quantity, quality and timeliness, and explain why.

- (i) At project inception, it took some time for the executing agency to meet the condition precedent for first disbursement. The very institutions involved also had limited knowledge of the Bank's procedures at the time and the high turnover of staff within the executing unit did not help the situation.
- (ii) The executing agency taking advantage of the contractual clause relating to reimbursable and retroactive expenditure proceeded to engage contractors in repairs and retrofitting of shelters with inconsistent adherence to design specifications agreed with the Bank. This caused unnecessary delays and additional costs to GOB. It resulted in less shelters than planned retrofitted.
- (iii) Macro-economic and fiscal difficulties in the latter part of project execution forced GOB to cancel/defer some of the planned activities under the operation namely, the regional shelter in Toledo and the establishment of National Building Standards.

2.2.3.2. Identification of positive factors to produce outputs Describe which were the main factors (maximum 3) that had a positive influence on the implementation of project components and the delivery of products (outputs) in terms of quantity, quality and timeliness, and explain why.

- (i) The vast improvement level of effort provided by the staff of the executing unit and the stability of the agency in the last two years of project execution made a difference in the delivery of outputs.
- (ii) The transfer of additional resources from the Modernization of Health Services project to this operation to assist in emergency efforts resulting from Hurricane Iris enabled the executing unit to retrofit more shelters in the Toledo and South Stann Creek Districts than was originally planned.
- (iii) The constant and direct contact between the Bank and the executing unit allowed for the adoption of relevant intervention measures in time as potential problems are anticipated

2.2.3.3. Identification of negative factors for the achievement of outcomes Describe what were the main factors (maximum 3) that had a negative influence on the achievement of project outcomes, and explain why.

- (i) The lack of political and institutional will within the BCC for reorganization and strengthening will have a negative effect on the ability of the City to sustain the investment already made in drainage and canals and hence to preserve the outcome of reducing the effects of flooding.

(ii) The part occupation of the NEMO headquarters by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will help to compromise NEMO's capacity to effectively coordinate disaster efforts within a reduced space than was originally planned.

(iii) The high turnover of trained staff within the management level of NEMO threatens the sustainability of the investment made in training.

2.2.3.4. Identification of positive factors for the achievement of outcomes Describe what were the main factors (maximum 3) that had a positive influence on the achievement of project outcomes, and explain why.

(i) The disaster awareness campaigns and the drill exercises that have become an integral part of Belizean life due to NEMO's efforts have tremendous impact on the state of disaster preparedness of the Belizean population.

(ii) The level of cooperation and understanding between NEMO and the administration of schools that serve as shelters may help to preserve the investment made in new and existing hurricane shelters.

2.2.4. Analysis of project management and lessons learned

2.2.4.1. Project Management Analysis Identify and analyze the effectiveness of adopted measures to address the problems and capitalize on the opportunities related with the critical factor analysis and explain how they were put into practice.

(i) In order to ameliorate the impact of limited local resources, COF/CBL and the Government had earlier agreed that support for the executing unit such as those related to the provision of office supplies, travel and subsistence could be met from the resources of the financing in order to expedite project execution.

(ii) In the early stages of execution, the establishment of a project steering committee helped to maintain focus on implementation according to the plan and to provide for timely intervention in anticipated problems.

2.2.4.2. Lessons learned on project management Based on your experience with this project, and considering the effectiveness of adopted measures mentioned in the project management analysis, describe in a concise way what alternative measures you recommend to address the problems that may arise during the implementation of similar project.

(i) The establishment, at a very early stage and maintenance till the very end, of a project steering committee comprising stakeholder organizations will assist tremendously in the necessary monitoring and oversight activities critical for effective project execution. This can ensure that specifications for works and services agreed with the Bank are maintained and waste of resources is eliminated or kept at a minimum.

(ii) Carry out a thorough and comprehensive institutional analysis of beneficiary organizations to determine their capacity for effective institutional strengthening before committing resources for such an activity as was the case with BCC.

Rating project implementation (IP)

2.2.4.3. Rating project implementation Rate the project implementation considering the above management analysis and the obtained project outputs in the expected quantity and quality, and reasonable timeframe, and reasonable costs.

[] Very Satisfactory (VS) [X] Satisfactory (S) [] Unsatisfactory (U) [] Very Unsatisfactory (VU)

(Explain your rating)

Most of the project outputs and outcomes have been substantially achieved.

2.3. SUSTAINABILITY ANALYSIS

SUSTAINABILITY ANALYSIS

2.3.1. Institutional / Organizational Strengthening (IOS)

2.3.1.1. Areas strengthened or improved by the project Identify those institutional/ organizational areas strengthened or improved by the project, directly or indirectly, and indicate the level of influence (national, regional, local).

| Institutional / Organizational Area | Yes | No | N/A | Level | | |
|--|-----|-----|-----|----------|----------|-------|
| | | | | National | Regional | Local |
| 1. Legal and regulatory framework | [X] | [] | [] | [X] | [] | [] |
| 2. Procedures, manuals, operational guidelines | [X] | [] | [] | [X] | [] | [] |
| 3. Capacity | | | | | | |
| 3.1. Top management capacity | [] | [] | [X] | [] | [] | [] |
| 3.2. Middle management capacity | [X] | [] | [] | [X] | [] | [X] |
| 3.3. Information Systems capacity | [X] | [] | [] | [X] | [] | [] |
| 3.4. Performance measurement (M&E capacity) | [X] | [] | [] | [X] | [] | [X] |
| 3.5. Client-oriented service | [X] | [] | [] | [X] | [] | [] |
| 4. Functional and organizational structure | [X] | [] | [] | [X] | [] | [X] |
| 5. Planning | [X] | [] | [] | [X] | [] | [] |
| 6. Budgeting / Financial management | [X] | [] | [] | [X] | [] | [] |

| | | | | | | |
|--|-------------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| 7. Intra- / Inter-sectoral coordination | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 8. Intra - / Inter-organizational coordination | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 9. Staffing / Human resources development | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 10. Procurement | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 11. Self-evaluation, auditing & accountability | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |

2.3.1.2. IOS achieved by the project in the country Describe the project's most significant contributions (maximum 3) to the institutional / organizational strengthening in the country.

(i) The transformation of NEMO into a well-organized disaster preparedness agency with trained personnel, equipped with modern communication equipment and a living Disaster Management Plan.

(ii) The development of a cadre of civil works consultants and contractors with some knowledge of the procurement procedures of the Bank.

2.3.1.3. IOS achieved by the project in the Executing Agency Describe the project's most significant contributions (maximum 3) to the institutional / organizational strengthening in the Executing Agency. Compare the current situation with the situation before the project.

The Executing Agency has traditionally performed a coordinating role in the area of planning and overall management of GOB public sector investment program. The responsibility over this project has increased the EA's project rather than program coordinating experience and increased its familiarity with the Bank's procurement and disbursement procedures.

2.3.1.4. Rating the project's contribution to the Institutional / Organizational Rate the extent in which the project contributed to the institutional / organizational strengthening in the Borrowing Country and the Executing Agency.

☐ Very Relevant (VR) ☒ Relevant (R) ☐ Partially Relevant (PR) ☐ Irrelevant (I)

Explain your rating

The project included a component specifically for institutional and organizational strengthening. While it was not specifically designed for the executing agency, it has strengthened and increased the capacities of NEMO and the Ministry of Works and to a lesser extent the executing agency. Additionally, it has increased the capacities of local contractors in the south who benefited from direct contractor under the Hurricane Iris emergency component of the reformulated project. It has also increased the number of potential project managers experienced in the management of a multi-dimensional program.

2.3.2. Project sustainability

2.3.2.1. Scope of project sustainability Through consultation with the Executing Agency, define what actions, services and/or outputs should be sustained, and for how long, to ensure the sustainability of the expected project's outcomes and future impacts.

(i) The physical infrastructure (hurricane shelters, canals, piers, NEMO building and equipment) should be maintained in a serviceable condition, since this is critical to the continued state of disaster preparedness of the country. There is also a contractual agreement between the Bank and GOB for the submission of maintenance reports to the Bank up to ten years post project execution.

2.3.2.2. Basis for sustainability analysis In a 1 to 4 scale estimate the probability of the existence during the first year after project completion (and the termination of IDB financing) of the following institutional and organizational settings, arrangements or resources in the country, needed to sustain the products, actions, services, outputs, outcomes and future impacts initiated by the project and described in 2.3.2.1.

| Institutional / Organizational arrangements and resources | Probability | |
|---|------------------------------------|---------|
| 1. Executing Agency top management's support | Low ← [] [] [] [] → High | [X] N/A |
| 2. Policy, legal and regulatory framework | Low ← [] [] [] [] [4] → High | [] N/A |
| 3. Preparedness and organizational capacity | Low ← [] [] [] [3] [] → High | [] N/A |
| 4. Inter-organizational coordination | Low ← [] [] [] [] [4] → High | [] N/A |
| 5. Availability of financial resources | Low ← [] [2] [] [] [] → High | [] N/A |
| 6. Key personnel | Low ← [] [2] [] [] [] → High | [] N/A |
| 7. Financial resources for infrastructure maintenance | Low ← [1] [] [] [] [] → High | [] N/A |
| 8. Project beneficiaries' support | Low ← [] [2] [] [] [] → High | [] N/A |
| 9. National government support | Low ← [] [2] [] [] [] → High | [] N/A |

2.3.2.3. Root-cause analysis of factors affecting negatively the project sustainability Considering the estimates described in the previous question and the factors, which may affect the project sustainability, identify concrete reasons why the future impacts, immediate outcomes, products, actions and/or services described in 2.3.2.1. may not be sustainable, and explain why.

The allocation of resources for infrastructure maintenance has not been a priority, especially given the fiscal constraints at the national level. If the requisite financial and human resources are not made available to NEMO and MOW in a timely fashion then the sustainability of the impacts of products and services provided for under this operation may be compromised.

2.3.2.4. Root-cause analysis of factors contributing positively to the project sustainability Considering the previous analysis, and the factors, which may affect the project sustainability, identify concrete reasons why the future impacts, immediate outcomes, products, actions and/or services described in 2.3.2.1 may be sustainable.

Disaster preparedness is a priority for the Government and people of Belize. The hurricane shelters serve a dual purpose as schools and community centers and therefore responsibility for repairs and maintenance may also dwell with school administration. Schools are basic and necessary infrastructure.

2.3.2.5. Lessons learned on sustainability (adopted measures) Based on your experience with this project, and considering the previous analysis, describe in a concise way what measures adopted in the project design and/or implementation were effective towards project sustainability, and explain how they were put into practice.

The project design (contractual clause) made provision for the submission of periodic maintenance reports up to ten years after project execution.

A subcomponent of the project focused on maintenance activities and the preparation of a maintenance plan that will guide NEMO equipment and MOW infrastructure maintenance activities. Additionally, information systems were installed within both agencies to assist in maintenance needs monitoring.

2.3.2.6. Lessons learned on sustainability (alternative measures) Based on your experience with this project, and considering the previous analysis, describe in a concise way what alternative measures you recommend during project design and/or implementation to improve the sustainability of future projects.

Ensure that structural designs for buildings and other civil works incorporate low cost maintenance features and that equipment procured allow for sustained use with locally available replacement parts.

The sustainability of the investment in drainage made in Belize City will be adversely affected by the inability of the Belize City Council (BCC) to embrace the institutional strengthening activities planned in the project. Future projects of this nature will need to conduct during the design phase a thorough analysis and evaluation of the capacity of such agencies to effectively receive strengthening within the project's framework and time. Engagement of local authorities up-front is critical for successful execution.

2.3.2.7. Sustainability action plan Considering the previous analysis, describe the significant actions that the Borrower and/or the IDB should undertake during the next year to ensure sustainability of future impacts, outcomes, products, actions and/ or services identified in 2.3.2.1.

The Bank should closely monitor the national budget to ascertain the level of commitment made by GOB for the maintenance of hurricane preparedness physical assets and the training of NEMO personnel.

The Bank and MOW show discuss the maintenance report and agree on actions to be taken to ensure that the necessary maintenance is carried out.

2.3.2.8. Rating project sustainability (S) Considering the previous analysis and the probability of implementing the Sustainability Action Plan, rate the probability for the sustainability of this project during the next three (3) years:

☐ Very Probable (VP) ☐ Probable (P) ☒ Low Probability (LP) ☒ Improbable (I)

While the beneficiary agencies are committed to ensuring improved efficiency in the use of limited resources, the assets will be maintained in a suitable condition only if resources are provided by the Ministry of Finance. Recent trends in budgetary allocations suggest a low probability that resources will be provided to sustain an acceptable level of service.

2.4. Executing Agency Performance

2.4.1. Executing Agency performance in key areas Assess the Executing Agency Performance (including co-executors and the Project Executing /Coordinating Unit) in the following areas:

| | |
|--|--|
| 1. Participation and quality of its contributions during project design | Low ← <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> → High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |
| 2. Organization for project execution (Executing/Coordinating Unit's staff, infrastructure, coordination, communication, etc.) | Low ← <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> → High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |
| 3. Coordination and integration of the project Executing/Coordinating Unit with the Executing Agency | Low ← <input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> → High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |
| 4. Establishing a monitoring and results framework (baseline data, systems, procedures, data analysis and reporting, etc.) | Low ← <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> → High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |
| 5. Executing/Coordinating Unit's management and decision-making capacity | Low ← <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> → High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |
| 6. Timeliness in the fulfillment of the IDB's policies, procedures and contractual clauses | Low ← <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> → High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |
| 7. Financial management (securing counterpart resources, disbursements, quality and timeliness of AFS, etc.) | Low ← <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> → High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |
| 8. Timeliness and efficiency for procurement of goods, works and consulting services | Low ← <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> → High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |
| 9. Executing Agency top-level management's leadership, ownership and support to project execution | Low ← <input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> → High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |
| 10. Concrete actions to secure project sustainability | Low ← <input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> → High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |

2.4.2. Lessons learned on organization and management of the PCU (adopted measures)

Based on your experience with this project, identify what adopted measures regarding the structure, organization and processes of the Coordination/Executing Unit, as well as the personnel profiles, were effective and analyze how they were put into practice.

The existence of two executing units within one structure allowed for the sometimes critical coordination between the Ministry of National Development and MOW for the resolution of problems such as the subsistence situation for staff.

2.4.3. Lessons learned on organization and management of the PCU (alternative measures)

Considering the above assessment, if in a future project you would have the opportunity to re-design the structure, organization and processes of the Coordination/ Executing Unit, as well as the personnel profiles, describe the alternative measures you would propose to improve their performance.

There would be a single executing agency despite co-financing. This could be either NEMO or MOW- amore appropriate agency. Given the level of civil works planned under the operation, procurement training for PEU staff should begin very early in the life of the project.

2.4.4. Rating the Executing Agency performance (EAP) Based on the above performance assessment made in this section, on the achieved project results, as well as on the Executing Agency's efficiency during project implementation, rate the Executing Agency performance:

☐ Very Satisfactory (VS)

☒ Satisfactory (S)

☐ Unsatisfactory (U)

☐ Very Unsatisfactory (VU)

(Explain your rating)

→ Though the executing agency performed satisfactorily, it was evident that the sense of ownership of the project fell more within MOW. Ministry of Economic Development (MED) is accustomed to a somewhat overall national coordinating role rather than an executing role. There were times when the support from MED was less than desirable and at times confrontational rather than supportive to the executing unit.

2.5. Foundations for the Ex-post Evaluation

2.5.1. Provisions for ex-post evaluation Establish if this operation requires an ex-post evaluation according to the Loan Agreement. If applicable, provide the following information about the provisions taken (see agreements among the IDB, Borrower and Executing Agency in the Project Completion Workshop Aide Memoire):

1. Does the Loan Agreement require an ex-post evaluation for this operation? ☒ No ☐ Yes
2. What will be its schedule? Start up date:
Submission date:
3. Who are the responsible parties for carrying out the evaluation? ☐ IDB ☐ Borrower
4. What is the estimate of the costs involved?
5. How the cost involved will be financed? ☐ IDB loan's funds
☐ Borrower financing
☐ Other source

If financing comes from other source, please specify:

2.5.2 Analysis of the ex post evaluation capacity Review the capacity of the Executing Agency, as well as its infrastructure and information systems to collect, review and report information on the achievement of future outcomes and impacts, and the main negative and positive factors that may affect this evaluation.

N/A

2.6. Other lessons learned and recommendations

2.6.1. Additional lessons learned and recommendations

In addition to the lessons learned and recommendations recorded in previous sections of this report, this section offers users the opportunity to state the lessons learned and recommendation that may be helpful in the design and/or implementation of new projects

In areas where consultancies are related and the expertise is not available in adequate quantity locally, efforts should be made early in the project to combine certain consultancy services and advertise abroad.

Carry out a thorough and comprehensive institutional analysis of beneficiary organizations to determine their capacity for effective institutional strengthening before committing resources for such activities as was the case with BCC.

Institutional capacity of the country may be stretched when several infrastructure projects are executed simultaneously as a result of limited capacities of local contractors. An assessment should be made of national capacity during project design.

Annexes

Annex 1A - Source of Financing (Amounts in thousands US\$)

Anex 1A Source of Funding

| Category | Original | | | | Actual | | | | GOB | | |
|---------------------|---------------|-----------|---------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|--------------|-----------|-----|----------|--------------------|
| | IDB | Borrower | Other Sources | Total | IDB | Borrower | Other Source | Total | IDB | Borrower | Other Source Total |
| Infrastructures | 14,556 | 1,913 | 5,681 | 22,150 | 11,401 | 2,219 | 5,129 | 18,749 | | | |
| Institutional Meas. | 1,000 | 273 | 850 | 2,123 | 1,309 | 76 | 115 | 1,502 | | | |
| Long Term Sustain | 280 | 0 | 0 | 280 | 136 | 0 | 0 | 136 | | | |
| Program Administr | 701 | - 163 | 70 | 934 | 1,381 | 465 | 139 | 1,985 | | | |
| Unallocated Cost | 1,654 | 0 | 1,149 | 2,803 | 127 | 0 | 0 | 127 | | | |
| Financing Cost | 3,142 | 232 | 558 | 3,932 | 1,747 | 484 | 296 | 2,527 | | | |
| Hurricane Iiris R. | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1,500 | 0 | 0 | 1,500 | | | |
| | <u>\$</u> | <u>\$</u> | <u>\$</u> | <u>\$</u> | <u>\$</u> | <u>\$</u> | <u>\$</u> | <u>\$</u> | | | |
| | \$ 21,333,000 | \$ 2,581 | \$ 8,308 | \$ 32,222 | \$ 17,601 | \$ 3,246 | \$ 5,680 | \$ 26,526 | | | |

Annex 1B - Schedule of Investments (Amounts in thousands US\$)

Annex 1B Investment Calender
(US\$000')

| Years | Original | | | | Actual | | | | GOB |
|-------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|--------------|
| | IDB | Borrower | Others | Total | IDB | Borrower | Others | Total | |
| 1 | \$ 3,333 | \$ 200 | \$ 1,500 | \$ 5,033 | \$ 2,600 | \$ 250 | \$ 500 | \$ 3,350 | 22.4% |
| 2 | \$ 6,000 | \$ 600 | \$ 2,000 | \$ 8,600 | \$ 3,500 | \$ 600 | \$ 1,200 | \$ 5,300 | 34.0% |
| 3 | \$ 6,000 | \$ 800 | \$ 2,308 | \$ 9,108 | \$ 6,026 | \$ 1,000 | \$ 2,000 | \$ 9,026 | 33.3% |
| 4 | \$ 6,000 | \$ 981 | \$ 2,500 | \$ 9,481 | \$ 4,045 | \$ 800 | \$ 1,000 | \$ 5,845 | 30.8% |
| 5 | <u>\$</u> | <u>\$</u> | <u>\$</u> | <u>\$</u> | <u>\$</u> | <u>\$</u> | <u>\$</u> | <u>\$</u> | <u>52.5%</u> |
| | \$ 21,333 | \$ 2,581 | \$ 8,308 | \$ 32,222 | \$ 17,601 | \$ 3,246 | \$ 5,680 | \$ 26,527 | 33.7% |

Annex 1-C

Financial Information and Audited Financial Statements

(To be completed by the Financial Specialist in the Country Office)

1. Capacity of the Executing Agency Evaluate in general the Executing Agency's capacity to manage efficiently and transparently the project resources (information systems, procedures, capacity of staff, etc.)

Based on the financial visits reports, Semiannual Progress Reports and the Audited Financial Statements, the Executing Agency has demonstrated that its capacity to manage the program funds in an efficient and transparent manner has satisfied the Bank's requirements.

2. Accounting System and Internal Control: Evaluate the efficiency of the accounting and internal control systems used by the Executing Agency during the implementation of the project to produce trustworthy financial information in a timely fashion.

As the auditors indicated in their annual report, no significant weaknesses were found in the principal controls of the project applied. The accounting system reflects and presents fairly, in all material respects, the receipts and disbursements of this project.

3. Quality of the financial Information: Evaluate the quality of the financial information presented to the IDB by the Executing Agency during the implementation of the project (Progress Reports, Reports on the Revolving Fund, Financial Statements, etc.)

The financial information included in all the reports received from the Executing Agency, likewise the audited financial reports and the Semiannual Reports, complied with the Bank requirements. Certainly such information was sufficient and accurate, as the auditors certified in their reports.

4. Audited Financial Statements: Taking into consideration the track record appearing in the LMS about the ratings of the Audited Financial Statements (Unqualified, Qualified, Adverse, Disclaimer), evaluate in general terms the quality and timeliness of presentation of the Audited Financial Statements.

The AFS were presented to the Bank in a timely fashion and all of them had an unqualified opinion from the auditors. The quality of the AFS received complied with the Bank norms as they are set forth in the document AF-300.

5. Lessons learned: Identify principal lessons learned from the execution of this operation, which could be used to improve financial and accounting management in future, operations

During the design stage of the project, there should be a more detailed analysis of the executing unit or the borrower's administrative capacity, in order to identify and resolve institutional technical capacity problems or difficulties, that could delay the execution, and the implementation of accounting and control systems.

HURRICANE REHABILITATION & DISASTER PREPAREDNESS PROJECT

Project Completion Report

Ministry of National Development Memorandum

Submitted to the Inter American Development Bank (IADB)
29th July 2005

| Project Basic Data |
|--|
| Project Name: Hurricane Rehabilitation & Disaster Preparedness |
| Project Number: BL 0015 |
| Loan Number /TC: 1211/OC-BL |
| Executing Agency: Ministry of National Development (formerly Economic Development) |
| Name of the Author of the Executing Agency Memorandum: Mr. Wayne Williams P.Eng |
| Position in the Executing Agency: Programme Coordinator |

3. EXECUTING AGENCY MEMORANDUM

3.1 RESULTS ANALYSIS (OUTPUTS, OUTCOMES AND FUTURE IMPACTS)

3.1.1 Outputs attained. Description of project outputs by components and analysis of factors that influenced project execution.

3.1.1.1. Output Indicators Analysis. Complete the indicators of the outputs attained in this component using the same output indicators retrieved from the PPMR. Compare the indicators in the Achieved and Planned columns. If there is a significant gap between them, briefly explain the factors responsible for the gap.

| PLANNED | ACHIEVED |
|--|---|
| Component 1 | Component 1 |
| <u>Mitigating Vulnerability: Structural Measures</u> 1. New shelters (9) completed and ready for use by January 1, 2002 2. Existing shelters (370) retrofitted and available for use by 2002 3. Water and sewage effective back-up system operational 4. Drainage system functional 5. Piers (2) completed and available for use | 1. (7) new regional hurricane shelters constructed by June 2004. 2. 218 out of 264 buildings retrofitted with 169 out of the 218 local shelters retrofitted and reinforced to withstand at least a category three hurricane by June. 3. Water and sewage works included: 5 generator huts constructed with fencing; retrofitted roof of BWSL treatment plant in Belmopan; installed filtration equipment and 1 generator. 4. 4500 meters of new canals and 4000 meters of drainage infrastructure were improved in Belize City by December 2003. 5. Piers (2) repaired and reinforced in Caye Caulker and San Pedro by December 2002. |
| Component 2 | Component 2 |
| <u>Improving Response Capacity: Institutional</u> 1. NEOC constructed, equipped and occupied 2. NEMO staffed and operational 3. IT equipment and installation consultancies 4. Telecommunication consultancy 5. Disaster Mitigation consultancy 6. Improved National Building Standards | 1. NEOC (10,581 sq. ft.) completed, occupied and operational 2. NEMO partially staffed with legislation enacted in September 2000. 3. IT equipment supplied, installed and operational. 4. Telecommunication equipment supplied, installed and operational. 5. Disaster Management Plan completed and approved in June 2004. 6. National building standards were not |

| | |
|--|--|
| | improved due to GOB austerity measures resulting from issues of governance. |
| Component 3 | Component 3 |
| Support to Long Term Sustainability 1. Technical support for improved maintenance delivery to the Ministry of Works and the Belize City Council (BCC). | 1. <u>Ministry of Works</u> : The targeted technical support was successfully accomplished in regard to a complete analysis of existing systems and recommendation for improvements coupled with IT solution to track maintenance of all shelter stock. 2. <u>The BCC</u> : The necessary improvements were not embraced and the resources needed to adequately provide for capacity building were not committed. |

3.1.1.2. Identification of achieved outputs. Bearing in mind the output indicators in the different project components, describe briefly the key outputs achieved by this project

1. Targeted physical infrastructure to mitigate the immediate impacted of a hurricane significantly completed.
2. Institutional measures in place to strengthen the country's disaster management capacity.
3. Technical support to Ministry of Works was satisfactorily executed but BCC sub-component was unsuccessful.

3.1.2. Project outcomes and impacts. Description of the project results in relation with its Development Objective (DO or purpose in the project logical framework)

3.1.2.1. Outcome Indicators Analysis. Complete the indicators of achievement in the development objective (outcome) using the same outcome indicators retrieved from the PPMR (key performance indicators). Compare the Achieved and Planned outcome indicators. If there is a significant gap between them, briefly explain the factors responsible for the gap.

| PLANNED | ACHIEVED |
|--|--|
| To reduce the vulnerability of the country to metrological disasters, primarily hurricanes: 1. 33,000 persons have access to proper shelters 2. Level of preparedness based on qualitative assessment, drills and evaluation exercises, maintenance reports etc. 3. Reduce post disaster mortality, morbidity and injury. | 1. 30,000 persons have access to adequate shelters. 2. 9 km ² of Belize City capable of being adequately drained. 3. Local population able to take refuge within 36 hrs of notice of an imminent hurricane. 4. The vulnerability of loss of life and property resulting from storms and related disasters, has been reduced. |

Factor responsible for the difference (if any): Construction of two regional shelters were deferred due to posterity measures implemented by the GOB.

3.1.2.2. Identification of intermediate outcomes and initial impacts. Considering the achieved project outputs, to the extent possible, identify intermediate outcomes and initial impacts achieved

by this project so far.

1. The institutional response capacity of NEMO has been significantly strengthened and in a heightened state of readiness, as in the case of hurricane Iris and Emily in 2001 and 2005 respectively.
2. The structural measures undertaken have resulted in enhancing the learning environment within the educational institutions.
3. The provision of maintenance software enables the Ministry of Works/NEMO to readily identify and classify structures, to be used as emergency shelters as well as for tracking maintenance works.

3.1.2.3. Identification of future outcomes and impacts. Considering the achieved outputs, identify expected future outcomes and impacts and describe how these outputs are critical towards the achievement of outcomes and impacts

- The achieved outputs will contribute to ensuring Belize's sustainable development, through the utilization of important infrastructure and the mitigation of risks associated with natural hazards would be reduced. This thereby enables limited losses and timely economic recovery.

3.1.2.4. Analysis of assumptions (from outputs to outcomes). Identify the necessary conditions towards the achievement of the project outcome and explain why they are necessary.

The following assumptions were identified at the project formulation, which were subsequently met, with the exception of GOB's deferment of \$13M of initial project budget:

- Restoration done to hurricane resistant standards
- There are no adverse shocks in the economy.
- GOB remains committed to sustainable development and the important contribution required from disaster management.
- Donor assistance is available to Belize on a timely basis whenever there is major hazard.
- Major economic sectors do not decline.
- Complementary socio-economic programmes are implemented and operational.
- Disasters do not adversely impact human, natural and other resources so as to reverse socio-economic development in the country.

3.1.2.5. Pilot question No. 1 – (Under construction). This question is optional for operations with a PCR due date prior to February 1, 2005. Before this date, answers to this question will only be required for those operations selected in a pilot group for completing the full version of the PCR. Have you observed inequalities in the access of the target population to project benefits based on gender, location, ethnicity, rural/urban sector, income group or other reason? If so, what are the reasons behind them?

- Inequalities would be evident among the target population located in Belize City and Punta Gorda, due to the lack of local shelters and regional shelters respectively. In the case of Belize City significant local shelters were not retrofitted because of susceptibility to storm surge. The lack of a regional shelter in Punta Gorda was as direct result of GOB's deferment of remaining project budget. This therefore, exacerbates the inequality evident in these two urban areas, Belize district with the highest Gini Index of 0.6 and Toledo with the lowest at 0.2 in 2002 respectively.

3.1.2.6. Pilot question No. 2 – (Under construction). This question is optional for operations

with a PCR due date prior to February 1, 2005. Before this date, answers to this question will only be required for those operations selected in a pilot group for completing the full version of the PCR. Were any unintended adverse effects produced by this project to the population or to the environment? If so, what measures have been taken?

- There were no unintended adverse effects produced by this project to the population or the environment.

3.1.2.7. Pilot question No. 3 – (Under construction). This question is optional for operations with a PCR due date prior to February 1, 2005. Before this date, answers to this question will only be required for those operations selected in a pilot group for completing the full version of the PCR. The results of the project have most likely contributed to the attainment either of the established goals of the Borrowing Country's sectoral or national strategies or to the indicators of the Bank's Country Strategy. If this has been the case, specify which objective or result indicator the project has contributed towards and explain how and to what extent it does.

The project has contributed to vital disaster preparedness initiatives as contained in Belize's Medium Term Economic Strategy for the period 2003 – 2005, including inter alia:

- (a) The development of hazards plans;
- (b) Training of personnel for the development and execution of Village Emergency Management Plans;
- (c) Improved the Emergency Communication Network country wide; and
- (d) Construction of regional shelters in the districts and improvement of draining system in Belize City.

3.1.2.8. Pilot question No. 4 – (Under construction). This question is optional for operations with a PCR due date prior to February 1, 2005. Before this date, answers to this question will only be required for those operations selected in a pilot group for completing the full version of the PCR. Where there any significant changes in the project context and in sectoral/national policies and/or development strategies? If so, explain how the project was adapted to respond to these changes.

- There were no significant changes in the national development strategy that impinged on the context of the project. Notwithstanding, GOB's contractionary fiscal policy in regard to capital expenditures as previously scheduled under the loan agreements.

3.1.2.9. Recalculation of the Internal Rate of Return (IRR). If the project included ex-ante a calculation of the project's expected rate of return, what was the expected rate of return and what is the observed rate of return?

- The project did not include an ex-ante calculation of expected rate of return.

3.1.2.10. Recalculation of other cost analysis indicators. If the project included ex-ante any other economic evaluation estimates (cost-effectiveness, efficiency-efficiency and/or cost-benefit analysis), what was the expected indicator and what is the observed indicator?

- The project did not include an ex-ante economic evaluation estimate, although given the magnitude of the level of investment in the economy a cost-benefit analysis might have been advisable.

3.1.2.11. Rating of project effectiveness in terms of the development objective (DO). Bearing in mind the analysis in sections 2.1.1. and 2.1.2., rate the project effectiveness in terms of attainment of the development objective.

☐ Very Effective (VE)
 ☒ Effective (E)
 ☐ Marginally Effective (ME)
 ☐ Ineffective (I)

- The project was effective in that it would contribute to the sustainable development of Belize's economy by reducing the vulnerability to disasters and mitigating economic lost associated with any such disasters.

3.2. IMPLEMENTATION ANALYSIS

3.2.1. Project's performance measurement

3.2.1.1. Elements for monitoring and evaluation. In a scale from 1 a 4 assess the quality of the following elements required for project monitoring and evaluation:

| | |
|---|--|
| 1. Problem analysis | Low ← <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> → High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |
| 2. Intervention Strategy in response to the problem (rationale) | Low ← <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> → High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |
| 3. Identification of expected outcomes and impacts | Low ← <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> → High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |
| 4. Identification of expected outputs | Low ← <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> → High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |
| 5. Indicators of expected outcomes | Low ← <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> → High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |
| 6. Indicators of expected outputs | Low ← <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> → High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |
| 7. Baseline for expected outcomes | Low ← <input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> → High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |
| 8. Baseline for expected outputs | Low ← <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> → High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |
| 9. Assumptions from outputs to outcomes | Low ← <input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> → High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |
| 10. Assignment of responsibilities for data collection | Low ← <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> → High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |
| 11. Project implementation plan | Low ← <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> → High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |
| 12. Procurement plan | Low ← <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> → High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |

3.2.1.2. Critical factors analysis in the project design. Considering the elements assessed above, describe which were the main factors (maximum 3) that had a major influence (negatively or positively) in the project performance measurement

The following main factors positively influenced the projects performance measurement:

- (a) Project implementation plan; and

- (b) Procurement plan; and
 It was negatively influenced by,
 (c) Baseline for expected outputs as it did not adequately relate time to desired output

3.2.1.3 Lessons learned for the project design (adopted measures). Describe in a concise way what measures were adopted to improve the project design in those aspects related with performance measurement

The following were the measures adopted to improve the project design:

1. The baseline Project Implementation Plan was tweaked to introduce packaging of activities and task to anticipate assumptions of critical paths important to project implementation.
2. The Procurement Plans were crucial as the Banks and GOB procedures for accountability and transparency meant adherence to strict guidelines which could result in missteps and delays if not followed. The Bank played a role in meaningful facilitation of the project to avoid time delays and compliance.
3. Baseline for expected outputs was reviewed and discussion with the Bank resulting in a more realistic time frame that reflected inclusion of the Iris component, among others, which reinforced the stated goal, purpose and outputs of the project.

3.2.1.4. Lessons learned for the project design (alternative measures). Based on your experience in this project, describe in a concise way what alternative measures you recommend to improve project performance measurement in the design of future operations

The following alternative measures would be useful for the improvement of project performance measurement in future operations:

1. The need to developed strict guidelines for engagement of consultant(s) undertaking project evaluation;
2. There could be an early introduction to the Banks standards for measuring project performance through Bank sponsored seminars; and
3. There should be criterion that at an early stage addresses the views of stake holders and end users.

3.2.1.5. Available information during project implementation. In a scale from 1 to 4 rate the level and quality of compliance of the following tasks that should be undertaken by the Executing Agency to obtain the necessary information for project performance measurement:

- | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|-----|---|--------------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------------|---|------|--------------------------|-----|
| 1. Establishment of processes and mechanisms for data gathering and data analysis (sources of data, responsibilities, periodicity and characteristics of the information) | Low | ← | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | → | High | <input type="checkbox"/> | N/A |
| 2. Data gathering for the outcomes base line | Low | ← | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | → | High | <input type="checkbox"/> | N/A |
| 3. Data gathering for the outputs base line | Low | ← | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | → | High | <input type="checkbox"/> | N/A |
| 4. Data gathering, data analysis and reporting of information on available resources (inputs) and undertaking activities | Low | ← | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | → | High | <input type="checkbox"/> | N/A |
| 5. Data gathering, data analysis and reporting of information on project outputs and their contribution to the achievement of expected outcomes | Low | ← | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | → | High | <input type="checkbox"/> | N/A |
| 6. Data gathering, data analysis and reporting of information on project outcomes and impacts and their contribution to sectoral and national goals | Low | ← | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | → | High | <input type="checkbox"/> | N/A |

3.2.1.6. Critical factors analysis for performance measurement during implementation.

Considering the elements assessed above, describe which were the main factors (maximum 3) that had a major influence (negatively or positively) in the project performance measurement during its implementation

The following factors were major influences in the project performance measurement during its implementation:

1. The realization and use of an Intervention Strategy that is capable of responding to the myriad of problems (rationale) early in the project cycle was a positive factor. This enabled the Project although complex, to be managed successfully.
2. The development of the Project Implementation Plan (PIP) that addressed outputs and measurement of the project was crucial. The PIP when used in conjunction with the requisite project management software to perform monitoring of the outputs, activities, tasks and the project resourcing was a crucial factor. And,
3. The timely problem analysis aided in the identification of adequate intervention strategies and the development of a relevant PIP. This oftentimes included looking outside the project organization to the external factors that could have negatively impact on the project outputs.

3.2.1.7. Lessons learned during project implementation (adopted measures). Describe in a concise way what measures were adopted to obtain the required information (in the expected quantity and quality) for the project performance measurement

- The key was the acquisition of relevant information in a timely manner from the Bank and Executing Agency. In this regard project execution was made easier and that reflected positively on the project's performance monitoring.

3.2.1.8. Lessons learned for the implementation (alternative measures). Based on your experience in this project, describe in a concise way what alternative measures you recommend to improve project performance measurement in the implementation of future operations

The following alternative measures would be recommended for the improvement of project performance measurement for future operations:

1. That the components having to do with institutional strengthening measures need to have a more direct link to the targeted institution that ought to benefit from the structural measures.
2. More frequent and critical evaluation of consultant(s) and contractor(s) performance especially for components that were funded by GOB, in order to provide for more efficient and effective delivery. This ought to also provide scope for termination of contract based on evaluation outcomes.

3.2.2. Factors affecting project implementation (according to PPMR)

(As useful information to answer section 3.2.3. it is advisable to review the factors affecting project implementation recorded in the PPMR. The Bank's Country Office should be able to provide this information).

3.2.3. Analysis of critical factors affecting project success

Critical factors affecting project success were:

1. The delay in fulfilling condition precedence for the establishment of the Project Executing Unit, coupled with high turnover of project coordinator.

3.2.3.1. Identification of negative factors to produce outputs. Describe which were the main factors (maximum 3) which affected negatively the implementation of project components and the delivery of products (outputs) in terms of quantity, quality and timeliness, and explain why

The following factors negatively affected the implementation of the project components and the delivery of outputs:

1. GOB's initial expenditure on structural measures ought to have been executed with adherence to the Bank's standards for project outputs, as per the loan agreement. This resulted in less structures retrofitted to hurricane standards.
2. The lack of timely administration for revenue collection, exception thereof, for local consultants and contractors, resulting in delays of timely execution of project outputs.

3.2.3.2. Identification of positive factors to produce outputs. Describe which were the main factors (maximum 3), which contributed positively to the implementation of project components and the delivery of products (outputs) in terms of quantity, quality and timeliness, and explain why

The following factors contributed positively to the implementation of project components, namely:

1. The cooperation of contractors, consultants and suppliers in delivering outputs despite administrative impediments in regards to tax exception.
2. The assumption of additional duties (supervision, monitoring, training, etc) by the Project Coordination and Execution Units, in relation to hired contractors, consultants and suppliers. This allowed for the quantity, quality and timely delivery of outputs without resorting to contractual termination due to non-performance or lack of due diligence.

3.2.3.3. Identification of negative factors for the achievement of outcomes. Describe which were, the main factors (maximum 3), which affected negatively the achievement of project outcomes and explain why

The following factors negatively influenced the outcomes of the project:

1. The goal of the Project was seriously challenged by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' (MFA) decision to occupy the NEMO HQ building which resulted in delays and cost escalation; in addition
2. The release of firstly, retired General Earl Arthurs as coordinator, at the most crucial point in the project implementation and within a few months the removal of his successor, Mr. Parchu, seriously questions whether the MFA decision as it relates to the NEMO Secretariat, augers well for the goals of the project and for GOB's intent as, included in the Medium Term Economic Strategy Paper 2003-2005. This is perhaps even more perplexing as Belize is lead on mitigation efforts at the regional level through its engagement in CARICOM.
3. The institutional strengthening outputs envisioned for the BCC were not realized and in part the Council did not embrace the challenges to reform and opted to remain with the status quo in terms of staffing capacity. This was unfortunate as the planed outputs were so vital to the Projects institutional strengthening measures for Belize City, the largest urban.

3.2.3.4. Identification of positive factors for the achievement of outcomes. Describe which were the main factors (maximum 3), which contributed positively to the achievement of project outcomes and explain why

The following factors contributed positively to the achievement of the project outcomes:

1. The role the Bank played in providing the relevant and timely guidance cannot be over emphasized. This collaboration was definitely a positive factor in product outcomes. It aided in the project delivery of outputs by ensuring quality standards were upheld in all areas of project administration and implementation.
2. The team assembled on the project was another factor as the collective strength and a perceived ownership of the Project meant that critical paths were identified and rectified as a team.
3. The sourcing and procurement of resources and other project inputs were reasonably available and the Coordination /Execution arm of the project liaise and got involved in ensuring standards were not compromised.

3.2.4. Analysis of project management and lessons learned

3.2.4.1. Project Management Analysis. Identify and analyze the effectiveness of adopted measures to address the problems and capitalize on the opportunities related with the critical factor analysis and explain how they were put into practice

1. The project organization informally operated in a way that the Coordination and Execution were at similar level and this became more meaningful as the project drew near completion. This reinforced effort aimed at problem analysis and adjustment of implementation program, to reflect changes and ensured quality delivery of outputs. This significantly reduced the learning curve, for all components and allowed for continuity despite staff turnover.
2. The utilization of Project Management Software enabled the whole reporting process to become manageable and this in turn meant that all aspect of the project performance were analyzed more rapidly.

3.2.4.2. Lessons learned on project management. Based on your experience with this project, and considering the effectiveness of adopted measures mentioned in the project management analysis describe in a concise way what alternative measures you recommend to address the problems that may arise during the implementation of similar future projects

1. In the implementation of future projects the requisite priority ought to be ascribed as per the project outcomes by the Executing Agency (s) in a manner that reflect GOB's national development interest.
2. Where Project Execution Unit and Project Coordinator are contracted by GOB but paid by funding agency, this provides scope for lack of adherence to agreement procedures, whilst exposing personnel to unjustifiable termination.

Rating project implementation (IP)

3.2.4.3. Rating project implementation. Rate the project implementation considering the above management analysis and the obtained project outputs in the expected quantity and quality, reasonable timeframe, and reasonable costs

☒ Very Satisfactory (VS)

☒ Satisfactory (S)

☐ Unsatisfactory (U)

☐ Very Unsatisfactory (VU)

3.3. SUSTAINABILITY ANALYSIS

3.3.1. Institutional / Organizational Strengthening (IOS)

3.3.1.1. Areas strengthened or improved by the project. Identify those institutional / organizational areas strengthened or improved by the project, directly or indirectly, and indicate the level of influence (national, regional, local).

| Institutional / Organizational Area | Yes | No | N/A | Level | | |
|--|-------------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| | | | | National | Regional | Local |
| 1. Legal and regulatory framework | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 2. Procedures, manuals, operational guidelines | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 3. Capacity | | | | | | |
| 3.1. Top management capacity | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 3.2. Middle management capacity | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 3.3. Information Systems capacity | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 3.4. Performance measurement (M&E capacity) | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| 3.5. Client-oriented service | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 4. Functional and organizational structure | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 5. Planning | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 6. Budgeting / Financial management | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 7. Intra- / Inter-sectoral coordination | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 8. Intra - / Inter-organizational coordination | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 9. Staffing / Human resources development | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 10. Procurement | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| 11. Self-evaluation, auditing & accountability | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |

3.3.1.2. IOS achieved by the project in the country. Describe the project's most significant contributions (maximum 3) to the institutional / organizational strengthening in the country.

The project's most significant contribution to the institutional/organizational capacity of the country is through the establishment and operation of a National Emergency Management Organization that did not previously existed.

3.3.1.3. IOS achieved by the project in the Executing Agency. Describe the project's most significant contributions (maximum 3) to the institutional / organizational strengthening in the Executing Agency. Compare the current situation with the situation before the project.

The institutional capacity for an Executing Agency is now resident in the GOB.

3.3.1.4. Rating the project's contributions to IOS

☒ Very Relevant (VR)

☐ Relevant (R)

☐ Partially Relevant (PR)

☐ Irrelevant (I)

Explain your rating:

As a result of this project Belize is now better placed to administer and execute similar national projects of similar magnitude in budget and project outcomes.

3.3.2. Project Sustainability

3.3.2.1. Scope of project sustainability. Through consultation with the Executing Agency, define what actions, services and/or outputs should be sustained, and for how long, to ensure the sustainability of the expected project's outcomes and future impacts.

- The GOB through the Executing Agency has signed the loan agreement to include a period of 10 years to maintain the physical infrastructure which is to be maintained beyond the scope of the project. In addition, the institutional strengthening component for NEMO and Ministry of Works ensures long term sustainability.

3.3.2.2. Basis for sustainability analysis. In a 1 to 4 scale estimate the probability of the existence during the first year after project completion (and the termination of Bank financing) of the following institutional and organizational settings, arrangements or resources in the country, needed to sustain the products, actions, services, outputs, outcomes and future impacts initiated by the project and described in 3.3.2.1.

| Institutional / Organizational arrangements and resources | Probability |
|---|---|
| 1. Executing Agency top management's support | Low ← <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input checked="" type="radio"/> → High <input type="radio"/> N/A |
| 2. Policy, legal and regulatory framework | Low ← <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input checked="" type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> → High <input type="radio"/> N/A |
| 3. Preparedness and organizational capacity | Low ← <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input checked="" type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> → High <input type="radio"/> N/A |
| 4. Inter-organizational coordination | Low ← <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input checked="" type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> → High <input type="radio"/> N/A |
| 5. Availability of financial resources | Low ← <input type="radio"/> <input checked="" type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> → High <input type="radio"/> N/A |
| 6. Key personnel | Low ← <input type="radio"/> <input checked="" type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> → High <input type="radio"/> N/A |
| 7. Financial resources for infrastructure maintenance | Low ← <input type="radio"/> <input checked="" type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> → High <input type="radio"/> N/A |
| 8. Project beneficiaries' support | Low ← <input type="radio"/> <input checked="" type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> → High <input type="radio"/> N/A |
| 9. National government support | Low ← <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> → High <input type="radio"/> N/A |

3.3.2.3. Root-cause analysis of factors affecting negatively the project sustainability. Considering the estimates described in the previous question and the factors, which may affect the project sustainability, identify concrete reasons why the future impacts, immediate outcomes, products, actions and/or services described in 3.3.2.1. may not be sustainable, and explain why.

- The future impacts and immediate outcomes may not be sustained if the requisite resources (financial and human) are not allocated by GOB for the purposes of maintenance of structural works, by NEMO and Ministry of Works.

3.3.2.4. Root-cause analysis of factors contributing positively to the project sustainability.

Considering the previous analysis, and the factors, which may affect the project sustainability, identify concrete reasons why the future impacts, immediate outcomes, products, actions and/or services described in 3.3.2.1. may be sustainable, and explain why.

- The future impact of the project may be sustained if GOB is able to utilize the building stock in a manner that allows for resources to be generated for the purposes of sustaining maintenance in the long term.

3.3.2.5. Lessons learned on sustainability (adopted measures).

Based on your experience with this project, and considering the previous analysis, describe in a concise way what measures adopted in the project design and/or implementation were effective towards project sustainability, and explain how they were put into practice.

- The Project Execution Unit were able to ensure that adequate cost-benefit analysis was undertaken, thereby ensuring that structural designs took into account cost of maintenance.

3.3.2.6. Lessons learned on sustainability (alternative measures).

Based on your experience with this project, and considering the previous analysis, describe in a concise way what alternative measures you recommend during project design and/or implementation to improve the sustainability of future projects

- In the project design there ought to be a necessary enforcement mechanism to ensure that commitment undertaken for the long term maintenance and funds dedicated for this purposed are so utilized. Perhaps the Office of the Contractor General could be utilized of this purpose.

3.3.2.7. Sustainability action plan.

Considering the previous analysis, describe the significant actions that the Borrowing Country and/or the Bank should undertake during the next year to ensure sustainability of future impacts, outcomes, products, actions and/ or services identified in 3.3.2.1.

- The GOB can undertake to allocate portions of the deferred funds for the purposes of the management of its building stock. This action can be further supported by the Bank insisting that GOB meets its obligation in regard to maintenance.

3.3.2.8. Rating project sustainability.

Considering the previous analysis and the probability of implementing the Sustainability Action Plan, rate the probability for the sustainability of this project during the next three (3) years:

☒ Very Probable (VP)

☐ Probable (P)

☐ Low Probability (LP)

☐ Improbable (I)

Explain your rating:

In light of GOB's recent contractionary fiscal policy, it is highly unlikely that the necessary resources would be available for the implementation of the Sustainability Action Plan of the project, unless due account is taken as per 3.3.2.7, or any such similar measure.

3.4. BANK PERFORMANCE

3.4.1. Bank Performance in critical areas. Evaluate the Bank's performance in the following areas:

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1. Extent to which the Bank facilitated the project design in a participatory manner with the Borrower and Executing Agency | Low ← <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> → High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |
| 2. Technical assistance and training as well as consistent follow-up provided so that the Executing Agency follow the Bank's policies and procedures | Low ← <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> → High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |
| 3. Technical assistance and training provided to the Executing Agency to improve project management | Low ← <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> → High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |
| 4. Benefits of the Bank's supervision and assistance to improve project management | Low ← <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> → High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |
| 5. Timeliness in the Bank's response to the needs of the Executing Agency during project implementation | Low ← <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> → High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |
| 6. Bank flexibility to respond to emergencies during project implementation | Low ← <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> → High <input type="checkbox"/> N/A |

3.4.2. Lessons Learned for the organization and operation of the PEU (measures adopted). Based on the project experience, identify the measures adopted in terms of structure, organization and processes of the Project Coordination/Executing Unit, as well as its interaction with the Bank, and the lessons learned. How were those measures put into practice?

- Due to the seamless nature of the operations between the execution and coordination units were it enabled the project to meet its objectives, in addition to making the interaction with the Bank more productive. Yet for purposes of transparency and accountability internal systems were introduced to track implementation.

3.4.3. Lessons Learned for the organization and operation of the PEU (alternative measures). Based on the project experience during its implementation, what do you suggest that the Bank do in future operations in order to support the improvement of the structure, organization and processes of the Project Coordination/Executing Unit and its interaction with the Bank in future operations?

- This is very important and it is the opinion of employees of the Unit that although GOB could have a measure of oversight over the criterion for selection of consultants it none the less should not determine arbitrarily termination of employees for this could give rise to abuse. A determination should be for hiring of personnel of these units to be undertaken by the Bank, this would ensure greater compliance to Bank's guideline.

3.4.4. Ratings of Bank Performance. Based on 3.4.1., rate the Bank's performance in monitoring the project, taking into account the experience of the Borrower and your experience as Executing Agency during project design and implementation.

☒ Very Satisfactory (VS)

☐ Satisfactory (S)

☐ Unsatisfactory (U)

☐ Very Unsatisfactory (VI)

The Bank rating of VS is given, as the level of cooperation extended was such that it contributed to the project's success. This was particularly the case post 2002.

3.5. FOUNDATIONS FOR THE EX-POST EVALUATION

3.5.1. Provisions for ex-post evaluation. Establish if this operation requires an ex-post evaluation according to the Loan Agreement. If applicable, provide the following information about the provisions taken (see agreements among the Bank, Borrower and Executing Agency in the Project Completion Workshop Aide Memoire):

Does the Loan Agreement require an ex-post evaluation for this operation?

☐ No ☒ Yes

What will be its schedule?

Start up date: 01 July 2005

Submission date: 29 July 2005

Who are the responsible parties for carrying out the evaluation?

☒ Bank ☐ Borrower

What is the estimate of the costs involved?

USD\$ [7500.00]

How the cost involved will be financed?

☒ IDB Resources

☐ Borrower Resources

☐ Other Source

If financing comes from other source, please specify:

3.5.2. Analysis of the ex post evaluation capacity. Review the capacity of the Executing Agency, as well as its infrastructure and information systems to collect, review and report information on the achievement of future outcomes and impacts, and the main negative and positive factors that may affect this evaluation.

- The Execution Agency has capacity to undertake analysis, staffing to collect information and review the ex-post evaluation.

3.6. OTHER LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In addition to the lessons learned and recommendations recorded in previous sections of this report, this section offers users the opportunity to state the lessons learned and recommendation that may be helpful in the design and/or implementation of new projects.

The GOB should develop a database of persons, who worked on Projects, such as the HRDPP, so that when it comes to selection of individuals to form a project management team for any Projects to be implemented in the future this database could assist in the selection. This will allow for the success of any project.

Also, GOB should create a team to look closely and seriously at project setup.

Annexes 1A - IB
Annex 1A - Source of Financing
(Amounts in millions of US Dollars)

| Investment Category | Original | | | | Actual | | | | Gap as % of Original | | | |
|---|---------------|--------------|-------------------|---------------|------------------|--------------|---------------|------------------|----------------------|----------|---------------|----------|
| | IDB | Borrower | Other Sources CDB | Total | IDB | Borrower | Other Sources | Total | IDB | Borrower | Other Sources | Total |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) |
| 01.00.00 – INFRASTRUCTURES | 14.556 | 1.913 | 5.681 | 22.150 | 13.076772 | 1.413 | 6.9095 | 21.399272 | -10.16% | -26.14% | +21.62% | -3.39% |
| 01.01.00 - RETROFITTING OF LOCAL SHELTERS | 6.131 | 0.613 | 0.00 | 6.744 | 5.981 | 0.613 | 0.00 | 6.594 | -2.45% | 0% | 0% | 2.22% |
| 01.02.00 - BUILDING NEW REGIONAL SHELTERS | 5.005 | 0.500 | 5.231 | 10.736 | 5.575930 | 0.00 | 6.4595 | 12.03543 | +11.41 | -100% | +23.48% | +12.10% |
| 01.03.00 - UPGRADING BELIZE CITY DRAINAGE | 3.270 | 0.800 | 0.00 | 4.070 | 1.370 | 0.800 | 0.00 | 2.170 | -158.10% | 0% | 0% | -46.68% |
| 01.04.00 - REPAIR TO PIERS | 0.150 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.150 | 0.149842 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.149842 | -0.11% | 0% | 0% | -0.11% |
| 01.05.00 – WATER & SANITATION | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.450 | 0.450 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.450 | 0.450 | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| 02.00.00 - INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES | 1.000 | 0.273 | 0.850 | 2.123 | 1.720303 | 0.273 | 0.8955 | 2.888803 | +72% | 0% | +5.35% | +36.07% |
| 02.01.00 – INSTIT. STRENGTHENING OF NEMO | 0.430 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.430 | 0.305 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.305 | -29.07% | 0% | 0% | -29.07% |
| 02.02.00 – EQUIPMENT & TELECOM. FOR NEMO | 0.300 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.300 | 1.105303 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.105303 | +268.43% | 0% | 0% | +268.43% |
| 02.03.00 – LOCATION REGIONAL SHELTERS | 0.060 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.060 | 0.100 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.100 | +66.67% | 0% | 0% | +66.67% |
| 02.04.00 – OTHER STUDIES | 0.210 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.210 | 0.210 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.210 | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| 02.05.00 – BUILDING | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.850 | 0.850 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.8955 | 0.8955 | 0% | 0% | 5.35% | 5.35% |
| 02.06.00 – LOCAL STAFF | 0.00 | 0.180 | 0.00 | 0.180 | 0.00 | 0.180 | 0.00 | 0.180 | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| 02.07.00 - SUPPLIES | 0.00 | 0.093 | 0.00 | 0.093 | 0.00 | 0.093 | 0.00 | 0.093 | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|-----------------|--------------|--------------|----------------|-----------------|--------------|---------------|-----------------|----------|---------|----------|----------|
| 03.00.00 – LONG-TERM SUSTAINABILITY | 0.280 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.280 | 0.280 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.280 | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| 03.01.00 – BCC-MAINTENANCE & PROCUREMENT | 0.130 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.130 | 0.130 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.130 | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| 03.02.00 – MOW-MAINTENANCE STUDIES | 0.150 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.150 | 0.150 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.150 | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| 04.00.00 – PROGRAM ADMINISTRATION | 0.701 | 0.164 | 0.170 | 1.035 | 1.558 | 0.164 | 0.100 | 1.822 | +122.25% | 0% | -41.18% | -3.38% |
| 04.01.00 – PROGRAM COORDINATION UNIT | 0.288 | 0.034 | 0.100 | 0.422 | 0.466737 | 0.034 | 0.100 | 0.600737 | +62.06% | 0% | 0% | +42.35% |
| 04.02.00 – MOW/PEU EXECUTING UNIT | 0.221 | 0.096 | 0.00 | 0.317 | 0.832 | 0.096 | 0.00 | 0.928 | +276.47% | 0% | 0% | +192.74% |
| 04.03.00 – BCC/PEU EXECUTING UNIT | 0.182 | 0.034 | 0.00 | 0.216 | 0.249263 | 0.034 | 0.00 | 0.283236 | +36.96% | 0% | 0% | +31.13% |
| 04.04.00 – GENERAL SUPPORT | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.010 | 0.010 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.010 | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| 04.05.00 – VEHICLES AND EQUIPMENT | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.070 | 0.070 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0% | 0% | -100% | -100% |
| 05.00.00 – CONTINGENCIES | 1.653670 | 0.00 | 1.049 | 2.702 | 0.058032 | 0.00 | 0.5675 | 0.625532 | -96.49% | 0% | -45.90% | -76.86% |
| 06.00.00 – HURRICANE IRIS RECONSTRUCTION | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.569563 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.569563 | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| 87.00.00 – CAPITALIZATION CHARGES | 3.142330 | 0.232 | 0.558 | 3.93233 | 3.070330 | 0.232 | 0.729 | 4.031330 | -2.29% | 0% | +30.65% | +2.52% |
| 87.01.00 – F.I.V. | 0.213330 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.21333 | 0.141330 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.14133 | -33.75% | 0% | 0% | -33.75% |
| 87.01.01 – F.I.V. | 0.213330 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.21333 | 0.141330 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.14133 | -33.75% | 0% | 0% | -33.75% |
| 87.02.02 – INTEREST | 2.929000 | 0.00 | 0.510 | 3.439 | 2.929 | 0.00 | 0.620 | 3.549 | 0% | 0% | +21.57% | +31.99% |
| 87.02.01 – INTEREST | 2.929000 | 0.00 | 0.510 | 3.439 | 2.929 | 0.00 | 0.620 | 3.549 | 0% | 0% | +21.57% | +31.99% |
| 87.03.00 – CREDIT COMMISSION | 0.00 | 0.232 | 0.048 | 0.280 | 0.00 | 0.232 | 0.109 | 0.341 | 0% | 0% | +127.08% | -21.79% |
| 88.00.00 – PENDIENTE | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| TOTAL | 21.333 | 2.582 | 8.308 | 32.223 | 21.333 | 2.082 | 9.2015 | 32.6165 | 0% | -19.36% | +10.75% | +1.22% |

Source of information:
From LMS: Columns (1) and (5)
To be completed by the author of the Executing Agency Memorandum: Columns (2) (3) (6) (7) (10) (11)

Annex 1B - Schedule of Investments
(Amounts in millions of US Dollars)

| Years | Original | | | | Actual | | | | Gap |
|-------|------------|-----------------|--------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|--------------|--------------|-----------------|
| | IDB (1) | Borrower (2) | Other (3) | Total (4) | IDB (5) | Borrower (6) | Other (7) | Total (8) | (8)- (4) (9) |
| 2000 | | 0.607 | 2.5285 | | | 0.281431 | 0.005518 | | |
| 2001 | | 1.283 | 4.8035 | | | 0.470288 | 0.070208 | | |
| 2002 | | 0.8737 | 1.1135 | | | 0.534743 | 0.139127 | | |
| 2003 | | 0.805 | | | | 1.082576 | 2.883648 | | |
| 2004 | | | | | | 0.791629 | 1.743968 | | |
| 2005 | | | | | | 0.685201 | 1.483004 | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| TOTAL | | 3.5687 | 8.4455 | | | 3.245868 | 6.325473 | | |

Source of information:
To be completed by the author of the Executing Agency Memorandum: Columns (2), (3), (6), (7)

PROJECT COMPLETION SEMINAR

Report on the Project Completion Seminar held at 9:00 a.m. on Wednesday June 15 2005 in the Conference Room of the Inter-American Development Bank, Belize City.

ATTENDEES

| | |
|---|---|
| Hurricane Project Unit | Wayne Williams, Completion Coordinator, HRDPP Godwin Sutherland, Project Engineer, HRDPP Jamillah Bulwer, Administrative Officer, HRDPP Elena Hutchinson, Secretary, HRDPP |
| IDB Executing Agency- Ministry of National Development | Duane Belisle, Senior Economist, MND |
| CDB Executing Agency- Ministry of Works | Cadet Henderson, Chief Engineer, MOW |
| Inter-American Development Bank | Harold Arzu, Operational Specialist, IADB Luis César Acosta, Financial Specialist Marta-Mejia-Zampieri – Multi-Sector Specialist |
| Caribbean Development Bank | George Yearwood, Operations Officer, CDB |
| National Emergency Management | Peter Parchue, Coordinator, NEMO |
| Belize City Council | David Fonseca, Mayor, Belize City Rick Magaña, D.O.T., B.C.C. Froylan Alvarado, Town Planner, B.C.C. |
| Ministry of Education | Lloyd Flowers, Head Bldg & Maintenance T.V.E.T/MOE |
| Ex-Post Consultant | Philip Castillo, U.B. |

DISCUSSION

Opening Remarks

The Programme Completion Coordinator (PCC), Wayne Williams gave the opening remarks on the status of the Hurricane Rehabilitation & Disaster Preparedness Project (HRDPP) mentioning that it was the largest Project that the Government of Belize (GOB) had ever embarked on. He also commented on his belief that the goals set out for the Project have been achieved and that the Project is a success. He further expounded on the different components under the HRDPP, such as the Regional Shelters,

Retrofitting, Drainage, Piers and BWS components, and stated that although there were difficulties and setbacks on major works, the Project has definitely achieved its objectives except for the two shelters that were not constructed, which he believed was a major loss to Belize.

Opening remarks were also presented by the IDB Sector Specialist, Harold Arzu, who stated the purpose of conducting a project completion seminar. This being to revisit the outputs of the Project to determine whether they are consistent with the original objectives of the Project, to discuss lessons learnt, and to discuss the possibility of establishing a mechanism to ensure that certain activities performed/accomplished by the Unit can be sustained.

George Yearwood, CDB representative also commented on the purpose of the completion seminar – being the need to document the challenges faced on the Project; objectives achieved; benefits derived from the Project; and the long-term sustainability of the investment. Furthermore, he commented on the need to hear from the stakeholders on the operation of the different components of the Project.

Status of Various Project Components

Drainage Works

Wayne Williams elaborated on the Drainage Project stating that these works targeted specific areas in the Southside of Belize – 4 total contracts signed for works on the Southside and 1 on the Northside. One additional contract was also signed – Jane Usher Boulevard Canal. These contracts cover about 4500 meters of work, over a two-year period. They have improved Belize City drainage in a major way.

BCC Institutional Strengthening

The BCC, however, has not met its objective in terms of technical support for improved maintenance. Three consultancies were identified to reorganize and improve the Council: the IT network; Administrative; and Town Planning; these three areas were to target the improvement of the BCC to efficiently manage its resources and maintain its capital investment in the infrastructures such as drains and canals. Attempts were made at reorganization of administration, but this wasn't successful and the consultancy was postponed.

Retrofit Works and Construction of Regional Shelters

Project Engineer, Godwin Sutherland. Presented views on the number of local retrofitted shelters and their sustainability in the event of major storms. The indicators on these components are as follows:

There was an initial target of 350 shelters for retrofitting. However, the project has retrofitted thus far a sum of close to 169 shelters, countrywide, packaged as Priority, Small, Large and Hurricane Iris.

The Project also saw the construction of 7 Regional Shelters and the NEMO Headquarters Building. Two classroom buildings were constructed at the University of Belize, Belmopan Campus, a Gymnasium at UB, Belmopan, a classroom at Belmopan Comprehensive School, a Multipurpose Building at Orange Walk Technical, a classroom at Corozal and one at the Agricultural Natural Resources Institute in Stann Creek. One regret in regards to the Regional Shelters Component is the deferral of the construction of the shelters in Punta Gorda.

Local Shelters

In an effort to earn better value for money, instead of retrofitting some shelters in the northern districts, the Unit constructed three local shelters in the northern districts two at San Jose Palmar and one at Caledonia. It is important to note that with the overall retrofit works, and the construction of regional and local shelters, a total capacity of about 30,000 with an average cost of BZ\$780 per person was attained.

Institutional Strengthening of NEMO

The Project has achieved a functional NEMO Headquarters Building, fully equipped with telecommunication and IT equipment and furniture.

However, the major challenge with this component had to do with the following factors:

- Consultant for the construction works
- The occupancy of the building by Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- IT Component – due to occupancy of the building

Maintenance

Most of the shelters were designed as multipurpose buildings – to be used not only on a once a year basis, but to be used throughout the year for functions such as educational, workshops, and entertainment and thereby a fee could be charged for such utilization and which in turn could help to defray the cost of maintenance. Most buildings are being used by schools for educational purposes and therefore should be routinely maintained by these schools as well. Constant monitoring is a necessity for these structures.

A software was created locally to monitor status, locations, capacity and safety of hurricane shelters. Inspections were done to buildings before they were placed on software. The major purpose of this software is to provide users (especially NEMO) with updated information on the readiness of the hurricane shelters. It will be housed at the NEMO Headquarters Building and the Ministry of Works will be the technical agency responsible for it – they will need to correspond with NEMO. This was agreed to during the meeting. Mentioned was also the fact that the consultancy, which saw the

development of this software, also conducted a review of the existing maintenance system to identify problems and to make recommendations for a more effective system.

Comments – Ministry of Education

The representative from the Ministry of Education was concerned about the maintenance of the structures, retrofitted and constructed – whether loan funds were set aside for the maintenance of these structures. Project Unit informed that no such funds were available due to the fact that the Banks do not finance such activities. Those present at the seminar were also informed that with the contracts for the retrofitting of shelters, the Unit ensured that maintenance plans were prepared for each shelter by the contractors/consultants.

Comments – Belize City Council

Mayor David Fonseca voiced his opinion that he believed that the drainage system constructed by the Unit has helped tremendously with the run-off of water. He also commented on the fact that the deferral of the institutional strengthening component has really hurt the Council. The BCC Administration consultancy, the only one implemented had proven to be beneficial to the BCC.

Comments – National Emergency Management Organization (NEMO)

The NEMO Coordinator presented a written presentation, which provided a brief background on the Project and NEMO. He commented on NEMO's satisfaction with their new headquarters building, despite the initial leak problem that was subsequently rectified by the Unit. He also commented on the new IT System installed at NEMO, which they are grateful for. However, there is a shortage of skilled manpower at NEMO to effectively and efficiently take control of the system and maintenance system to be installed at NEMO. Consequently, the NEMO Coordinator was in favor of the Ministry of Works taking control of the new Maintenance System.

Comments – Ministry of Works

Chief Engineer of the Ministry of Works outlined his comments/questions as follows:-

One of the problems encountered on the Project was the construction of the NEMO Headquarters Building and the resistance of the consultants to carry out/implement requests made by the Unit. He also inquired whether the great turnover with the coordinators of the Project affected the coordination of the Unit. He also asked why the Jane Usher Boulevard Canal is not functioning the way it should.

He felt that there is a need to enter into agreements with the end-users of some of the Regional Shelters to ensure that an excessive fee is not charged to the public to utilize the facilities.

Below are the responses provided by the Project Unit:

In regards to the problem with the NEMO Headquarters Building, the Unit has written to the CDB to obtain approval to undertake additional works on the building.

The drainage system in place at the Jane Usher Boulevard allowed water to run off in about ½ hour. However, the new Port Development blocked all the outlets, which affects the operation of the drainage system in place.

Comments – Ministry of National Development

Representative apologized for the CEO's absence from the seminar. He further commented on the loss of two Programme Coordinators due to health reasons. However, the loss did not affect the implementation of the Project.

Executing Agency believes that the structural component of the Project has been achieved to a more than satisfactory level whereas the institutional strengthening activities have been achieved to a satisfactory level. He also commented on the lessons learnt from the problem with the consultants for the NEMO Headquarters Building. He believed that situation should be documented as lessons learnt so as to avoid situations like this one from reoccurring. He then announced GOB's intentions of wanting to *undefers* the construction of the Punta Gorda Regional Shelter the deferred one in Belmopan.

CDB representative responded to this announcement indicating that he needed to refer to management before he could make any decision on financing this aspect of the Project. IDB also needed to discuss the matter internally.

Closing Remarks

The Project Unit closed off by thanking IDB, CDB, MOW and MND for the assistance rendered during the execution of the Project.