



Project Completion Report

Policy-Based Loan

PCR

Project Name: Social Safety Net Reform Program

Country: Trinidad and Tobago

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Loan Number(s): 2598/OC-TT

Project Number(s): TT-L1014

Final Approval Date of PCR:

PCR Team: Ian Ho-A- Shu, Principal Author: Beverly Chase

Acronyms and Abbreviations

CCTP	Conditional Cash Transfer Program
CSO	Central Statistical Office
CSSP	Continuous Sample Survey of Population
DAG	Disability Grant
DPS	Deputy Permanent Secretary
GORTT	Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
MIS	Management Information System
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MOFE	Ministry of Finance and the Economy
MPSD	Ministry of the People and Social Development
PAG	Public Assistance Grant
PBL	Policy Based Loan
PCR	Project Completion Report
PEU	Project Execution Unit
PMT	Proxy Means Test
SC	Steering Committee
SSN	Social Safety Net
TC	Technical Cooperation
TCCTP	Targeted Conditional Cash Transfer Program

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Annexes

I. Basic Information

BASIC DATA (AMOUNTS IN US\$)

PROJECT NO: TT-L1014 **LOAN(s)** **TITLE:** Social Safety Net Reform Program

Programmatic ☒ Yes ☐ No

If yes, list all related Project and Loan Numbers:
2598/OC TT

Borrower: Republic of Trinidad and Tobago
Executing Agency (EA): Ministry of Planning and Sustainable Development supported by the Ministry of the People and Social Development

Date of Board Approval: 19 October, 2011

Date of Loan Contract Effectiveness: 30 November, 2011

Date of Eligibility for First Disbursement: 19 December, 2011

Sector: Social Investment

Months in Execution

* from Approval:

* from Contract Effectiveness:

Disbursement Periods

Original Date of Final Disbursement: 30 November, 2012

Current Date of Final Disbursement 30 November, 2012

Cumulative Extension (Months):

Social Equity (SEQ): Yes

Environmental Classification: A, B, or C

On Alert Status

Is project currently designated "on alert" by PAIS? Yes/No

If yes, then why is the project on alert (DO, IP Ratings and/or relevant PAIS indicators):

Comments on relevance of "on alert" status for this project (if applicable):

Summary Performance Ratings

DO	<input type="checkbox"/> Highly Probable (HP)	<input type="checkbox"/> Probable (P)	<input type="checkbox"/> Low Probability (LP)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Improbable (I)
IP	<input type="checkbox"/> Very Satisfactory (VS)	<input type="checkbox"/> Satisfactory (S)	<input type="checkbox"/> Unsatisfactory (US)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Very Unsatisfactory (VU)
SU	<input type="checkbox"/> Highly Probable (HP)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Probable (P)	<input type="checkbox"/> Low Probability (LP)	<input type="checkbox"/> Improbable (I)

II. The Project

a. Project Context

In 2011 the Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago (GORTT) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) entered into agreement to execute the policy based component of the Social Safety Net (SSN) Reform Program. The execution of the program was to be carried out by the GORTT through the Ministry of Finance and the Economy (MOFE) with the support of the Ministry of the People and Social Development (MPSD).

The GORTT felt that the SSN reform programmatic Policy Based Loan (PBL) operation would contribute to its effort to regain fiscal stability given the existing prevailing economic environment where there was a decrease in economic activity to 3.5 percent in

real terms in 2009 after having experienced economic growth for more than 15 years. It was felt that sustained levels of expenditure, despite substantial decreases in energy revenues, had contributed to the decrease in economic activity.

The Government's social sector spending increased from 5.9 percent of GDP to 7.9 percent of GDP between 2006 and 2010. This expenditure was across seven Ministries: Education; Health; People and Social Development; Community Development; Culture and Gender Affairs; Sports and Youth Affairs; and Labour and Small and Medium Enterprise Development.

The fiscal year 2010/2011, expenditures on cash grants in the MPSD were estimated at US\$409 million with an excess of 98% being shared among four programs. The SSN reform was to focus particularly on the following four cash grants: (i) the Senior Citizens Grant which provided funds to persons 65 years and over; (ii) the Public Assistance Grant (PAG) which financially supported citizens (adults and/or children) who were deemed to be in situations which warrant such support; (iii) the Disability Grant (DAG) which was given to persons who were deemed disabled and unable to earn an income; and (iv) the Targeted Consolidated Cash Transfer Program (TCCTP), which was a short-term food assistance and development program aimed at providing social protection by promoting nutritional and food security to vulnerable households.¹ An analysis of these four programs revealed that there was some form of overlapping and duplication, for example, it was determined that approximately 16% of recipients of that Ministry's TCCTP also received the Senior Citizens Grant, 18 percent received Public Assistance and also TCCTP; and 12 percent received both the Disability Grant and TCCTP.

The GORTT felt that in addition to the SSN Reform Program having a positive impact on the fiscal health of the country it would also contribute to the removal of inefficiencies in the SSN while more effectively meeting the needs of poor and vulnerable citizens.

The GORTT therefore made a request to the IDB for a three single-tranche programmatic PBL series over a 4-year period. The first operation was to be a hybrid operation with a programmatic PBL component of US\$45 million and an investment component of US\$5 million. The Investment Component was to be executed by the MPSD to support activities aligned with the overall policy objectives, support the MPSD institutional capacity and support technical work to action policy conditions in the second and third operations.

As complementary support to the hybrid operation, the Bank approved in 2011 a Technical Cooperation TT-T1010 (ATN/OC-12641-TT) in the sum of \$500,000 to fund the following activities to support the implementation of TT-L1014: (i) a diagnostic of the effectiveness of the poverty reduction efforts delivered by the State; (ii) a Public Social Expenditure Review, with emphasis on the Social Protection programs; (iii) an Institutional analysis of the Ministry of the People and Social Development and the Ministry of Community Development with a view to identify areas that may need to be strengthened in order for them to carry out their mandates most effectively; and (iv) a Mapping and Analysis of the relationship and effectiveness of civil society groups (NGOs, CBOs, etc.) within the context of social service delivery in Trinidad and Tobago.

The GORTT completed the technical work to fulfill all the policy conditions for the first PBL tranche which resulted in the full disbursement of US\$45 million in December 2011.

¹ <http://www2.mpsd.gov.tt/content/social-welfare-division-0>

The policy conditions of Tranche 1 as set in the Policy Matrix (Annex 1) comprised of action plans to implement the reforms. The actual implementation of the reforms was to be done under the second PBL tranche with the support of the Investment Component of the Hybrid Operation. However and as described in more detail in the Project Implementation section, shifting priorities and frequent rotations of senior staff stalled the momentum of the actions needed to carry out this important reform and thus, it was not possible to complete the following key actions in order to advance the implementation reforms required to satisfy the policy conditions set out in second PBL: (i) Establish the Program Steering Committee that would oversee guidance and oversight; and (ii) Develop a comprehensive communication strategy which would form part of the change management process to sustain continuous stakeholder support and buy-in for the complex reforms. With the transfer of the project champion from the MPSD, the technical team at the MPSD also lost the support (at both the policy and operational levels) that were necessary to propel the organizational and structural requirements to implement the reform activities. This subsequently led: (i) to the cancellation of the Investment Operation; and (ii) to the request of Government to remove the second and third programmatic loans in the Bank's project inventory list.

The cancelation was prompted by the changing political economy surrounding the reforms constrained the institutional changes required to implement them. The loan was designed to achieve the depth of institutional changes needed in the Ministry of People and Social Development (MPSD) to rationalize the social protection network and synchronize project implementation results with the political cycle. A softer design would have resulted in entrenching or rubberstamping "business as usual," which would have set back future attempts at reform. The project champion during the design stage was reassigned; in the absence of a strong champion with political influence and presence, program ownership was questionable. In addition, MPSD faced the frequent rotation of senior staff (including five Permanent Secretaries) during project execution, which worked against developing a deep institutional sense of ownership of the reforms and commitment to their execution.

The Government advised the Bank of its decision to cancel the US\$5 million hybrid investment loan, as well as the second and third operations of the programmatic series, in March 2014. The resources from a related TC were also cancelled. The PEU was unable to commit at both the policy and operational levels to the organizational and structural requirements to implement the reform activities. The proxy means test and the monitoring and evaluation framework, while not now in use, were developed and are important tools that can be used in the future and will have potentially large effects on the efficacy of social programs. The loan was officially canceled in January 2015. Due to the delay in getting key Government stakeholders to commit to a firm date, an exit workshop was held 11 months later in December 2015, the results of which were used to inform this PCR. In addition, there was a delay in receiving the completed Borrower Evaluation form which held up the completion of the PCR.

b. Project Description

i. Development Objective(s)

The objective of the SSN Reform Program was to support the GORTT's reform efforts to improve the effectiveness of the SSN programs delivered by the MPSD through: (i) reform of cash grants provided by MPSD; (ii) an improved targeting system for MPSD non-contributory social protection programs; and (iii) capacity development and implementation of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems in the MPSD.

ii. Project Description

The SSN Reform Program comprised three Programmatic PBLs to be implemented towards supporting the GORTT in achieving the stated objective. As outlined in the Results Matrix (Annex 2), specific results indicators were set out for each of the following three components over the three-year Programmatic PBL series:

- (i) Strengthening the delivery of Cash Transfers to enhance efficiency and effectiveness;
- (ii) Developing an efficient, easily verifiable and transparent targeting system; and
- (iii) Developing and implementing a robust Monitoring and Evaluation strategy.

While the Policy Matrix (attached as Annex 1), in the Loan Proposal identified all three operations in the programmatic series, the Loan Contract was prepared only for the first PBL operation (as is typical of this instrument). As detailed in the Policy Matrix, the core activities under each of the three components for the first PBL operation were as follows:

Component I: Cash Transfer Program Component – the reform of cash grants.

This involved the consolidation of existing cash transfer programs and the elimination of duplication in processes and multiple targeting criteria for entry into programs. The MPSD would therefore merge existing cash grant programs and implement one cash transfer program through a single cash grant unit. Households would be targeted as a single unit with selection based on an improved Proxy Means Test (PMT).

Component II: Targeting Component – Improved targeting system for beneficiaries of targeted programs.

This component supported the creation of a Proxy Means Test (PMT) for targeting of programs and the development of a Management Information System (MIS) and a Central Beneficiary Registry that will allow: (i) the entering of data from the PMT forms; and (ii) obtaining of a score that will determine eligibility for targeted programs. The component also involved the implementation of M&E mechanisms to determine the effectiveness of the targeting methods. In this regard, a process evaluation to determine exclusion due to lack of information or interest and inclusion due to performance of the PMT or operational errors was to be undertaken. In addition, an evaluation of targeted outcomes of the new PMT was also to be done. The Central Statistical Office (CSO), was to facilitate these evaluations by including specific questions in the Continuous Sample Survey of Population (CSSP).

Component 3: M&E Component – Capacity development of monitoring and evaluation.

This component involved increasing the M&E capacity of the MPSD through: (i) the design of an M&E plan for the new consolidated CCTP; (ii) training of human resources; (iii) implementation of a series of process evaluations of different aspects of the consolidated CCTP; and (iv) implementation of an impact evaluation of the consolidated CCTP.

III. Results

a. Outcomes

Outcome Indicators and targets for the project were identified in the Results Matrix (attached as Annex 2). Given that the other policy based operations in this series which were to implement the reform did not take place, the stated outcomes were not achieved.

ACHIEVEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES (DO)	
Development Objective ((Purpose)	<p>The objective of the program was to support the GORTT's reform efforts to improve the effectiveness of the SSN programs delivered by the MPSD through:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) reform of cash grants provided by MPSD; (ii) an improved targeting system for MPSD's noncontributory social protection programs; and (iii) capacity development and implementation of M&E systems in the MPSD.
<p>1. Cash Transfer Program Component – the reform of cash grants to consolidate existing cash transfer programs and eliminate duplication in processes and multiple targeting criteria for entry into programs. In this regard, the MPSD would merge existing cash grant programs implementing one cash transfer program through a single cash grant unity.</p> <p>Classification: I</p>	
<p><u>Key Planned Outcome Indicators</u></p> <p>1.1 Increase efficiency gains of the program by decreasing redundant transaction fees.</p> <p>1.1 B Monthly fee of \$178,000 TT dollars/month.</p> <p>1.1E 80% decrease in monthly fees.</p> <p>1.2 Increase efficiency gains by eliminating leakage.</p> <p>1.2B 0</p> <p>1.2 E TT\$ 98.7 million savings from PAG and to TT\$113,4 million savings from TCCTP.</p> <p>1.3 Increase effectiveness of the programs by enforcing compliance of co-responsibilities.</p> <p>1.3 B 0 (no beneficiaries have lost their transfer as a consequence of not fulfilling conditions)</p> <p>1.3 E 70% of beneficiaries complying with co-responsibilities.</p> <p>1.4 Increase human capital of beneficiaries, particularly youth in forms 3 to 5.</p> <p>1.4 B Poor 14 year olds attending secondary: 74%</p> <p>Poor 15 year olds attending secondary: 74%</p> <p>Poor 16 year olds attending secondary: 65%</p>	<p><u>Outcomes Achieved</u></p> <p>1.1 N/A</p> <p>1.2 N/A</p> <p>1.3 N/A</p> <p>1.4 N/A</p>

1.4 E Poor 14 year olds attending secondary: 80% Poor 15 year olds attending secondary: 80% Poor 16 year olds attending secondary: 72%	
2. <u>Develop an efficient, easily verifiable and transparent targeting system that can be used for targeted safety net programs</u>	
Classification: I	
<u>Key Planned Outcome Indicators</u>	<u>Outcomes Achieved</u>
2.1 Decrease inclusion errors (measured by % beneficiaries in the bottom 2 quintiles)	2.1 N/A
2.1B 46.4%	2.2 N/A
2.1E 58%	
2.2 Decrease poverty rate due to under coverage and consolidation of programs	
2.2 B 16.8%	
2.2E 15.54%	
3. <u>Development and implementation of a robust M & E strategy</u>	
Classification: I	
<u>Key Planned Outcome Indicators</u>	<u>Outcomes Achieved</u>
3.1 Improve the capacity for the development and implementation of an M&E strategy	3.1 N/A
3.1B 0	
3.1E Process evaluations completed and fieldwork started from follow up of impact evaluation	
Reformulation [] N/A	
PPMR Retrofitting. Indicate if and when the PPMR was retrofitted and explain any changes resulting from this exercise. [] N/A	
Summary Development Objective(s) Classification (DO):	
[] Highly Probable (HP)	[] Probable (P)
[] Low Probability (LP)	[x] Improbable (I)
Although important technical work that was part of the first series was carried out, the subsequent series were not. The outcomes of the project were not achieved. Although the policy reforms selected were all achieved, the investment component which was supposed to support the achievement of these reforms was cancelled. In addition, the subsequent programmatic series was placed in inventory. The political economy changed between design and implementation which was the main constrain to implement the changes the loan had envisioned.	
Country Strategy. The Bank's country strategy for 2011 – 2015 has social protection as one of its priority areas. Therefore, the project would have contributed to the country strategy had it been implemented fully.	

b. Disbursements

DISBURSEMENT TRANCHES				
Tranches	Amount (US\$000)	Expected Date	Actual Date	Waiver Granted Yes/No
1 (single tranche)	45,000,000	20 December, 2011	20 December, 2011	No
All conditions were met satisfactorily for the single tranche and the resources were disbursed.				

c. Outputs

IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS (IP)	
Thematic Areas/Components:	Key Conditionalities/Output Indicators:
1. Thematic Area/Component 1: Design features of Consolidated Cash Transfer Program (CCTP) <u>Classification:</u> VU	<u>Outputs Achieved</u> A plan for the consolidation of cash grants was developed. The plans were however not executed.
Briefly explain differences between planned and actual outputs (if applicable). <input type="checkbox"/> N/A	
2. Thematic Area/Component 2: Targeting Component – Improved targeting system for beneficiaries of targeted programs <u>Classification:</u> VU	<u>Outputs Achieved</u> A module to monitor targeting of the CCTP for inclusion in the Continuous Sample Survey of Population was sent to the Central Statistical Office (CSO) but was not included. A PMT was created and tested but not piloted nor implemented.
Briefly explain differences between planned and actual outputs (if applicable). <input type="checkbox"/> N/A	
3. Thematic Area/Component 3: M&E Component – Capacity development of monitoring and evaluation <u>Classification:</u> VU	<u>Outputs Achieved</u> A Monitoring and Evaluation Framework was developed but no associated activities pursued. This component was to be supported by the Investment Component of the loan which was never implemented and eventually cancelled.
Briefly explain differences between planned and actual outputs (if applicable). <input type="checkbox"/> N/A	
Summary Implementation Progress Classification: <input type="checkbox"/> Highly Satisfactory (HS) <input type="checkbox"/> Satisfactory (S) <input type="checkbox"/> Unsatisfactory(U) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Very Unsatisfactory (VU)	

IV. Project Implementation

a. Analysis of Critical Factors

There were several critical factors which were necessary for the project to be successful:

- (1) The loan intended to propel important reforms to rationalize the social protection network alongside institutional changes within the Ministry of People and Social Development (MPSD). During the design, the loan used the experiences of other conditional cash transfers in LAC. Although the approach was appropriate and relevant during design, the changes in the political economy had negative impacts

during implementation.² In the future, it would be useful to analyse the order in which investment instruments are used to propel reforms. Given the preparatory work and stakeholder engagement that was required, a model of TC, Investment Loan and then PBL may be more appropriate to the Caribbean context.

- (2) Need for both Political and Technical Champions. While the design of the PBL loan operation was technically sound and appropriate for the country, the shifting political economy called for both a strong Political Champion who could exert political influence at the policy level and a Technical Champion at the operational level who could drive the implementation of the reforms, had these champions been present in the design phase they may have been able to garner momentum and stimulate action earlier and faster. In the absence of such, the project stalled. In addition, during implementation, MPSD faced the frequent rotation of senior staff (including five Permanent Secretaries) which did not foster the enabling environment to carry out deep institutional reforms nor did it create a sense of ownership or commitment of the intended reforms. There was consensus among interviewees that once the Deputy Permanent Secretary (DPS) at the MPSD was transferred to another Ministry, there were challenges to implementation as the DPS was seen as the technical champion who had strong technical/administrative competencies as well as the organizational savvy to effectively lead the implementation of the SSN reforms at the Ministry operational level. Additionally, it should be noted that the Minister of Finance and the Minister of the People and Social Development were from different political parties. The complexity of navigating the internal politics of a coalition government may have required greater attention than foreseen during the design phase of this project.
- (3) Greater understanding of the implementation process. In its original format, this project was to be executed by the Ministry of Finance, along the way it was changed to the MPSD, which may have introduced further implementation challenges. In the absence of technical support to the project from the MPSD or its supervising agency, the Ministry of Planning and Sustainable Development, the project manager attempted to facilitate activities with little or no support from the said Ministries, in an effort to try to advance project implementation. The communication strategy was not implemented. The Project Manager was not in a position to influence policy decisions. For example, even though the Project Manager had worked with the stakeholders to schedule the implementation of the PMT pilot in Sangre Grande, the decision to actually conduct the pilot was never taken by senior management and as a result, it never happened.
- (4) Project Oversight. The project required the establishment of a Program Steering Committee (SC) with responsibility for overall program guidance and oversight. The SC was to have been chaired by the MPSD and to comprise representation from several Ministries (who were also implementing social protection projects that would be rationalized) as well as members of Civil Society and the Union. Such a SC was never established since the required cabinet approval was never sought by the MPSD. Without having the benefit of the SC mechanism, the collaboration and synergy among participating Ministries and Civil Society required to effectively implement the project did not materialize.

² The changes in the political economy were highlighted in the OVE Country Program Evaluation of TT 2011-2015, November 2016 <https://publications.iadb.org/handle/11319/8060>

The country's social safety net is made up of multiple programs (a total of 120) administered by many actors (ministries and agencies). With the rotation of senior staff including Permanent Secretaries, without the influential champions, and without this steering committee the reforms stalled.

- (5) Project Execution Unit. There was a Project Execution Unit (PEU) of three people, headed by a Program Manager. Despite a clear and approved Terms of Reference by the MPSD, there seemed to be some misunderstanding by the MPSD, in particular, as to the role of the Program Manager at the PEU; that is, whether the role was to manage the implementation of the Implementation Component of the project or to be the interlocutor between the MPSD and the IDB, or both. In addition, the loss of the technical champion as outlined in (1) above at the MPSD also created uncertainty at the PEU on how to proceed with the activities set out in the Investment Component.
- (6) Perceptions of Job Losses. Given the nature of reforms proposed under the project, there was the perception by a number of MPSD personnel that the reforms may bring job losses. This perception may have been grounded in the way the human resources are structured in the Public Sector where some employees are permanent public officers while others are temporary contract officers on month-to-month contracts. For example, at the time, more than 80% of the employees working with the TCCTP were contract officers who might be susceptible to loss of jobs should there be mergers and/or streamlining of the various programs towards improved efficiency of delivery. While no firm evidence of this was found, some respondents mentioned that such a perception may have contributed to a lack of motivation to implement project reform activities. It should be noted that the project document had in fact included the union as part of the Program Steering Committee to ensure that such employees' interests and concerns were addressed. However, the Program Steering Committee was never convened as explained in (3) above. Additionally, with such highly politically sensitive reforms underway, as the union was not engaged during the design phase, this may have lowered initial buy-in and hindered the project in its ability to address challenges early on.
- (7) Political Sensitivities. The reforms were designed to achieve important institutional changes needed to rationalize the social protection network and improve targeting which could have resulted in the elimination of existing benefits or projects. The intention was that the implementation of the different stages of reforms would yield results within a political cycle. From the beginning, there was discussion that the rationalization may lead to some projects closing. With the passage of time, the full implementation of the reforms proved to be even more delicate and politically charged than previously foreseen. To improve efficiency, the proposed targeting mechanism would've reduce leakages and undercoverage which would have resulted in the reduction of certain benefits and would have resulted in the exiting of some beneficiaries. The technical design drew upon the experiences of other conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs implemented by the Bank in LAC, and while it was technically sound and relevant for the country, it seems that the Government may have underestimated the political sensitivities involved to implement the reforms. In the Caribbean region, these types of reforms have had difficulty achieving high success rates despite technical soundness and politically

sensitive design, proving that the issues of this project may have also been systemic.

b. Borrower/Executing Agency Performance

For reasons outlined above, the performance of the MPSD, the focal point for the project, appeared to be less than satisfactory since all responses indicated that the project was stagnant. It was reported that while decisions were taken at meetings, there were little or no resulting actions and/or follow-up.

The project carried out all the activities of the first loan, but while progress was made in the areas of legislation, policy and existing structures however there was no allocation of resources by the MPSD to facilitate the needed reforms. While this was recognised by the MPSD, other Ministry activities external to the project took precedence over the SSN program.

At a Portfolio Review meeting in October 2013 to discuss the scope of the SSN, Government indicated that while the full programmatic series had some elements of the reforms, Government took a policy decision to carry out broader reforms across the entire Public Service to look at the cross cutting nature of all its social protection and social safety net delivery programs. To this end and noting that this decision represented a significant departure from the original scope of the Programmatic series, Government its desire to place Phases 2 of the Programmatic series in inventory.

Borrower/Executing Agency			
<input type="checkbox"/> Highly Satisfactory (HS)	<input type="checkbox"/> Satisfactory (S)	<input type="checkbox"/> Unsatisfactory (U)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Very Unsatisfactory (VU)

c. Bank Performance

In assessing the Bank's performance for the PBL, it was important to focus on the support provided during loan preparatory stages and during project implementation. Respondents stated that the Bank was supportive in preparatory stages of the project. This was demonstrated through the engagement of personnel from the MOFE and the MPSD as well as other key stakeholders. The Bank, during this stage not only sought to gather information on operations of the MPSD but through specialists, shared with the stakeholders, experiences in social protection and information on the utilization of PMTs. This it was felt served to provide stakeholders with additional information on Social Safety Nets and reinforced the need for reform in the local context. The Bank through its approach during the preparatory stage was therefore able to ensure that the main SSN components to be addressed by the project, and the associated required studies to be undertaken, were identified.

Some interviewees indicated that the Bank was extremely proactive as a supervisor during the implementation phase. The Bank was seen to have played a key role in ensuring that the Policy Triggers for the first tranche of the programmatic series was achieved within the required scheduled timeframe. In many instances, the Bank provided technical support to facilitate the completion of the required items. Interviewees indicated that while the Bank continued to demonstrate unswerving support, the project implementation challenges experienced by the MPSD resulted in the non-realization of

the required Policy Triggers for the second tranche of the programmatic series. After extensive consultation with Government, the Bank subsequently agreed to this second tranche being placed in inventory.

Bank Performance			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Highly Satisfactory (HS)	<input type="checkbox"/> Satisfactory (S)	<input type="checkbox"/> Unsatisfactory (U)	<input type="checkbox"/> Very Unsatisfactory (VU)

V. Sustainability

a. Analysis of Critical Factors

1. GORTT's commitment to continue the reform agenda. The most critical factor related to the sustainability of the SSN reform is the GORTT's commitment to continue the reform agenda. There seems to be some interest towards continuity given the efforts being made to improve the efficiency of the SSN. For example, the country has continued to implement several actions related to the social safety net, such as the biometric card, which was launched in 2015 for the payment of food support, pensions, and public support. The proxy means test developed under the loan is being refined for implementation in 2018. The Government has also indicated its interest in a "social services center" where beneficiaries from different social programs can apply through a single window; however, this initiative may require legislative changes.

The Ministry of Public Administration recently commenced a Business Process Management Initiative which is focused on achieving integration of processes inclusive of those like the Consolidated Cash Transfers. The MPSD is one of the Ministries involved in this initiative and is currently tasked by the Ministry of Public Administration to develop a road map of their processes. This initiative is reportedly funded by the GORTT.

2. Placed in Inventory. The fact that the second tranche of the programmatic series was not cancelled but placed in inventory is an indication that there seems to be recognition for a future need for such an initiative. Further, most, if not all people interviewed indicated that the project was necessary to improve the SSN. The diagnosis and the need to carry out the actions set out in the investment portion was relevant and it is probable that there might be renewed interest to resuscitate the required actions to support improving efficiency in the SSN.

b. Potential Risks

As set out in the project document, it was noted that with the implementation of the PMT came political risks, especially since current beneficiaries receiving cash grants may be excluded, once they did not pass the PMT. This risk was to be mitigated with a communication strategy coupled with a beneficiary exit strategy which were integral components of the Consolidation Plan for the Cash Transfer Programs. However as previously mentioned, neither the PMT nor the Consolidation Plan was implemented.

c. Institutional Capacity

Capacity Development was seen as one of the key needs for the project's success. Special allowance through the Investment Component of the SSN program was made for

this. Given that this component was cancelled, it meant that for continuity in the future, such a need will have to be revisited.

Sustainability Classification SU:			
<input type="checkbox"/> Highly Probable (HP)	<input type="checkbox"/> Probable (P)	<input type="checkbox"/> Low Probability (LP)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Improbable (I)

VI. Monitoring and Evaluation

a. Information on Results

According to the Loan Contract No. 2598/OC-TT, a Steering Committee would be established by the MOFE, with the responsibility for overall program guidance and oversight as well as to review the progress on the execution of the policy reforms. This committee was to be chaired by the MPSD. The steering committee never met because the requisite approvals from Cabinet were never sought. There were however regular meetings of a steering committee at the MPSD comprising approximately eight persons from the MPSD and the Project Execution Unit of three persons. To support effective project implementation and oversight, a Monitoring and Evaluation Framework was developed, however associated activities were not implemented. This component was to be supported by the Investment Component of the loan which was never implemented and subsequently cancelled weakening the possibility of effective Monitoring and Evaluation activities.

b. Future Monitoring and Ex-Post Evaluation

All policy triggers to facilitate the first disbursement were achieved. Since the project was subsequently placed on inventory, there is no need for future monitoring and evaluation.

VII. Lessons Learned

The lessons learned are based on those suggested by interviewees during the evaluation process:

- i. **Stakeholder Identification and Engagement.** In projects that are trying to promote complex policy measures, it would be recommended to carry out and update periodically a stakeholder analysis which could be used to inform how other supporters could be mobilized at different stages of the project. The TC resources were to play an important role in mobilizing other supporters. Particularly the TC would have generated the empirical data and information to substantiate the benefits of the changes that were to be implemented with the project. The evidence would have been used to keep supporters engaged and solidify their buy-in. In addition, the research could have identified an implementation strategy presenting options to minimize negative impact socially and politically. There was a perception that there could be job losses as result of the reforms proposed under the SSN, and it was believed that unions would not support the measures. Frequent engagement with unions providing information and communicating what the analysis was demonstrating (pertaining job loss) could have been useful to address some of their concerns. A clear identification of the supporters and opponents would have helped particularly when the champion was lost.

- ii. **Transition plans between project directors.** Personnel changes in public service is common. This often leaves a void as was reportedly experienced early in the life of the SSN Reform Program, in which the project champion, the DPS from MPSD was transferred unexpectedly to another ministry. It would have been useful to prepare a transition plan for the new staff in the coordinating unit. Transition plans should include background. Given the absence of technical support, the Project Manager was not in a position to influence policy decisions which directly impacted the success of this project. Additional efforts must be made for future projects to retain and maintain project buy-in with project champions and technical support in order to empower staff to successfully implement projects.
- iii. **Political Champion.** Strong overlapping of political and administrative support can influence implementation and project outputs and outcomes negatively or positively. It would be important to seek and promote a common vision of the reforms at the technical and political level. One mechanism may be to have the project reside in a Ministry where the support of the political directorate has been demonstrated and then transferred to the line Ministry once it is operational.

Annexes:

1. Original Policy Matrix
2. Results Matrix
3. List of Persons Interviewed
4. List of Documents Consulted
5. Borrower Evaluation

Annex 1 - Original Policy Matrix

The objectives of the Social Safety Net Reform Program are to: (i) improve the efficiency and effectiveness of key safety net programs; and (ii) establish a coherent and fiscally sustainable social safety net in Trinidad and Tobago.

ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN DURING EXECUTION TO TRIGGER DISBURSEMENTS

Specific Objectives	Policy triggers for the 1 st programmatic loan	Policy triggers for the 2 nd programmatic loan	Policy triggers for the 3 rd programmatic loan
I. Macroeconomic Framework			
Maintain a stable macroeconomic framework.	The Borrower shall maintain an appropriate macroeconomic policy framework congruent with the program's objectives and in accordance with the provisions of the Policy Letter.	The Borrower shall maintain an appropriate macroeconomic policy framework congruent with the program's objectives and in accordance with the provisions of the Policy Letter.	The Borrower shall maintain an appropriate macroeconomic policy framework congruent with the program's objectives and in accordance with the provisions of the Policy Letter.
II. Cash Transfer Programs			
Strengthen the delivery of Cash Transfer to enhance efficiency and effectiveness	<p>Ministerial approval of design features of Consolidated Cash Transfer Program (CCTP) including³:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -definition of target population. -estimation of the size of eligible population. -value and structure of the benefits. -form that the revised social contract will take with respect to the conditionalities to be monitored and enforced for receipt of benefits. <p>Cabinet approved plan⁴ developed in consultation with all relevant stakeholders for consolidation⁵ of TCCTP, Public Assistance, Old-Age Pension, Dietary, Clothing, Education, School Supplies and Disability Grants. Key elements of the plan to include:</p>	Operations manual for the CCTP approved by the Bank and by Permanent Secretary of MPSD. ⁸	<p>Value of benefit from consolidated cash transfer maintained in real terms at level agreed in policy trigger for 1st programmatic loan.</p> <p>Evidence that compliance with social contract (beneficiary co-responsibilities) continues to be enforced.</p>

³ This will include bank support through workshop sessions to reach necessary agreements.

⁴ This will include bank support through workshop sessions to reach necessary agreements.

⁵ The plan for the consolidation of the programs will be based on evidence regarding the specific details about where there will be efficiency gains based mainly upon the cost benefit analysis and other related technical work to prepare the program. The plan should include meaningful changes for key items, including: personnel structure, infrastructure and system processes.

Specific Objectives	Policy triggers for the 1 st programmatic loan	Policy triggers for the 2 nd programmatic loan	Policy triggers for the 3 rd programmatic loan
	<p>-Description of the consultation process to be followed to develop the plan.</p> <p>-Transition plan for the integration of systems, personnel, infrastructure and processes.</p> <p>-Plan for monitoring compliance with conditionalities.⁶</p> <p>-Plan for recertification of existing beneficiaries.</p> <p>-Plan for enrolment of new beneficiaries and exit strategy.</p> <p>-Plan for the design of the Executing Unit for the CCTP.</p> <p>Cabinet approved Steering Committee to oversee the implementation of the CCTP.⁷</p> <p>MIS modules for data entry of applications and for calculation of PMT score complete and piloted.</p>	<p>Evidence that compliance with social contract (beneficiary co-responsibilities) is being enforced.⁹</p> <p>Transition of personnel, infrastructure, and systems to CCTP complete.</p> <p>Full MIS for consolidated cash grant launched.</p>	<p>Evidence of compliance with recertification process according to Operations Manual.</p> <p>Submission of management audit¹⁰ (of quality acceptable to Bank) for consolidated cash transfer.</p> <p>Report of an external evaluation of MIS and payment mechanism and recommendations adopted in revised version of the Operations Manual approved by Bank.</p>

⁸ To include design of consolidated program, including responsibilities of key staff, and all of the processes to be followed for enrollment, recertification, delivery of transfers, key links to other ministries and programs and monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to be followed, including reports to be submitted to the IDB. The OM should also include the level of benefit, targeting and eligibility criteria, co-responsibilities, duration of eligibility and recertification requirements, internal and external audits, and appeal mechanisms.

⁶ The plan would identify institutional reforms (consolidation of divisions, governance structure); operational reforms (including MIS, payment systems, and key performance and operational indicators), criteria to define the eligible population, the estimation of the size of the eligible population, the definition of the size and design of the benefits associated with the consolidated cash transfer, and the plan to support the transition from the current array of programs to the CCTP.

⁷ As evidenced by a letter from the Ministry of Finance confirming Cabinet's decision.

⁹ Report to Bank indicating the percentage of beneficiaries per month that were compliant with co-responsibilities, those that were non-compliant and did not receive the transfer and those that did not receive transfer due to noncompliance with co-responsibilities.

¹⁰ A management audit is a systematic assessment of methods and policies of an organization's management in the administration and the use of resources, tactical and strategic planning, and employee and organizational improvement. The objectives of a management audit are to (1) establish the current level of effectiveness, (2) suggest improvements, and (3) lay down standards for future performance.

Specific Objectives	Policy triggers for the 1 st programmatic loan	Policy triggers for the 2 nd programmatic loan	Policy triggers for the 3 rd programmatic loan
III. Targeting			
Develop an efficient, easily verifiable and transparent targeting system that can be used for targeted safety net programs	<p>Cabinet approved plan for the use of the new Proxy Means Test (PMT) for CCTP under the MPSD¹¹</p> <p>Module to monitor targeting of CCTP included in <i>Continuous Sample Survey of Population</i> in 1st quarter of 2012.¹²</p>	<p>Evidence that PMT is being used to select beneficiaries for the consolidated cash transfer program. At least 60% of the total roster of beneficiaries should have been selected or recertified based on the PMT.¹³</p> <p>Module to monitor targeting of consolidated cash transfer included in <i>Continuous Sample Survey of Population</i> for 3rd quarter of 2012 and 1st quarter of 2013</p> <p>Process evaluation of adequacy of TCCTP demand-based model to incorporate beneficiaries for a CCTP.¹⁴ Revised enrolment process based on recommendations from evaluation.</p>	<p>Evidence that PMT is being used to select beneficiaries for the consolidated cash transfer program. At least 75% of the total roster of beneficiaries should have been selected or recertified based on the PMT.</p> <p>Targeting evaluation of the consolidated cash transfer program¹⁵ has been conducted and the PMT and MIS for consolidated cash transfer program have been updated based on recommendation of this evaluation. The updates are included in a revised Operations Manual approved by the Permanent Secretary of the MPSD.</p> <p>Evidence that PMT and MIS for consolidated cash transfer program have been updated based on recommendations from targeting evaluation.</p> <p>Cabinet approved Plan to expand use of PMT to other targeted safety net programs.</p>

¹¹ The plan would identify the strategy to assess the eligibility of current and new beneficiaries for the consolidated CCTP and exit strategy for current and new beneficiaries who will not be eligible for the consolidated CCTP. The plan would also identify the strategy for capturing new beneficiaries including geographical areas for specific outreach exercise, promotion methods and timeline to be prioritized.

¹² The targeting module would be included in the CSSP annually.

¹³ Indicator = New enrolments using PMT +existing beneficiaries recertified using PMT. Total beneficiaries of the program

¹⁴ This evaluation should include focus groups to answer key questions such as beneficiaries' knowledge and understanding of the program.

¹⁵ The evaluation would consist on a census of a few selected geographical areas to collect information about socioeconomic characteristics, and information about the percentage of population (who should and should not get the program) who know about the program, who applied for the program, got into the program and the reasons behind each one of these answers (see Coady and Parker, 2004). Information from the Continuous Sample Survey of Population should be also used.

Specific Objectives	Policy triggers for the 1 st programmatic loan	Policy triggers for the 2 nd programmatic loan	Policy triggers for the 3 rd programmatic loan
IV. Monitoring and Evaluation			
Development and implementation of a robust monitoring and evaluation strategy	<p>Monitoring and Evaluation Plan for the CCTP approved by Cabinet.¹⁶</p> <p>Evidence that budget for the design and baseline for the impact and process evaluations of the CCTP have been assigned.¹⁷</p> <p>Evidence that competent staff are in place to implement the M&E plan.¹⁸</p>	<p>Design and sample selection for impact evaluation submitted to, and approved by Bank.</p> <p>Design of the process evaluation submitted to, and approved by Bank.</p> <p>Evidence that the monitoring system as specified in M&E Framework is being implemented.</p> <p>Evidence (based on signed contracts for impact and process evaluations) that implementation of evaluations specified in the M&E Plan has commenced.</p>	<p>Revised Operations Manual based on findings of process evaluation approved by Permanent Secretary of MPSP.</p> <p>First round of the impact evaluation of CCTP carried out and revised Operations Manual based on preliminary findings of first round of evaluation approved by the Permanent Secretary of MPSP and by Bank.</p>

¹⁶ Plan to include as a minimum, mechanisms to carry out process evaluations, impact evaluations and beneficiary assessments.

¹⁷ As evidenced by letter from the Ministry of Finance confirming the 2012 budget allocation for the design and baseline for the impact and process evaluations.

¹⁸ As evidenced by letter from the Ministry of the People and Social Development assigning competent staff with the appropriate combination of training and experience to oversee the implementation of the M&E plan.

Annex 2 - Results Matrix

Sub Components	Base	Yr 1	Yr 2	Yr 3	Comments
1.1 MPSD Strategic Plan 2011-2016: Departmental Operational Plans					
Expected results					
1.1.1. Updated MPSD Strategic Plan and new departmental operational plans	0	Cabinet approval of MPSD strategic plan	Implementation of departmental operational plans	Review and update of departmental plans	In order to achieve common consensus, a critical component of the strategic plan will include a change management component and transition plan along with an internal stakeholder communications strategy.
1.1.2. Staff training	0	Ministerial approval of staff training plan to support implementation of consolidated cash transfer plan	40% of MPSD frontline client staff trained	60% of MPSD frontline client staff trained	Quality insurance will be carried out by the MPSD's training unit to ensure that service staff is well trained to implement the consolidated cash transfer program.
2.1 IT Systems expansion; design of Central Beneficiary Registry					
Expected results					
Conceptual design for the CBR	0	Ministerial approval of: (i) IT expansion Plan; and (ii) Conceptual Design for the Central Beneficiary Registry (CBR)	Installation of CBR and implementation of wider IT expansion plan	Refinements to CBR	It is expected that by year 2, the MPSD will use the CBR to administer and evaluate the consolidated transfer program.
3.1 M & E Framework					
Outputs					
Updated M&E Framework	0	Cabinet approval of M&E revised framework	Implementation of process and impact evaluation of the CCTP in line with the revised M & E framework	Use of M&E framework for other targeted SSN programs	
4.1 Civil Society Strategy					
Expected results					
Civil Society Integration Strategy and Implementation Plan	0	Ministerial approval of civil society integration strategy and implementation plan	Implementation of plan	Review and update of plan	In order to generate synergies and cohesion, the civil society integration plan will include a process of information sharing among all SSN program providers, both public and private, to provide

					information about the complementarities of what each provider does.
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Annex 3 – List of Persons Interviewed

Name	Position/Organisation	Method
Gary Tagallie	Director, Poverty Reduction Unit/Ministry of the People and Social Development	Telephone (twice) Questionnaire
Melissa Bertrand	Planning Officer II/ Ministry of Planning and Sustainable Development	Telephone Interview
Jacinta Bailey – Sobers	Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Public Utilities (formerly of the MPSD)	Telephone Interview
Wayne Maughn	Former Project Manager, SSN Program	Interview (Face to face) Telephone Interview
Vijay Gangapersad	Chief Technical Officer, MPSD	Interview (2) – both incomplete
Kieron Richards	Change Management Specialist, Ministry of Public Administration	Telephone Interview
Bertrand Bernard	Former Project Accountant, SSN Program	Telephone Interview
Narine Charran	Senior Economist, MOF	Telephone conversation Correspondence via email
Nirmala Maharaj	Research Officer/MPSD	Telephone Interview (twice) and Questionnaire
Beverly Khan	Socio-Economic Policy Planning (SEPP), Director (Ag)/ Ministry of Planning and Sustainable Development	Telephone Interview


Annex 4 – List of Documents Consulted

1. Trinidad and Tobago Social Safety Net Reform Program (TT-L1014): Loan Proposal
2. Loan Contract No. 2598/OC-TT between the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago and the IDB, Social Safety Net Reform Program (First Programmatic Operation - PBL Component) November 30, 2011
3. Loan Contract No. 2599/OC-TT between the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago and the IDB, Social Safety Net Reform Program (Investment Component) November 30, 2011
4. Monitoring and Evaluation plan for CCTP, Ministry of the People and Social Development Nov 2011
5. Brief on Cancellation of Loan Resources Social Safety Net Reform Program. TT-L1014
6. Mission Reports
7. Implementation and Management Plan
8. Reports on Stakeholder's workshops and public dissemination campaigns
9. Draft Consolidation Plan for Existing Cash Transfers
10. Draft Proxy Means Test
11. Draft Job Descriptions for key personnel
12. Draft MIS Module Report
13. Draft MIS Report – Findings on the PMT
14. Draft TOR Inter Ministerial Committee for the Development and Implementation of the CCTP
15. Memo from Permanent Secretary, MPSD to Permanent Secretary MOFE on Assignment of Staff to implement the Monitoring and Evaluation Plan for IDB Social Sector Reform Project
16. IDB Country Strategy with the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago 2011 -2015

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BORROWER EVALUATION FORM

Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago



Inter-American Development Bank
Project Completion Report
Borrower Evaluation

Project Name: Social Safety Net Program (PBL and Investment Components)	
Executing Agency: Ministry of Finance and Economy; Ministry of People and Social Development	
Borrower: Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago	
Date of Project Approval for PBL Component (LO-2599/OC-TT): 19 October 2011	Date of Contract Effectiveness for PBL Component(LO-2599/OC-TT): 30 November 2011
Date of Project Approval for Investment Component (LO-2598/OC-TT): 19 October 2011	Date of Contract Effectiveness for Investment Component (LO-2598/OC-TT): 30 November 2011
Date of Borrower Evaluation:	Expected Date of Exit Workshop: 19 October 2015

Borrower Project Performance Ratings

Probability on Achieving its Development Objective(s):

☐ Highly Probable (HP) ☐ Probable (P) ☒ Low Probability (LP) ☐ Improbable (I)

Project Implementation:

☐ Highly Satisfactory (HS) ☐ Satisfactory (S) ☒ Unsatisfactory (US) ☐ Very Unsatisfactory (VU)

Sustainability of Project Results:

☐ Highly Probable (HP) ☐ Probable(P) ☒ Low Probability (LP) ☐ Improbable (I)

Comments:

Bank Performance

Please rate the Bank's overall performance during project preparation and execution. Factors to be considered include the extent to which the Bank facilitated a participatory project design, proposed adequate technical solutions to the problems identified, and responded to the needs of the Borrower (timeliness, selection of instrument type) as well as technical assistance (including informal and formal training) to Executing Agency, timeliness of Bank response and the Bank's flexibility to respond to emergency situations during project implementation. Your comments will be incorporated unedited into the PCR.

☐ Highly Satisfactory (HS) ☒ Satisfactory (S) ☐ Unsatisfactory (US) ☐ Very Unsatisfactory (VU)

Comments:

Borrower Performance

Please rate your own overall performance during project preparation and execution.

☐ Highly Satisfactory (HS) ☐ Satisfactory (S) ☒ Unsatisfactory (US) ☐ Very Unsatisfactory (VU)

Additional Suggestions for Improving Bank Performance

Additional comments/suggestions for improving Bank performance in the future.

Comments:

Signature:

Deepak Khara

Date:

January 8, 2016