



## Board of Executive Directors

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**To:** The Board of Executive Directors  
**From:** The Secretary  
**Subject:** Guatemala. Proposal for a loan for a violence prevention program

**Basic Information:** Borrower ..... Republic of Guatemala  
Amount ..... up to US\$29 million  
Source ..... Single Currency Facility of the Ordinary Capital

**Inquiries to:** Ms. Nathalie Alvarado (extensión 2662)

**Remarks:** The attached document exceeds the page limit established in document CS-3528-2 "New guidelines on documents for Board consideration", nevertheless, Management deemed necessary to authorize its distribution, due to its special nature.

**References:** GN-1838-1(7/94), DR-398-5(5/03)

**Other distribution:** Representative in Guatemala

DOCUMENT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK

## **GUATEMALA**

### **VIOLENCE PREVENTION PROGRAM**

**(GU-0163)**

### **LOAN PROPOSAL**

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## CONTENTS

### PROJECT SUMMARY

I.	FRAME OF REFERENCE .....	1
A.	Background .....	1
B.	Expressions of violence among the most vulnerable groups .....	3
C.	The institutional setting.....	4
1.	Existing prevention initiatives and actions .....	5
2.	Institutional shortcomings in violence prevention and crime .....	8
D.	The Bank and country strategies for dealing with the problem, and lessons learned.....	10
E.	Program strategy .....	12
F.	Coordination with other donors.....	13
II.	THE PROGRAM.....	13
A.	Objectives .....	13
B.	Description .....	13
1.	Subprogram 1. Comprehensive measures to prevent violence .....	14
2.	Subprogram 2. Comprehensive interventions at the municipal and local level, and institutional strengthening for the VAC .....	18
3.	Subprogram 3. Strengthening the government's capacity to formulate, evaluate and update prevention policies .....	21
C.	Cost and financing .....	23
III.	PROGRAM EXECUTION .....	25
A.	Borrower and executing agency .....	25
B.	Project execution and administration .....	25
1.	Organization of execution.....	25
2.	Program coordination.....	26
3.	Annual Work Plans (AWPs) .....	28
4.	Program Operating Regulations .....	28
C.	Procurement of goods and services .....	28
D.	Disbursement schedule .....	28
E.	Special disbursement .....	29
F.	Revolving fund.....	29
G.	Monitoring and evaluation.....	29
H.	Ex post evaluation .....	30
I.	External audit .....	30

IV.	FEASIBILITY AND RISKS .....	31
A.	Institutional feasibility .....	31
B.	Socioeconomic and financial feasibility .....	31
C.	Social and environmental impact .....	33
D.	Benefits and risks. ....	34

## ANNEXES

Annex I      Logical framework

Proposed resolution

Electronic Links and References	
Basic socioeconomic data	<a href="http://www.iadb.org/RES/index.cfm?fuseaction=externallinks.countrydata">http://www.iadb.org/RES/index.cfm?fuseaction=externallinks.countrydata</a>
Portfolio in execution	<a href="http://ops/approvals/pdfs/GUen.pdf">http://ops/approvals/pdfs/GUen.pdf</a>
Tentative lending program	<a href="http://opsgsl/ABSPRJ/tentativelending.ASP?S=GU&amp;L=EN">http://opsgsl/ABSPRJ/tentativelending.ASP?S=GU&amp;L=EN</a>
Procurement Plan/Mean of verification	<a href="http://idbdocs.iadb.org/WSDocs/getDocument.aspx?DOCNUM=716806">http://idbdocs.iadb.org/WSDocs/getDocument.aspx?DOCNUM=716806</a>

## ABBREVIATIONS

AECI	Spanish International Cooperation Agency
AWP	Annual Work Plan
CONAPREPI	Comisión Nacional de Prevención de la Violencia y Promoción Integral de Valores de Convivencia [National Commission for the Prevention of Violence and the Promotion of Social Harmony]
CONAPREVI	National Coordination Office for the Prevention of Domestic Violence
CONJUVE	National Youth Council
DGPCD	Community Crime Prevention Office
INE	National Statistics Institute
JSP	Japan Special Fund
MINEDUC	Ministry of Education
MINGOB	Ministry of the Interior
OAV	Victim care center
ODHA	The Archbishop's Office of Human Rights
PAHO	Pan American Health Organization
PEU	Program Executing Unit
PLANОВI	National Plan against Domestic Violence
PNC	Policía Nacional Civil [National Civilian Police]
PROPEVI	Program for the Prevention and Eradication of Domestic Violence
SBS	Social Welfare Bureau
SECCATID	Executive Bureau on Drug Addiction and Trafficking
SEPREM	Presidential Office for Women
SOSEP	First Lady's Office of Social Works
UDAF	Financial Administration Unit
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VAC	Office of the Deputy Minister for Community Support

## PROJECT SUMMARY

### GUATEMALA VIOLENCE PREVENTION PROGRAM (GU-0163)

Financial Terms and Conditions <sup>1</sup>			
<b>Borrower:</b> Republic of Guatemala <b>Executing agency:</b> Ministry of the Interior, through the Office of the Deputy Minister for Community Support		Amortization period:	25 years
		Grace period:	4.5 years
		Disbursement period:	4.5 years
		Interest rate:	Adjustable
	<b>Amount (US\$)</b>	Inspection and supervision fee:	0%
IDB (Ordinary Capital)	29 million	Credit fee:	0.25%
Total	29 million	Currency:	U.S. dollars from the Single Currency Facility
Project at a glance			
<b>Project objective:</b> <b>Objective:</b> The objective of the program is to improve the State's capacity to design and implement strategic, comprehensive, interagency, participatory actions to prevent violence, particularly juvenile and domestic violence. <b>Special contractual conditions:</b> <b>(a) Precedent to the first disbursement:</b> (i) the PEU must have been formed with the staff mentioned in paragraph 3.3; (ii) program participation agreements must have been signed between MINGOB and each participating entity on coordinating and implementing the program, including the appointment of the contact official of each participating entity and his/her alternate (see paragraph 3.4); (iii) the program Operating Regulations must have been approved by the executing agency and submitted to the Bank as agreed with the latter (see paragraph 3.12); and (iv) the executing agency must have submitted the report called for in the general contractual conditions of the loan, including the first-year AWP (see paragraph 3.11); <b>(b) Special contractual condition:</b> once the loan is in effect and the conditions precedent to the first disbursement have been fulfilled, the Bank may disburse up to the equivalent of US\$100,000 from the loan for startup of program activities (see paragraph 3.16). <b>Exceptions to Bank policies:</b> None.			
Project consistent with country strategy:    Yes [ X ]                      No [   ] Project qualifies as:                              SEQ [ X ]              PTI [ X ]              Sector [   ]              Geographic [   ]              Headcount [   ]  Procurement: See paragraphs 3.13 and 3.14. Verified by CESI on: 10 February 2006			

<sup>1</sup> The interest rate, credit fee, and inspection and supervision fee mentioned in this document are established pursuant to document FN-568-3 Rev. and may be changed by the Board of Executive Directors, taking into account the available background information, as well as the respective Finance Department recommendations. In no case will the credit fee exceed 0.75%, or the inspection and supervision fee exceed 1% of the loan amount.\*

\* With regard to the inspection and supervision fee, in no case will the charge exceed, in a given six-month period, the amount that would result from applying 1% to the loan amount divided by the number of six-month periods included in the original disbursement period.

## I. FRAME OF REFERENCE

### A. Background

- 1.1 Insecurity is one of the greatest limitations on personal freedom and is unquestionably the most troubling factor disrupting social harmony in Guatemala at the start of the new millennium. A study tracking the country's main problems, based on the opinion polls conducted by CID-Gallup since 1995, shows clearly that violence has become the public's chief concern. The data provided by *Latinobarómetro* in 2005 indicate that nearly 90% of Guatemalans believe that crime in the country has increased greatly. Data from the same source for 2004 suggest that 64% believe the country is losing the battle against crime.
- 1.2 According to a 2004 survey<sup>1</sup> of crime victims and perceptions of insecurity in Guatemala City, 42% of families said that at least one member had been the victim of a crime; 65.3% of assailants were between the ages of 16 and 25 years; 43% of assaults were committed with firearms; and 27% with knives and cutting instruments.
- 1.3 Consistent with this perception, the last national survey of crime victims (1999) found that over a 12-month period around 40% of the population had been victims of robbery, armed assault, threats of physical aggression, sexual attack, or domestic violence. It was also found that only one of every five cases was reported, which suggests that the hidden crime rate is very high. The National Civilian Police (PNC) reported 34,236 crimes in 2004, while the Attorney General's Office (*Ministerio Público*) recorded 48,200 cases. Although there are discrepancies in the data depending on the source of information, they point to the seriousness of the problem.
- 1.4 The various studies conducted during preparation of this program concluded that, based on the information available, the annual homicide rate, as measured by the number of homicides for every 100,000 inhabitants per year, rose by one third between 1996 and 2005, to a level of 36.6. In metropolitan Guatemala City, which is home to 15% of the country's population, the rate stood at 103 in 2005.<sup>2</sup> These rates also show an increase in recent years compared to other Central American countries, where the average rate is around 30 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants.
- 1.5 A study of the magnitude and cost of violence in Guatemala, which was conducted in preparation of this project, identified several factors associated with violence in the country. First, it noted that 36 years of internal armed conflict had broken down many of the bonds of harmony and trust between individuals and had undermined

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<sup>1</sup> Source: UNDP 2004, POLSEC Project, "Policy Dialogue on Civilian Security".

<sup>2</sup> Source: UNDP, 2005, based on data from the PNC and the National Statistics Institute.



the government institutions responsible for security and justice, to the particular detriment of women and girls who had been raped or had lost their parents and companions, and had had to move to the cities. Second, it found that the high degree of impunity has fostered a culture of violence that rewards the use of force and encourages citizens to take justice into their own hands. In fact, the use of lynching is one manifestation of impunity-induced violence that the perpetrators try to justify on moral grounds, although it is known to be illegal.

- 1.6 Another factor associated with violence has to do with the inequality of opportunity for social and economic progress in Guatemala. According to the UNDP,<sup>3</sup> the poorest 20% of the population receives 2.6% of income, while the richest 20% garner 64.1%. Political, social and cultural exclusion translates into uncertainty, desperation, intolerance, and collective unease, which foster antisocial attitudes in the country. Heavy migration to the cities by people fleeing rural violence or seeking better futures has created huge peripheral shantytowns, especially around metropolitan Guatemala City, where exclusion and cultural conflict trigger aggression and violence.
- 1.7 A high proportion of this aggression is domestic or family violence, particularly against women. According to PNC data, the number of women murdered in the country doubled between 2001 and 2005, a disturbing statistic symptomatic of the rising trend in domestic violence. In the first half of 2003, the Attorney General's Office heard 6,630 complaints, of which 6,080 involved violence against women, and 550 child abuse, or 25% of all crimes reported nationally. The problem could have a ripple effect, sparking yet more violence and weakening the human and social capital children and young people represent, driving them out of the home and into the arms of the "*maras*" or street gangs for solace and support.
- 1.8 The study also reports that acts of robbery, assault, kidnapping, and extortion perpetrated by organized criminal gangs have led to soaring rates of violence and crime in recent years. Youths with links to the *maras* and drug trafficking are perceived as the root cause. According to the National Statistics Institute (INE) 44% of the victims of crime are young people between the ages of 15 and 24 and, in Guatemala City, 46% of arrests are youths between the ages of 18 and 24, evidence that young people are the population group most at risk of being the victims or the victimizers.
- 1.9 Repeated studies show that women, minors and young people are the groups most vulnerable to violence, and cause-and-effect relationships can be shown to exist. Domestic violence often leads to murder of women, leaving children and youths as orphans, who swell the at-risk population and eventually join the *maras*. Domestic violence, through physical, sexual or psychological abuse of children and youths, may also drive them into the street, with the same or similar consequences.

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<sup>3</sup> *Human Development Report* 2004, New York, UNDP, 2004, page 190.

- 1.10 Based on this analysis of the situation, and bearing in mind the guidelines for the Bank's violence reduction programs and the lessons learned from other projects in the region, the present program will focus on the prevention of violence and crime, stressing protection and support for victims of domestic violence, protection and support for at-risk youth and children, and treatment and reintegration of children and young people in trouble with the law.

**B. Expressions of violence among the most vulnerable groups**

- 1.11 **The rising incidence of domestic violence.** As noted, domestic violence is an important risk factor, yet the lack of official information poses a serious obstacle to policy making, as there are virtually no records that break down the data by gender.<sup>4</sup> In 2000 the Attorney General's Office reported 5,706 complaints, 88% of them involving aggression against women and children. A Bank report on poverty reduction and sustainable development in Guatemala notes that, according to the most conservative estimates, 36% of Guatemalan females living with a man are victims of domestic violence. As well, the PNC reports that in the first four months of 2005, 80% of personal violence cases involved domestic violence.
- 1.12 "The Situation of Children in Guatemala 2004", a report prepared by the Human Rights Office of Guatemala (ODHA), found that one girl dies violently every two days, eight out of 10 cases show evidence of sexual assault, and two of those assaults are committed against young girls between the ages of five and seven. The Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) notes that, although the actual number of cases is probably underrecorded because they are reported as accidents, domestic violence and child abuse are the fourth leading cause of violent death among minors.
- 1.13 To make matters worse, there are no national studies to quantify the prevalence, magnitude, and nature of domestic violence and its trend over time. However, studies of public perceptions and the analysis of complaints suggest that the community sees domestic violence as a serious social problem that occurs daily and is endemic to all communities, regardless of ethnic or social status.
- 1.14 **Rising juvenile violence.** It is juveniles who are most at risk in the rising wave of violence: they are the principal victims, and account for nearly one half of convicted felons. The population under 18 years represents 52% of the total (and four out of 10 are under 15 years). This population segment is growing at 2.6% a year. School absenteeism is 17% in primary school, and 48% at the secondary level (average schooling is less than six years), and youth unemployment is high. All of these considerations underscore the importance of targeting prevention efforts at this group in order to mitigate the perpetuation of violence. It must be recognized that young people who are unemployed and have dropped out of school have too

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<sup>4</sup> Amnesty International, "No protection, no justice: Killings of women in Guatemala", 2005.

much free time on their hands, and are likely to misuse it, especially in situations of domestic violence.

- 1.15 To the foregoing must be added the growing presence of the *maras* or street gangs that engage in violent activities,<sup>5</sup> and that have recently been joined by indigenous youths from outside the cities. The members of these gangs are primarily young males of up to 25 years who are excluded from the education system, suffer from low self-esteem, are habitual drug users, come from unstable families, are not gainfully employed, and turn to these organizations for the protection and support that they cannot find at home or elsewhere.
- 1.16 Also, a high percentage of murders are committed by youths in arguments under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Most involve the use of firearms. Weapons became freely and widely available after the armed conflict, and it is estimated that 36% of the civilians in rural areas are in possession of 2 million guns. A study of a sample of felons convicted of at least one killing found that 12% of them had learned to use a gun before the age of 13, and 50% by 18 years of age. As things now stand, prisons could become battlegrounds for confrontations between rival gangs.
- 1.17 This troubling panorama suggests that insecurity poses a great challenge for democratic governance and fulfillment of the Peace Accords, severely affecting the quality of civilian life, the development of social capital, peaceful coexistence, economic growth, and the investment climate.

### **C. The institutional setting**

- 1.18 The Ministry of the Interior (MINGOB) has legal authority to “formulate policies, enforce the laws for maintaining peace and public order, protecting lives and public property, guaranteeing civil rights, and executing court orders and judgments”. Security work was previously limited to reactive measures to suppress, control, and prosecute crime, through the PNC and the Penitentiary System Administration. This narrow focus was broadened with the creation in April 2004 of the Office of the Deputy Minister for Community Support (VAC), with the mandate to promote the prevention of violence and crime and to build bridges to the community. In December 2005, the Crime Prevention Office was set up within the PNC to forge closer ties between the PNC and the community, through confidence building and understanding, better communications, and greater interaction. The subdepartment presently has a staff of 40 agents. As it was recently created, it does not yet have a specific budgetary allocation, although an allocation equivalent to US\$1.5 million is projected for 2007. MINGOB’s present budget is equivalent to US\$286 million, of which 80% corresponds to the PNC.

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<sup>5</sup> There are perhaps 160 “*mara*” gangs in the country, with some 2,400 members (Source: FLACSO, Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences, 2000). A survey of 20 departmental capitals estimated that there could be as many as 10,000 *mara* members (Source: *Estudios de Opinión Aragón y Asociados*, 2002).

- 1.19 The VAC comprises a Community Crime Prevention Office, with four support units and a staff of 44. The VAC's operating budget, based on a budgetary appropriation of its own starting in 2006, is equivalent to US\$2.5 million, of which 18% is for payroll and 6.4% for maintenance, with the remaining 75.6% covering the cost of community outreach programs.
- 1.20 Addressing the problem of violence requires a multisector and interagency approach. There are a number of State institutions, in addition to the MINGOB, that are attempting to respond to this issue through preventive initiatives as described below. Those institutions include the Ministry of Education (MINEDUC), the Ministry of Culture and Sports, the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, the Social Welfare Secretariat (SBS), the First Lady's Office of Social Works (SOSEP), the Executive Office of Drug Trafficking and Addiction Control (SECCATID). Some of these institutions work on projects of their own in conjunction with civil society organizations. Their initiatives are described in the following section.

## **1. Existing prevention initiatives and actions**

- 1.21 **Adoption and monitoring of national policies.** To define and coordinate national policy on violence prevention, the government established in 2005 a National Commission on Violence Prevention and Social Coexistence (CONAPREPI), reporting to the Office of the Vice President of Guatemala, to prepare a national social policy for preventing violence and advocating the values of social coexistence, with a particular focus on the at-risk population. As a result, Guatemala was one of the first countries to ratify the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women (the Convention of Belém do Pará) adopted in 1995. The women's movement successfully pressed for the Domestic Violence Act, its regulations, and the creation of the National Coordinating Office for the Prevention of Domestic Violence (CONAPREVI), an office that coordinates the efforts of public and private institutions to prevent, punish, and eradicate violence in the home and against women.
- 1.22 These achievements constitute a solid foundation for the 2002 policy on eradicating violence in the family and against women (PLANOVI),<sup>6</sup> which establishes guidelines, policies and concerted actions to prevent, address, punish, and reduce domestic violence and violence against women during a 10-year period. To put this plan into effect, PLANOVI determined that the State's capacity to build an institutional framework for the prevention of domestic violence needed to be bolstered. This was done by deepening analysis of the problem and possible responses, improving the quality, integrity, and timeliness of prevention care

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<sup>6</sup> National Plan for Prevention and Eradication of Domestic Violence and Violence against Women 2004-2014, prepared by CONAPREVI (established in March by Decree 97-96 and regulated by Government Resolutions AG 831-2000 and AG-417-2003).

services, and strengthening the sensitization process. In addition, the National Policy for the Prevention of Juvenile Violence<sup>7</sup> sets guidelines for designing and implementing the coordinated efforts by the government agencies involved in order to integrate at-risk youth into the country's social, political, economic, and productive life. To implement these guidelines, the policy proposes three levels of intervention: (i) comprehensive early prevention programs that target young people with a penchant for criminal behavior in order to nip antisocial behavior in the bud; (ii) comprehensive actions to promote the social integration of young people with ties to the maras and young people at risk by encouraging a change in attitudes and values through participation in sports, cultural interests, and recreational activities; and (iii) a process of reintegrating children and young people in conflict with the law into society and the labor force through comprehensive care and training activities.

- 1.23 In pursuing these policies, the country is moving forward with the actions described in the table below:

**Table 1.1**  
**Treatment of Domestic Violence (VIF)**

<i>Name and purpose</i>	<i>Current annual investment - Coverage</i>	<i>Evaluation criteria – Institutional establishment</i>	<i>Weaknesses of the initiative</i>
<b>Victims Care Centers (OAVs)</b> Receive complaints of VIF. Provide comprehensive care immediately and facilitate medium-term support options.	25 OAV, 22 in departmental seats and 3 in Capital/ 8,000 cases handled each year / \$ 600,000/ year (own resources) – wages and salaries, marginal operating costs.	Based on comprehensive approach to prevention – Initial contact with the VIF victims in order to: (i) offer basic assistance; (ii) obtain information and perform tests for timely judicial investigations; and (iii) provide guidance and short- and medium-term support.	(i)lack of privacy in facilities; (ii) restrictions on service delivery; (iii) shortfalls in flow of supplies; (iv) inadequate records; and (v) training requirements.
<b>Support for VIF victims/shelters</b> Take victims in, and give them comprehensive care and emergency support when they are forced to leave their homes.	2 Local shelters of PROPREVI/235 family groups served in 2005 - \$25,000/year (own resources and donations of furniture).	Comprehensive approach to prevention – international experience – institutionalized projects. Shelters: (i) offer refuge and emergency care to victims/family group, in case they have left home ( <i>local shelters</i> – for up to one week); and (ii) medium-term support for assistance services offered by NGOs.	Limited geographic coverage and an absence of medium-term support to respond to the growing demand for services of this kind.

<sup>7</sup> Presidential Commission on Human Rights (COPREDEH), June 2005.

**Table 1.2**  
**Initiatives for Prevention of Domestic Violence and Youth Crime**

<i>Name and purpose</i>	<i>Current annual investment - Coverage</i>	<i>Evaluation criteria – Institutional establishment</i>	<i>Weaknesses of the initiative</i>
<b>Initiatives at Learning Centers</b> (i) <i>Dreams of Young People for Peace</i> : Assist students in their final year of secondary school with building productive life projects as part of peaceful coexistence approach. (ii) <i>Prevention of drug use and substance abuse</i> : prevent drug use by students in grades 5 and 6.	<i>Dreams of Young People for Peace</i> : 1 pilot program in 2 <sup>o</sup> half of 2005/1,000 young people, with each one passing on the benefits to 2 others (\$300,000 - donation).  <i>Prevention of drug use and substance abuse</i> : Pilot program of 3 years' duration/benefited 6,165 teachers and 224,000 students (\$150,000 - donation).	Successful pilot experiences— institutionalized projects that require expanded coverage— international experience.  <i>Dreams of Young People for Peace</i> : 60% of young people taking part in pilot program developed skills and carried out productive life projects that raised up their families and communities. <i>Prevention of drug use and substance abuse</i> : Pilot program demonstrated importance of awareness building as a factor in prevention.	Methodology and materials require review for replication and an increase in adequate coverage, which calls for training and sensitization.
<b>Promoting effective use of spare time</b> (i) <i>Barrio Adentro</i> : Promoting sports and cultural activities for families in vulnerable areas; and (ii) <i>Sports for Everyone</i> : Use of spare time by young people who are vulnerable and at risk through participation in sports.	<i>Barrio Adentro and Sports for Everyone</i> : 69 events divided between the two programs 2005/57,000 beneficiary adults and young people (\$250,000 – own resources, does not include installation of sports facilities).	Institutionalized projects— successful international experience. Alternative uses of spare time, benefits for community cooperation and solidarity, young people are encouraged to practice peaceful coexistence and productive behavior.	The programs call for training, supply of materials, physical renovation for targeting and projection towards participatory development of beneficiary skills and abilities of beneficiaries, particularly young people.
<b>Job training and promotion of youth employment</b> Help young people who are vulnerable and at risk to obtain jobs by making information available about employment opportunities and training requirements.	<i>Electronic job exchange</i> : 20,000 companies registered (2005)/44,280 positions identified nationwide (\$150,000 -grant).	Fits into a comprehensive approach to prevention – international experience (Colombia, Chile, Brazil). In these three countries, the impact of initiatives of this kind have been measured. These initiatives offer opportunities to young people who are somewhat vulnerable and at risk , with an ensuing multiplier effect.	The Electronic Job Exchange needs to be updated and its functions expanded/insufficient funding for training and monitoring mechanism.
<b>Rehabilitation programs with parole (SBS)</b> Shelter and offer health services, basic education, and treatment to children and young people in conflict with the law.	4 detention centers 1,600 children and young people each year—\$2.0 million/year (own resources and includes staff).	Institutionalized projects that require improvements – comprehensive approach to intervention.	Overcrowding and coexistence of children and young people who are not dangerous with minors who are extremely dangerous (convicted felons housed with defendants) Physical facilities need to be rehabilitated and redesigned, and training is needed.
<b>Social and worker reintegration programs (SBS)</b> Offer psychological assistance and job training to children and young people in conflict with the law.	4 detention centers 1,600 children and young people each year (\$1.6 million/year)	Institutionalized projects that require improvements – comprehensive approach to intervention. The service is essential for reintegrating children and young people in trouble with the law into society or the labor force, or both.	Services need to be reoriented towards productive areas and activities that are attractive and profitable for the present market. Physical facilities need to be rehabilitated and redesigned, and training and monitoring mechanisms are needed.

**Table 1.3**  
**Local Violence Prevention Initiatives**

<i>Name and purpose</i>	<i>Current annual investment - Coverage</i>	<i>Evaluation criteria – Institutional establishment</i>	<i>Weaknesses of the initiative</i>
<b>Local prevention plans.</b> Comprehensive participatory public safety and civic awareness plans are prepared and implemented at the municipal and local level.	<i>Pilot application of the model.</i> Diagnostic assessment being carried out in 26 communities, by VAC/\$200,000 in 2005 (\$1,000,000 requested for 2006). Diagnostic assessment and formulation of the plan initiating the project in 2006, in 4 communities (\$200,000 - grant)	Institutionally established projects that require improved and expanded coverage– successful international experience (Brazil).	Initiatives in need of consolidation require adjustments to the methodology, expanded coverage, training, materials, and training for facilitators as multipliers as well as awareness building in communities on violence prevention and strengthening of capacity to apply participatory methodologies and monitoring mechanisms to gauge impact.

## **2. Institutional shortcomings in violence prevention and crime**

- 1.24 **Weak interagency coordination.** As noted above, while policy formulation bodies exist, the preventive actions taken are scattered, unconnected, and haphazard, they do not share a single and coordinated conceptual vision, and they duplicate efforts inefficiently. Consequently it is difficult to carry out a government policy on civilian security in a coordinated way.
- 1.25 **Weaknesses in State entities.** The creation of the VAC represents an institutional transition from an exclusively repressive approach for dealing with violence to a strategy that takes a long-term preventive focus, and one that requires support for building bridges to the community, including boosting capacity for strategic planning and improved organizational management. In this same vein, the Guatemalan State, aware of the breakdown in public safety, is striving to bring the community and the PNC closer together, by building trust and improving communications. To this end, it has approved a restructuring of the PNC that entails the recent creation of the Crime Prevention Office<sup>8</sup> with various specialized units and improvements in police training in prevention through support for the Police Academy and training on the ground, an effort that will require further support for consolidation to ensure it functions smoothly.
- 1.26 Also, the SBS is the State entity in charge of implementing social welfare and protection programs for children and young people in irregular situations or in trouble with the law as well as to arrange for custody and provide them with guidance and treatment. It has temporary shelters and four detention centers for young offenders that are administered in conjunction with civil society

<sup>8</sup> Government Resolution 662-2005, regulating the organization of the National Civil Police. Consists of a technical secretariat and divisions of preventive guidance, child and adolescent care, multicultural affairs, gender equity, community relations, and culture and sports.

organizations that specialize in providing treatment for young people of this kind. The principal organizations are REMAR and the CEIBA Group. In addition, SBS pursues various reintegration and education programs (table 1.2) as well as offers foster homes and other less restrictive arrangements such as socioeducational measures.<sup>9</sup> The SBS will need support to address its shortcomings and overcome weaknesses in its organizational structure, resource management, and operational planning and coverage, including preparation of a new model for dealing with youngsters in trouble with the law. Moreover, there are no mechanisms for monitoring children and young people once they leave the integration programs. Lastly, it is essential to bring judicial operators into training and awareness building activities for dealing with young offenders.

- 1.27 Victim care programs suffer from a number of shortcomings that are described in table 1.1. Also, there are no updated studies, research, and systematic and periodic analysis in the country on situations in which domestic violence occurs, a failing that is compounded by the need for more reliable records to improve data on which decisions are based. Victims of domestic violence do not have any opportunities to reintegrate into the labor market. One major weakness was found to be a lack of training and proper awareness building in treating cases of domestic violence by judicial operators. Furthermore, the OAV and the shelters referred to in table 1.1 operate informally with the support of short- and medium-term assistance service provider networks for governmental institutions and NGOs that specialize in domestic violence (approximately 200 in the country which have been mapped) that offer therapeutic, psychological, psychiatric, and legal help or treatment for addictions and dependence. However, it is necessary to strengthen this mechanism by coordinating the efforts of the different social bodies and institutions, as a means of improving the relationship between different technical teams and thus optimizing the use of existing resources.
- 1.28 **Lack of a standardized information system.** Guatemala has no reliable statistical information on the incidence and prevalence of the different types of crime. The data provided by the main entities responsible for crime statistics show discrepancies in addition to their natural differences, which means there is no accepted and shared database of statistical evidence on the magnitude of crime, in order to pinpoint its causes and formulate public policies to prevent or control it. In addition, these institutions have not developed their information technologies homogeneously, their data recording information systems are not reliable, and they lack the capacity and infrastructure to plan their operations and compile statistics on violence and crime.

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<sup>9</sup> Socioeducational measures are a program that allows a minor to serve a sentence under the supervision of a multidisciplinary team; and community service is a program where offenders do community work as an alternative to incarceration.



- 1.29 **Feeble local institutional response.** Local or community initiatives have demonstrated their effectiveness in reducing the risk factors associated with violence, through the influence they can exert on the delivery of services such as street lighting, surveillance cameras, access roads, and the availability of public spaces for cultural or sporting activities. Guatemala's municipalities do not have the capacity to design and manage comprehensive, participatory plans for effective local measures to prevent violence. As noted above, the VAC has had some success in this area, and it is important now to build on that basis.
- 1.30 The VAC has scored a number of successes in this area that will need strengthening in order to consolidate the gains and ensure their continuity. The “Citizen Dialogue for a Safer Guatemala” is an important strategy consisting in preparing and implementing local violence prevention and community relations building plans through departmental, municipal, and community committees (local security boards) as part of the Rural and Urban Development Councils System. The composition of each committee depends on the locality, authorities, community leaders, and public institutions. The aim of the initiative is to afford the community with an analytical tool to address violence prevention that seeks a comprehensive approach to the problems through a participatory methodology that identifies problems and areas associated with crime and feelings of insecurity and offers possible solutions. The resulting plans need to ensure that the proposed solutions are viable and match the capacity of the public institutions and community leaders who have the commitment or the will to carry them out sustainably. At this time, 26 initiatives are under way to assess local security conditions for the community.
- 1.31 **Lack of communication and social awareness strategies.** In Guatemala, perceptions differ as to the magnitude and impacts of violence, and this fact has led government, social agencies and the general public to favor repressive, reactive measures as the only means of solving the problem. This situation is exacerbated by the slant given by the media in the reporting of violence to a public highly susceptible to the way crime is portrayed. As mentioned earlier, the legacy of decades of violence and armed conflict has left a pall of widespread fear, manifested in a culture of silence, which has led to a lack of consensus on ethical values, the collapse of social cohesion in communities, a breakdown of the social fabric, an ebbing of social harmony, and a reluctance to report crimes or to turn to the authorities to resolve conflicts.

**D. The Bank and country strategies for dealing with the problem, and lessons learned**

- 1.32 The *Bank's strategy* with Guatemala for 2004-2007 envisages the reduction of poverty and exclusion as its ultimate goal and proposes three strategic courses of actions for achieving it: (i) promoting sustainable economic growth; (ii) ameliorating social management; and (iii) strengthening the framework of

governance. The proposed program is consistent with that strategy, particularly as it improves the framework for democratic governance in the country.

- 1.33 The *country's strategy*. The new administration defined its central objectives in the 2004-2008 Government Plan, which includes civilian security as a priority area. The strengthening of security institutions, a reorganization of the PNC, particularly the Office of Professional Accountability, the Crime Investigation Service, and various police stations, and training and professional development for police officers are among the measures proposed by the government. The government has also established the Office of the Deputy Minister for Community Support (VAC), as well as CONAPREVI, which has already drawn up a policy on the topic, and CONAPREPI, as the interagency coordination body for designing crime prevention strategies and policies.
- 1.34 *Lessons learned*. The Bank has supported several countries with across-the-board security and social coexistence programs. Projects are in progress in Colombia, Chile, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, and Uruguay and others are being prepared in Panama, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and Guyana. These operations, particularly those in Colombia, Chile, and Uruguay, that have now been completed as well as international experience with these programs, have served as a model for study and analysis of the proposed operation. They also underscore the importance of the following main points: (i) strengthening recurring gaps in public policies and comprehensive national strategies and understanding the causes and the specific problems associated with citizen security and coexistence as well as the mechanisms to monitor them; (ii) having economical systems for managing data on different manifestations of violence whose cost can be shared with other institutions as a tool for establishing strategies for intervening at the local and national level; (iii) developing implementation plans with high technical capacity and interagency coordination mechanisms with a long-term approach; (iv) addressing the problem from a comprehensive and multisector perspective; (v) shifting the emphasis of the public sector focus to preventive actions that are reflected in budgetary allocations for security; (vi) promoting customs, actions, and minimum shared rules to generate a sense of belonging, facilitate peaceable coexistence, and encourage respect for the common heritage and recognition of civic rights and duties; (vii) focusing on vulnerable population groups or groups at risk of following a criminal career path; (viii) caring for the victims of crime; (ix) banking on local solutions and initiatives in neighborhoods and targeted communities; (x) preventing and punishing behavior that is harmful to the well-being of the public and back those who foster peace, solidarity, respect, and life in the community; and (xi) bringing the police and the community closer together in designing and implementing participatory prevention strategies.
- 1.35 It is important to note that in Colombia over a 15-year period programs of this kind, some of which were supported by the Bank, were successful in reducing the homicide rate from 100 for every 100,000 inhabitants to approximately 30.

## **E. Program strategy**

- 1.36 In order to achieve positive results in addressing this issue, the lessons learned have shown that the complex dimensions of violence call for a comprehensive, multisector approach to deal with the different factors that generate it, and the active participation of all the players involved. This approach responds to the need for wide-ranging, effective, and sustainable preventive interventions, strategically prioritized, targeted and gradual in their execution, that will supplement the limited reach of coercive and control measures.
- 1.37 The activities called for in the program are complementary to the efforts the country is making to address the problem of violence and the macro factors associated with it, such as social programs for reducing poverty and promoting equity, as well as fiscal and judicial reforms. Also, the initiatives and projects of the different entities with technical involvement in the operation were selected according to the following criteria: (i) the extent to which they comply with the strategic actions and the priority established in national policy; (ii) the extent to which they apply a comprehensive approach to violence prevention; (iii) the extent to which they conform to the guidelines with the Bank's guidelines on violence prevention; (iv) the extent to which those from which pilot experiences are drawn are successful and require a hand to be consolidated and made sustainable ("Dreams of Young People for Peace" and training of 5<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> grade primary school teachers); (v) successful institutional projects<sup>10</sup> in need of broader coverage (Barrio Adentro; Deporte para Todos); and (vi) comparative international experiences that demonstrate acknowledged success.
- 1.38 The operation will help the country to consolidate the violence prevention strategy as State policy, by: (i) improving and coordinating government initiatives and existing social assistance programs for countering risk factors that tend to reproduce criminal behavior, with the emphasis on victims of domestic violence and on vulnerable children and young people, as well as high-risk population groups; (ii) strengthening the capacity of the bodies responsible for violence prevention policies, so that they can coordinate and monitor policy implementation; (iii) strengthening the VAC's ability to take a preventive approach as a supplement to the traditional, limited focus on repressive and coercive measures; and (iv) consolidating community relations and the social fabric for preventing violence, helping to build confidence in the public security agencies, by implementing local plans for violence prevention and forging stronger community relations, as described in paragraph 1.30.

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<sup>10</sup> In the curriculum or part of the institution's business.

## **F. Coordination with other donors**

- 1.39 The program's design has been coordinated with external cooperation agencies to identify the supplementary activities that this operation will support. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has pilot projects for local security studies in certain municipios, focusing on the most common types of crime. Those studies were considered in developing the approach to participatory planning for implementing the VAC's local prevention plans, which the program will support. The Narcotics Affairs Section of the United States Embassy is supporting prevention programs in schools to reduce teenage drug consumption. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the German and Netherlands cooperation agencies (GTZ and NUFFIC) have concentrated their support on reforming the police recruitment process and the PNC Academy, and on the platform for research and national dialogue that has served as the basis for seeking consensus on a national security policy. The program will not intervene in these areas, which are nevertheless considered to complement it.
- 1.40 The European Union has a project with the Attorney General's Office and the judiciary to fight discrimination and to reduce the use of pretrial detention. The Organization of American States has included security as a critical element in maintaining democratic governance. Also, the Spanish International Cooperation Agency (AECI), which has a program with the judicial authorities for combating impunity, assisted in preparing the program. Other studies serving as input for the operational design were funded by the Japan Special Fund.

## **II. THE PROGRAM**

### **A. Objectives**

- 2.1 The objective of the program is to improve the government's capacity to design and implement strategic, comprehensive, interagency, participatory actions to prevent violence, particularly juvenile and domestic violence.
- 2.2 The present operation focuses on the priorities that were identified during its preparation and which, based on experience, and lessons learned by the Bank, are amenable to a preventive approach. The program will also incorporate an inclusive crosscutting approach that takes account of Guatemala's cultural, ethnic and linguistic diversity without discrimination, particularly on grounds of ethnic origin, gender or age.

### **B. Description**

- 2.3 The program is structured into three subprograms: (i) comprehensive measures to prevent violence; (ii) interventions at the municipal and local level, and institutional strengthening for the prevention services of MINGOB; and (iii) strengthening the

government's capacity to formulate, evaluate and update policies for preventing crime and violence.

**1. Subprogram 1. Comprehensive measures to prevent violence (US\$16.4 million)**

2.4 The objective of this subprogram is to strengthen the government's capacity to deal with domestic violence, and to prevent juvenile violence and crime by improving and strengthening as well as coordinating existing initiatives. The subprogram includes three components:

- a. **Domestic violence (US\$6.4 million).** This component follows the policy guidelines established in the PLANNOVI 2004-2014, and will finance technical assistance, training, equipment and materials for participating entities to strengthen their capacities and improve implementation of comprehensive initiatives to prevent and treat this type of violence. The component calls for:
  - (i) Performing and updating studies, systematic analysis of periodic information, and research on the nature of domestic violence and the circumstances in which it occurs, and the impact the program is having on the trend in violence, as a prerequisite for successfully implementing and updating national policies (US\$500,000).
  - (ii) Strengthening the agencies that provide care for victims and supporting research into domestic violence, particularly by upgrading facilities, equipping and improving the recording systems of the OAVs of PNC (three in the metropolitan area and 22 in the departmental capitals), and training for their staff and for the OAVs of the Attorney General's Office, the Human Rights Ombudsman, and the Hygiene and Mental Health Program of the Ministry of Health (US\$2 million – recurring costs: US\$180,000).
  - (iii) Strengthening the agencies that provide support services for domestic violence victims, particularly by expanding the coverage of shelters (immediate and short-term shelter for adults, especially women and young children), including physical upgrades and the establishment of four temporary regional shelters (maximum stay 3 months), and furnishing and outfitting of 22 community refuges;<sup>11</sup> and strengthening coordination and linkages with the “rescue network” known as the *Red de Derivación* through the systematic registration of member organizations and the services they provide, as well as the negotiation of protocols and feedback mechanisms (US\$3.2 million – recurring costs: US\$200,000).

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<sup>11</sup> The shelters program is coordinated by the Violence Prevention Program (PROPREVI) of SOSEP.

- (iv) Support for victims of domestic violence by the shelters through job training activities. Training would be provided to about 1,600 individuals as part of the operation (US\$500,000).
  - (v) Specific training for judicial operators (approximately 2,000 people), in dealing with family violence situations and handling cases. An ongoing awareness and training plan will be designed and implemented in coordination with the government agencies or institutions responsible for each group of officials (US\$250,000).
- b. **At-risk children and youth (US\$5 million).** The objective of this component is to help with the social integration or reintegration of at-risk children and young people through comprehensive violence prevention measures designed to counter the main factors that generate violence, and to reinforce those that promote positive behavior among young people. Four types of action are planned, involving funding of national and international technical assistance for developing methodologies and implementing prevention initiatives, including the purchase of materials, logistical support, equipment, physical rehabilitation, awareness raising and training for:
- (i) Review and implementation of government strategies and policies for protecting at-risk children and youth, through a study of their circumstances, given their social conditions and the steady increase in delinquency, associated in particular with the street gangs and *maras*, stressing national and international technical assistance and the exchange of experiences with other countries<sup>12</sup> (US\$250,000).
  - (ii) Interventions in education centers, directed at students, teachers, principals and parents. The program will support training and awareness campaigns, supply of materials for activities that will take account of the schools' roll in inculcating a culture of nonviolence and in preventing violence, in particular MINEDUC's "Dreams of Young People for Peace" program, to help students in the final years of secondary school plan for the future (benefiting each year's cohort of high school graduates, or 85,000 young people from 2,200 schools), and the national program for training teachers in grades five and six and basic levels for promoting ethical and civic values, assuming responsibilities, alternative dispute settlement mechanisms, and the peaceful exercise of authority, and disseminating information on the risks associated with substance abuse that SECCATID would coordinate (reaching about 3,000 teachers and 460,000 young people each year, the annual total in grades 5 and 6) (US\$3 million).

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<sup>12</sup> CONAPREPI and SBS will have especially important roles in adapting strategies and policies.

- (iii) Interventions to promote the constructive use of free time, aimed at both youngsters and community leaders and parents, in an effort to reduce the harmful effects of idleness, lack of parental supervision outside school hours, and socialization in an unlawful and criminal environment. The program will finance training and awareness campaigns, including materials, equipment, and physical upgrades to support social integration efforts, in particular the *Barrio Adentro* programs that include sporting and cultural activities of various kinds (the idea is to finance nearly 1,000 alternative participatory activities during the program, such as theater, music, cinema, painting, writing and sports, reaching nearly 70,000 adults and young people), mainly in high-risk zones, and "Sports for All" (300 alternative activities for bringing 60,000 young people into sports). The initiatives will be carried out in the 57 communities referred to in paragraph 2.5(a), as noted in paragraph 3.5, and will be coordinated with the Ministry of Culture and Sports, the Physical Education Department of MINEDUC, and public and private institutions at the local and national levels (US\$750,000).
  - (iv) Interventions for training and for promoting youth employment, intended to develop skills and abilities among at-risk young people so that they can join the workforce. The program will support a pilot experience through job training for 2,000 young people from 57 selected communities (approximately 35 from each one) to hone their skills and competencies. The work will be carried out under local violence prevention plans. The beneficiaries will be identified (job demand) by means of employment kiosks organized by the Ministry of Labor<sup>13</sup>. Available positions will be pinpointed through the Ministry's electronic employment exchange. The young people will receive training in different specialized institutions. Every effort will be made to form partnerships with organizations in the private sector, civil society, or other government entities to bring the beneficiaries into the work force. The Project Executing Unit will establish a mechanism to monitor local violence prevention plans (US\$1 million – recurring costs: US\$50,000).
- c. **Children and young people undergoing social rehabilitation (US\$5 million).** This component will support the planning and implementation of comprehensive programs for the social integration of children and young people in trouble with the law. The component starts with the recognition that the conditions in which juvenile delinquency is now flourishing, and in

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<sup>13</sup> Each year the Ministry of Labor organizes one national and three regional employment fairs and several employment kiosks in the departments. It is then able to identify demand for employment in areas where potential employers exist.

particular the growing influence of the *maras*, calls for new institutional programs and a redirection of services. The component involves:

- (i) A review of the care and social rehabilitation model for children and young people in conflict with the law, recognizing that street gangs and *maras* have infiltrated the rehabilitation centers, and that many adults imprisoned for serious crimes are in fact young and by law must remain at the disposal of the system. The component will support the design and implementation of a new model, through national and international technical assistance to guide the process of organizational redesign, process improvement (reengineering), training, and logistical support (US\$250,000).
- (ii) Institutional strengthening of the SBS in its rehabilitation programs for children and young people (socioeducational measures and detention centers), including its capacity for working with other institutions such as universities, businesses, or specialized institutes. The component will finance national and international technical assistance, training, upgraded administrative facilities, and equipment (US\$1.5 million – recurring costs: US\$140,000).
- (iii) Methodological and logistical consolidation of rehabilitation programs for children and young people in each of the four SBS centers (two for protection or preventive detention and two for reeducation, covering a total of 400 children and young people). Linkages will be established with the youth employment initiatives, strengthening specific areas relating to coaching for young offenders in the process of social and vocational reintegration. Methods of psychological and psychiatric treatment and social inclusion will be revised to produce new pedagogical methods focused on productivity and employment, and innovative strategies for labor market entry or for creating self-employment in controlled environments, involving strategic partnerships with the private sector. The component will finance technical assistance, training for monitors, mental-health programs, and psychological and psychiatric support, detox programs for children and youth, and infrastructure improvements and upgrades in areas not related to security (classrooms, infirmaries, sports and cultural facilities, industrial shops) (US\$1.75 million – recurring costs: US\$80,000).
- (iv) Consolidation of social and labor integration programs (socioeducational measures), a sine qua non for building stronger ties between the system and social networks and the productive sector. The component will finance occupational training programs (approximately 400 young people in four years), and will create linkages with youth



employment initiatives, strengthening specific areas of the SBS to coach children and young people in the process of social and vocational reintegration. The component will provide technical and financial support for three pilot projects, including training for young people in business administration and management. This activity will benefit from the activities planned under point (iv) of the preceding component (US\$1.25 million – recurring costs: US\$20,000).

- (v) Specific sensitization campaigns for judicial operators in dealing with young people in trouble with the law. The plan is to design and implement workshops and training and awareness activities covering specific needs of children and young people in conflict with the law, their particular vulnerabilities, and the special conditions they require for social and vocational reintegration (US\$250,000).

## **2. Subprogram 2. Comprehensive interventions at the municipal and local level, and institutional strengthening for the VAC (US\$7.7 million)**

- 2.5 The specific objectives of this subprogram are: (i) to strengthen the capacity of participating communities in preparing and managing violence prevention plans, restoring their credibility, and fostering trust in institutions and in authority; (ii) to strengthen the capacity of the VAC to implement policies to prevent violence and crime; and (iii) to strengthen the management level of the PNC for instilling in the police a culture of developing good community relations. The subprogram includes three components.

- a. **Community prevention projects (US\$4 million).** This component is intended to strengthen and broaden coverage of the community relations strategy that the VAC is pursuing, with the help of the Community Crime Prevention Office. The focus of this approach, "Citizen Dialogue for a Safer Guatemala", is based on a plan for violence prevention and stronger local or community ties conceived jointly by the VAC, the local authorities, and the community. During program design, 57 localities were identified, including 11 zones in the metropolitan area of Guatemala City, and 46 of the 332 municipios in the country, in which the program will work at the local level. (These localities are identified in Annex 2 of the Program Operating Regulations). These localities are urban in nature and were identified on the basis of criteria such as: (i) high levels of common crime in localities where the police and local authorities maintain a modicum of control and organized crime has not made great inroads; (ii) centers of tourist attraction; (iii) adequate level of community trust in police work; (iv) presence or imminent threat of *maras*; and (iv) existence of social and local leadership organizations in the community. The component calls for three activities:

- (i) Consolidating the community outreach strategy, as described above, starting with expanded coverage and the fostering of multiplier bodies, including documentation on the working methodology and how it is applied, preparation of training materials, training of facilitators,<sup>14</sup> preparation of materials and operational support for the model in its various phases, among other aspects (US\$250,000).
  - (ii) Application of the strategy in the 57 localities identified by the program, taking care to ensure that institutional learning is comprehensive and that the model can be replicated to expand its coverage. The component calls for activities to make the community and the various authorities aware of the comprehensive and interagency approach to preventing violence, as well as training and the provision of support materials for participatory diagnostics and the design, management and monitoring of violence prevention plans (US\$2.39 million).
  - (iii) Training, hiring, and deployment of facilitators for community participation, mainly at the local level (approximately 170), who will appropriate and apply the working methodology for the coordinated formulation of violence prevention plans. Consistent with paragraph 1.29, the resulting plans will need to ensure that the solutions proposed are feasible in light of the capacities of the public institutions and the community leaders who will have to implement them in a sustainable manner (US\$300,000).
  - (iv) Design and supply of surveillance equipment to detect violence in 9 communities in the Metropolitan Guatemala City area, one of 57 communities selected that will come under the preventive action undertaken by local and municipal authorities to make public spaces safer and more protected (US\$1 million – recurring costs: US\$80,000).
- b. **Strengthening the VAC (US\$2.2 million).** This component will consolidate the institutional capacity of the VAC to fulfill its mandate and to coordinate the program.<sup>15</sup> It will finance national and international technical assistance, technical visits to successful international experiences, training, logistical support, physical upgrading, and equipment for:
- (i) Improving the VAC's planning and strategic management capacity, both for its day-to-day activities and for execution of the program (US\$300,000).

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<sup>14</sup> The number of facilitators working to multiply the model locally will be increased from 10 to 50.

<sup>15</sup> This refers to the Program Coordination Unit, the costs of which are detailed in the budget.

- (ii) Improving the VAC's capacity for internal coordination of the operational and management aspects of its activity, and external coordination with the other institutions involved in the program (US\$1.1 million).
  - (iii) Development and implementation of a system for monitoring and evaluation of the VAC's own day-to-day activities as well as for program execution and, specifically, of the effectiveness and impact of the local violence prevention plans referred to in paragraph 1.29, as well as execution of the communication and dissemination strategy (US\$500,000).
  - (iv) Consolidating the VAC's operational capacity to meet the requirements of the 57 local violence prevention plans (US\$300,000 – recurring costs: US\$30,000).
- c. **Support for the Crime Prevention Office of the PNC (US\$1.5 million).**  
This component will support the institutional strengthening of the Crime Prevention Office so that it can assume its duties in an appropriate and timely manner, and help introduce an awareness raising strategy for the PNC in prevention work and community outreach, applying the VAC guidelines. Technical assistance, training and logistical support will be financed for:
- (i) Implementing a strategic plan of action and its operating plans, both for the Crime Prevention Office and for each of its divisions (US\$250,000).
  - (ii) Formulation and implementation of a system for monitoring and evaluating the Section's activity and its impact on each division, focusing on the results of its efforts, as reflected primarily in the daily activity of others (officers and agents of the office who change their attitude and their policing approach to one focused on building community relations, and a community that is more activist in asserting its rights and obligations in crime prevention and its own security) (US\$250,000 – recurring costs: US\$20,000).
  - (iii) Methodological, technical and logistical support for formulating and developing: (1) awareness-building and training programs for active officers (approximately 20,000), both in the current system and in partnership with the Police Academy; and (2) training programs for new officers (approximately 6,000 in 4 years) in crime prevention and community relations, together with reform of the PNC recruitment process (US\$500,000).

- (iv) Design and supply of training materials for enhancing awareness of the country's multicultural nature, and support for general or targeted distribution of those materials (US\$250,000).
- (v) Operational support (office upgrades, computer equipment) for startup of the Crime Prevention Office and implementation of its work plans (US\$250,000 – recurring costs: US\$30,000).

**3. Subprogram 3. Strengthening the government's capacity to formulate, evaluate and update prevention policies (US\$3.3 million)**

2.6 This subprogram will equip the government with mechanisms and instruments for systematically examining crime and violence trends, updating national policies, and identifying new facets of the problem. It has three components.

- a. **Public Policy coordination (US\$350,000).** This component will help CONAPREPI, CONAPREVI, and MINGOB to formulate prevention policies through operational mechanisms of coordination and monitoring. The component will be coordinated by the VAC, and will provide national and international technical assistance and logistical support for:
  - (i) The design of comprehensive interagency and multisector plans and strategies for violence prevention, in accordance with the policies approved (US\$500,000).
  - (ii) Design and implementation of a mechanism for monitoring and evaluating policy implementation (US\$100,000).
  - (iii) Studies and research on trends and developments in the problems that the policies are supposed to address (US\$200,000).
- b. **Violence and Crime Prevention Strategy Room (US\$2 million).** This component will establish within MINGOB<sup>16</sup> a structure for researching and analyzing information that, based on an integrated interagency system for collecting relevant statistical and qualitative data, will provide elements for taking decisions and formulating and managing policies for dealing with violence and crime. The Strategy Room will make it easier to track and analyze the results of prevention policies, together with those of complementary policies for citizen security and violence prevention. The component will finance technical assistance, equipment, training and logistical support for:

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<sup>16</sup> It has been agreed that the Strategy Room would be attached to MINGOB, which has the capacity to accommodate its computer platform.

- (i) Design of the Strategy Room, its techniques for compiling, refining, organizing and processing data from various sources, and methodologies for the systematic analysis of information, and the preparation of databases for studies and research (US\$250,000).
  - (ii) Configuration of the Strategy Room,<sup>17</sup> which will include training for its professional and technical staff, establishment of institutional linkages to ensure the timely and adequate flow of information, and design and implementation of the management, administrative and control processes to make it operational (US\$410,000).
  - (iii) Outfitting of the Strategy Room with the technology infrastructure needed for its operations (US\$550,000 – recurring costs: US\$110,000).
  - (iv) Assistance for strengthening supporting technology infrastructure in each entity that produces primary data (mainly PNC, Attorney General's Office, and the Judiciary) in an effort to improve information sources and quality. This would entail procurement, development, and installation of hardware, software, and communications equipment, and hiring of different network and systems administration and maintenance services (US\$800,000 – recurring costs: US\$160,000).
- c. **Communication and dissemination strategy (US\$1 million).** This component will support the design and implementation of a mass communication and social outreach strategy on violence and crime prevention for promoting ethical values and social harmony, publicizing the initiatives and services that the government and the program are making available to the community for promoting those values. The VAC will coordinate this activity with the entities participating in the program. The program will finance national and international technical assistance, training and logistical support for:
- (i) Participatory formulation and design of the strategy (with direct participation by the beneficiaries themselves), in terms that will guarantee adequate coverage and scope, and respect for the country's ethnic and cultural diversity and gender dimension. It will include campaigns to raise public awareness of the problem of violence and crime (US\$250,000).
  - (ii) Implementation of the strategy, through the design and execution of specific outreach and awareness campaigns dealing with issues covered

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<sup>17</sup> The Observatory will initially have a coordinator, two information analysts, a data analyst and a database administrator. Program funding for these costs will decline: as of the third year, MINGOB will be left with permanent responsibility for two analysts and one operator.

by the program, using both conventional and traditional community media. This strategy will imply mechanisms for monitoring and evaluating its effectiveness and adjusting it during the course of the program. The campaigns will be coordinated in light of progress with the various program components and activities. This activity includes the design and production of texts, materials and instruments for dissemination (US\$750,000).

### C. Cost and financing

- 2.7 The cost of the program is tentatively estimated at the equivalent of US\$29 million, from the Bank's Ordinary Capital. The costs are itemized in the following table:

**Table 2.1 Program Costs \* (in US\$000s)**

<b>IDB</b>	<b>Total cost IDB</b>	<b>Additional resources</b>	<b>%/IDB</b>
<b>SUBPROGRAM 1</b>			
<b>Comprehensive measures to prevent violence</b>	<b>16,400</b>		<b>57</b>
<b>1. Prevention and treatment of domestic violence</b>	<b>6,400</b>		
1.1 Consultants	800		
1.2 Training	970		
1.3 Equipment	275		
1.4 Works	3,175		
1.5 Nonconsulting services and goods	1,180		
<b>2. At-risk children and young people</b>	<b>5,000</b>		
2.1 Consultants	270		
2.2 Training	1,380		
2.3 Equipment	150		
2.4 Non-consulting services and goods (education materials)	3,200		
<b>3. Children and young people undergoing social rehabilitation</b>	<b>5,000</b>		
3.1 Consultants	770		
3.2 Training	1,180		
3.3 Equipment	350		
3.4 Works	1,800		
3.5 Non-consulting services and goods	900		

**Table 2.1 Program Costs \* (in US\$000s)**

<b>IDB</b>	<b>Total cost IDB</b>	<b>Additional resources</b>	<b>%/IDB</b>
<b>SUBPROGRAM 2</b>			
<b>Comprehensive municipal activities and institutional strengthening of VAC</b>	<b>7,700</b>		<b>27</b>
<b>4. Community violence prevention projects</b>	<b>4,000</b>		
4.1 Consultants	600		
4.2 Equipment	400		
4.3 Works	80		
4.4 Nonconsulting services/goods (Citizen Dialog in 57 communities)	2,920		
<b>5. Strengthening the VAC</b>	<b>1,100</b>		
5.1 Consultants	875		
5.2 Training	80		
5.3 Equipment	45		
5.4 Non-consulting services	40		
5.5 Works	60		
<b>6. Crime Prevention Office of the PNC</b>	<b>1,500</b>		
6.1 Consultants	400		
6.2 Training	100		
6.3 Equipment	210		
6.4 Works	40		
6.5 Non-consulting services	750		
<b>7. Administration**</b>	<b>1,100</b>		
7.1 Consultants	862		
7.2 Equipment	105		
7.3 Non-consulting services	133		
<b>SUBPROGRAM 3</b>			
<b>Strengthening government capacity to formulate and evaluate prevention policies</b>	<b>3,350</b>		<b>11</b>
<b>8. Public Policy coordination</b>	<b>350</b>		
8.1 Consultants	350		
<b>9. Violence and Crime Prevention Strategy Room</b>	<b>2,000</b>		
9.1 Consultants	650		
9.2 Equipment	1,350		
<b>10. Communication and awareness strategy</b>	<b>1,000</b>		
10.1 Consultants	380		
10.2 Nonconsulting services	620		
<b>11. Associated costs</b>	<b>1,100</b>		<b>4</b>
11.1 Monitoring & evaluation ***	1,000		
11.2 External audit	100		
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>28,550</b>		

**Table 2.1 Program Costs \* (in US\$000s)**

<b>IDB</b>	<b>Total cost IDB</b>	<b>Additional resources</b>	<b>%/IDB</b>
<b>12. Financing costs</b>			
12.1 Credit fee		175	
12.2 Inspection and supervision	0		
12.3 Interest	0		
<b>13. Contingencies</b>	<b>450</b>		<b>1</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>29,000</b>	<b>175</b>	<b>100</b>

\* Interest expenses will be defrayed by the government.

\*\* Includes costs of the PEU, consultants, travel and allowances.

\*\*\* Includes costs of external evaluations and monitoring systems (victim surveys, statistics and impact studies, focus groups).

### **III. PROGRAM EXECUTION**

#### **A. Borrower and executing agency**

- 3.1 The borrower will be the Republic of Guatemala. The executing agency will be the Ministry of the Interior (MINGOB), through the Office of the Deputy Minister for Community Support (VAC), acting through the Community Crime Prevention Office with the participation by Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Culture and Sports, the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, Social Welfare Secretariat, the First Lady's Office of Social Works, the Presidential Office for Women and the Executive Office of Drug-Trafficking and Addition Control, hereinafter called "the participating entities".
- 3.2 Program execution will be consistent with the guidelines established in national policies for the prevention of violence, prepared by CONAPREPI and CONAPREVI, and the policies of the Ministry of the Interior.

#### **B. Project execution and administration**

##### **1. Organization of execution**

- 3.3 For program execution, the Office of the Deputy Minister for Community Support will be strengthened by a coordinator, three technical directors who will manage the program, a financial/administrative specialist, a procurement specialist, an accountant, and a secretary, who together will form the Program Executing Unit (PEU).<sup>18</sup> This unit will rely upon the line divisions and units of MINGOB for administrative and accounting matters and for contract management. The coordinator will report directly to the Office of the Deputy Minister for Community

<sup>18</sup> The program will finance the PEU on a declining basis, with the government covering its full costs by the end of the program.



Support. **As a condition precedent to the first disbursement, the VAC will submit evidence that the PEU has been established, and that its staff have been contracted or seconded.**

- 3.4 The PEU will support the MINGOB in its work of coordinating the entities participating in the program and in providing guidance and technical supervision. These entities will help implement the technical features of the activities described in Chapter II, seeking assistance if necessary from NGOs that have been working successfully on violence prevention as well as other government units. These entities will work closely with the VAC in preparing the terms of reference and specifying the goods and works to be procured, and will sit on the bid evaluation committees. They will also undertake technical supervision of activities within their competence, and of the contracts for carrying them out. The participating entities will submit progress reports to the PEU, which will compile this information in a report to the Bank. The executing agency will be responsible for administering the funds, as well as for contracting and procurement. To this end, **each participating entity will sign an agreement with the MINGOB, as a condition precedent to the first disbursement.** The agreement signed with each participating entity will include the appointment of the liaison officer, or the latter's alternate, referred to in paragraph 3.9.
- 3.5 All requests for program-supported activities in connection with the violence prevention plans emanating from the strategy of a "Citizen Dialogue for a Safer Guatemala", to be implemented in the 57 communities mentioned in subprogram 2(a), will be referred to the VAC through the PEU. The Unit will coordinate the institutional responses with the official contacts in each participating entity to ensure that the proper priority is accorded to each activity.

## **2. Program coordination**

- 3.6 **Overall coordination** of the program will be the responsibility of the VAC, which will oversee the entire operation and its components, and will be responsible for their execution and for achievement of their targets and objectives. Among other functions, the VAC will: (i) appoint the staff of the PEU and supervise their work; (ii) approve the reports prepared by the PEU for submission to the Bank; and (iii) submit disbursement requests to the Bank. **Technical coordination** of the program will fall to the VAC's Community Crime Prevention Office, which will provide technical guidance and see to it that in meeting objectives and targets program planning has been observed. The functions of the VAC and the Crime Prevention Office will be outlined in the program Operating Regulations.
- 3.7 **Operational and administrative coordination** of all program activities will be done by the PEU. The coordinator will fulfill the following functions, among others: (i) liaison with the Bank for technical, administrative and financial aspects of the program; (ii) coordination of procurement and contracting of consulting

- services for the program, in accordance with the approved Annual Work Plans (AWPs); (iii) coordinate, supervise and report on overall progress with the program and each component and activity relating to the AWP; (iv) maintain an up-to-date record of information for calculating the program monitoring indicators; (v) coordinate contracting of the independent external auditors for the program, and support their work; (vi) group the AWP for the components and present a consolidated AWP to the VAC and subsequently to the Bank; (vii) ensure compliance with Bank procedures; (viii) ensure maintenance of separate and specific auxiliary accounts for identifying and handling Bank resources; (ix) present the VAC with timely applications for disbursement and substantiation of eligible expenditures; (x) present semiannual reports on program execution and the revolving fund and other financial reports as required; (xi) submit audited annual financial statements of the program; (xii) maintain a proper filing system of backup documentation on eligible expenses, for verification by the Bank and the external auditors; and (xiii) based on the AWP, coordinate with official contacts the institutional response to each request for support for a local violence prevention plan activity.
- 3.8 As noted in paragraph 3.3, the PEU will be supported by the Financial Administration Unit (UDAF) of the MINGOB, which will be responsible for all financial, budgetary and accounting aspects. The Procurement Unit of the MINGOB will take care of contracting and purchasing, in coordination with the PEU. The PNC will appoint an official to work with the PEU on police-related activities of the program. These officials will be given training in the operation's technical activities and be familiarized with Bank procedures.
- 3.9 **Liaison with participating entities.** Each participating entity will appoint a liaison officer and an alternate to coordinate its participation in the program, by activity or product, and these persons will support the PEU in all aspects relating to technical execution of their respective line of action. They will be given training by the program to familiarize them with the methodologies and procedures of technical execution. The terms of reference of the liaison officers and their alternates are set out in the Operating Regulations. The appointment of the liaison officer and the latter's alternate will be part of the agreement between each participating entity and MINGOB.
- 3.10 **International advisory services.** Given the innovative nature of an operation of this type, it was agreed with the authorities that international advisory services with broad experience in crime and violence prevention projects would be engaged during program execution if considered necessary by the VAC, to enable the latter to draw on the benefits of comparable international experiences. Also, technical visits will be made to countries noted for successful experiences with violence prevention.

### **3. Annual Work Plans (AWPs)**

- 3.11 Program-supported activities will be organized in a series of AWPs, with the first covering a horizon of 18 months. In April of each year the draft AWP for the following year will be prepared and submitted, in accordance with the preceding paragraphs, and it will be reviewed and approved in the first two weeks of January, consistent with the deadlines for approval and publication of the national budget. The AWP will include at least: (i) a detailed description of activities for each component and product; (ii) the targets to be achieved and the expected products and outcomes, consistent with the goals in the logical framework; (iii) the procurement plan, which will be revised annually; and (iv) as of the second year of execution, an evaluation of the preceding year. **The AWP for the first year will be a condition precedent to the first disbursement.**

### **4. Program Operating Regulations**

- 3.12 **Approval of the Operating Regulations agreed with the Bank will be a condition precedent to the first disbursement.** The Operating Regulations will include: (i) a detailed execution and coordination scheme; (ii) functions of the staff of the Executing Unit; (iii) responsibilities of the liaison officers of the participating entities and their alternates; (iv) the standard agreements that the VAC will sign with the participating entities; (v) community selection criteria; and (vi) AWP specifications.

### **C. Procurement of goods and services**

- 3.13 The procurement of works and goods, and the selection and contracting of consultants, will be done in conformity with the Bank policies contained in document GN-2349-6. The selection and contracting of consultants will be done in accordance with the Bank policies contained in document GN-2350-6. The borrower may use any method of selection and contracting stipulated in Bank policies. For purposes of paragraph 3 of document GN-2350-6, the short list of consultants where the estimated cost is less than the equivalent of US\$200,000 per contract may consist entirely of national consultants.
- 3.14 The Bank will initially conduct ex ante review of public bidding and other forms of procurement or contracting for consulting services. If the results from application of Bank procedures are satisfactory, the Bank may at its discretion agree to ex post review under specified circumstances.

### **D. Disbursement schedule**

- 3.15 The disbursement period for the program is estimated at four years. The national budget will include allocations to the MINGOB for the corresponding disbursements, according to the following schedule:

Table 3.1 Disbursement schedule (in US\$ millions)					
Source	Year1	Year2	Year3	Year4	Total
Bank	6	10	8	5	29
%	21%	34%	28%	17%	100%

#### **E. Special disbursement**

- 3.16 Once the contract is in force and the general conditions precedent to the first disbursement have been fulfilled in accordance with the general contractual conditions of the loan, the Bank may disburse up to the equivalent of US\$100,000 from the loan to initiate program activities.

#### **F. Revolving fund**

- 3.17 To expedite program disbursements, a revolving fund will be established in an amount of up to 10% of the financing, a level that is justified by the considerable decentralization of the initiatives supported by the program.

#### **G. Monitoring and evaluation**

- 3.18 The Bank's Country Office will supervise the program in close cooperation with the project team at Headquarters. To facilitate monitoring and analysis of the rate of advance of the program, the executing agency will present annual progress reports on the program, and the AWP, 60 days before the end of each year. The project team will participate in semiannual administration missions. If, pursuant to program monitoring, the Bank determines that progress has not been satisfactory as measured by the performance indicators, the executing agency, in agreement with the participating entities, will present to the Bank for consideration a proposal for corrective measures and an implementation plan.
- 3.19 The program logical framework contains indicators for use in program monitoring (see Annex I). As part of program preparations, the executing agency has indicated it will adhere to the baselines, implementation plan, and the monitoring and outcomes matrix to be developed on the basis of the AWP, for supervision of program targets, accomplishments, and outcomes.
- 3.20 The executing agency will implement and maintain a monitoring and evaluation system to verify the progress and impact of program activities. The system will have the following functions: (i) to compile and systemize periodic records of physical progress (activities) and financial progress (funds available and expended); (ii) to maintain readily accessible, relevant, up-to-date information on the execution of program activities and resources; (iii) to coordinate programmed activities with

the participating entities; and (iv) to systemize the information from the evaluations and other processes outlined in the Operating Regulations.

- 3.21 The impact of the program will be gauged by means of evaluations of each subprogram. The evaluations will need to include the baselines that are being constructed and are referred to in the logical framework. The factors that should be evaluated are victimization surveys that include perceptions of violence and the level of confidence in the authorities concerned and focus groups to describe juvenile violence that will be financed entirely by the program. Also, consideration will be given to the base lines resulting from existing primary information and the records of the participating entities. In addition, once the Violence and Crime Prevention Strategy Room is up and running, information will be generated regularly so that violence prevention plans can be monitored at the local level and national violence prevention policies can be implemented. The executing agency, through the PEU, will work with the entities directly involved to prepare terms of reference for the program monitoring activities.
- 3.22 An **initial evaluation** is planned by month 18 of the program, to review all aspects of execution, analyze the main obstacles to implementation, and estimate the program's impact. This evaluation will provide the basis for any necessary adjustments. The executing agency will present a **final evaluation** prior to the last disbursement of the program, comparing the proposed objectives and the actual outcomes, and providing a quantitative and qualitative evaluation of the final results, beneficiary satisfaction, and the main lessons learned and recommendations.

#### **H. Ex post evaluation**

- 3.23 The executing agency will compile, store, and retain all the accounting and technical information generated by the program, indicators and parameters, including the AWP's and the midterm and final evaluations, so that the Bank can prepare the Project Completion Report. The Bank's Office of Evaluation and Oversight (OVE) may use the same information, indicators, and parameters, if it so decides, to perform an ex post verification of the direct effects or impacts of the program, in accordance with policy GN-2254-4.

#### **I. External audit**

- 3.24 The PEU will present the program's annual financial statements, within 120 days after the close of each fiscal year, audited by an independent firm of external auditors acceptable to the Bank. The auditing firm will be selected and contracted in accordance with Bank procedures.

## IV. FEASIBILITY AND RISKS

### A. Institutional feasibility

- 4.1 The program's institutional feasibility rests on the legal powers accorded the Ministry of the Interior, and in particular the Office of the Deputy Minister of Community Support, to work with government agencies and communities in coordinating and facilitating comprehensive and sustainable actions to prevent violence. During the study of the executing agency's institutional capacity, conducted at the time of the analytical mission, it was concluded that the agency has the organizational strength to carry out the program, notwithstanding the institutional strengthening that the operation will support, as described in subprogram 2 (b).
- 4.2 The participating entities will not themselves be handling the operation's funds. However, they will be given training to strengthen specific aspects identified during program preparation, to ensure that they are able to carry out their technical activities properly.
- 4.3 The program will leave behind installed mechanisms for supporting interagency coordination and for helping the PEU implement violence prevention policies. The Violence and Crime Prevention Strategy Room will also be left in operating mode, and it will constitute a fundamental instrument for improving the design and pursuit of plans, strategies and policies.

### B. Socioeconomic and financial feasibility

- 4.4 **Socioeconomic feasibility.** Violence and insecurity exact many costs that have a negative impact on economic and social development. Studies conducted by the Bank suggest that the social cost of crime in Latin America ranges from 5% to 25% of GDP. A number of these costs are intangible, including those associated with the destruction of human capital, loss of life, deterioration of the quality of life, additional health costs as a result of violence, and compensation for damages as well as the higher operating costs of the agencies responsible for prosecuting and punishing crime. The quantifiable economic cost of violence and violence prevention in Guatemala, attributable to material losses, is about 7% of GDP.<sup>19</sup> Information from private security companies indicates that their operational personnel outnumber the National Police Force.
- 4.5 The four-year investment represented by this project is equal to 3.39% of the PNC budget over that time, assuming the budget does not increase in real terms, or 2.85% if the budget grows at its previous rate (which was 5.87% annually in real terms over the period 2003-2005). This means that the program's investments in

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<sup>19</sup> Inter-American Development Bank, "Assault on Development: Violence in Latin America", 2000, page 26.

prevention represent only a marginal increase in what the country is investing now in the control and suppression of violence and crime.

- 4.6 Finally, the few previous experiments in this field that have been evaluated in terms of the impact of preventive interventions on at-risk youth, such as the projects in Colombia and Uruguay, show that the positive impact, as measured against a control group, will become apparent in just a few years. Similarly, the economic return from interventions of this type, as measured by an ex post cost-benefit analysis, is very high.
- 4.7 **Financial feasibility.** To measure the financial feasibility of the project, a comparison was performed between the "do-nothing" scenario (no investment in activities to prevent violence and crime) and implementing the project. Under the "do-nothing" scenario, it is assumed that policing costs (the PNC budget) will continue to grow at the previous average annual rate of 5.87% (2003-2005).
- 4.8 From these calculations it was deduced that the program will pay for itself in four years (the execution period) if the effect of its prevention policies and actions produces savings of 1.67 percentage points in the average annual growth of the PNC budget: in other words, if the project succeeds in reducing pressure for additional police work to the point where the PNC budget could rise by 4.2% instead of 5.87%. If the savings recovery period is extended to six years, however, the required differential would be 1.05% (i.e. a reduction of 1% in the annual PNC budget increases over that time would pay for the loan). Finally, if the most conservative estimate (1.05%) of the decline in the PNC budget growth rate is extended over 10 years, the resulting savings would represent 4.7 times the cost of the program.
- 4.9 **Fiscal impact.** The government accords top priority to the program, given the important aspects it will address: the country's high rates of violence, rising juvenile delinquency, and crimes such as human trafficking. Bearing in mind the program's emphasis on building management capacity in existing institutions, the Ministry of Public Finance has committed itself to make the adjustments necessary to finance the recurring costs that the program will generate, and to sustain its activities, which as explained are not onerous.
- 4.10 The bulk of program funding is earmarked for improving the capacity of existing institutions that have weaknesses in their management and execution capacities. This is the case with the VAC and the Crime Prevention Office of the PNC, both recently created; the Offices for Working Women and Working Youth in the Ministry of Labor; and the SBS. As to judicial personnel and current or incoming police officers, efforts are directed at changing the way they work, and those efforts will need to be reinforced as part of the normal training and refresher programs within those entities. Finally, efforts such as improving working conditions and training for the employees of the existing OAVs, which will be strengthened as part

of the transformation of the PNC, or enhancing the skills of grade 5 and 6 teachers to deal with student behavior problems and to train their peers in these skills, will require ongoing downstream activities that will cost much less than those covered by the program.

- 4.11 Most of the recurring costs relate to maintaining upgraded facilities and computers, and other standard institutional equipment. The costs that imply a direct budget increase relate to the hiring of new personnel for the VAC, in connection primarily with running the Strategy Room once it has been set up and the shelters; and strengthening the PNC's Crime Prevention Office, all of which are built into future budget adjustments. The costs of running the shelters will be covered by the government, together with civil society organizations working in this area. These costs total about US\$1.5 million, and represent only 5% of program investment over four years.
- 4.12 A final issue relates to the citizen security and peaceful coexistence plans in sections of Guatemala City and municipalities in three other areas. The sustainability of these initiatives is closely linked to their design. They are based on a methodology for developing community-based management capacities, and training local facilitators who can mobilize the "grassroots" to action and support. They will be financed through resources available either in municipal budgets (e.g. actions to improve and maintain public services or to reorganize PNC activities) or in national programs (e.g. funds of the Ministry of Culture and Sports for financing sporting facilities or recreational and cultural activities). In the final analysis, the sustainability of these plans will depend not on additional budgetary injections but rather on the day-to-day activity of the VAC, which is assured increased funding, and on leadership from the community itself.

### **C. Social and environmental impact**

- 4.13 **Social impact.** The program will leave behind installed capacity at the national level to design and execute public plans and strategies for a comprehensive and participatory approach to violence prevention, information systems, and citizen participation. It will also help lay the basis for reducing juvenile delinquency, and this will have a positive social impact: it will benefit the population at highest social risk, mainly low-income minors and young people who are at risk or are already offenders, promoting conditions for their human development and strengthening civic values through the family, schools, civil society organizations, and the community.
- 4.14 The program will also encourage members of the community to take part in preventive activities, thereby achieving a greater commitment and sense of ownership. The program will incorporate an inclusive and crosscutting approach in its subprograms, components and activities, one that takes account of the country's



cultural and linguistic diversity, and that is careful not to discriminate in any way, particularly for reasons of gender.

- 4.15 **Environmental impact.** No negative environmental impact is anticipated. However, for projects involving small infrastructure works, such as rehabilitation or upgrading of physical facilities, environmentally appropriate technical specifications will be prepared and will form part of the contracts for the construction and supervision of those works.
- 4.16 **PTI/SEQ classification.** This operation qualifies as a social equity-enhancing program, as described in the key objectives for Bank activity contained in document AB-1704. It also qualifies as a poverty-targeted investment, insofar as more than 60% of its activities are directed at low-income groups in marginal areas.

**D. Benefits and risks.**

- 4.17 **Benefits.** The program will leave behind installed capacity within government to deal with violence and crime, improving the design and implementation of strategic, comprehensive and interagency activities for prevention, and improving interagency coordination mechanisms. It will also institute participatory mechanisms at the local level for assessing and improving the management of community plans for citizen security and peaceful coexistence, which will among other things restore credibility and trust in public institutions. These mechanisms will guarantee the sustainability of program interventions.
- 4.18 The Violence and Crime Prevention Strategy Room will continue to function through a standardized information system that gives the country a shared interagency tool for analysis, monitoring, and systematic interpretation of data on crime. The Strategy Room will permit guidance on the formulation of public policy and specifically targeted security plans and the prompt adoption of economically effective local and national strategies. Moreover, the information will be standardized to give the public clear, reliable statistics on different aspects of violence.
- 4.19 The program will be of direct benefit to the poorest segments of the population, by laying the basis for addressing a problem that, if left unattended, could pose a risk to the country's stability.
- 4.20 **Risks.** As noted above, lessons learned from previous experiments with the preventive approach to violence and crime show that long-term success depends on comprehensive interagency action. Thus, interagency coordination of activities is essential. To minimize this risk, the VAC has demonstrated its ability to rally the support of national and local agencies and to win the commitment of all stakeholders to the challenge of executing the program's planned initiatives. The program is also consistent with the policy guidelines of CONAPREPI and

CONAPREVI, which are the interagency coordination bodies for violence prevention. In both cases program will strengthen them in their functions.

- 4.21 Another risk has to do with whether a preventive strategy for dealing with violence and crime can successfully take root in agencies that have traditionally practiced the repressive approach, one that moreover enjoys broad public support because it shows short-term results. This risk is mitigated by the country's demonstrated willingness to change and to undertake reforms, as it is now doing, to incorporate the preventive approach, including the transformations called for in this operation. As well, the program will support, through its communication and outreach strategy, significant efforts to foster change, both among players and operators in the system, and among beneficiaries and the public at large.
- 4.22 Finally, there is the risk inherent in the changeover of government and authorities, which will take place during the second year of program execution. That change should not affect the program or its thrust, since the operation is already built into nationally institutionalized activities, and will contribute to consolidation and strengthening of a sense of ownership on the part of the various stakeholders.

**VIOLENCE PREVENTION PROGRAM (GU-0163)**  
**LOGICAL FRAMEWORK**

Narrative summary	Indicators	Means of Verification	Assumptions
<p><b>Goal</b></p> <p>To improve government efforts to deal with violence and crime through prevention.</p>	<p>High rate of acceptance (at least 70%) by the public of prevention.</p>	<p>Victimization surveys three years after program.</p>	<p>The socioeconomic situation in the country does not deteriorate</p>
<p><b>Purpose of the Program</b></p> <p>To improve the government capacity to design and implement a strategic, comprehensive, interagency and participatory plan of prevention activities, particularly with respect to juvenile violence and domestic violence, in the zones targeted by the program.</p>	<p>By the end of the program, violence in the areas targeted have declined by at least 15% in the areas served.</p> <p>Baseline: Initial and periodic victimization surveys.</p> <p>By the end of the program MINGOB's budgetary allocation for prevention has risen by at least 6%, including corresponding program funds.</p> <p>Baseline: Budget for 2006 (0.86%).</p>	<p>Initial and periodic victimization surveys in communities targeted by the program.</p> <p>Statistics of Violence Strategy Room.</p>	<p>The socioeconomic situation in the country does not deteriorate</p> <p>There are no other factors that cannot be addressed.</p>
<p><b>Subprogram 1. Comprehensive actions for violence prevention</b></p> <p><b>Purpose 1:</b></p> <p>Improve the capacity of entities responsible for prevention and treatment of juvenile and domestic violence.</p>	<p>Upon completion of the program, all of the functioning OAVs will report that number of cases served promptly at least 20% over baseline: Number of cases open with Attorney General's Office 2006.</p> <p>Upon completion of the program, at least 30% of women housed in shelters in touch into the labor market.</p>	<p>Records of cases attended by Attorney General's Office, PNC, Ministry of Health</p> <p>Records of shelters</p> <p>PEU monitoring reports</p>	

Narrative summary	Indicators	Means of Verification	Assumptions
	<p>Upon completion of the program, the incidence of drug and alcohol consumption in students addressed by program has not increased from baseline or has diminished, and the age at which substance use begins is higher (Focus group survey at start of the program of students in grades 5 and 6).</p> <p>The rates of recidivism amongst young offenders falls by 10% by the end of year 2 and 15% upon completion of the program (Baseline: 2005 recidivism records).</p>	<p>Focus groups surveys of a representative sample</p> <p>Program execution reports (evaluations)</p> <p>SBS records</p> <p>SBS Monitoring reports of young people</p>	
<p><b>Component 1. Domestic violence</b></p> <p>Policy for preventing domestic violence evaluated and in operation.</p> <p>Coverage of the OAVs expanded, and their services strengthened.</p> <p>Coverage of shelters expanded and services strengthened.</p>	<p>By the end of year 1, CONAPREVI is issuing monitoring reports on execution of domestic violence prevention policy.</p> <p>By the end of year 2, two OAVs in Guatemala City and 13 in other departments have been established and are operating. By the end of the program, the third OAV in Guatemala City and the remaining nine are established and operating.</p> <p>By the end of year 2, two regional shelters and 11 shelters in departmental capitals are established and operating. By the end of the program, all the remaining shelters (two more regional shelters and 11 more in departmental capitals) are established and operating.</p>	<p>Annual policy monitoring report</p> <p>Policy execution evaluation report.</p> <p>Annual program execution reports.</p> <p>PNC execution reports</p> <p>Program execution report</p> <p>SOSEP reports</p>	
<p><b>Component 2. At-risk children and youth</b></p> <p>Policies for preventing violence among at-risk children and youth evaluated.</p> <p>Intervention strategy in education centers carried out.</p>	<p>By the end of year 1, CONAPREPI is issuing implementation reports on policies for protecting at-risk juveniles and helping young offenders.</p> <p>By the end of year 2, at least 60% of grade 5 and 6 teachers nationwide (about 1,800 teachers) have been trained, with at least 80% success rate. By the end of the program, the remaining 40% of teachers (about 1,200 teachers), with the same success rate.</p>	<p>Annual policy monitoring report.</p> <p>Policy implementation evaluation report.</p> <p>Education Ministry reports</p>	

Narrative summary	Indicators	Means of Verification	Assumptions
<p>Activities to promote constructive use of free time.</p> <p>Activities to promote youth employment.</p>	<p>By the end of the program, 2,500 youngsters in the last year of general secondary school have been working for one year under the "Dreams of Young People for Peace " project.</p> <p>By the end of the program, 1,000 participatory activities have been held to promote the effective use of free time “<i>Barrio Adentro</i>” reaching 70,000 children, young people and adults.</p> <p>By the end of the program, 40 sporting events have been held, attracting 10,000 children and young people.</p> <p>At least 50% of beneficiary young people are to join the job market (baseline: 2,000 young people who are vulnerable and at risk in microenterprise pilot projects).</p>	<p>Education Ministry reports</p> <p>Program execution reports (evaluations)</p> <p>Local prevention plan progress reports</p> <p>Program evaluation report</p> <p>Program execution reports</p> <p>Employment Exchange records</p> <p>Labor Ministry records</p>	<p>Active private sector participation</p> <p>Training and business centers.</p>
<p><b>Component 3. Juveniles undergoing social reintegration</b></p> <p>Strategy for care and rehabilitation of young offenders implemented.</p>	<p>By the end of year 1, the young offenders treatment policy has been revised.</p> <p>By the end of year 2 there are three rehabilitation centers up and running</p> <p>By the end of year 2, overcrowding in detention centers has been reduced against the baseline and meets international standards in the human rights conventions signed by Guatemala (Baseline: record of number of young people housed in detention centers compared with installed capacity per room in shelters).</p> <p>By the end of year 2, one microenterprise pilot project is running.</p>	<p>Enactment of the policy</p> <p>Policy implementation monitoring reports</p> <p>Program execution reports</p> <p>SBS reports</p> <p>SBS records</p> <p>Program monitoring reports</p> <p>PEU monitoring reports and local violence prevention plans</p>	<p>Private sector offers job opportunities to juveniles in process of reintegration.</p>

Narrative summary	Indicators	Means of Verification	Assumptions
<p><b>Subprogram 2. Comprehensive interventions at the municipal and local level, and institutional strengthening for VAC</b></p> <p><b>Purpose 2:</b></p> <p>Communities have a greater capacity for local management of initiatives to prevent violence and promote peaceful coexistence.</p>	<p>By the end of the program, the perception of safety and peaceful coexistence in program intervention areas has improved against the baseline (Baseline: initial survey and periodic perception and victimization surveys).</p>	<p>Initial and periodic victimization surveys in program areas</p>	<p>The socioeconomic situation in the country does not deteriorate</p>
<p><b>Component 1: Community prevention programs</b></p> <p>Local and community projects for violence prevention are operating.</p>	<p>By the end of year 2, six areas of Guatemala City and 30 municipios have a local prevention plan implemented and evaluated. In addition, at the end of the program, five more areas of Guatemala City and 22 more municipios have a local prevention plan implemented and evaluated.</p>	<p>Program execution reports VAC execution reports on prevention plans.</p>	<p>The socioeconomic situation in the country does not deteriorate</p>
<p><b>Component 2: Strengthening the VAC</b></p> <p>The VAC's institutional capacity has been strengthened.</p>	<p>By the end of year 2, the VAC has resources and operating plans formulated, implemented and evaluated. By the end of the program, the VAC has evaluated its management, measuring its effectiveness and leadership capacity to implement prevention initiatives, including the technical profile analysis of its new staff.</p>	<p>Program execution reports MINGOB allocations to VAC. VAC personnel register.</p>	<p>MIGOB maintains the political will to continue supporting and developing its preventive activities (for components 2 and 3 of this subprogram).</p>

Narrative summary	Indicators	Means of Verification	Assumptions
<p><b>Component 3:</b></p> <p><b>Support for the National Prevention Section of the PNC</b></p> <p>National Crime Prevention Office (SGPD) is functioning</p> <p>PNC officers trained and sensitized.</p>	<p>By the end of year 1, the SGPD has resources and operating plans formulated, implemented and evaluated for all its units. By the end of the program, the SGPD has evaluated its management, measuring its effectiveness and the success of its community relations, including a technical profile analysis of its new staff.</p> <p>By the end of the program, 100% of new PNC officers and 85% of current officers have participated in training and awareness courses and activities, with a success rate of at least 80%.</p> <p>By the end of the program, at least 60% of users interviewed in program intervention areas have a positive opinion of PNC officers' work (Baseline: beneficiary targeted surveys).</p>	<p>Program execution reports</p> <p>Budget allocations by MINGOB to the Crime Prevention Office.</p> <p>SGPD staff register.</p> <p>PNC Academy reports</p> <p>Officer appraisal reports.</p>	
<p><b>Subprogram 3: Strengthening government capacity to formulate, evaluate and update prevention policies.</b></p> <p><b>Purpose 3:</b></p> <p>The State has improved its capacity to formulate, evaluate and update prevention policies.</p>	<p>The Strategy Room produces regular reports, tracking and evaluating public policies on the prevention of domestic violence, protection of vulnerable and at-risk youth, and treatment and support of young offenders, which are used by government bodies in public policy planning.</p>	<p>CONAPREPI and CONAPREVI reports</p>	

Narrative summary	Indicators	Means of Verification	Assumptions
<p><b>Component 1: Coordination of public policies on violence prevention</b></p> <p>Interagency coordination mechanisms have been strengthened.</p>	<p>Six months into the program, regular sessions are being held to monitor and evaluate public policies on violence and crime prevention.</p>	<p>Semiannual reports of CONAPREPI and CONAPREVI</p>	<p>High-level synergy is maintained among member entities of CONAPREPI and CONAPREVI for coordination of prevention activities.</p>
<p><b>Component 2: Strategy Room for the Prevention of Violence and Crime</b></p> <p>The Strategy Room keeps reliable statistics and records.</p>	<p>The Strategy Room's operating manuals on violence and crime are complete and in force for the second year of the program.</p> <p>As of year 2, all institutions involved are familiar with and using the Strategy Room for violence regularly.</p> <p>By the end of year 1, the Strategy Room begins operations. As of year 3 it is producing a report monitoring the prevention and peaceful coexistence policies supported by the program. By the end of the program, the Strategy Room has been transferred to the VAC and continues to operate.</p>	<p>Operating manuals</p> <p>Regular reports of the Strategy Room</p> <p>Program execution reports</p>	
<p><b>Component 3: Communication and dissemination strategy</b></p> <p>A communication and dissemination strategy has been designed and implemented.</p>	<p>By the end of year 1, a communications and dissemination strategy has been designed. As of year 2 the strategy is being implemented.</p>	<p>Communication strategy</p> <p>Reports on progress of communications strategy</p>	



DOCUMENT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK

PROPOSED RESOLUTION

Guatemala. Loan \_\_\_\_/OC-GU to the Republic of Guatemala  
Violence Prevention Program

The Board of Executive Directors

RESOLVES:

That the President of the Bank, or such representative as he shall designate, is authorized, in the name and on behalf of the Bank, to enter into such contract or contracts as may be necessary with the Republic of Guatemala, as Borrower, for the purpose of granting it a financing to cooperate in the execution of a violence prevention program. Such financing will be for the amount of up to US\$29,000,000, from the resources of the Single Currency Facility of the Bank's Ordinary Capital, and will be subject to the Financial Terms and Conditions and the Special Contractual Conditions of the Executive Summary of the Loan Proposal.

(Adopted on \_\_\_\_ 200\_\_)

LEG/OPR/RGII/IDBDOCS#680229  
GU-0163