

PROJECT PROFILE

I. BASIC INFORMATION

Project Name:	Citizen Security and Justice Program III
Project Number:	JA-L1043
Project Team:	Arnaldo Posadas (IFD/ICS), Team Leader; Mariel Fiat (ICS/CJA); Joel Korn, Jennifer Peirce, and Melissa Gonzalez (IFD/ICS); Marcella Distrutti (SCL/GDI); Glaister Cunningham (CCB/CJA); Lila Mallory and Graham Williams (FMP/CJA); Bernardita Saez (LEG/SGO); and Federico Changanaqui, Tom McArdle, external consultants.
Borrower:	Government of Jamaica
Executing Agency:	Ministry of National Security (MNS)
Financing Plan:	IDB: US\$20,000,000 DFID ¹ : UK£10,000,000 DFATD ² : C\$20,000,000 Estimated Total ³ : US\$55,000,000
Safeguards:	Policies Triggered: N/A; Classification: C

II. GENERAL JUSTIFICATION AND OBJECTIVES

- 2.1 Since 2001, the Bank has collaborated with the efforts carried out by the Government of Jamaica (GoJ) through its Citizen Security and Justice Program (CSJP)⁴, which aims to reduce crime and violence in vulnerable communities⁵ through interventions addressing identified individual, family, and community risk factors.⁶ In a recent evaluation of Bank programs on citizen security in four countries, the Bank's Office of Evaluation and Oversight (OVE)⁷ concluded that CSJP had the most successful implementation and included most elements identified as best practices.⁸
- 2.2 The evaluation of CSJP II⁹ will be completed in October of 2013. Data suggests generally positive results to date. For example, the murder rates in the eight parishes in which CSJP operates in targeted communities have declined 43% from 2009-2012, compared to 35%

¹ Department for International Development of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; approximately US\$15 million and subject to internal approval.

² Department of Foreign Affairs Trade and Development of Canada; approximately US\$20 million and subject to internal approval.

³ Gross amount of project specific grants available for funding the program would be reduced by approximately US\$1,750,000, representing the IDB's 5% Administrative Fee, in accordance with Cooperation Framework Arrangements with DFID and DFATD.

⁴ The Bank's support has included two lending operations (phases I and II of CSJP), and two project specific grants funded by DFID (which expanded the scope of CSJP II), for a total level of support of approximately US\$50 million.

⁵ For purposes of CSJP, communities are considered vulnerable and in turn have been targeted for participation in the program based on the following criteria: i) severity and variance of crime and violence, ii) population, iii) socioeconomic conditions, and iv) community assets and opportunity for collaboration.

⁶ These include primary and secondary prevention, job skills training, and restorative justice services (part of Justice Sector Reform).

⁷ The Implementation Challenge: Lessons from Five Citizen Security Projects, OVE, June, 2013.

⁸ Some included: participatory preparation allowing high buy-in by communities, sensitive situational diagnostics, involvement of a limited number of ministries to reduce coordinating difficulties, partnerships with non-governmental and community-based organizations, and the use of community officers to link beneficiaries and program services. The OVE report also noted that programs addressing inter-generational transmission of learned behaviors (e.g. violence or aggression) require many years of multi-pronged interventions to bear results, which are influenced by external factors in challenging community contexts.

⁹ Loan resources provided by the Bank for CSJP II are fully disbursed whereas the PSG funded by DFID is 72% disbursed.

nationally.¹⁰ In terms of results related to community governance for crime prevention, the existence and capacity of legitimate community-based organizations has expanded: from a baseline of zero to 45 Community Action Committees (CAC)¹¹ created through the program, one in practically each of the 50 CSJP communities, 21 of which have achieved the status of *benevolent societies*.¹² Additionally, the proportion of vocational skills trainees who held steady employment for at least six months after completing training has been increasing, reaching 16.4% in the second semester of 2012,¹³ in a challenging economic context. Of community residents aware of CSJP, 66% said it is doing a *good job* in crime prevention; only 3% had a negative view.¹⁴

- 2.3 **The problem.** Crime and violence continue to be significant challenges in Jamaica, with serious consequences for social and economic development.¹⁵ The homicide rate remains among the highest in the region,¹⁶ and insecurity is a top public and political concern.¹⁷ To understand and address crime and violence at the community level, most analysts and practitioners¹⁸ adopt a public health or risk factor model.¹⁹ High crime rates are generally associated with concentrations of young people living in poor, single-parent families, with low education, in areas of rapid urbanization, high unemployment, and with exposure to domestic violence and antisocial behavior.²⁰ In the Jamaican context, three key elements are especially relevant when analyzing crime and violence and building public policy approaches:
- 2.4 **Community governance and social cohesion:** Social cohesion refers to a community's ability to set shared goals and rules and to act cooperatively in defining, monitoring and counteracting social conflict and undesirable behavior²¹; communities lacking this often experience relatively high levels of crime and violence.²² In Jamaica (especially in the inner-city), this is manifested in part through the distorted forms of collective governance created when local gangs operate,²³ using both fear and benefits to control the

¹⁰ Ministry of National Security, CSJP Project Execution Unit. CSJP II: Sixth Semester Report. February 2013, JCF data. Community-level data not available. See also Jamaica Vision 2030 Medium-Term Socio-Economic Framework (MTF) 2012-2015.

¹¹ CACs are representative bodies in CSJP communities that identify and organize responses to community needs, including on violence prevention.

¹² The Social Development Commission declares a civil society organization (CSO) a benevolent society based on training and operational capacity criteria; this status permits a CSO to receive/manage financial resources. 23 more CACs are expected to reach this status by the end of 2013.

¹³ CSJP PEU February 2013 report, citing data for the last two quarters.

¹⁴ Ministry of National Security, CSJP Baseline Survey, 2011, p. 5.

¹⁵ In addition to the human toll, economic impacts such as a major drop in the competitiveness index are attributed to crime.

¹⁶ In 2011, Jamaica's homicide rate (41 per 100,000) was significantly higher than that of neighboring countries: 36 in The Bahamas, 11 in Barbados (for 2010), 17 in Guyana, and 26 in Trinidad and Tobago (UNODC Global Study on Homicide Statistics- 2011).

¹⁷ Vision 2030 MTF 2012-2015. According to the 2009 National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), 88.5% of respondents believed that crime had increased in Jamaica in the past five years and 15% indicated that crime had increased in their own community.

¹⁸ For example: Jamaica National Crime Prevention and Community Safety Strategy (MNS, 2010) (under "Crime Prevention through Social Development;" and through the WHO's ecological risk factor model); UNDP Caribbean Human Development Report 2012; "Youth Violence in Jamaica", The Violence Prevention Alliance of Jamaica (vpajamaica.org) and the Jamaica Institute of Criminal Justice (University of the West Indies), 2011; Trends in Urban Crime and Violence in Kingston (UN Habitat Global Report on Human Settlements 2007);

¹⁹ "Risk factor" does not imply direct causation between crime and a given variable. The presence of a single risk factor does not mean that crime/violence will necessarily occur.)

²⁰ See, for example, Ludwig, Jens and Julia Burdick-Will. "Poverty Deconcentration and the Prevention of Crime." In Oxford Handbook on Crime Prevention, edited by Brandon C. Welsh and David Farrington. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2012); and also, Anthony Harriott (2004), "Understanding Crime in Jamaica: New Challenges for Public Policy."

²¹ See Tironi 2008, cited in Francisco Javier Diaz & Patricio Meller, *Violencia y Cohesión Social en América Latina*, CIEPLAN.

²² Sampson, R.J., W. Raubenbush, and F. Earls. (1997). 'Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy'. *Science* 277 (5328): 918-924. See also, Katz, C.M., and S. Schnebly. (2011) 'Neighborhood Variation in Gang Member Concentrations' in *Crime & Delinquency* 57 (3): 377-407.

²³ See, Henry-Lee, Aldrie, "The nature of poverty in the garrison constituencies in Jamaica" (2005). <http://eau.sagepub.com/content/17/2/83>. The 2009 NCVS indicates that one out of every four Jamaicans (23%) feels that there are criminal gangs in their community.

community, overtaking the normal role of local civic leaders.²⁴ Although 69.1% of Jamaicans have expressed willingness to work with the police in reducing gang influence,²⁵ there is still low trust in the police – 60% of people who witnessed crime in the most affected communities did not report it to the police.²⁶ Domestic violence is a further factor in this context, given its critical role in the inter-generational transmission of violent behavior.²⁷ In Jamaica, 19.6% of women have been subjected to physical or sexual violence by a partner, 69.5% were beaten or physically abused in childhood, and 16.7% witnessed abuse against their mother or stepmother.²⁸

- 2.5 **Socio-economic conditions:** There is growing evidence that lack of attachment to school and the workplace during adolescence and adulthood is strongly associated with crime.²⁹ Researchers also identify insufficient skills and lack of connections with potential employers as important reasons that youth have difficulty securing jobs.³⁰ According to the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF), unemployed, and undereducated males aged 15-29 represent the majority of both perpetrators and victims of violent crimes. In general, these youth are not from the absolute poorest areas (mostly rural), but rather from inner-city areas where jobs are scarce. Jamaican youth face an especially tough employment context: the 2013 unemployment rate for those 15-24 years old is 30.1% for men and 49.1% for women, compared to the overall rate of 16.3%.³¹
- 2.6 **Community level justice mechanisms:** In 2012, only 32.3% of survey respondents thought the Jamaican criminal justice system was sufficiently capable of addressing crime and violence problems,³² and the GoJ has acknowledged that low access is among justice sector's main challenges.³³ In general, people from vulnerable communities do not have the knowledge or financial resources to obtain legal counsel (for litigation or defense)³⁴ – and this lack of recourse through the justice system creates fertile ground for extra-judicial and vigilante violence.³⁵ Furthermore, the justice system is overburdened by several factors: pending cases that have escalated to violence due to a lack of community-based alternative conflict resolution mechanisms³⁶, overcrowded jails due to few alternatives to incarceration,³⁷ a high proportion of people incarcerated on minor and/or non-violent charges³⁸ and high rates of pre-trial detention.³⁹

²⁴ See A. Harriott, B. Lewis, K. Nelson and M. Seligson. "Political Culture of Democracy in Jamaica and in the Americas."

²⁵ The University of West Indies (2013). Political Culture of Democracy in Jamaica and in the Americas (2012).

²⁶ MNS, 2011 CSJP Baseline Survey.

²⁷ Boys exposed to domestic violence are more likely to engage in delinquent behavior as adolescents and use violence against women as adults. Girls who have suffered child abuse will have greater tolerance for violence as adults. (Archer 1994; Whitfield et al. 2003; Heise 2011).

²⁸ Pan American Health Organization (2013), with data from Reproductive Health Survey 2008/09.

²⁹ Bushway, Shawn. 'Labor Markets and Crime' in Wilson, J.Q. and Petersilia, J. eds. 2011. Crime and Public Policy. Oxford University Press. Lack of attachment to the school system is a further risk factor: According to STATIN, the average school dropout rate over the last five years in Jamaica is 8.8% for grades 10-11 and 27.4% for grades 12-13.

³⁰ Tracer Study of Beneficiaries (Project Rise), Joy Moncrieffe, 2013, p. 60.

³¹ Statistical Institute of Jamaica, 2013.

³² UNDP. Caribbean Human Development Report 2012, "Human Development and the Shift to Better Citizen Security," p. 129.

³³ Jamaica National Crime Prevention and Community Safety Strategy. Dennis Darby "Jamaica Justice System Policy Reform Agenda Framework" (2009), prepared for the Ministry of Justice (strategic issues: access to justice; community-national links; social dimensions of justice reform).

³⁴ IACHR Human Rights Report on Jamaica (2012), Organization of American States, page 30-35.

³⁵ US Human Rights Report on Jamaica (2012) notes that extra-judicial violence by police and mob killings are in part related to frustration with non-responsiveness from the justice system.

³⁶ Ministry of Justice Restorative Justice Policy (2012) notes that RJ reduces feelings of revenge/reprisal, reduces post-traumatic stress among victims, and reduces recidivism in some offences (page 9).

³⁷ Ministry of Justice Restorative Justice Policy (2012).

³⁸ The Office of the Children's Advocate noted concerns about minors (especially girls) being detained in adult facilities, and being detained for non-criminal "uncontrollable behaviour." Jamaica Information Service, 18 March 2013. <http://www.jis.gov.jm/news/list/33267>

- 2.7 **Justification:** The GOJ has identified reduction of crime and violence as priorities through recent policy framework instruments, including the Crime Prevention Community Development Strategy (2010), the Community Renewal Program (2011) and Vision 2030 (2009). CSJP III will build upon these approaches, its own best practices and those from other community security programs⁴⁰ to promote community cohesion and governance, employability and employment, and expanded availability of community level justice mechanisms.
- 2.8 CSJP III will continue its preventative work in 50 inner-city communities where the program is currently focused, but it will also seek to reach the at-risk population in other communities.⁴¹ The program will continue to promote a participatory model with activities and priorities tailored to each community's specific needs. In certain activities, CSJP III will have a nationwide focus such as drawing on program expertise to respond to unforeseeable incidents of violence in a given community, and through social marketing efforts disseminating an anti-violence message. The GOJ is working to develop a plan to better coordinate the work of ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) in CSJP communities⁴² and to better leverage CSJP resources. During the implementation of the program, the GoJ intends that services and activities funded by CSJP III will gradually be phased into the budgets and plans of relevant MDAs, to ensure long-term institutional and financial sustainability and broader coverage of these crucial activities.
- 2.9 The program is aligned with the Operational Guidelines for Program Design and Execution in the Area of Civic Coexistence and Public Safety (GN-2535), the objectives and Regional Development Goals of the Ninth General Capital Increase,⁴³ and the goal of supporting C&D countries. The program is aligned with the Country Strategy for Jamaica (GN-2422-1) under social protection and is included in the 2014 Country Program. It is also in line with the Sector Strategy on Institutions for Growth and Social Welfare (OP-473-2), the Citizen Security Initiative (GN-2660), and the Operational Policy on Gender Equality (GN-2531-6).
- 2.10 **Objectives and Expected Results:** The general objective is to contribute to the reduction of crime and violence. The specific objectives are to: (i) improve social cohesion and community governance; (ii) increase employability and employment of residents in target communities; and (iii) improve access to and efficiency of justice services at the community level.

III. EXECUTION ISSUES AND PROGRAM RISKS

- 3.1 **Component 1: Improved social cohesion and community governance (US\$22.25 million).** Community governance mechanisms, such as CACs, can enable legitimate community participation and collective action in responding to local challenges and conflicts. This component will finance activities aimed at building and strengthening legitimate community-based organizations, such as: (i) community events to promote

³⁹ For these and other challenges facing the country's justice system, see Jamaican Justice System Reform Task Force. Final Report (2007).

⁴⁰ For example: PIOJ, Assessment of Community Security and Transformation Programs in Jamaica (2009); the OVE evaluation (June 2013).

⁴¹ These include rural and urban communities that do not have the highest crime rates, but that may become volatile and/or may be 'feeder' communities, i.e. residents who may be attracted to higher crime urban areas.

⁴² Ministries of Education, Health, Youth and Culture, Sports and Labor and the Social Investment Fund have been identified as key MDAs.

⁴³ GCI-9 objective: to reduce poverty and inequality; GCI-9 Results Matrix indicator: reduction in homicides per 100,000 inhabitants.

pro-social behavior; (ii) parenting education; (iii) psychosocial support (counseling) services; (iv) conflict resolution training (including in schools); (v) training, resources, and mentorship for CACs and community action officers (including preparation of community safety plans); (vi) small community infrastructure projects to create safe spaces for sports and training; and (vii) social marketing campaigns addressing the “culture of violence” and promoting healthy, respectful relationships and gender norms.⁴⁴

- 3.2 **Component 2: Employability and Employment (US\$19 million).** This component will seek to reduce risk factors by increasing work skills, employment and entrepreneurship opportunities for at-risk youth and young adults primarily in targeted communities. The component will finance activities such as: (i) vocational skills, life skills, and remedial education; (ii) on-the-job training internships⁴⁵; (iii) community business development plans and partnerships; and (iv) design strategies for promoting private sector participation and alliances.
- 3.3 **Component 3: Community Level Justice Mechanisms (US\$12 million).** Increased access to the justice system, including to legal information, legal representation and alternative dispute mechanisms can alleviate pressure on the justice system, which in turn has the potential to strengthen the country’s institutional capacity to tackle crime and violence. Thus, the objective of this component is to improve access to and the efficiency of justice services in marginalized communities. This component will finance: (i) victim support programs (especially for gender-based violence); (ii) restorative justice programs⁴⁶; (iii) mediation and dispute resolution mechanisms; (iv) expanded roles for Justices of the Peace; (v) diversion (deferred judgment) programs for minors; (vi) legal aid services; and (vii) social marketing campaigns to increase awareness of justice-related rights and services.
- 3.4 **Expected Outcomes.** This program will contribute to: (i) increased ability of communities to address conflicts and challenges collectively;⁴⁷ (ii) better skills profiles for vocational trainees and more connections and opportunities with potential employers (e.g. through apprenticeships and community enterprises);⁴⁸ and (iii) improved access and efficiency of justice services at the community level.⁴⁹

IV. EXECUTION ISSUES AND PROGRAM RISKS

- 4.1 The executing agency will be the MNS, through the experienced and efficient CSJP executing unit. CSJP III will seek to strengthen the institutional capacity of MDAs to work with traditional CSJP populations as well as in data collection and analysis.⁵⁰ At this stage, the following potential risks include: (i) overcoming low levels of coordination among government entities;⁵¹ (ii) fiscal limitations and fiscal space to complete the

⁴⁴ Possible themes: ‘reprisal justice’; ‘masculinities’ that promote aggression, guns, or gangster identities; tolerance of domestic violence.

⁴⁵ With both the private and public sectors, including the model built with the Jamaican Defence Force in the construction sector.

⁴⁶ The MoJ defines restorative justice as a “process whereby all parties with a stake in a particular offence come together to resolve collectively how to deal with the aftermath of the offence. It focuses on holding the offender accountable in a more meaningful way. It repairs the harm caused by the offender, helps to integrate the offender into the community and helps to achieve a sense of healing for both the victim and the community”.

⁴⁷ This can be measured by a reduction in community disputes and reprisal or school violence incidents, community trust in local governance mechanisms, participation in collective events (especially by young men), and community perception of inter- and intra-community tensions.

⁴⁸ This can be measured by how many trainees obtain and retain work for at least 6 months and/or pass vocational certifications, and to what extent community businesses are being established or expanded and are hiring local residents.

⁴⁹ This can be measured by more cases being justifiably diverted from courts/prisons and community views on if the justice system serves their needs.

⁵⁰ For example: increased coverage and integration of the Jamaica Crime Observatory and community-level data mechanisms.

⁵¹ Coordination between MNS and MoJ is crucial for program execution; coordination with all MDAs is key for longer-term sustainability.

objectives of the program; (iii) lack of data generation for effective monitoring and evaluation; (iv) macro-economic conditions and fiscal pressures that may result in a negative impact on the security situation and employment prospects; and (v) institutional and financial sustainability as violence prevention programs are transferred to MDAs. During the analysis phase, these risks, as well as their mitigating measures, will be analyzed with stakeholders.

V. SAFEGUARDS AND FIDUCIARY SCREENING

- 5.1 The environmental and social classification for this program is “C” based on the Safeguard Policy Report and the Safeguard Screening Form of the Environmental Classification Toolkit.

VI. RESOURCES AND TIMETABLE

- 6.1 It is expected that the POD distribution to QRR will take place on December 10, 2013. Approval by the Board is expected by February 26, 2014. The resources needed for project preparation are estimated to be US\$101,000. The staff time needed from project preparation will be 1.15 FTEs (see Annex V).

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SAFEGUARD POLICY FILTER REPORT

PROJECT DETAILS	IDB Sector	SOCIAL INVESTMENT-CITIZEN SAFETY
	Type of Operation	Innovation Loan
	Additional Operation Details	
	Investment Checklist	Institutional Development Investment
	Team Leader	Fiat Ortiz, Cristina Mariel (CFIAT@iadb.org)
	Project Title	Citizen Security and Justice Program III
	Project Number	JA-L1043
	Safeguard Screening Assessor(s)	Gonzalez, Melissa Maria Laura (MMGONZALEZ@iadb.org)
	Assessment Date	2013-08-07
	Additional Comments	

SAFEGUARD POLICY FILTER RESULTS	Type of Operation	Loan Operation	
	Safeguard Policy Items Identified (Yes)	Activities to be financed in the project area are located within a geographical area or sector exposed to natural hazards* (Type 1 Disaster Risk Scenario).	(B.01) Disaster Risk Management Policy– OP-704
		Does this project offer opportunities to promote gender equality or women's empowerment through its project components?	(B.01) Gender Equality Policy– OP-761
		The operation is in compliance with environmental, specific women's rights, gender, and indigenous laws and regulations of the country where the operation is being implemented (including national obligations established under ratified Multilateral Environmental Agreements).	(B.02)
		The operation (including associated facilities) is screened and classified according to their potential environmental impacts.	(B.03)
		The Bank will monitor the executing agency/borrower's compliance with all safeguard requirements stipulated in the loan agreement and project operating or credit regulations.	(B.07)
		Any part of the investment or component(s) is being co-financed.	(B.15)

		Suitable safeguard provisions for procurement of goods and services in Bank financed projects may be incorporated into project-specific loan agreements, operating regulations and bidding documents, as appropriate, to ensure environmentally responsible procurement.	(B.17)
	Potential Safeguard Policy Items(?)	No potential issues identified	
	Recommended Action:	<p>Operation has triggered 1 or more Policy Directives; please refer to appropriate Directive(s). Complete Project Classification Tool. Submit Safeguard Policy Filter Report, PP (or equivalent) and Safeguard Screening Form to ESR.</p> <p>The project triggered the Disaster Risk Management policy (OP-704).</p> <p>A more limited and specific Disaster Risk Assessment (DRA) may be required (see Directive A-2 of the DRM Policy OP-704). Please contact a Natural Disaster Specialist in VPS/ESG or INE/RND for guidance.</p> <p>Also: if the project needs to be modified to increase resilience to climate change, consider the (i) possibility of classification as adaptation project and (ii) additional financing options. Please contact a INE/CCS adaptation specialist for guidance.</p>	
	Additional Comments:		

ASSESSOR DETAILS	Name of person who completed screening:	Gonzalez, Melissa Maria Laura (MMGONZALEZ@iadb.org)
	Title:	
	Date:	2013-08-07

SAFEGUARD SCREENING FORM

PROJECT DETAILS	IDB Sector	SOCIAL INVESTMENT-CITIZEN SAFETY
	Type of Operation	Innovation Loan
	Additional Operation Details	
	Country	JAMAICA
	Project Status	
	Investment Checklist	Institutional Development Investment
	Team Leader	Fiat Ortiz, Cristina Mariel (CFIAT@iadb.org)
	Project Title	Citizen Security and Justice Program III
	Project Number	JA-L1043
	Safeguard Screening Assessor(s)	Gonzalez, Melissa Maria Laura (MMGONZALEZ@iadb.org)
	Assessment Date	2013-08-07
	Additional Comments	

PROJECT CLASSIFICATION SUMMARY	Project Category: C	Override Rating:	Override Justification:
			Comments:
	Conditions/ Recommendations	<input type="checkbox"/> No environmental assessment studies or consultations are required for Category "C" operations. <input type="checkbox"/> Some Category "C" operations may require specific safeguard or monitoring requirements (Policy Directive B.3). Where relevant, these operations will establish safeguard, or monitoring requirements to address environmental and other risks (social, disaster, cultural, health and safety etc.). <input type="checkbox"/> The Project Team must send the PP (or equivalent) containing the Environmental and Social Strategy (the requirements for an ESS are described in the Environment Policy Guideline: Directive B.3) as well as the Safeguard Policy Filter and Safeguard Screening Form Reports.	

SUMMARY OF IMPACTS/RISKS AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS	Identified Impacts/Risks	Potential Solutions

DISASTER SUMMARY	Details The Project should include the necessary measures to reduce disaster risk to acceptable levels as determined by the Bank on the basis of generally accepted standards and practices. Alternative prevention and mitigation measures that decrease	Actions A more limited and specific Disaster Risk Assessment (DRA) may be required (see Directive A-2 of the DRM Policy OP-704). Please contact a Natural Disaster
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	<p>vulnerability must be analyzed and included in project design and implementation as applicable. These measures should include safety and contingency planning to protect human health and economic assets. Expert opinion and adherence to international standards should be sought, where reasonably necessary.</p>	<p>Specialist in VPS/ESG or INE/RND for guidance.</p> <p>Also: if the project needs to be modified to increase resilience to climate change, consider the (i) possibility of classification as adaptation project and (ii) additional financing options. Please contact a INE/CCS adaptation specialist for guidance.</p>
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ASSESSOR DETAILS	Name of person who completed screening:	Gonzalez, Melissa Maria Laura (MMGONZALEZ@iadb.org)
	Title:	
	Date:	2013-08-07

Environmental and Social Strategy

- 1.1 The general objective is to contribute to the reduction of crime and violence. The specific objectives are to: (i) improve social cohesion and community governance; (ii) increase employability and employment of residents in target communities; and (iii) improve access to and efficiency of justice services at the community level.
- 1.2 The environmental and social classification for this program is “C” based on the Safeguard Policy Report and the Safeguard Screening Form of the Environmental Classification Toolkit.

INDEX FOR COMPLETED AND PROPOSED SECTOR WORK

Topic	Description	Estimated Dates	References and Electronic Links
Technical options and design aspects	Three Year Anti-Gang Strategic Plan Jamaica Constabulary Force 2011	Completed	IDBDOCS-#37986854- 3 year anti-gang strategic Plan
	Citizen Security and Justice Program Baseline Study 2011	Completed	IDBDOCS-#37992096- 2011 Baseline Study IDBDOCS-#37992177- 2011 Baseline Study - appendix 1
	National Crime Prevention and Community Safety Strategy (NCPCSS) Ministry of National Security October 2010		
	National Development Plan, Vision 2030 March 2013	Completed	IDBDOCS-#37984354-Vision 2030 Jamaica NDP Full No Cover (web)
	Medium Term Socio-Economic Framework 2009 - 2012	Completed	IDBDOCS-#37992419 - Medium Term Socio-Economic Policy Framework (2009-2012)
	National Development Plan, Vision 2030 Sector Policy National Security and Correctional Services 2009-2030	Completed	
	The Impact of Jamaica CSJP Program Office of Evaluation and Oversight (OVE) November 2010`	Completed	

Topic	Description	Estimated Dates	References and Electronic Links
	Consultancy to provide an analysis of the Jamaica labor market and its capacity to generate employment for those who benefit from the CSJP III Program.	Pending	
	Consultancy to undertake an analysis and review of line ministries where services provided under CSJP would be divested. This consultancy will include a diagnosis of the costing of the security programs, including direct and indirect budgets involved so the CSJP services are divested to their respective sector government agency/ministry.	Pending	
Cost analysis and economic viability of the Program	Cost Benefit Analysis	Pending	
Financial management and fiduciary issues			
Data collection and analysis for reporting the results			

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