



Project Completion Report

PCR

Project Name: Modernization of the Barbados Statistical Service

Country: Barbados

Sector/Subsector: Modernization of the State

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Project Number: BA-L1009

Loan Number (s), TC(s): 2003 /OC-BA

QRR Date:

Final Approval Date of PCR:

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

BSS	Barbados Statistical Service
CS	Country Strategy
CPC	Chief Parliamentary Council
DPD	Data Processing Department
GOB	Government of Barbados
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
IT	Information Technology
MDA	Ministries, Departments and Agencies
MF&EA	Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs
NSO	National Statistical Office
NSS	National Statistical Service
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OPM	Oxford Policy Management
PAD	Personnel Administration Unit
PCU	Project Coordinating Unit
PIU	Public Investment Unit
SSC	Statistical Steering Committee
STC	Special Tenders Committee
TAD	Training Administration Department
TOR	Terms of Reference



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I. Basic Information

BASIC DATA (AMOUNTS IN US\$)		
PROJECT NO:	TITLE:	
Borrower: Government of Barbados	Date of Board Approval: July 28, 2008	
Executing Agency (EA): The Ministry of Finance, Economic Affairs and Energy (MOF) through the Barbados Statistical Service (BSS);	Date of Loan Contract Effectiveness: December 11, 2008	
Loan(s): 2003 /OC-BA	Date of Eligibility for First Disbursement:	
Sector: Modernization of the State	<u>Months in Execution</u>	
Lending Instrument: Investment Loan	* from Approval: 98 months	
	* from Contract Effectiveness: 94 months	
	<u>Disbursement Periods</u>	
	Original Date of Final Disbursement: November 11, 2012	
	Current Date of Final Disbursement: September 30, 2016	
	Cumulative Extension (Months): 36 months	
	Special Extensions (Months): 9 months	
	<u>Loan Amount(s)</u>	
	* Original Amount: US\$5M (Financed through Institutional Development Sector Facility)	
	* Current Amount: US\$5M	
	* Pari Passu (if applicable): 80/20	
Poverty Targeted Investment (PTI): Yes/No	<u>Disbursements</u>	
Social Equity (SEQ): Yes/No	* Amount to date: \$4,861,837.51 (97.24%)	
Environmental Classification: A, B, or C	<u>Total Project Cost</u> (Original Estimate): US\$6.25M	
	<u>Redirectioning</u>	
	Has this Project?	
	Received funds from another Project	[]
	Sent funds to another Project	[]
	N/A	[x]
	To/From Project Number	From Sub-Loan Number
		Amount
	* Current amount (adjusted for redirectioning):	
	<u>On Alert Status</u>	
	Is project currently designated "on alert" by PAIS: Yes/No	
	If yes then why is the project on alert (DO , IP Ratings and/or relevant PAIS indicators):	

Summary Performance Classifications				
DO	<input type="checkbox"/> Highly Probable (HP)	<input type="checkbox"/> Probable (P)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Low Probability (LP)	<input type="checkbox"/> Improbable (I)
IP	<input type="checkbox"/> Highly Satisfactory (HS)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Satisfactory (S)	<input type="checkbox"/> Unsatisfactory (US)	<input type="checkbox"/> Very Unsatisfactory (VU)
SU	<input type="checkbox"/> Highly Probable (HP)	<input type="checkbox"/> Probable (P)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Low Probability (LP)	<input type="checkbox"/> Improbable (I)

II. The Project

a. Project Context

International and regional drivers and standards govern the production of timely and relevant statistics. The demand for statistics and more granular data has escalated significantly as Governments increasingly adopt results based management and evidence – based policy making. Statistical systems around the world are forced to improve the quality and relevance of the supply of statistics and address the various and evolving needs of statistical users in the public and private sectors, and academia and civil society. This requires enhanced skill sets, coordination and effective utilization of information technology to handle the increasing volume and complexity of data and to undertake more sophisticated data analysis. Barbados is not immune from this global trend, and like many countries in the Caribbean, there are recognized weaknesses and capacity gaps in the ability of the Government to provide relevant, timely statistics.

The Barbados Statistical Service (BSS) was established in June 1956 and is governed by the Statistics Act. The Act mandates the BSS as the single entity responsible for all data collection in the country— despite the fact that many other agencies also collect and disseminate data. The Act was generally understood to have several weaknesses as it: (i) does not expressly facilitate the creation of a multi-agency national statistical system; (ii) does not allow for the BSS to enforce compliance by public and private agents in the collection of information; (iii) does not provide for sufficient administrative autonomy or authority, and (iv) limits the extent to which data can legally be shared within the Government, as many subsequent Acts supersede the BSS Act. Additionally, limited investment in the technical and human capacity of the BSS, along with varying levels of priority regarding data collection across government agencies, and lack of regularly conducted surveys have rendered the national capacity for statistical data and collection, analysis and dissemination less than desirable to meet the nation's needs.

At the international level, ten *Fundamental Principles of Official Statistics* guide the operation of most Statistical Agencies across the world. At the regional level, Barbados as a member of CARICOM participates in regional efforts towards harmonization of statistics by member states in support of the implementation of the Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME). The Standing Committee for Caribbean Statisticians (SCCS) whose main objective is promoting and providing advice for the development of statistics in the Region seeks to:

- foster increased recognition of the importance and availability of adequate statistical services to the countries of the Region relative to development;
- widen the scope and coverage of statistical data collection; and
- Improve the quality, comparability and timeliness of statistics (harmonization).

In December 2008, the IDB and the GOB entered into a US\$5M loan agreement to finance activities with the objective to “strengthen the BSS ability to provide relevant, timely and quality economic and social statistics, and to establish its leadership in this area within the public sector.” The GOB provided counterpart funds of US\$1.25M. At the time of design, there were other regional initiatives in support of improving the efficacy of national statistical offices across the region, including a project supported by IDB. Barbados has also benefited from CARICOM initiatives to strengthen national technical capacity in statistics collection, however the structural changes necessary required additional external support provided by the loan.

This project was designed to address the capacity gaps that prevented Barbados from meeting international, regional and national demands and standards for the production of statistics. The Loan Proposal identified the need for Barbados to improve data collection and/or processing



related to social and economic indicators in areas such as: (i) population and demographics, (ii) education; (iii) health and vital records; (iv) informal sector and poverty; (v) law and order, particularly crime; (vi) housing; (vii) the environment; (viii) economic activity with special attention to trade, tourism satellite accounts, agriculture and the international business sector; (ix) GDP; and (x) labour statistics.

The project was also intended to ensure that BSS applies state of the art methodologies, conforms to international standards, and works within the CARICOM statistical framework.

The need for the Project did not change during implementation, although according to some stakeholders interviewed for the final evaluation, there did appear to be softening of domestic demand for statistics compared with the past, despite increasing international demand for data with respect to reporting on the Sustainable Development Goals.

There were two significant changes in the project context between the time of design and completion that influenced the timeliness of project implementation: (i) changes in the macro-economic circumstances of Barbados and in key project stakeholders, particularly, the position of Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs.

The project was approved in 2008 at the beginning of the global financial crisis, whose effects were significantly felt in Barbados in subsequent years and left Barbados with reduced fiscal space. Although this did not affect the counterpart contributions to the project, it constrained the extent to which recommended restructuring of the BSS could proceed. With respect to turn-over of key project stakeholders, there was a difference of opinion between the outgoing and incoming Permanent Secretaries regarding the structure and positioning of the BSS within the GOB. This led to delays in decision-making about the ultimate positioning and structure of BSS and the submission to Cabinet of the draft proposal to change the legislation governing the BSS.

The original disbursement deadline for the loan was initially December 11, 2012. The project was extended 4 times between. The final end of disbursement date was September 30, 2016 as a result of a special extension granted by IDB to permit an efficient closing of the loan.

b. Project Description

i. Development Objective(s)

The ultimate goal of the project was improved evidence-based policy-making and management for the social and economic development of Barbados.

The project purpose was: Improved availability of relevant, timely and quality statistical data offered by the BSS to the public sector, the business community and the general public.

ii. Components

Component 1: Legal Framework: This involved a review of the Statistics Act and relevant laws which pertain to the collection, compilation and dissemination of data.

Component 2: Statistics Network: This component sought to build on the informal network of agencies which provide raw data to the Barbados Statistical Service or produce data for dissemination.



Component 3: Institutional Reengineering: This component supported the review of the managerial, administrative and technical structure, policies and procedures of the BSS to identify and address bottlenecks and inefficiencies.

Component 4: Enhancement of Statistical Products: This component supported improving BSS existing products and developing new ones. In addition, it will be necessary to examine the activities, inputs and requirements that would be needed to achieve the foregoing.

Component 5: Human Capacity: This component supported the preparation of a strategy and implementation of human resources management transformation; corresponding regulatory reforms as needed; and training of BSS and other agency staff to support institutional re-engineering and the enhancement of statistical products.

Component 6: Technical Infrastructure and Public Outreach: This component supported the upgrading of BSS's information technology and that of other relevant agencies to facilitate public access to various statistical products.

III. Results

a. Outcomes

There were changes to the original results expected by the end of the project compared with what was planned in the design. After a few years into the implementation, the original results were analyzed and it was determined that many of the indicators were either irrelevant to the current situation of the program or the original design of the indicators was inappropriate (i.e. attempting to measure what was beyond the control of the Executing Agency, such as Cabinet approval and the operationalization of the National Statistical Service). In consultation with the PCU, IDB undertook an overhaul of the Results Matrix and the outputs were modified in 2014. This was justified as the original design had misjudged the actual ability of the BSS, through its positioning within the GOB, to directly influence certain modernization outcomes.

At the end of the project the revised outcomes were:

- Strengthened ability of the Barbados Statistical Service (BSS) to provide relevant, timely, and quality economic and social statistics and to establish its leadership in this area within the public sector
- Transformation in human resource management at the BSS implemented.

ACHIEVEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES (DO)

Development Objective(s) (Purpose) Improved availability of relevant, timely and quality statistical data offered by the BSS to the public sector, the business community and the general public.	Key Outcome Indicators <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Enactment of a new Statistical Act and/or new regulations – main reforms include: stronger mandate for the Barbados Statistical Service to lead the production of statistics in the country. 2. Increased availability of statistical products offered by the Barbados Statistical Service, including a regular household survey with relevant modules 3. Days between publication of statistical products and availability of these products to the public on on-line data base 4. Online data base established 										
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Strengthened ability of the Barbados Statistical Service (BSS) to provide relevant, timely, and quality economic and social statistics and to establish its leadership in this area within the public sector 2. Transformation in human resource management at the BSS implemented. <p><i>Classification: Low probability</i></p>											
Planned Outcomes <table style="width: 100%;"> <tr> <th style="text-align: left; width: 50%;">Baseline (2008)</th> <th style="text-align: left; width: 50%;">End of Project</th> </tr> <tr> <td>1.1 Outdated legislation with no regulations legislation and regulations enacted</td> <td>1.1 Updated</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1.2 No multipurpose household survey or reporting on MDGs.</td> <td>1.2 New products based on recommendations by multilateral agencies, particularly the UN Statistical Commission</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1.3 No database through online..</td> <td>1.3 Database becomes available in 15 days after publication.</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1.4 No online database.</td> <td>1.4 Online database established.</td> </tr> </table>	Baseline (2008)	End of Project	1.1 Outdated legislation with no regulations legislation and regulations enacted	1.1 Updated	1.2 No multipurpose household survey or reporting on MDGs.	1.2 New products based on recommendations by multilateral agencies, particularly the UN Statistical Commission	1.3 No database through online..	1.3 Database becomes available in 15 days after publication.	1.4 No online database.	1.4 Online database established.	Outcomes Achieved <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1.1 Not achieved. The new Statistical Act and regulations are still being drafted and have not been enacted. 1.2 Not achieved. No increase in the publication of statistical products offered BSS, including regular household survey with relevant modules. A release calendar has not been prepared. 1.3 Not measured the number of days yet. 1.4 Achieved. Online database has been established.
Baseline (2008)	End of Project										
1.1 Outdated legislation with no regulations legislation and regulations enacted	1.1 Updated										
1.2 No multipurpose household survey or reporting on MDGs.	1.2 New products based on recommendations by multilateral agencies, particularly the UN Statistical Commission										
1.3 No database through online..	1.3 Database becomes available in 15 days after publication.										
1.4 No online database.	1.4 Online database established.										
Reformulation. <input type="checkbox"/> X <input type="checkbox"/> N/A											
PPMR Retrofitting. Indicate if and when the PPMR was retrofitted and explain any changes resulting from this exercise. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> N/A											
Summary Development Objective(s) Classification (DO):											
<input type="checkbox"/> Highly Probable (HP) <input type="checkbox"/> Probable (P) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Low Probability (LP) <input type="checkbox"/> Improbable (I)											
Briefly justify DO classification, based on degree to which planned targets were met, explaining the differences between planned and achieved outcomes as well as any other relevant factors. Include references to evidence that can support these results. <p>Due to the delay in the critical actions of passing the legislation, formalizing the NSS beyond the MOUs with the 6 pilot MDAs, and operationalizing the new BSS structure, the project is able to report only limited outcomes. The new Statistical Act and new regulations have not been enacted and there is no indication from GOB as to when this may occur. This reduces the legal underpinning for BSS to coordinate and lead the NSS and ensure interagency collaboration, which is at the heart of an effective National Statistical System. While this has not yet materialized as envisaged, it has been advanced with the signing of Memoranda of Understanding between the BSS and 5 of 6 pilot Ministries, Departments and Agencies. The NSS incorporates at least 12 MDAs. The IT infrastructure has been installed and will assist in improved data sharing between and across agencies.</p> <p>There has been no increase in the publication of statistical products offered by the Barbados Statistical Service, including a regular household survey with relevant modules. A release calendar has not been prepared. The OPM recommended products agreed for review that could be undertaken with existing resources of which there is no evidence on the website. While there are improvements to the presentation of tourism statistics, the recommended changes such as expenditure and accommodation statistics have not been implemented.</p> <p>Country Strategy. The focus of the Country Strategy for Barbados at the time of the approval of this project included addressing institutional and capacity weaknesses that inhibit the efficient and competitive functioning of the public and private sectors. In this sense the project was aligned to the CS of the time. However, the results described above indicate that its contribution to the improvement in the efficiency and competitiveness of the public and private sectors is limited as of yet. The most significant contribution is that now there is a concrete action plan per recommendations by the OPM, which can be implemented once the new Statistical Act is enacted.</p>											



b. Externalities

Externalities, defined as “an activity that imposes a negative or positive effect on an unrelated third party”, are not observed on a significant scale.

c. Outputs

The presentation of project results was modified from the original logical framework as it became apparent that the achievement of some outputs was beyond the control of the executing agency and may have been overly ambitious as designed.

IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS (IP)		
Components (Outputs):		
Component 1: Legal Framework Total cost of Component 1: \$142,375.28 Counterpart: \$0 IDB: \$142,375.28 IDB Disbursement: 100% <u>Classification:</u> Satisfactory (S)		
Key Output Indicators:		
1.1 Revised legal framework submitted to Cabinet 1.2 Report that includes recommendation for establishing Statistical Steering Committee (SSC) led by the BSS prepared.		
Planned Outputs <u>Baseline (2008)</u> 1.1 Outdated Legal Framework submitted to Cabinet 1.2 No report that recommends SSC		Outputs Achieved <u>End of Project</u> 1.1 Output achieved. 1 “Modernization of the BSS Legal Framework.” Submitted by The Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy Note 12. MFE EA (EP3). 1.2 Output achieved. Report that recommends establishing SSC led by the BSS.
<u>End of Project (2016)</u> 1.1 Updated Legal submitted to 1.2 Report exists		
Briefly explain differences between planned and actual outputs (if applicable).		
[] N/A. The original result at design was draft new enabling legislation. This was modified when it became apparent that the drafting of the legislation was outside of the control of the project.		
Restructuring. As a result of the revision of the Results Matrix in 2014, it was determined that the original output “By month 24 of project implement it is expected that a draft legal law and/or regulations are defined and presented for approval to the Cabinet” was beyond the control of BSS. Therefore, the output was reformulated to “Revised legal framework proposal produced and submitted to the Cabinet”. [x] N/A		
Component 2: Statistics Network Total cost of Component 2: \$303,133.53 Counterpart: \$2,551 IDB: \$300,582.53 IDB Disbursement: 100% <u>Classification:</u> Satisfactory (S)		
Key Output Indicators:		
2.1 Manual outlining administrative and operational procedures of NSS 2.2 Documented standardized procedures, definitions and working methodologies involving different ministries/agencies participating in the NSS		



Planned Outputs		Outputs Achieved
<u>Baseline (2008)</u> 2.1 0 Recommendations 2.2 0 Manual 2.3 0 Documented procedures	<u>End of Project (2016)</u> 2.1 1 Report with Recommendations 2.2 1 Manual 2.3 Documented procedures	<u>End of Project</u> 2.1 Output achieved. 2 Reports: (1) Governance of the National Statistical System - Addendum to White Paper; (2) Report on the definition and nature of the National Statistical System and recommendations for coordination. 2.2 Output achieved. 1 Report: Barbados National Statistical Council. 2.3 Output achieved. 2 Reports: (1) Compendium of Standards and Practices; (2) Draft Code of Practice for the Barbados National Statistical System..
Briefly explain differences between planned and actual outputs (if applicable). <input type="checkbox"/> [X] N/A		
Restructuring. Indicate if this component was restructured (date of approval by Manager). Briefly discuss the consequences of these changes. <input type="checkbox"/> [X] N/A		
Component 3: Institutional Re-engineering Total cost of Component 3: \$1,443,191.48 Counterpart: \$24,195 IDB: \$1,418,996.48 IDB Disbursement: 100% <u>Classification:</u> Satisfactory (S)		
Key Output Indicators: 3.1 Assess the sufficiency of core and support personnel to carry out the new mandate of BSS 3.2 Develop a staff appraisal system 3.3 Management of BSS trained in planning techniques, change management and strategic planning 3.4 Define a re-engineered BSS		
Planned Outputs		Outputs Achieved
<u>Baseline (2008)</u> 3.1 0 Assessments 3.2 0 Staff appraisal system 3.3 0 BSS Management trained 3.3 Outdated BSS structure	<u>End of Project (2016)</u> 3.1 1 Report 3.2 1 System 3.3 20 Managers trained 3.4 1 Consultant's report	<u>End of Project</u> 3.1 Output achieved. Proposal for a capacity building strategy for the NSS 3.2 Output achieved. HR Policies & Procedures Manual 3.3 Output achieved. 40 Persons trained 3.4 Output achieved. 1 Report: Recommendations on Restructuring of Barbados Statistical Service
Briefly explain differences between planned and actual outputs (if applicable). <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> [X] N/A		
Restructuring. Indicate if this component was restructured (date of approval by Manager). Briefly discuss the consequences of these changes. <input type="checkbox"/> [X] N/A		
Component 4: Enhancement of Statistical Products Total cost of Component 4: \$0 Counterpart: \$0 IDB: \$0 IDB Disbursement: 100%		
Key Output Indicators: 4.1 Statistical Procedures Manual adopted 4.2 Statistics procedural manual prepared on collection, processing and dissemination of data		

Planned Outputs		Outputs Achieved
<u>Baseline (2008)</u> 4.1 0 manual	<u>End of Project</u> 4.1 Statistical Procedures Manual adopted 4.2 Statistical procedural manual	<u>End of Project</u> 0 Manual prepared and adopted Outputs not achieved
Briefly explain differences between planned and actual outputs (if applicable). The delays in IT deployment, associated staff training and operationalizing the new structure delayed the progress of this component. This is a downstream effect of the issues essentially outside of the direct control of the BSS and the PCU: lack of a new legal framework, delay in the institutional re-engineering, lack of formalized statistical network, and delay in IT upgrades. Without these issues resolved, it was not practical to make a progress on the production of new and enhanced statistical products. [] N/A		
Restructuring. As a result of the revision of the Results Matrix in 2014, it was determined that the original outputs "statistics procedural manual adopted" and "statistics procedural manual prepared on collection, processing and dissemination of data prepared" were inactivated from the Results Matrix. [] N/A		
Component 5 : Human Capacity Total cost of Component 5: \$1,017,730.46 Counterpart: \$30,941 IDB: \$986,789.46 IDB Disbursement: 100% <u>Classification:</u> Satisfactory		
Key Output Indicators:		
5.1 National Statistical system staff trained in post-graduate studies in statistics. 5.2 Statisticians and other statistical personnel in the BSS and relevant agencies receiving on-the-job training in specific statistical skills 5.3 BSS general staff receiving on-the-job training in general skills for best practices in business environments 5.4 Strategy for a human resources management transformation developed		
Planned Outputs		Outputs Achieved
<u>Baseline (2008)</u> N/A 5.4 0 Strategy	<u>End of Project (2016)</u> 5.1 8 Staff trained 5.2 60 Staff trained 5.3 22 Staff trained 5.4 1 Strategy	<u>End of Project (2016)</u> 5.1 Output modified. 5 staff trained in post graduate studies. 22 staff trained through short term post graduation courses 5.2 Output achieved. 42 Staff trained in SPSS/Surveys and SNA PC Implementation 5.3 Output achieved. 52 non-management staff trained by BIMAP 5.4 Output achieved. Human Capacity Development – HR Management System Staff Handbook; HR Policies & Procedures Manual and Staff Database Guidelines
Briefly explain differences between planned and actual outputs (if applicable). For 5.1 the number of staff trained exceeded the EOP target. This was because BSS had more technical personnel qualified for receiving the training than initially anticipated. On the other hand 5.2 shows a slightly lower achievement than targeted. This was because the definition of the necessary "specific statistical skills" was delayed as a result of the postponement of the institutional re-engineering. For 5.3 higher-than-anticipated number of non-management staff was trained in BIMAP as the course could accommodate a greater number of participants than anticipated. [X] N/A		
Restructuring. Indicate if this component was restructured (date of approval by Manager). Briefly discuss the consequences of these changes. [X] N/A		

Component 6: Technical Infrastructure and Public Outreach

Total cost of Component 6: \$1,190,623.54

Counterpart: \$74,185

IDB:\$1,116,438.54

IDB Disbursement: 94.24%

Classification: Satisfactory**Key Output Indicators:**

6.1 Computers with Statistical Software installed at the BSS

6.2 Core infrastructure of ICT network for NSS implemented

6.3 BSS website launched

Planned OutputsBaseline (2008)

6.1 Outdated IT system

6.2 0 Network

6.3 1 website

End of Project

6.1 25 computers with software installed

6.2 1 Network for NSS

6.3 1 new website

Outputs AchievedEnd of Project (2016)

6.1 Output achieved. 23 computers installed

6.2 Output achieved. Network installed

6.3 Output not achieved. Original website still on line

Briefly explain differences between planned and actual outputs (if applicable). The absence of the formalized inter-ministerial/agency network and more defined roles and responsibilities of corresponding ministries/agencies created a lot of uncertainties about the definition of the new technical infrastructure. Consequently, the technical infrastructure-related activities were pushed to the very end of the project. Once this installation starts, all existing IT-related capacities were dedicated to this task. As a result, the renewal of the website was considered less of a priority.

[] N/A

Restructuring. Indicate if this component was restructured (date of approval by Manager). Briefly discuss the consequences of these changes.

[] N/A

Summary Implementation Progress Classification:

[] Highly Satisfactory (HS) [x] Satisfactory (S) [] Unsatisfactory(U) [] Very Unsatisfactory (VU)

d. Project Costs

Total Project Cost - Planned (US\$000)				Total Project Cost - Actual (US\$000)				% Difference
	IDB	GOB	TOTAL		IDB	GOB	TOTAL	
SUPERVISION AND ADMINISTRATION	300	200	500	SUPERVISION AND ADMINISTRATION	370.0	968.50	1,338.5	+168.%
Project Coordinating Unit	300	200	500	Project Coordinating Unit	370.0	968.50	1,338.5	+168.%
DIRECT COSTS COMPONENTS	4,300	850	5,150	DIRECT COSTS COMPONENTS	3,965.2	143.7	4,108.9	-20%
Legal Framework	50	10	60	Legal Framework	142.4		142.4	+137%
Statistics Network	50	150	200	Statistics Network	300.6	2.6	303.1	+51%
Institutional Re-engineering	900	150	1,050	Institutional Re-engineering	1,419.0	24.2	1,443.2	+37%
Enhancement of Statistical Products	1,200	240	1,440	Enhancement of Statistical Products	0	11.8	11.8	-99%
Human Capacity	1,100	50	1,150	Human Capacity	986.8	30.9	1,017.7	-11%
Technical Infrastructure and Public Outreach	1,000	250	1,250	Technical Infrastructure and Public Outreach	1,116.4	74.2	1,190.6	-5%
CONCURRENT COSTS	70	20	90	CONCURRENT COSTS	221.9	30.4	252.3	+180%
Evaluation	0	20	20	Evaluation	0		0	-100%
External Auditing	70	0	70	External Auditing	221.9	30.4	252.3	+260%
CONTINGENCIES	330	180	510	CONTINGENCIES	0		0	-100%
TOTAL	5,000	1,250	6,250	TOTAL	4,557.1	1,142.6	5,699.7	-9%



Briefly explain any differences.

The major over-expenditures over the original approved budget concerned increased supervision and project administration and external audit costs incurred as a result of multiple extensions to the execution period. There was marginal underspending in the overall direct costs for components, although there was significant variability between components, and costs for Technical Infrastructure and Outreach were higher than expected. The lack of achievement of outputs related to the legal framework and enhancement of statistical products is reflected by the significant underspending in these components. There was a review of the budget and reallocation between components during implementation which is not reflected in these tables. Although mid-term and final evaluations were undertaken, these have not been reflected in GOB's counterpart spending reports.

IV. Project Implementation

a. Analysis of Critical Factors

- Scheduling for procurement did not take into account the dependency on the cooperation of a number of GOB stakeholders. The complex and somewhat independent procurement processes of IDB and GOB lengthened the time required for procurement activities. IDB's ex-ante procurement processes requiring IDB approval at each step, along with GOB's processes had to be followed which extended procurement timelines. Both processes were used in tandem. Scheduling for procurement did not take into account the dependency on the cooperation of a number of stakeholders – eg. IDB, PCU, Statistical Steering Committee and office of the Solicitor General and Special Tenders Committee.
- While specialist skills were outsourced for the 2 main procurement blocks, (i.e. the major consultancy for the Diagnostic Studies and Recommendations, and acquisition and installation of IT systems/hardware and software) the PCU did not have sufficient staffing or experience to efficiently handle the remaining procurement tasks. Management of procurement was deemed a risk at the time of design, given limited procurement expertise within GOB. While steps were taken to bring in external specialized procurement consultants during project execution, the intermittent vacancy and turn-over of the Project Officer's position placed an undue burden on the Project Coordinator to manage procurement among other responsibilities. Project Officer's responsibilities included: coordination of meetings; preparation of evaluation reports for the selection of consultants; writing minutes of meetings; drafting correspondences; communicating with stakeholders; following up with consultants about the progress of work; and preparing other project documents, among other things.
- The staffing of the PCU was dependent on GOB's Personnel Administration Department and this removed a significant element of control over the project from the BSS. Thus, although the Loan Proposal called for a staff complement of five: (i) Program Coordinator (PC); (ii) Senior Accounting Officer, (iii) project officer; (iv) clerk/typist; and (v) part time Procurement Specialist, during execution, the PCU was never staffed as designed, and experienced turn-over of junior staff. In June 2012, the original Project Coordinator, who was seconded from the BSS, retired. He was replaced by the Project Officer at the time, who managed the execution of the majority of project activities. The position of Project Officer was often vacant and there was turnover of this position, as well as that of the accountant. This instability and need for new staff to adjust affected timeliness of implementation.
- The decision from the Cabinet regarding the preferred organizational model (so-called option B – the semi-autonomous model within the GOB under civil service



rules) for BSS was not finalized until June 2013; however in mid-2016, the legislation had still not been passed. The project unit had no control over the legislative agenda and the legislation was not given high priority by the GOB and languished in the office of the Chief Parliamentary Council.

- The lack of identified leadership and a project champion was demonstrably shown to have affected implementation, as this person should have been positioned to remove bottlenecks and advocate internally for project activities to be completed.
- The enthusiasm of MDAs for the project and the concept of BSS leading and coordinating statistical dissemination and enforcing quality standards was variable and waned as the project lagged. Agency heads were not included in the governance of the project, and there was no influential project champion/Chair of a high level strategic oversight and coordinating body to ensure inter-agency cooperation.
- The priority of the BSS reforms within the GOB was assumed, but there was no demonstrated evidence of urgency within the Ministry of Finance or the Cabinet to deal with the issues requiring central government action or interagency support. As a result, bottlenecks and delays went unresolved.
- There was insufficient recognition that this was a change management project, and there was no one identified in the GOB to lead the change management process and re-organization of the BSS, and ensure cooperation of GOB stakeholders across the wider civil service.
- The diagnosis done as part of the project design was only at a high level. Detailed design was dependent on the comprehensive diagnostic consultancy financed under the project. Consequently, at the time when the result of the diagnosis was available, there was a general lack of consensus and knowledge on what would be required to execute the recommendations from the initial diagnostic consultancy. This added a layer of uncertainty as to what would be needed and therefore how procurement should proceed. Limited knowledge of the market of IT service providers resulted in the need to re-tender when the original tender process was unsuccessful. Additionally, there were few options to fulfil the needs for the Statistics and Management Consultancy.
- The demands on SCC members were underestimated in the design and there were often delays in responses to stakeholders to draft reports submitted by OPM and other consultants. This resulted in delays in having the final reports submitted by the scheduled time

b. Borrower/Executing Agency Performance

Borrower/Executing Agency			
<input type="checkbox"/> Highly Satisfactory (HS)	<input type="checkbox"/> Satisfactory (S)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Unsatisfactory (U)	<input type="checkbox"/> Very Unsatisfactory (VU)

The PCR Team observes that there is a significant room for improvement in the project management capacities of the PCU. The PCU did not sufficiently internalize the knowledge about the IDB's procurement policy and the procurement processes in general. Financial information contradicted from what was submitted in the previous period. PCU never took ownership of the measurement of the indicators in the Results Matrix, leaving most of that work in the hands of



the Bank team. PCU did not have the capacity to develop a realistic schedule of any given task related to project management. Overall, project management was not professionalized in this PCU.

According to the executing agency there were certain factors that explains the low level of performance demonstrated:

- The current BSS staff were not involved in the initial project design or preparation. This factor may have contributed to some level of disengagement by a few staff, during the project execution and implementation stages. Generally, the staff worked well with the Project Coordination Unit and all consultants, to achieve the stated objectives. However, there were some difficulties at times, to keep up with reading and commenting on the large volumes of documentation (e.g. the initial recommendations from the OPM consultants), while at the same time, trying to maintain the normal production of work.
- More time needed to be factored into implementation schedules, after the OPM consultants completed their recommendations; to account for unforeseen delays due to the bureaucracy of the public service. Otherwise, a separate project should be considered for full Implementation – leading to the full establishment of the NSS.

c. Bank Performance

Bank Performance			
<input type="checkbox"/> Highly Satisfactory (HS)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Satisfactory (S)	<input type="checkbox"/> Unsatisfactory (U)	<input type="checkbox"/> Very Unsatisfactory (VU)

The BSS has made the following comments about the Bank's performance:

- The Bank was helpful in assisting the Project Coordination Unit in managing the project, with all its documentation. Training provided for the project staff was very useful. However, some delays were attributed to the time required for the Bank's non-objections at each stage, before proceeding to the next steps.

V. Sustainability

a. Analysis of Critical Factors

The investment in the project activities will be sustained if:

- there is strong political leadership
- The updated legislation is passed soon, and the NSS is formally established and operates as designed. Without the legislation, the real impact of the project in establishing a formal statistical system will not be realized.
- The new structure of the BSS is operationalized and sufficient resources are allocated on an annual basis. It will be critical that the new structure includes the right mix of trained and qualified staff that can grow into more senior positions and for whom there is a clear career path. BSS must have the flexibility to recruit, promote and assign staff to key positions based on its technical requirements.
- The IT infrastructure is fully deployed and properly maintained and is assessed to be meeting the needs of the BSS and the NSS with respect to functionality to support interagency networking and statistical analytical needs.

b. Potential Risks

The risks to sustainability are:

- Limited or insufficient commitment to interagency cooperation by the pilot MDAs and across all 12 agencies that are currently part of the informal NSS.
- Lack of continuation of PR Strategy and delayed deployment of communications officer
- Insufficient attention to monitoring of the effectiveness of the MOUs
- Failure to implement the HR Policy and to continually focus on staff development
- The BSS not being able to retain staff trained, and lack of succession planning within the BSS. (While retention of staff within BSS is ideal, movement of trained staff within the civil service to agencies within the NSS may also be desirable).
- Limited/weak internal demand for statistics production and publication by the Government, private sector and civil society.
- inadequate financial resources from GOB to sustain the new structure and support new statistical products and maintenance of the IT infrastructure

c. Institutional Capacity

The project provided the foundation to significantly strengthen the BSS as it was essentially an institutional strengthening project. The full effects will not be visible until the new structure is operationalized and staff utilize the new ICT tools provided by the project.

Sustainability Classification **SU:**

<input type="checkbox"/> Highly Probable (HP)	<input type="checkbox"/> Probable (P)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Low Probability (LP)	<input type="checkbox"/> Improbable (I)
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VI. Monitoring and Evaluation

a. Information on Results

The original results indicators in the logical framework were revised when the implementation challenges became evident, and it became apparent that there were activities outside of the project's control that could affect the achievement of results. The information related to results in the semi-annual reports reflected a lack of capacity in the PCU. The nature of the project did not require baseline studies or on-going data collection. A mid-term and end of project evaluation were conducted.

b. Future Monitoring and Ex-Post Evaluation

N/A

VII. Lessons Learned

1. While the project was titled "Modernization of the BSS" a more apt title would have been "Modernization of the National Statistics System". The positioning of the BSS as the Executing Agency, and the location of the PCU underscored the focus of the project on modernizing that entity, when in fact, the project needed to have been more prominently positioned within the **Ministry of Finance, Economic Affairs and Energy** itself to provide the institutional 'heft' for a systemic change process involving multiple agencies. In this regard, the project needed a champion who could motivate participation of the other government agencies and departments to give priority to the required activities



2. Project Coordinating Units require a strong combination of project management, and importantly procurement skills.
3. Reform of one government agency is not isolated from other public agencies. Where institutional interests were not aligned, the project was treated as a low priority by agencies whose support was needed.
4. The domestic demand for statistics may have been over-estimated and perhaps the project should have included additional activities early in the process to build awareness and generate demand by policy makers and the private sector as to the vital importance of statistics.
5. Modernization interventions should involve parallel change management strategies and be designed to incorporate best practice approaches.
6. At the time of the project approval, the design of this project was specified only at a high level. Important specific outputs and activities were left to be designed through studies/consultancies that were to be completed as part of the project. In such cases, sufficient time must be allocated to complete detailed design and for implementation and to, in turn, demonstrate results. While a generic design can be suitable to facilitate approval of a loan, detailed design is necessary to plan the specific activities, their timing and budget.
7. Projects whose results are hinged on passage of legislation, where there does not already exist a commitment to approve the legislation, entail important risks. Preferably, critical outputs and results should not be contingent upon authorization of the legislation.



Annexes:

1. Minutes from the Exit Workshop
2. Borrower Evaluation



Minutes of the Project Exit Workshop
Modernization of the Barbados Statistical Service
Wednesday, November 2, 2016
Warrens Suite, Baobab Tower, Warrens, St. Michael

1. Welcome – Mr. Aubrey Brown, Director BSS

Mr. Brown welcomed all stakeholders and provided an outline of the project background, which originated from the National Strategy for the development of Statistics and the annual regional committee of regional statisticians held in 2005. The IDB Loan came into effect in 2008 and was intended to be a four year project. He noted however that procurement of the primary consultancy took 3 years, with the resulting delays requiring several extensions to the project to 2016. Mr. Browne noted the positive impact of the Paris 21 on the BSS which sensitized stakeholders to the importance of advocacy, and the National Consultations of the National Statistical Service in 2015 which served to promote cooperation between data providers.¹

2. Opening Remarks – Mr. Seibert Frederick, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs

Mr. Frederick provided additional background to the project, including the project objectives. He noted this project's importance in contributing to the country's financial/economic infrastructure, along with other IDB-supported projects such as loans in support of the Barbados National Standards Institution, Barbados Revenue Authority and the Competitiveness Loan which are intended to upgrade and enhance institutions, systems, processes and procedures. He emphasized the importance of statistics and the challenge of obtaining adequate, comparable statistics over time. Although the occasion was an exit workshop, he viewed this phase not as an end, but the start of upgrading the BSS. He noted the timeliness of the project and the need to upgrade the BSS and enhance its capacity.

3. Opening Remarks – Camilo Gomez, IDB Representative

Mr. Gomez noted that since the project was approved in 2008 it had its 'ups and downs', however the IDB and the Government of Barbados had worked together to overcome the obstacles affecting project implementation.

He noted that IDB is presently the largest multi-lateral development partner to Barbados and provided an overview of the Bank's current priorities – including gender equality and inclusion, climate change and institutional capacity building and rule of law. He reminded the gathering that although IDB is often associated with infrastructure development, the Bank is not only about infrastructure but significantly supports institutional strengthening which is an integral part of its agenda with member countries. He

¹ The Partnership in Statistics for Development in the 21st Century (PARIS21) was founded in November 1999 by the United Nations, the European Commission, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank, in response to the UN Economic and Social Council resolution on the goals of the UN Conference on Development.

referred to IDB's Country Strategy for Barbados which includes support to unlock Private Sector development, as well as financial support for tourism, energy, climate change, environmental sustainability and resilience, transportation plus modernization of the state and social assistance. He noted the importance of data for evidence-based decision making, cost benefit analyses and better public sector expenditure efficiencies. He indicated that IDB was also supporting the GOB to undertake a survey of living conditions which will provide deeper analysis to better define poverty.

With respect to the project he noted the project's focus on the supply side of statistics, but pointed to the demand side in which the wealth of data produced needed to be used by policy makers. In closing he reiterated the commitment of IDB to Barbados.

4. Feature Address – The Hon. Chris Sinckler, Minister, Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs

The Minister noted that Paris 21 identified the need for a robust statistical service for evidence-based policy making, and the importance of producing social and environmental statistics. Statistics, he said, must serve the public and be 'useable'. He referred to CARICOM's endorsement of the Action Plan during CARICOM Statistics Week held in 2015. The Minister highlighted several elements of the action plan including the modernizing and strengthening of the NSS, updating of the legislation, multi-purpose surveys and increasing use of administrative data.

He identified a recent development in which the public appears to question the reliability of statistics (eg. employment and GDP) and the methodology used to produce them, noting that it is important for public discourse that there be credible available statistics. He noted that respondents needed to be encouraged to provide data as this was critical to decision-making.

The Minister referred to the vision of the Government of Barbados to transform the country to developed country status, free of poverty, and able to meet the sustainable development goals, for which data was extremely important. In that vein, collaboration and cooperation within the NSS was critical in order for the BSS to coordinate the provision and presentation of data. He noted the legal framework was being designed and was with the Chief Parliamentary Counsel. He offered the full and complete support of the Ministry of Finance to the programmes of the BSS.

In closing, he noted the success of the project would be demonstrated when statistics are delivered to the public that is recognized as high quality, reliable and empirical. He noted the trade-off between timeliness and data quality; noting the country cannot afford to rush, cut corners or undervalue the integrity of the data. The country he noted, had to become more mature in understanding how statistics are compiled and the need to revise and update provisional data where necessary.

5. Presentation – Mariko Russell, Modernization of the State Senior Specialist

Ms. Russell's presentation provided a perspective on IDB's work on Modernization of the State, specifically in terms of the use of data for public sector management. She noted the environment in which statistical organizations has evolved, nevertheless, many countries are still working with outdated statistical legal frameworks which could not have anticipated the potential power of IT and ability for integration across various agencies.

She noted that since 2000, agencies have been integrating statistics collection across agencies, however the legislation in general does not support this. With respect to the project, the updated draft legislation supports the integration of data and use of administrative registries.

6. Project Achievements & Lessons Learned – Ms. Christine Scott Dunkley, Final Evaluation Consultant

Ms. Scott Dunkley reviewed the project's background, design and expected results. She presented the findings from the end of project evaluation which indicated that the majority of the outputs (modified during implementation) were achieved, however the legislation was still in draft form which had implications for establishment and proper functioning of both the re-engineered BSS as well as the formalization of the National Statistical System. In general the project outcomes had not yet been achieved, primarily due to the delay in enacting the legislation.

The factors affecting project execution were reviewed, which included delays in procurement and the passage of legislation; challenges in inter-agency collaboration; limited demonstration that the project was a high priority of GOB; the absence of a detailed design to guide execution; stakeholders' influence on implementation; limited recognition of the special demands to successfully implement a change management project; and unforeseen and uncontrollable circumstances. Lessons learned and recommendations revolved around major themes:

- that reforms of individual government agencies, and entire public sector systems require appropriate placement of project units within the public sector and must be led by a high level change champion
- project units must be appropriately staffed and resourced to handle complex execution demands
- the project design should have taken into greater account the inherent challenges in public sector modernization and organizational change, and not focused solely on providing 'technical' solutions to institutional capacity challenges
- donor financing modalities are often not the most appropriate for public sector modernization results to be seen in the typical donor timeframe, and consideration should be given to phasing of such projects
- a distinction should be made between operational and strategic leadership and stakeholders' roles and responsibilities assigned appropriately
- projects hinging on passage of legislation are risky and there must be assurance that such legislation will be assigned high priority on the legislative agenda.

With respect to project sustainability, Ms. Scott Dunkley concluded that this depended to a large degree on the passage of the legislation, the operationalization of the new structure and HR development, deployment and utilization of the ICT network, interagency cooperation and on-going adequate financial resources from GOB.

7. Feedback Session

Stakeholders were invited to ask questions and contribute feedback on the presentations. Stakeholders noted that the presentation was thorough and highlighted the critical points that needed to be taken into account by decision makers in both GoB and IDB.

Way Forward: Ms. Celeste Wood, Adviser, Central Bank of Barbados

Ms. Wood focused on the issue of sustainability of the project post-completion of loan activities. The critical factor for moving forward, was the passage of the legislation, without which, the objectives of the project would not be achieved. Ms. Wood highlighted the importance of inter-agency co-operation and

collaboration which could only be guaranteed by the promulgation of the legislation to ensure BSS has the authority to play a coordinating role. She also highlighted the importance of ensuring the re-engineered BSS is executed as designed, and that the human resources within BSS and the system are developed. She also noted that on the demand-side for statistics, there needs to be demonstrated demand for statistics from public and private sector stakeholders.

8. Presentation: Mr. Aubrey Brown

Director of the BSS, Mr. Aubrey Brown presented tokens of appreciation to members of the Statistical Steering Committee.

9. Vote of Thanks – Mrs. Judith Small-Clarke

The Vote of Thanks was moved by Mrs. Judith Small Clarke and the workshop was adjourned.

Workshop Agenda

9:00-9:30	Registration
9:30-9:35	Prayers
9:35-9:40	Welcome – Mr. Aubrey Brown
9:40-9:50	Opening Remarks – Mr. Seibert Frederick, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs
9:50-10:00	Opening Remarks – Camilo Gomez, IDB Representative
10:00-10:30	Feature Address – The Hon. Chris Sinckler, Minister, Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs
10:45-10:55	Presentation – Mariko Russell, Modernization of the State Senior Specialist
10:55-11:20	Project Achievements & Lessons Learned – Ms. Christine Scott Dunkley, Final Evaluation Consultant
11:20-11:30	Way Forward: Ms. Celeste Wood, Adviser, Central Bank of Barbados
11:30-12:00	Feedback: Mrs. Olivia Chase-Smith
12:00-12:10	Presentation: Mr. Aubrey Brown
12:10-12:20	Vote of Thanks – Mrs. Judith Small-Clarke



Inter-American Development Bank
Project Completion Report – PCR
Borrower Evaluation

Project Name: Modernization of the Barbados Statistical Service

Executing Agency(ies): Barbados Statistical Service

Borrower: Government of Barbados

Date of Project Approval: July 28, 2008

Date of Contract Effectiveness: May 22, 2009

Date of Borrower Evaluation: 28 February 2017

Expected Date of Exit Workshop: November 2, 2016

Borrower Project Performance Ratings

Probability on Achieving its Development Objective(s):

☐ Highly Probable (HP) ☒ Probable (P) ☐ Low Probability (LP) ☐ Improbable (I)

Project Implementation:

☐ Highly Satisfactory (HS) ☒ Satisfactory (S) ☐ Unsatisfactory (US) ☐ Very Unsatisfactory (VU)

Sustainability of Project Results:

☐ Highly Probable (HP) ☒ Probable(P) ☐ Low Probability (LP) ☐ Improbable (I)

Comments:

Implementation was satisfactory in some areas: e.g. installation of the core IT infrastructure and PR training; capacity building; draft legislation. Under the Project, implementation seemed limited to these areas.

However, there were some challenges which resulted in implementation delays: e.g.

- finalization of contracts by the Chief Parliamentary Council; finalization of the draft Statistics Bill for enactment; getting staff recruited/put in place by the Personnel Administration Division, for the restructuring of the Department.
- The approved restructuring of the Department was limited by government funding, to a minimum number of posts – not exceeding the budget for the current total Estimates, re. BSS' payroll. This is the minimum structure that the Department will need to adjust to, in order to continue its functions.
- Change management is critical at all levels. Despite some training in this area, all staff did not fully grasp/ embrace the changes necessary, to move to using the new IT system. The training provided by the various consultants in a short time span (about 6 months) before the end of the Project, was not fully absorbed by all relevant staff. Further training will be useful, in order for staff to be comfortable with using the new IT system, including the more extensive functionality of the Web Portal. The latter is vital, before we can seek to launch the Web Portal for use by external users.

The recent loss of trained staff has compounded our implementation challenges – losses due to retirement and to re-assignments in the public service (beyond the control of the BSS).

The project will need a champion at the highest level of government, to drive sustainability and cooperation from other agencies/ministries – for the formal establishment of the National Statistical System (NSS).

Bank Performance

Please rate the Bank's overall performance during project preparation and execution. Factors to be considered include the extent to which the Bank facilitated a participatory project design, proposed adequate technical solutions to the problems identified, and responded to the needs of the Borrower (timeliness, selection of instrument type) as well as technical assistance (including informal and formal training) to Executing Agency, timeliness of Bank response and the Bank's flexibility to respond to emergency situations during project implementation. Your comments will be incorporated unedited into the PCR.

☐ Highly Satisfactory (HS) ☒ Satisfactory(S) ☐ Unsatisfactory (US) ☐ Very Unsatisfactory (VU)

Comments:

The Bank was helpful in assisting our Project Unit in managing the Project, with all its documentation. Training provided for the Project staff was very useful. However, some delays were attributed to the time required for the Bank's non-objections at each stage, before proceeding to the next steps.

Borrower Performance

Please rate your own overall performance during project preparation and execution.

☐ Highly Satisfactory (HS) ☒ Satisfactory(S) ☐ Unsatisfactory (US) ☐ Very Unsatisfactory (VU)

Comments:

The current BSS staff were not involved in the initial project design or preparation. This factor may have contributed to some level of disengagement by a few staff, during the project execution and implementation stages.

Generally, the staff worked well with the Project Unit and all consultants, to achieve the stated objectives. However, there were some difficulties at times, to keep up with reading and commenting on the large volumes of documentation (e.g. the initial recommendations from the OPM consultants), while at the same time, trying to maintain the normal production of work.

Additional Suggestions for Improving Bank Performance

Additional comments/suggestions for improving Bank performance in the future.

More time needed to be factored into implementation schedules, after the OPM consultants completed their recommendations; to account for unforeseen delays due to the bureaucracy of the public service.

Otherwise, a separate project should be considered for full Implementation – leading to the full establishment of the NSS.