



Project Completion Report

PCR

Project Name: Citizen Security Programme

Country: Trinidad and Tobago

Sector/Subsector: Social Investment/Citizen Security

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Project Number: TT-L1003

Loan Number: 1965/OC-TT

Final Approval Date of PCR: April 17, 2017

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

AGD	Attorney General's Department
C&V	Crime and Violence
CAC	Community Action Council
CAO	Community Action Officer
CAPA	Crime and Problem Analysis Unit of the MNS
CBO	Community Based Organization
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CSP	Citizen Security Programme
CSWG	Civil Society Working Group
DO	Achievement of Development Objective Classification
EoP	End of Project
GoRTT	Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago
ICON	Inspiring Confidence in our Neighbourhoods Micro-projects
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
IP	Implementation Progress Classification
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MNS	Ministry of National Security
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPD	Ministry of Planning and Development
MCD	Ministry of Community Development
NCVS	National Crime and Victimization Survey
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PEU	Project Execution Unit
PROPEF	Project Preparation and Execution Facility
PYC	Police Youth Club
RIP	Rapid Impact Projects
SGD	Solicitor General's Department
SU	Sustainability Classification
TT	Trinidad and Tobago
TTPS	Trinidad and Tobago Police Service
YFS	Youth Friendly Spaces



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I. Basic Information

BASIC DATA (AMOUNTS IN US\$)	
PROJECT NO: ATN/OC-1965-TT	TITLE: Citizen Security Programme
Borrower: Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago	Date of Board Approval: March 11, 2008
Executing Agency (EA): Ministry of National Security	Date of Loan Contract Effectiveness: April 5, 2008
Loan: TT-L1003	Date of Eligibility for First Disbursement: May 12, 2008
Sector: Social Investment/Citizen Security	Months in Execution
Lending Instrument: Investment Loan	* from Approval: 107
	* from Contract Effectiveness: 104
	Disbursement Periods
	Original Date of Final Disbursement: April 5, 2014
	Current Date of Final Disbursement: December 15, 2016
	Cumulative Extension (Months): 32.5
	Special Extensions (Months): 8.5
	Loan Amount(s)
	* Original Amount: \$24, 500,000
	* Current Amount: \$18,794,797.09
	* Pari Passu (if applicable): \$10,500,000
Poverty Targeted Investment (PTI): No	Disbursements
Social Equity (SEQ): Yes	* Amount to date: \$18,794,797.09
Environmental Classification: B ¹	Total Project Cost (Original Estimate): \$35,000,000
	Redirectioning
	Has this Project?
	Received funds from another Project No
	Sent funds to another Project No
	On Alert Status
	Is project currently designated "on alert" by PAIS: No

Summary Performance Classifications				
DO	<input type="checkbox"/> Highly Probable (HP)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Probable (P)	<input type="checkbox"/> Low Probability (LP)	<input type="checkbox"/> Improbable (I)
IP	<input type="checkbox"/> Highly Satisfactory (HS)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Satisfactory (S)	<input type="checkbox"/> Unsatisfactory (US)	<input type="checkbox"/> Very Unsatisfactory (VU)
SU	<input type="checkbox"/> Highly Probable (HP)	<input type="checkbox"/> Probable (P)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Low Probability (LP)	<input type="checkbox"/> Improbable (I)

II. The Project

a. Project Context

In October 2005, the Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago (GoRTT), through the Ministry of Planning and Development (MPD), requested loan financing for a citizen security operation that would become the Citizen Security Programme (CSP); as well as a US\$750,000 Project Preparation and Execution Facility (PROPEF)² to support the new operation's design. At the time of the request, Trinidad and Tobago (TT) was experiencing a significant increase in

¹ Though initially classified as a C, the project was re-classified as B in 2012 as it was anticipated that the Youth Friendly Spaces (YFS) activity would entail both refurbishment of existing sites as well as construction of new locales.

² The PROPEF operation (TT-L1006), approved in November 2005 and closed on June 19, 2008, financed consultancies to collect baseline information as well as to conduct assessment and planning exercises necessary to design, monitor, and evaluate the CSP. PROPEF resources were also used to hire the key Project Execution Unit staff to support CSP's design and implementation.



serious crimes, with the rate and number of homicides more than tripling between 2000 and 2005 (from 120 homicides per year to 386 per year, and 9.5 homicides per 100,000 persons to 29.8 homicides per 100,000 persons, respectively). In 2008, when CSP was approved, TT had 547 homicides and a homicide rate of 43.3 per 100/000 persons, the highest of the previous 20 years.³

b. Project Description

i. Development Objectives:

CSP's general objective was to contribute to a reduction in crime and violence (C&V) in selected high-crime communities⁴ throughout TT through the financing of preventive interventions addressing the most proximal and modifiable C&V risk factors. The specific objectives of the Programme were: (i) a reduction in the levels of homicides, robberies and woundings in partner communities; (ii) an increase in the perception of safety in the partner communities; (iii) reduction in injuries related to firearms, child maltreatment, domestic violence and youth violence; and (iv) an increase in the collective efficacy to prevent violence in the partner communities.

ii. Components

CSP was comprised of three components. Below is a brief description of the components as described in the 2014 Amendatory Contract.

Component I. Community Action aimed to promote community engagement as well as to deliver C&V prevention activities. Activities were financed in the following areas:

a. *Mobilization of communities.* Consultants were to be contracted to assist in the design and implementation of strategies for engaging the community, conducting assessments, assisting in the development of interventions and associated monitoring and evaluation systems. Community Action Officers (CAO), contracted by the Project Execution Unit (PEU) and overseen by the PEU's Community Action Specialist, served as the community-level focal points for the assessment and brokering of opportunities for collaboration, private sector involvement and service provision in their respective communities. The CAOs were trained to help each community to articulate and prepare proposals for rapid impact projects (RIP) geared towards the situational prevention of violence and community-identified activities to facilitate community engagement and cohesion.

b. *Community Violence Prevention Services* financed a menu of specified C&V prevention services as well as capacity-building activities to address priority issues. Consultants (individuals and firms) were contracted to support the PEU to develop evidence-based interventions to address: (i) youth violence, delinquency and anti-social behavior, child abuse and neglect, and domestic violence (e.g. parenting, dating violence prevention, conflict resolution in settings such as schools and community); (ii) situational crime prevention (e.g. the creation of safe community spaces, community gardens and playground equipment); (iii) local policy and service provision improvements (involving varied sectors, such as health, education, human services and police) to implement state of the art youth and community work precepts (such as Youth Friendly Spaces (YFS)⁵); and (iv) media and other public education campaigns. Social norms and public education

³ Data provided by the Ministry of National Security, Crime and Problem Analysis Unit via the CSP.

⁴ Pursuant to the signature of an Amendatory Agreement, this objective was amended in July 2014 from the original "22 high crime pilot communities" to allow CSP to expand into additional communities. As project costs were less than estimated at approval, no activities were cancelled to allow this.

⁵ Prior to executing this activity, MNS was required to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Ministry of Community Development, which was to oversee YFS operation once completed, fleshing out the financing and operational responsibilities of each Ministry. Though an MoU was drafted in 2013 (and first discussed with the Ministry of Sport and Youth Affairs before the Ministry of Community Development), it was never submitted to Cabinet for approval or signed. As such, this activity was never fully executed as designed. Resources were used to finance the construction of a multi-use Police Station and Community Centre in the Gonzales partner community, as well as the upgrade and refurbishment of two community-owned community centres in the Mon Repos and Beetham partner communities.

campaigns were to be carried out through trained community videographers, who were to develop local content. Strategies funded were to target individual, family, relationship, community and societal level contexts, largely focus on primary and secondary prevention, and address firearm injury prevention issues. Projects were required to incorporate beneficiary participation at all stages of project identification, design, implementation and operation. The CAO assigned to each project was responsible for liaising with the consultants to ensure adequate community participation.

c. *Strengthening community based Multi-Service Centers* to house community activities and serve as coordination sites for community and other participants (such as the Community Action Council (CAC), Government Agencies, etc). Residents, hired on a stipend basis, were to staff these centers. Loan resources were to be used to finance construction of new and rehabilitation of existing, underused or unused structures for the community-based, multi-purpose facilities to serve as YFS, computer equipment and a resource library with C&V prevention material.

Component II. Support for the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service (TTPS) financed activities to increase public confidence and enhance police-public interaction. Financed activities included (i) rehabilitation of police stations to improve service to citizens (reception area, rape crisis room, interview and identification rooms in order to protect identities and take reports); (ii) computer equipment and basic IT training to process reports from community members in the rehabilitated stations; (iii) establishment of the Victim Witness Support Unit to provide counseling support, crisis negotiation and grief counseling to victims and witnesses of crime; and (iv) counseling support for officers to provide psycho-social services to reduce work related stress and improve police-public relations.⁶

Component III. Institutional Strengthening of the MNS had four sub-components. The first sub-component financed the strengthening of the Crime and Problem Analysis Unit⁷ (CAPA) of MNS through purchase of computer equipment and software as well as training in areas such as geo-reference mapping, statistical analysis, and problem identification. This sub-component was intended to also finance the implementation of a surveillance system of external causes of injuries and deaths.⁸ The second sub-component aimed to finance technical assistance to strengthen the capacity of the MNS to develop evidence based policies, formulate comprehensive national violence and crime reduction plans; and conduct surveys. The third sub-component aimed to develop evidence-based education and media campaigns; while the fourth sub-component was to finance six national victimization and violence surveys⁹.

c. Quality -At- Entry Review

No Quality-at-Entry review was conducted for this project.

⁶CSP financed two types of psycho-social support for officers. From 2010-2013, CSP financed the provision of counseling services by social workers. Starting in 2014, having found that officers were reluctant to talk to persons outside the police service about their experiences, the psycho-social support was reoriented to training of police officers in Peer Counseling.

⁷ Initially, it was intended that CSP would finance the development of a Crime Observatory within the MNS. However, shortly after project approval, this activity was replaced with support to CAPA, a unit of MNS that collects and processes TTPS administrative crime data.

⁸ This activity required the signing of an MoU between MNS, the Ministry of Health, and the Regional Health Authority. A draft MoU was submitted to and approved by Cabinet in 2013, following an initial vetting by the Solicitor General's Department (SGD). Following Cabinet approval, the MoU was sent back to the SGD for final vetting prior to signature. As of project closure, the SGD had not completed the MoU vetting and it remained unsigned. As a result, this activity was not executed and unused funds allocated for its conduct were cancelled.

⁹ Though the loan proposal specified 6 national violence and victimization surveys, CSP only financed one national crime and victimization survey (NCVS) due to logistical issues (including difficulty coordinating with the Central Statistical Office) and delays with contracting. Though NCVS planning was initiated in 2009, a contract was not issued until 2015. Unused funds allocated for the conduct of additional surveys were cancelled.

III. Results

a. Outcomes¹⁰

ACHIEVEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES (DO)				
Indicator	Unit	Baseline (Year)	Planned End of Project (EoP)	Actual EoP
Programme Outcome Indicators				
Rate of murder in partner communities (A)	Murders per 100,000	98.00 (2008)	38	40.3
Rate of murder in partner communities (B) ¹¹	Murders per 100,000	150.4 (2013)	132	83.6
Rate of wounding and shooting in partner communities (A)	Woundings and Shootings per 100,000	120.00 (2008)	65	77.4
Rate of wounding and shooting in partner communities (B)	Woundings and Shootings per 100,000	279.10 (2013)	110	76.0
Rates of robbery in partner community stations	Robbery per 100,000	418.50 (2008)	255	190.8
Rate of robbery with violence in partner communities (A)	Robbery with violence per 100,000	98.00 (2008)	90	74.2
Difference between national murder rate and rate in partner communities (A)	CSP communities' rate / national rate	54.7 (2008)	6	6.1
Difference between national murder rate and rate in partner communities (B)	CSP communities' rate / national rate	107.10 (2013)	100	49.4
Difference between national wounding and shooting rate and rate in partner communities (A)	CSP communities' rate / national rate	64.30 (2008)	20	33.3
Difference between national wounding and shooting rate and rate in partner communities (B)	CSP communities' rate / national rate	223.4 (2013)	65	31.9
Difference between national robbery rate and rate in partner community stations	CSP communities' rate / national rate	44.50 (2008)	35	9.9
Difference between national robbery with violence rate and rate in partner communities (A)	CSP communities' rate / national rate	-43.90 (2008)	-10	-12.1
Persons in partner communities who perceive them to be safe (A)	%	71.80 (2007)	80	75
Component 1 – Community Action Outcome Indicators				
Percentage of persons in partner communities with positive conflict management skills (A)	%	69.3 (2007)	72	72.1
Percentage of all individuals engaged by CureViolence Initiative who have at least 1 core need/risk factor addressed	%	0 (2013)	75	60.4
Percentage of all individuals completing Community Based Social Interventions who achieve learning and behavioral objectives	%	0 (2008)	65	74.3
Number of individual users receiving services at multi-purpose resource centres	Users per year	0 (2012)	6,712	262 ¹²
Percentage of persons in partner communities who feel that the authorities are concerned about them (A)	%	24.6 (2007)	45	28.8
Percentage of Police Youth Club (PYC) leaders with increased knowledge and skills to facilitate management of a PYC	%	0 (2013)	74.8	80
Rate of domestic violence in partner community stations	Rate per 100,000	173.8 (2008)	90	38.6
Rate of youth violence in partner community stations	Rate per 100,000	124.2 (2008)	58	69.3
Difference between national domestic violence rate and rate in partner community stations	CSP communities' rate / national rate	57.4 (2008)	22.5	-29.3
Difference between national youth violence rate and rate in partner communities	CSP communities' rate / national rate	50.5 (2008)	2.0	32.4
Residents reporting a high degree of social cohesion (A)	%	31.8 (2007)	57	50.2 ¹³

¹⁰ The Results Matrix presented is the last approved Results Matrix. Over the course of project implementation, certain indicators were updated, removed, or replaced for clarity, to reflect changes in the project's activities and scope, or the inability to collect related data during project execution.

¹¹ All indicators with an (A) refer to the original 22 CSP communities. All indicators with a (B) refer to new communities in which CSP began work following the signature of the 2014 Amendatory Contract.

¹² The financing of the multi-purpose resource centres required signature of an MOU between MNS and the Ministry of Community Development (MCD). MCD did not sign off on a draft MoU circulated in 2012 and, as such, this activity was only partially implemented. A multi-purpose police station and community center was constructed in Gonzales in 2013. Unfortunately, despite persistent follow-up, no consistent data was collected by the operators of the community centres on the number of users receiving services. The number presented here is from the last report from community operators provided in 2013 and does not reflect usage thereafter.

Residents reporting a high degree of social control (A)	%	43.6 (2007)	55	45.3 ¹⁴
Component 2 – TTPS Supported Outcome Indicators				
Number of unique clients per quarter served at victim support units ¹⁵	Cumulative total of clients per quarter ¹⁶	0 (2009)	10,963	8,963
Percentage of persons who receiving services perceive they have benefitted from the support of social workers	%	0.00 (2009)	75	84.4 ¹⁷
Percentage of public perceiving TTPS positively (A)	%	29.60 (2007)	50	47.8 ¹⁸
Component 3 – MNS Strengthened Outcome Indicators				
Percentage of participants reporting that training has assisted them in the performance of their duties	%	0 (2008)	75	85.8
Reformulation. N/A				
<p>PPMR Retrofitting. This project was approved at a time when the Bank did not require Results Matrices for projects. In 2010, an Aide Memoire (IDBDocs #40807092) was signed between the Bank and the GoRTT to approve a Results Matrix that would address issues with the Logical Framework developed at operation approval. These issues included: (i) national indicators not having relevance at the community level, (ii) unclear relationship between outputs and outcomes, (iii) unrealistic targets, (iv) ambiguous interpretation and definition of indicators, (v) the need for an indicator to reflect mobilization of the communities, (vi) base figures that could not be substantiated, and (vii) replication of indicators within specific components. Under the retrofitted Results Framework, 2008 was used as the baseline year rather than 2006, to more accurately reflect pre-activity start up conditions during CSP's first year of operations. Also, 7 indicators were removed, 11 indicators were added; and 17 indicators were revised or replaced. The ensuing Results Matrix was used from 2010 to 2014.</p> <p>In 2014, in tandem with the signature of an Amendatory Agreement (see http://www.iadb.org/en/projects/project-description-title.1303.html?id=tt-11003) to expand CSP to additional communities and revise some of the activities initially scoped, the Results Framework was retrofitted. The second, retrofitted Results Matrix no longer tracked indicators for activities that would not be implemented under the Project; and introduced new indicators for the new CSP partner communities as well as new activities incorporated under the Amendatory Agreement.</p>				
Summary Development Objective(s) Classification (DO):				
<input type="checkbox"/> Highly Probable (HP) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Probable (P) <input type="checkbox"/> Low Probability (LP) <input type="checkbox"/> Improbable (I)				
The Development Objective is classified as Probable due to the lack of a sustainability plan for CSP at the time of project closure.				
<p>Country Strategy. Approved in 2008, the CSP was not aligned with the priority areas identified in the Bank's 2004-2010 or 2011-2015 Country Strategies.</p>				

b. Externalities

A number of unintended positive and negative consequences occurred during project execution. Among the more positive externalities was the creation of the Civil Society Working Group (CSWG). Established by CSP to ensure the availability of a sufficient number of service providers for project activities, by project end the CSWG had grown into a robust network of over twenty civil society organizations. The CSWG operates independently of the Programme, though it has been a channel through which numerous Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) have received CSP-funded capacity strengthening trainings, and has become a resource for CSOs interested in further strengthening their capacity, exchanging experiences and resources, and advocating for the CSO sector. Another important positive externality has been the creation of the Mon Repos farm, in CSP's Mon Repos partner community. An initiative of the Mon Repos CAC, the farm has become a source of pride in the community as well as a source of income. As of project closure,

¹³ This data was collected from the 2015 NCVS. As a subsequent survey was not run before project end, the most recent figure from 2015 is used here.

¹⁴ This data was collected from the 2015 NCVS, financed by the CSP. As a subsequent survey was not run before project end, the most recent figure from 2015 is used here.

¹⁵ This indicator was presented here as an outcome, rather than output, indicator to serve as an intermediate outcome to the related, lower level indicator - Persons trained to provide specialized victim support services - in the output section.

¹⁶ The original unit for this indicator was clients per quarter. However, for ease of review, the planned total, cumulative number of clients and the actual number of clients received over the course of project implementation is presented.

¹⁷ In 2014, MNS absorbed the Victim Witness Support Unit, established and initially financed by the CSP, into its structure and all associated costs were paid directly from a non-CSP, MNS budget allocation. As such, CSP ceased to procure information on client satisfaction after 2013.

¹⁸ This data was collected from the 2015 NCVS. As a subsequent survey was not run before project end, the most recent figure from 2015 is used here.



CSP was supporting community residents to prepare a business plan to sell their farm-produced herbs in local supermarkets.

The principal negative externality of the Programme has been its failure to produce sustained GoRTT commitment to the community-based approach it piloted. Based on CSP's outcomes (presented above), the Programme demonstrated the efficacy of a community-based approach to both crime prevention and crime reduction. Nevertheless, CSP failed to stimulate internal GoRTT or public dialogue on the viability, or interest in continuation, of the community-based approach to crime prevention and its institutionalization within the GoRTT's crime-fighting measures. Various GoRTT administrations that oversaw the project acknowledged its success yet took time to determine how best to align the project's goals and activities with their development agendas in a manner that negatively impacted project execution and sustainability.

c. Outputs

IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS (IP)				
Indicator	Unit	Baseline (Year)	EoP	Actual EoP
Component 1 – Community Action Output Indicators				
Total cost: \$13,358,412.82 Counterpart: \$3,863,809 IDB: 9,494,603.82 IDB Disbursement: 72.1% Classification: S Restructuring: No				
Communities actively engaged	Communities	10 (2008)	32	32
Non-governmental organizations (NGO) and community-based organizations (CBO) trained/strengthened	NGO/CBO	0 (2008)	301	292
CAC members and community leaders trained in violence prevention ⁶	Community members trained	50 (2008)	897	1,088
New RIP implemented ¹⁹	RIP	0 (2008)	25	22
Police-led community projects supported	Projects	0 (2009)	27	29
Youth participating regularly in PYC activities	PYC participants	0 (2008)	1,640	1,640
New families engaged by Cure Violence initiative ⁷	Families	0 (2013)	67	61 ²⁰
Residents participating in community based social interventions	Residents	0 (2008)	3,892	4,110
Inspiring Confidence in our Neighborhoods Micro-projects (ICON) implemented (CBOs and TTPS)	ICON	0 (2008)	168	175
School-based violence reduction projects implemented (direct CSP grant)	School-based interventions	0 (2008)	35	38
Multi-purpose resource centers (YFS) established	Centers	0 (2009)	13	3

¹⁹ It was planned to implement 1 RIP in each CSP partner community, including the expansion communities that were added in 2014. While RIPs were implemented in each of the 22 original CSP partner communities, the programme was unable to fully complete the preliminary activities necessary for implementation of RIPs in the expansion communities prior to project closure.

²⁰ The CureViolence program is carried out by an independent contractor that is responsible for reporting the number of families engaged. The contractor has had difficulties using the CureViolence reporting software as well as training field staff on reporting. As such, the number here is drawn directly from the CureViolence reporting system. Nevertheless, based on information from the CureViolence implementer, it is believed that it underreports the actual number of families engaged.



Briefly explain differences between planned and actual outputs: CSP met or exceeded most expected Component I output targets. The failure to meet targets for the CureViolence and Multi-Purpose Resource Centres established is explained in footnotes 20 and 12, respectively. CSP did not complete the expected number of RIPs, due to the delay in project start-up in communities added following the 2014 Amendatory Contract. Finally, though the target for number of NGOs and CBOs trained/strengthened was not met, it was missed by less than 3%.

Restructuring: No

Component 2 – TTPS Supported Outcome Indicators

Total cost: \$2,074,653.83

Counterpart: \$332,286

IDB: \$1,742,367.83

IDB Disbursement: 50.4%

Classification: S

Restructuring: No

TTPS officers in CSP partner stations trained in basic IT skills	TTPS Officers	0 (2008)	283	3
Persons trained to provide specialized victim support services	Persons trained	0 (2009)	46	46 (2013)
Social workers assigned to TTPS to support officers re stress reduction and coping skills	Social workers assigned	0 (2009)	8	8 (2013)
TTPS officers in CSP partner stations trained in peer counseling	TTPS Officers	0 (2013)	210	278

Briefly explain differences between planned and actual outputs: The difference between planned and actual output for "TTPS Officers in CSP Partner Stations trained in basic IT skills" is due to difficulties liaising with TTPS, the beneficiary organization, to complete the procurement materials necessary to contract an agency to provide the training on a large scale (discrete support to individual officers was more easily facilitated and, therefore, provided). A contract was executed to carry out this activity on a large scale in December 2016 and the activity will be carried out by the GoRTT following project closure. The greater number of officers trained in peer counseling than expected is due to the tremendous popularity of the course and a request from TTPS to do increase the number of courses offered as well as the number of participants.

Restructuring: No

Component 3 – MNS Strengthened Outcome Indicators

Total cost: \$2,853,068.68

Counterpart: \$395,090

IDB: \$2,457,978.68

IDB Disbursement: 80%

Classification: S

Restructuring: No

MNS staff trained in data analysis and/or GIS mapping	Staff trained	0 (2008)	119	119
Number of MNS software and equipment requests facilitated	MNS requests facilitated	0 (2008)	9	10
Number of Capacity building initiatives for MNS facilitated	MNS initiatives facilitated	0 (2008)	5	5

Briefly explain differences between planned and actual outputs: There were no significant deviations from output targets.

Restructuring: No

Summary Implementation Progress Classification:

☐ Highly Satisfactory (HS) ☒ Satisfactory (S) ☐ Unsatisfactory(U) ☐ Very Unsatisfactory (VU)

d. Project Costs

Investment Category	Source of Financing (US\$)			
	Approved		Actual	
	IDB (1)	Local (2)	IDB (3)	Local (4)
Component I	13,163,000	4,954,000	9,494,603.82	3,863,809
Component II	3,455,000	2,280,000	1,742,367.83	332,286
Component III	3,075,000	1,545,000	2,457,978.68	395,090
Program Management	2,850,000	1,150,000	4,084,221.12	1,847,428
Auditing	600,000	0	268,732.47	33,285
PROPEF	750,000	0	746,893.17	0
Contingencies	1,182,000	571,000	0	0
Total Cost	24,500,000	10,500,000	18,794,797.09	6,471,898
Source: Adapted from Cost and Financing Table of the Loan Proposal 1965/OC-TT and IDB's Loan Management System (LMS)				



Total Project Cost - Planned (US\$000)	Total Project Cost - Actual (US\$000)	% Difference
US\$35,000,000	US\$25,266,695	28%

Briefly explain any differences. There was a significant difference in planned cost from actual cost of the project. For Component I, this was due, in large part, to the inability to carry forward most actions that required coordination with agencies or Ministries outside of CSP. Procurement processes for most of CSP's large activities required the engagement of the Central Tenders Board of the Ministry of Finance, the Solicitor General's Department under the Ministry of the Attorney General, as well as MNS legal, technical, and finance teams. These processes took between 8 to 18 months to complete and were a significant drag on project execution and expenditure. Another drag on project execution was the difficulty coordinating with partner GoRTT agencies to use resources allocated for them under the project. \$2 million that was allocated for joint work with the Ministry of Education was never used because the Ministry could not decide how it wanted to use the funds (even after an MoU was signed and a consultant hired to support the Ministry in developing its plan). Activities to be carried out in coordination with the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Social Development, estimated at \$7M, could not be carried forward because MoUs required to authorize the activities were never executed by the Government. Under Component III, national surveys and other activities expected to be carried out with the MNS to strengthen its ability to collect and analyze data, as well as develop evidence-based policies, were never deployed due to a lack of a designated counterpart within the Ministry to carry these activities forward.

IV. Project Implementation

a. Analysis of Critical Factors

Three factors most critically affected CSP's implementation: (i) human resources, (ii) IDB support, and (iii) Governmental coordination.

Human Resources: From inception, CSP had difficulty finding adequate human resources to provide the administrative backbone necessary to manage the project. This was particularly acute in the procurement, financial management, project management, and communications functions. To provide the level of service necessary, in addition to a generic technical expertise, staff needed sufficient public sector experience to be able to navigate the government processes and to have an extensive internal network to support their work. Additionally, given the scope and pace of CSP's work, staff persons needed a high level of commitment and willingness to work long hours. It took six years, and ample experimentation with different staffing methods and configurations to recruit staff with the requisite profiles to properly fill the procurement, project management, and financial management positions. Unfortunately, CSP was unable to adequately fill the communications role; which had a significant impact on the Programme's ability to properly market and socialize its successes. The ability to recruit suitable qualified and experienced personnel was not flagged during project design though it is a recurring issue on IDB funded projects in TT. It should be noted that the frequent stops and starts in project execution due to GoRTT delay in deciding whether to move forward with the project, at different junctures, contributed to staff attrition and low morale.

IDB Support: The impetus to prepare a citizen security project sprang from a national IDB specialist, who was keenly aware of the rising insecurity in TT, and a Minister of National Security who, after participating a citizen security study tour to Jamaica, was inspired to implement a project similar to the IDB-financed Citizen Security and Justice Programme. However, neither the IDB Country Office nor the broader Government was initially convinced that citizen security was a significant development challenge for TT at that time. Following project approval, the IDB appointed a new Team Leader who was reluctant to sign off on many of the community-based activities the CSP was intended to finance. This, in turn, affected the roll out of the program as well as the disbursement of IDB resources, which were sorely underused for the first five years of project execution. The Government noted that assignment of IDB personnel affected effectiveness of project execution, at times creating challenges to CSP's implementation. It is also worth noting that the very nature of social interventions such as CSP requires a long-term commitment and investment; as well as an understanding of the institutional and coordination difficulties inherent to a program which aims to address issues in a new way. As such, the



approach to implementation and disbursement planning for a project such as CSP must go beyond the medium-term, linear project execution period and path initially projected for the CSP.

Government Coordination: Implementation of any GoRTT project requires significant cross-governmental coordination in terms of operational and legal approvals, budget allocation, procurement, and payments. For projects such as CSP, which are specifically designed to address a cross-cutting issue involving several line Ministries, the need for strong intra-Governmental coordination is paramount. Coordination hinges on a clear understanding of each agency's role, an agreement on joint objectives, a willingness to jointly set and abide by project timelines, and accountability structures to incentivize and expedite joint action. Over the course of CSP's implementation, the GoRTT did not dispose of a mechanism, structure, or incentives to facilitate efficient cross-governmental coordination. The lack of coordination resulted in delays of all sorts, including inadequate budget allocation to complete planned project activities. Particularly significant delays were related to the signing of MoUs with other line Ministries to complete joint activities.

- A signed MoU with the Ministry of Education to allocate \$2M to school-based violence prevention programs was largely unused, as the MoE was unable to identify or agree on any activities for which to use the funds.
- A draft MoU to implement an Injury Surveillance System was approved by the Ministry of Health, MNS, and the Northwest Regional Health Authority. Following an initial vetting by the Attorney General's Department (AGD), it received provisional approval by GoRTT Cabinet in 2014 subject to a final AGD vetting. The AGD, upon receiving the MoU for final vetting, never took action to complete the vetting process. As of project closure, the MoU remained unsigned.
- A draft MoU to allow financing of the construction and/or rehabilitation of community centres as youth friendly spaces was never completed. The MoU would have permitted CSP to finance any construction and/or rehabilitation costs while ensuring that Ministry of Community Development (MCD), which is responsible for managing community centres nationally, would finance the operation of the centres once completed. Over a 3-year period and up until project closure, MNS was unable to receive final input or sign off from MCD, though the Ministry self-financed expansion of community centres across the island.

Though this issue was flagged at inception, the related mitigation measure – creation of an inter-Ministerial Steering Committee – was insufficient to address it. In future operations, it is recommended that all required MoUs be signed before project approval and that implementation units within the partner Ministries be established as a condition precedent to implementation.

The coordination issues affecting CSP's implementation at the macro level within the GoRTT were also present at a micro-level within MNS. Though CSP had a significant amount of operational autonomy, all project payments, procurements, and contracts were required to go through normal Ministry channels. This caused a significant drag on project execution. Further, though operating under one Ministry, the various sub-agencies with which the CSP was designed to work (TTPS, MNS Units) also operated with a fair share of political and operational autonomy as well as cultural insularity. For CSP to have cut through the red tape within MNS, two things were necessary: (i) a high-level champion with the power to compel action and (ii) specific Project Coordinators appointed from within TTPS and MNS that would have been able to effectively maneuver within, and work with, those bodies²¹.

b. **Borrower/Executing Agency Performance:**

As noted in the Borrower's Evaluation (see Annex V), the achievement of CSP's vision required significant cross-government coordination and collaboration, as well as, given the size of MNS, intra-ministerial coordination. Unfortunately, neither the Borrower nor the Executing Agency was able to shepherd the various actors into working together toward the Project's objective. The lack

²¹ This approach was used with some success with TTPS starting in 2013 when an official liaison was appointed. However, the liaison did not remain in the position consistently and this affected the efficacy of their appointment.



of a government actor with the ability to engage necessary resources on a sustained basis to meet agreed goals is an issue that extends beyond CSP and which should be considered in the design of any cross-cutting program in Trinidad and Tobago.

Borrower/Executing Agency			
<input type="checkbox"/> Highly Satisfactory (HS)	<input type="checkbox"/> Satisfactory (S)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Unsatisfactory (U)	<input type="checkbox"/> Very Unsatisfactory (VU)

c. Bank Performance

While the Bank's performance was rated as Satisfactory, respondents noted the following:

1. The changeover in Bank staff assigned to the Project following project approval created challenges and delays in implementation, as the new staff person's vision was not aligned with the project's Modus Operandi. It was recommended that efforts be made to maintain the same Project Team Leader from design during implementation.
2. During implementation, the IDB was overly focused on expenditure and disbursement metrics rather than results. It was recommended that more technical resources and assistance be provided to the PEUs in the area of monitoring and evaluation.

Bank Performance			
<input type="checkbox"/> Highly Satisfactory (HS)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Satisfactory (S)	<input type="checkbox"/> Unsatisfactory (U)	<input type="checkbox"/> Very Unsatisfactory (VU)

V. Sustainability

a. Analysis of Critical Factors

As of project closure, neither the GoRTT nor MNS had prepared a plan for sustaining positive results achieved under CSP. This in itself poses a huge risk to the sustainability of the Programme. The key factor affecting the sustainability of CSP's results is the existence of a structure and resources to continue CSP-related activities following project closure. In line with this, the likelihood of Programme sustainability varies across the three project components and component activities. However, the project's overall sustainability rating is low probability as there has yet to be a decision made as to whether to continue CSP activities under a comprehensive programme.

Under Component I, CSP financed the piloting of community-based crime prevention activities. These activities were new and no government structure was created outside of the PEU to coordinate Component I activities nor were resources brought to bear outside of CSP. Component I activities were focused on behavioral change at the individual, family, and community levels and, in accordance with the theory of change, require ongoing implementation to be effective. As such, as the GoRTT has not identified resources nor approved an execution structure to manage these activities following closure of CSP, it is unlikely that they will be sustained. Two areas of greatest potential to sustain positive changes are the CSWG and the CACs. The CSWG brings together more than twenty (20) of the most progressive NGOs in T&T and has benefitted from institutional strengthening as well as specific technical training. Member NGOs have also gained considerable project implementation experience and developed a network that is committed to continuing the asset based and community centered approach to citizen security promoted by CSP. Similarly, the CACs, comprised of and led by partner community residents, which CSP helped to establish, built significant institutional capacity (particularly in the original 22 CSP communities) in community organizing, planning, resource management, and advocacy which will hopefully allow them to sustain many of the activities previously funded and facilitated by the CSP.

Component II activities, implemented in tandem with the Police, are likely to be largely sustained as CSP either worked with existing programs (Police Youth Clubs) that had implementation structures and assigned resources, or was able to establish new structures that the TTPS absorbed and agreed to provide full financing for even before project closure (Victim and Witness Support Unit and TTPS Social Workers). The Peer Counseling program, which was initiated in

the last two years of CSP's execution, has significant support from the TTPS. The TTPS training academy and the executive have indicated their intent to continue the initiative and to expand it to include the training and upgrading of trainers within the TTPS. As of project closure, two new contracts were underway, to be funded entirely by GoRTT, to continue this work.

Component III activities focused principally on provision of software and hardware, as well as training, to facilitate crime data collection, analysis, and translation into evidence-based policy. Funds were used both for agencies within MNS that analyze crime data as well as, in certain instances, for data collection agencies under MNS, such as TTPS. In general, CSP's support was critical in strengthening CAPA's capacity in this regard as well as through training in data analysis. Some initiatives financed hereunder brought significant enhancements to physical resources of the TTPS that are likely to have medium- to long-term effects. These include the purchase of GPS handsets, to facilitate accuracy in reporting on the location of crime, the establishment or upgrade of specialized interview rooms, and an Automated Fingerprint Identification System, to support crime investigation. Nevertheless, as much of what was financed under this component were one-off activities to address short- to medium-term needs and did not necessarily respond to a broader institutional capacity strengthening strategy or agenda from MNS, their sustainability is subject to the continued tenure of the MNS staff that worked with CSP under this component. Given that the importance of conducting Crime and Victimization Surveys has been highlighted with the conduct of the 2015 survey; it is hoped that a periodic National Crime and Victimization survey will remain on the MNS research agenda. However, as of project closure, there was no entity or person within MNS assigned to this.

b. Potential Risks

The single most important risk to sustainability of CSP results is the lack of political interest in the community-based crime prevention approach piloted under the Programme. It is recommended that the IDB continue to put forward the evidence of the usefulness of this approach to addressing crime and violence globally and maintain an ongoing dialogue on ways that it can continue to support the GoRTT in addressing C&V nationally.

c. Institutional Capacity

As of project closure, neither the GoRTT nor MNS had developed a plan for sustaining CSP's results or CSP-financed interventions in partner communities after April 2017, when all PEU staff contracts are set to expire. This indicates a low institutional capacity for sustaining community crime prevention activities piloted under the Programme. Nevertheless, many of the interventions financed under Component II and III, which addressed capacity within the TTPS and MNS, are likely to be sustained. The Victim Witness Support Unit, established under CSP, was fully incorporated into MNS as of 2014 and the TTPS peer counseling activities have been widely heralded and championed by the Police Service. The Bank will continue to finance an impact evaluation of the CureViolence pilot, which was financed under CSP but has no other actions planned to monitor project sustainability following closure. The final evaluation is expected by December 2017.

Sustainability Classification SU:

[] Highly Probable (HP) [] Probable (P) [X] Low Probability (LP) [] Improbable (I)

VI. Monitoring and Evaluation

a. Information on Results

CSP benefited from a strong Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) framework and human resources; which is atypical in projects implemented in TT. Given the scope of CSP's interventions and the number of actors involved in their implementation, the M&E framework emphasized decentralized data collection and the participation of several stakeholders in M&E activities. Significant effort



was expended to train implementing NGOs, CBOs, community members, and Ministry counterparts to collect the required data to track project activities. The framework worked well for indicators that were already routinely collected by GoRTT stakeholders or required of NGOs and CBOs as part of their contracts. Nevertheless, it worked less well with the GoRTT stakeholders for those indicators that were new and not collected as part of the routine operations of the collecting entity. The decentralized model also did not work well in the case of the CureViolence initiative, which was initiated in 2014. Program field staff were required to use the standard CureViolence reporting software, which experienced some issues, and they did not all have the required computer skills to effectively carry this out.

CSP's M&E Unit was staffed with a Specialist and an Assistant, who were responsible for all internal and IDB non-financial reporting. Third party consultants were hired to carry out specific M&E tasks such as preparation of the Mid-Term Evaluation, conduct and analysis of the NCVS (which provided input for the RM reporting).

The Programme's M&E system components includes the CSP Project Management Database, the Results Framework, the Crime Observatory/Monthly Crime Data (through the support to the police service), Contracts Management Database, Cost Benefit Analysis, a Collective Efficacy Study, Crime and Victimization Surveys, Analysis of Administrative Efficiency, and External Evaluations. More specifically, the logical framework developed during project design to gather information and evaluate results essential for measuring and monitoring project results commenced with the collection of baseline data which came from the Crime and Victimization Survey (2007), CAPA SRC annual data (2008), community assessment surveys. The CSP Results Matrix was introduced in 2009 and later updated in 2014 following signature of an Amendatory Agreement; to more easily monitor project outcome and output progress. Baseline data collected at approval was updated and other data collection tools drawn on - including surveys; feedback instruments; pre- and post-testing of attitudes, skills and competencies; monitoring forms; focus groups, interviews with key stakeholders, Cost Benefit Analysis, observations and rapid appraisals. Apart from primary data collection mechanisms, secondary data was also used for monitoring and evaluating project outcomes and outputs²² - to facilitate reporting over the life of the project.

The M&E system in place facilitated the tracking of Program performance via specific output and outcome indicators and included specific time frames for evaluation activities. Monitoring of project activities and interventions was also supported by a management information system and various reporting mechanisms. M&E was used primarily to enable relevant and effective programme delivery in partner communities and to develop evidence-based models for replication of crime and violence prevention strategies on a wider scale. In general, the approach was consistent with the CSP's guiding philosophy of community empowerment and increasing capacity at the institutional, community and individual levels simultaneously which focused heavily on stakeholder participation, sharing of evaluation information and transparency and accountability at all levels.

b. Future Monitoring and Ex-Post Evaluation

Though the IDB-financed project closed on December 15, 2016, the program received Cabinet approval to continue until April 4, 2017. As such, the M&E Unit will continue to perform its monitoring activities up to that point. No project or M&E activities are contemplated following April 4, 2017. In accordance with the Loan Proposal, no final evaluation was required for the project. Notwithstanding this, the GoRTT approved procurement of a final evaluation in 2016 and it is expected that a contract will be issued for this consultancy in 2017. Additionally, the IDB approved grant resources under RG-T2210 to conduct an impact evaluation of the CureViolence

²² Secondary sources of data included CAPA, the Central Statistical Office, VWSU, TTPS Social Work Unit, Site visit reports, data from external, contracted implementing agencies, as well as data produced by stakeholder ministries.

pilot financed under Component I. The evaluation is being conducted by a team at Arizona State University and is expected to be completed by December 2017.

VII. Lessons Learned

Monitoring and Evaluation: CSP's implementation structure was comprised of a central administrative core, including M&E, which managed and oversaw the execution of project-financed activities by other actors (with the exception of the CAO-led activities). While this structure had a number of programmatic benefits, it posed difficulties with respect to Results Matrix reporting as CSP relied on external entities to collect and provide data. In many cases, the executing entities were not capable and/or interested in providing the required information. One lesson learned from CSP is the importance of finding incentives and providing training to external agencies implementing project-related activities to improve their reporting. Additionally, when CSP expanded in 2014 to include 11 new partner communities, it was anticipated that activities in the new communities would implement at a faster rate than in the original 22 communities, thereby allowing for results to be measured in the new communities before project closure. However, while the PEU had gained valuable experience that allowed it to move more quickly into communities, the time required for communities to become sensitized to and engaged in CSP was consistent with that in the original communities. For this reason, several of the expected outputs for the new communities, such as executed RIPs, were not completed before project closure and there was no information on change in outcome indicators before project closure.

Development is Political: The overarching lesson of the CSP is that a keen understanding of politics and communications is as important as results to effective project execution and sustainability. Internally, the IDB often emphasizes the importance of data and evidence as a primary tool for engaging with Governments on options for addressing development challenges and/or for determining the effectiveness of a given intervention. CSP, unlike most IDB-financed projects in TT, had the benefit of a strong, in-house M&E unit that was able to follow up and report on the Programme's outputs and outcomes. CSP substantially met or exceeded targets for the majority of outcomes related to implemented activities and outputs for slightly less than three-quarters of the anticipated initial cost. Additionally, the Programme benefited from several evaluations (external and internal) that substantiated CSP's internal M&E reporting and indicated CSP was achieving its objectives. Nevertheless, despite the relative wealth of positive quantitative and qualitative data demonstrating that CSP was reducing crime and violence, as well as the increasing political pressure over CSP's tenure for GoRTT to find a solution to effectively reduce C&V, the GoRTT failed to appropriate CSP as a whole and champion it. Indeed, as of project closure, the Programme failed to secure even general political agreement on the effectiveness of the type of interventions it piloted despite a wealth of data demonstrating their apparent success.

The Programme's leadership took a scrupulously technical stance and viewed communications as an activity primarily focused on informing the general public. The lack of an effective, continuous, multi-level communications plan that could sensitize the public as well as the various levels of Government stakeholders as to the Programme's successes ultimately doomed the programme to obscurity and closure. During implementation, this meant that CSP never received the priority within MNS or the broader GoRTT that was necessary to accomplish all of the activities it set out to undertake. As the Programme drew to a close, it meant that it had few champions within MNS or elsewhere within the GoRTT to ensure its continuation and/or sustainability. In this sense, the key take away from the Programme is that good programs need both results and effective communications strategies.

Building Capacity to Implement New Approaches: CSP aimed to support MNS to address crime and violence in a new way by involving sectors of the Government and the nation that might not have been formally engaged by the Ministry in such efforts before. An important lesson



from the Programme is the importance of building capacity of each new stakeholder to allow them to effectively fulfill their role. Though not initially included in project design, the CSWG was a critical tool to strengthening the capacity of CSOs to effectively deliver CSP's community-based programming. CSP aimed to deliver new services in new ways to historically underserved communities. Many of the CSOs that worked with the Programme did not initially have experience or human resources to deliver programming on the scale required by CSP. The CSWG enabled them to expand their capacity to do so. Unfortunately, CSP was unable to find an equally effective tool to increase capacity of Ministry partners to work collaboratively and in a coordinated fashion with the Programme. CSP worked through the project Steering Committee, used formal Ministry-to-Ministry outreach, and offered the incentive of fully financing CSP-related activities benefiting partner Ministries or other agencies under MNS. None proved effective. The internal bureaucracy and lack of delegation of authority stymied cross-Ministerial and intra-Ministerial action. In future programmes that require significant amounts of intra-Governmental coordination, it will be key to ensure the authority to carry out the coordination is delegated to the PEU prior to initiation of the programme (either via Memorandum of Understanding if inter-Ministerial or some other instrument of delegation if intra-Ministerial). Also critical is securing and maintaining high level ministerial support (having a champion for the programme).

Human Resources: During its first three years of execution, CSP was hampered by the lack of a full complement of staff with the requisite skills necessary to implement the project. It was particularly difficult to secure qualified staff to carry out project management, procurement, and financial administration. A key lesson learned on this front is that PEU candidates' practical experience should be given more weight than their qualifications. To that end, evaluation of candidates for PEU positions should include a practical test in addition to the interview and the review of resumes and references. Finally, to the extent possible, initial contracts should be for only 6-12 months and all contracts should require the attainment of clear performance-based targets for extension.



Annex VI:

CITIZEN SECURITY PROGRAMME EXIT WORKSHOP – MEETING MINUTES **PS Conference Room, Ministry of National Security (MNS)** **February 9, 2017**

Meeting Participants: PS Lydia Jacobs (MNS); Patrick Cunningham (Project Planning Division, MNS); Gregory Sloane-Seale (Citizen Security Programme (CSP)); Tonya Pierre-Gopaul (CSP); Gary Grant (CSP); Omatee Geawan-Ramdass (Ministry of Planning and Development); Dana King (Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)); Alex Veyrat-Pontet (IDB).

Comments:

1. For the outcome indicator “Percentage of officers receiving services who perceive they have benefitted from the support of peers trained in peer counseling,” the end-of-project outcome achievement should be reported as not applicable, as the survey did not have enough respondents to provide a robust response.
2. On the last paragraph on page 7, it was noted that rather than the Government not reaching consensus on the approach piloted under CSP, the various Government administrations that oversaw the project took time to determine how best to align the project’s goals and activities with their development agendas.
3. In response to the *Human Resources* paragraph on page 10, it was noted that the delays in decisionmaking with respect to whether the project will continue or be closed have caused CSP staff insecurity and led to significant staff attrition.
4. With respect to an eventual second phase of CSP, the following comments were put forward:
 - a. Coordination arrangements with other stakeholder Ministries should be formalized before the second-phase project is approved.
 - b. If the program is scaled nationally, it would be important to ensure that there is fidelity to the intervention model and theory of change. In particular, the ratio of Community Action Officers to communities covered should be maintained and the pre-intervention community surveys continued to ensure the intervention model is suitably adjusted to meet the specific community’s needs.
 - c. There were differing views on how must to enhance the effectiveness of the CSP Steering Committee. One view put forward was that, in a follow-on phase, the Steering Committee should be comprised of persons who had decisionmaking power within their respective Ministries so that they would be best able to facilitate cross-Ministerial coordination with CSP. Another view was that greater authority needed to be delegated to the technical level to ensure more timely response to project needs. A third view was that, rather than coordinating cross-Ministerial activity through a Steering Committee, the CSP should request the Permanent Secretary MNS to work through the Permanent Secretary Forum to coordinate inter-Ministerial efforts.
 - d. Government delay in deciding on CSP’s future has generated mistrust in CSP partner communities and positive change inertia. If a second-phase is approved, it would be best to move forward quickly with implementation so as to minimize the loss of community trust that might impeded the second phase’s effectiveness.
5. CSP confirmed that the project’s Final Financial Audit will be delivered by April 2017.
6. MPD confirmed that the value-for-money audit of CSP had been completed and was currently with the Minister for final approval. It was noted that while the audit appeared to indicate that there were significant community benefits from the program, more effort would need to be made to ensure the project’s sustainability without drawing on loan resources. It was noted that no sustainability plan has been prepared to date.

