

CITIZEN SECURITY AND JUSTICE PROGRAM

(JA-0105)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Borrower:	The Government of Jamaica (GOJ)		
Guarantor:	The Government of Jamaica (GOJ)		
Executing agency:	Ministry of National Security and Justice (MNSJ)		
Amount and Source:	IDB Loan: (OC/IFF)	US\$ 16.0 million	
	Local:	US\$ 4.0 million	
	Total:	US\$ 20.0 million	
	IDB TC: (FSO non-reimbursable)	US\$ 0.5 million	
		US\$ 0.1 million	
	Local:	US\$ 0.6 million	
	Total		
Financial terms and conditions:	Amortization Period:	25	Years
	Disbursement Period:	4	Years
	Interest Rate:	variable	
	Supervision and Inspection:	1.00	%
	Credit Fee:	0.75	%
	Currency:	US\$ Single Currency Facility	
Objectives:	<p>The overall goal of the program is to enhance citizen security and justice in Jamaica. The principal objectives of the program are to (i) prevent and reduce violence; (ii) strengthen crime management capabilities; and, (iii) improve the delivery of judicial services.</p> <p>At the end of the program the following results are expected: an increased ability on the part of the criminal justice system to prevent and contain crime, an improved capability on the part of the MNSJ to mobilize and utilize resources channeled into crime and violence prevention, an increased number of effective crime and violence reduction initiatives implemented in inner-city communities, and greater awareness among the citizens of Jamaica</p>		

regarding the negative effects of crime and violence as well as some of the measures that are being used to combat them.

Description:

The Program will have the following four basic components:

1. **Elaboration of an integrated National Crime and Violence Prevention Strategy**, together with corollary studies and a flexible technical assistance fund (TAF), to be financed under the program with a parallel TC (see Annex I).
2. **Capacity building of the MNSJ** by (a) improving its long-term ability to execute or coordinate projects related to violence prevention and crime management; and (b) improving the ability of the Ministry to monitor trends in crime and violence, facilitate information exchange, plan strategically and formulate appropriate policy or program responses.
3. **Strengthening the criminal justice system** through initiatives that are designed to improve the impact of programs and quality of services provided by the criminal justice system, and to increase the accountability of the Jamaica Constabulary Force to civil society.
4. **Community Action** to deliver a set of violence prevention initiatives that will be carried out by NGOs within selected pilot communities in the Kingston Metropolitan Area. The component also entails technical assistance and infrastructure rehabilitation to promote community mobilization and cohesion along with improved community-police relations.

Cutting across the above components, a comprehensive **social marketing and public education campaign** will be undertaken at both the national and targeted inner-city community levels. The campaign will support each program component with a view to influencing attitudinal change with regard to crime and violence and to inform the public of the scope and nature of the program.

Bank's country and sector strategy:

The Bank's strategy for Jamaica has two overriding objectives. The first is to support the establishment of a satisfactory macroeconomic environment. The second is to promote an improved environment for long-term private sector-led growth and development. This program will respond to the second objective since the decrease in violence and crime in the country will lead to higher productivity and competitiveness (especially in the tourism industry), and it will improve social sector performance and environmental conditions. The program will also complement

other Bank operations in execution or in preparation and provide opportunities for synergy.

**Environmental/
social review:**

No negative environmental impacts are expected as a result of program execution. On the contrary, through community interventions and corresponding social marketing efforts, the program is more likely to have a positive impact on the urban environment. The program calls for limited rehabilitation of existing structures in order, for example, to ready the community facilities for NGO providers of violence prevention services. In those cases where rehabilitation of infrastructure is required, procedures will be followed to ensure that any improvements are carried out by the contractors and utilized in compliance with the Jamaica Town Planning Act, along with other relevant national environmental standards or health regulations, and that the Bank's environmental guidelines and reporting requirements are met.

From the outset, program design has benefited extensively from an active participatory approach, beginning with a national stakeholders workshop to conceptualize the basic logic of the operation. Subsequently, a Jamaican technical advisory team from a cross-section of interests, including NGOs and community groups, provided valuable contributions to program design. This participatory approach is also reflected in the process of pre-selecting and selecting those inner city communities to participate and benefit from the provision of violence prevention services under the program, all of which are low-income and suffer from high levels of crime and violence, as well as in the process of articulating priority community needs. Finally, mechanisms are in place to sustain this active participatory approach through program implementation.

The social impacts of the project are expected to be extremely favorable. Since violence erodes social capital and limits economic opportunities in poor communities, reducing the levels of violence in inner-city Kingston will create economic opportunities for the poor and consequently will reduce poverty. Women's development issues are addressed in important ways. The National Violence Prevention Strategy will incorporate actions to prevent domestic violence against women. In addition, several of the interventions that will be delivered by NGOs in the inner-city communities can be expected to reduce the incidence of domestic violence. Finally, the social marketing component will address the issue of domestic violence against women.

Benefits:

Preparation of national strategy for crime and violence prevention that will provide a blueprint for future crime and violence reduction activities and an Action Plan to implement these activities. The strategy will be prepared in coordination with government ministries and civil society stakeholders; thus, ensuring a collaborative, multi-sectoral approach to crime and violence prevention.

Better police-community relations and reduced recidivism rates through the strengthening of the Police Public Complaints Authority, and the implementation of a Police Code of Conduct. In addition, strengthening rehabilitation services, especially those targeted to young male short-term offenders, should result in reduced recidivism rates among released offenders.

Reduced levels of violence in targeted inner-city communities through the Community Action component, which provides violence prevention services to a selected set of inner-city communities. Collateral benefits of the Community Action component include strengthening of NGOs working in the area of violence reduction, empowerment of inner-city communities via the creation of community action committees, and increased collaboration between government and civil society.

Risks:

Sustained participation and commitment. Due to the multi-sectoral nature of the program, the active participation and continued commitment of all major stakeholders during program implementation are fundamental. These stakeholders include agencies of the criminal justice system, relevant ministries, NGOs and communities. This issue has been addressed through the formation of a core technical team for program guidance during the design stage that included representatives from these groups, and the establishment of a senior level steering committee with similar representation to guide implementation. In addition, steps have been taken to develop a mechanism for permanent consultation with the targeted communities.

Community involvement and access. There is a risk that communities selected for intervention will find their full involvement during execution restrained by gangs or “dons” who have a vested interest in the violent status quo. There is a risk that the NGOs called on to provide violence prevention services would find their access to the communities blocked by these same people. A similar issue is the siting of the community facility for service delivery. Care must be exercised that a facility is not placed in

territory belonging to one faction in a community, with the result that persons identified with other factions would be unable to travel safely to and from the facility. These risks are mitigated through the regular consultation process to be carried out with community leaders and residents. The consultations will be conducted by respected individuals with intimate knowledge of the distribution of power and territory in inner city Kingston. These risks are mitigated also through the planned social marketing campaign, through efforts made to select communities for intervention where a high degree of cooperation has been demonstrated and through the application of previously successful experience. Nevertheless, provision will be made in the operating regulations to address the unforeseen case in which the continued participation of one or more communities is no longer feasible.

Complexity of design. The complexity inherent in a multi-sectoral approach, even on such a limited basis, is a potential obstacle to effective program implementation. Recognition of this fact influenced the dimensioning of the program. The GOJ and Bank's project team will continually assess design features during execution so as to further streamline and/or simplify program activities if needed.

Coordination. In an environment in which so many donor/lending agencies are involved, it is essential to ensure complementary use of resources. Several steps are being taken to achieve this. First, the development of a national strategy for violence prevention and a blueprint for future activities will entail donor/lender participation. A Donor/Lender Group is already holding periodic meetings on the issues of crime and violence in particular. Second, the other activities of the program have been carefully selected in terms of sectoral coverage and geographic focus in order to avoid duplication and maximize coverage. Finally, the combined work of the PEU, the Operations Committee and the Steering Committee will provide further protection against the duplication of effort and help facilitate a complementary approach.

Special contractual clauses:

Conditions prior to first disbursement of the loan:

1. Evidence that organizational changes of the MNSJ, to create the Strategic Planning and Policy Division and the Project Management Unit, have been approved.
2. Evidence that all PEU staff have been hired and that the unit is fully operational.
3. Evidence that the Program Steering Committee and the Program Operations Committee have been formally established.
4. Submission of approved Operating Regulations.
5. Submission of the baseline information as required under the Impact Evaluation Plan.

Notwithstanding the above conditions and once the general conditions for disbursement eligibility have been met, up to US\$100,000 of loan resources may be disbursed for the specific purpose of contracting consultants to determine the baseline information referred to in (5) above.

Conditions of disbursement for the Community Action component:

1. Contracts in effect with participating NGOs and management firm (s), including prior review of detailed work plans and costs.
2. Submission of signed Memorandum of Understanding with the Jamaica Social Investment Fund.

Poverty-targeting and social sector classification:

This operation qualifies as a social equity-enhancing project, as described in the indicative targets mandated by the Bank's Eighth Replenishment (Document AB-1704). Furthermore, this operation qualifies as a Poverty Targeted Investment (see paragraph 4.3). The borrowing country will be using the 10 percentage points in additional financing (see paragraph 2.15).

Exceptions to Bank policy:

In relation to procurement under the program, the sole sourcing of NGO service contractors is considered advisable for the purpose of providing targeted rehabilitation services and delivery of community-based violence prevention services. (see paragraphs 3.34 and 3.35).

Procurement:

Bank procedures will be followed in the procurement of goods and consultant services. International competitive bidding procedures will be followed for procurement of goods and related services of

more than US\$250,000, or US\$1.5 million in the case of civil works. Bids below these ceilings will be obtained in accordance with the relevant local laws. Consultant services will be provided in accordance with the applicable Bank procedures.

I. FRAME OF REFERENCE

A. Introduction

- 1.1 The problem of crime and violence is one of the most urgent concerns facing Jamaican society today. Not only does violence degrade the quality of life for most Jamaicans, but it also impacts negatively on the country's economic and social development.
- 1.2 In this context, the GOJ has requested Bank support for a program to reduce the high levels of crime and violence afflicting Jamaican society. Investing in crime and violence prevention makes good economic sense because such investment is likely to lead to higher productivity and competitiveness, and will improve social sector performance and environmental conditions. According to a recent World Bank study on governance and social justice in the Caribbean, if Jamaica were to strengthen the rule of law it could expect significantly more foreign investment and considerably higher growth.¹ Crime and violence are far too costly to Jamaica in terms of direct government expenditures on control measures and in terms of foregone socioeconomic growth and development.

B. Macroeconomic context

- 1.3 Jamaica experienced declining output during most of the second half of the 1990s, and unemployment remained high at around 16%. This environment has been conducive to high levels of crime and violence. At the same time, the problem of crime and violence tends to impede improvement of economic performance.
- 1.4 The fiscal balance deteriorated during the second half of the decade, with deficits ranging from 7% to 9% of GDP. This situation was exacerbated by the severe financial sector crisis, which led to Government intervening to rescue failing institutions to the tune of nearly 40% of GDP. As a result, the public sector debt escalated sharply during the late 1990s, rising from 94% of GDP in 1994 to 144% in 2000, due mainly to increases in domestic debt .
- 1.5 The GOJ's macroeconomic policy of stabilization has concentrated on curbing inflation, which has been reduced from a peak of 80% in 1991 to 6% in 2000. This policy has been associated with a large accumulation of net international reserves, after being negative throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. However, this policy has also been associated with high interest rates, which have inhibited output growth. With the escalation of public domestic debt, characterized by high interest rates, debt service has reached the point where over half of all government fiscal revenues are being absorbed by debt service obligations, about 70% of which corresponds to domestic debt service. Consequently, the bulk of government revenue is being absorbed by debt service and public sector wage

¹ Dollar, David, *Governance and Social Justice in Caribbean States*, World Bank report prepared for the Caribbean Group for Cooperation in Economic Development (CGCED), June 2000, p.3.

costs, leading to a severe contraction of resources allocated to capital expenditure and the provision of social services.

- 1.6 Responding to the macroeconomic challenges and rising debt burden, the GOJ reached agreement with the IMF on a medium-term economic and financial program that focuses on debt reduction and the restoration of fiscal balance. In this connection financial sector reform is being supported by policy-based loans from the IDB, World Bank and the CDB. Another related activity is comprehensive reform of the social safety net in Jamaica. The reform is intended to protect the poor and vulnerable social groups against the effects of economic stabilization measures by maintaining the level of safety net spending while, at the same time, improving its efficiency and effectiveness.
- 1.7 Over the last two years, there have been indications that the economic program is bearing some fruit in the form of an economic turnaround. The GOJ succeeded in reducing the fiscal deficit significantly to an estimated 1% of GDP in 2000/2001, and it is estimated that the economy recorded 1% growth in 2000/2001. A fiscal deficit of around 3% of GDP is now projected for 2001/2002, due primarily to the interest cost associated with the GOJ's take over of FINSAC's liabilities, while output is projected to grow by about 2.5% in 2001/2002.
- 1.8 The immediate objectives of economic policy in Jamaica are the continued containment of inflation and the achievement of conditions for sustainable economic growth. A reduction in crime and violence can contribute significantly to these objectives by encouraging a more favorable environment for investment and growth and promoting economic efficiency and productivity.

C. Characteristics of crime and violence

- 1.9 Although crime and violence has been a feature of Jamaican society for several decades, with political and cultural roots, the incidence of violence has risen dramatically in recent years. Between 1995-99, there was an average of approximately 800 reported murders a year. In 2000, 887 murders were reported, and 458 murders have been reported thus far in 2001 (Jan – June). Recent data show that Jamaica has the highest homicide rate in the Caribbean region, with an approximate rate of 34 per 100,000. In comparative terms, this figure places Jamaica as the fourth most violent country in Latin American and the Caribbean.
- 1.10 In Jamaica, violence is highly concentrated demographically among young males. A study conducted at Kingston Public Hospital (KPH) shows that males in the 16-30 age group perpetrate the majority of violent acts. Of those arrested for murder in 2000, the concentration among youth is even more notable: 48% were between the ages of 16 and 25 and another 19% were between 26 and 30.² Not surprisingly, the victims of violence are also concentrated among young males.

² Information provided by the Planning Institute of Jamaica, based on crime statistics compiled by the Jamaican Constabulary Force, 2000.

More than 60% of those treated for violence-related injuries at KPH were male and 51% of homicide victims were between the ages of 16 and 35. The majority of violent crimes are committed in the Kingston Metropolitan Area (KMA), which includes Kingston, St. Andrew and sections of the parish of St. Catherine.

1.11 Within the KMA, the communities of the inner city are among the poorest in Jamaica; they also experience a relatively higher level of crime and violence and pose the greatest obstacles to efforts aimed at addressing the problem. Recent studies on KMA inner-city communities revealed the following main characteristics:

- All the communities are adversely affected by at least some level of conflict
- Area stigma, high unemployment, limited education pose significant barriers to inner-city development as part of Jamaican society
- Limited access to employment opportunities contributes to crime and violence
- Poor parenting skills and a range of social problems also contribute to conflict
- Conflicts among young women often revolve around fights over male partners
- Awareness of rights is very limited, including access to the legal system

1.12 While economic violence (principally home break-ins and robbery) is the most frequent type of violence committed in Jamaica, the levels of homicide continue to be of greatest concern. Several risk factors seem to be especially important contributors to homicide in Jamaica. The first is gang and drug-related violence, which is regarded as one of the most serious forms of violence in some communities. A second important risk factor is easy access to guns. Statistics reveal that firearms were used in more than 64% of murders in Jamaica last year.

1.13 In some communities, inter-personal violence (rape, verbal and physical abuse and other forms of inter-personal conflict) is the most prevalent form of violence. One type of inter-personal violence—domestic violence—is particularly common. Data from a recent UNDP study show that over one-third of all murders in the 1988-1997 period were related to domestic disputes. While there are no data available on the prevalence of domestic violence against women or children in Jamaica, the number of cases of domestic violence seen by social service agencies has risen dramatically in recent years. The Crisis Center in Kingston, for example, has seen the number of cases of domestic violence rise from 135 in 1990 to 1,350 in 1997; domestic violence in 1990 represented 8.3% of all cases seen at the Center, but this percentage had risen to 47% by 1997.³

D. Costs of violence

1.14 The costs of violence may be classified into four categories: (i) direct costs, which reflect the value of goods and services used in preventing and treating violence, (ii) non-monetary costs, which capture health impacts such as death, pain and suffering which are difficult to translate into monetary terms, (iii) economic

³ United Nations Development Program. National Report on the Situation of Violence against Women and Girls in Jamaica. Kingston: UNDP, 1999.

multiplier effects on human capital, labor market participation, productivity, saving and investment, and (iv) social multiplier effects including the inter-generational transmission of violence, diminished social capital, reduced quality of life, and de-legitimization of government institutions such as the police and the judiciary.

- 1.15 For Jamaica's health sector, violence-related expenditures represent the second largest outlay. Violence affects the education sector in that attendance suffers because children are afraid to go to school in unsafe environments. Of particular importance is the impact on the criminal justice sector, namely the police, corrections and the judiciary. The most obvious cost is the increased public expenditures for controlling crime. Moreover, the seeming inability of these institutions to respond to rising levels of violence and to provide adequate services to all citizens have led to a erosion of public confidence in the rule of law. One serious consequence has been the establishment of parallel, informal systems that mete out popular, community justice by individuals known as "dons."
- 1.16 The economic impacts of violence are severe. Violence reduces the accumulation of human capital because it reduces enrollment, attendance and achievement in school. Access and quality of education are adversely affected due to difficulties in getting well-trained teachers to work in violence-ridden areas. This reduction in Jamaica's human capital in the long run could have an important negative impact on economic growth. More short-run impacts on growth are evident in the productive and tourism sectors, where violence deters foreign and domestic investment and frightens away potential visitors to Jamaica. The business sector is further hampered by costs associated with contracting private security.
- 1.17 It is important to highlight the links between violence and poverty in Jamaica. An important cost of violence is the destruction of social capital, especially in poor neighborhoods. As fundamental norms of cooperation and communication are eroded, the income-earning potential of the poor is further reduced. This linkage seems to bear out in the experience of the predominately poor, inner-city communities of the KMA.
- 1.18 It is also important to note the links between education and violence in Jamaica. While violence imposes costs on education, it is also true that a lack of education and skill acquisition among the youth is conducive to criminal and violent activity. There is evidence to indicate that students who drop out, skip class or have a poor self-image are more likely to engage in violent behavior; and those who complete school but remain unemployed due to insufficient skill acquisition may also be more likely to engage in activities associated with crime and violence. Finally, children who fail to learn the value and techniques of peaceful conflict resolution at an early stage, at home and within the primary school setting, may also be more apt to display violent behavior in later years.

E. The security and justice sector

1. Sector management

- 1.19 The prevention and control of violence in Jamaica is by its very nature multi-sectoral. The institutions within the security and justice sector, which are primarily responsible for preventing and reducing crime and violence in Jamaica, include both public institutions and non-state actors such as civil society organizations (CSOs). Although the MNSJ plays a central role, other ministries such as Health and Education are also important in managing the sector. CSOs, which include NGOs and community-based organizations (CBOs), are actively involved in the delivery of services and programs that address some of the factors contributing to violence such as poor parenting skills, drug and alcohol abuse, gang membership and lack of marketable skills.
- 1.20 The MNSJ encompasses several departments that are charged with the prevention of crime, the investigation and arrest of suspected criminals, the incarceration and rehabilitation of convicted offenders, and promoting the creation and proper administration of a fair, equitable and accessible justice system. The MNSJ oversees the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF), the Correctional Services and the Criminal Justice Research Unit (CJRU), which undertakes research on crime so as to inform the GOJ on policy considerations. In addition to providing administrative support to the courts, the MNSJ also administers programs in the areas of victim support, witness protection and civic inspection of prison conditions.
- 1.21 In recent years, the MNSJ has developed linkages with other ministries, such as Education and Health, to address crime and violence in coordinated fashion. It has also begun collaborating with civil society and NGOs with a view to obtaining their support for governmental interventions. Within the Correctional Services, for example, a youth diversion program was recently piloted in two parishes. It involves the cooperation of representatives from the community, schools and churches, and from the criminal justice system.
- 1.22 While the responsibility for operation and administration of the court system falls to the MNSJ, the Judiciary in Jamaica represents a separate branch of the State. Judges are selected by an independent Judicial and Legal Services Commission, which is comprised of a wide cross-section of civil society and government. Their selections are sent to the Prime Minister for approval, who is mandated by the Constitution to consult with the leader of the Opposition.
- 1.23 Other relevant GOJ agencies include the Kingston Public Hospital, which is financed by the Ministry of Health and which receives the largest number of victims of crime and violence in the country. The Ministry of Education also addresses violent behavior in the secondary schools through various means, including a direct working relationship with NGOs that provide training in such areas as conflict resolution.

- 1.24 There are numerous CSOs active in violence prevention and reduction. Examples are: (i) the Dispute Resolution Foundation (DRF), which trains groups and individuals in conflict resolution interventions. At present, the DRF informally receives small claims cases from the Resident Magistrates courts in the KMA; (ii) Peace and Love in Schools (PALS) designs and implements conflict resolution training programs for students and teachers; (iii) University of the West Indies (UWI) conducts research into the sociological and other causes of violence and provides information to various community groups; and (iv) Kingston Restoration Company (KRC) works to restore the physical infrastructure and human resources of a number of inner-city communities in the KMA.

2. Sector constraints

- 1.25 Limited research, planning and project management capacity. The MNSJ's capacity to respond effectively in addressing the growing problems associated with violence, shifting the emphasis from control to prevention, is severely limited. As a result of weaknesses in information and data collection, and specifically relevant research and policy analysis, long-term strategic planning and program development based on crime and violence trends is not feasible. There is also a large research deficit because little institutional attention has been paid to the development of criminal justice as a social focus and area of academic research. For example, there has been very little evaluation of existing policing, sentencing and correctional policies. Judges have considerable discretionary powers and may consider a varied sentencing menu, yet they and policymakers have limited knowledge as to the types of sentences which may reduce recidivism. While the problems are becoming progressively more complicated, the public institutions of the security and justice sector continue to work with the traditional tools. Moreover, though the need to modernize and upgrade current capacity to plan strategically is recognized, the MNSJ is hampered by inadequate resources. Similarly, there is at present no central focal point of responsibility within the MNSJ to effectively manage or coordinate the many projects underway or planned to help prevent crime and violence.
- 1.26 Inadequate dissemination about victim support and no effective referral system. The MNSJ established a Victim Support Program in 1998 intended to assist victims of crimes through referrals to services for emotional, technical, legal and mediation support. This has added significance given the number of homicides stemming from reprisals. However, the support program needs to be strengthened. There is virtually no collaboration with personnel who manage the injury surveillance system of the KPH, which receives most victims of violence in Jamaica, in order to establish an effective referral system. At the same time, there is very little public knowledge and appreciation of the contents of the Victim Support Program and its presence in the communities. In part, this is due to a limited dissemination of its mandate in the print and electronic media or through other means which would reach residents in the inner-city areas.

- 1.27 Perceived lack of accountability. It is the police officer of the JCF who often informs a citizen's first impression of security and justice in Jamaica. Yet there is a visible rift between the police force and many citizens, particularly those in the inner-city communities of the KMA. There have been instances where the approach taken by the JCF in these areas falls below acceptable human rights norms and contributes to the tension between the JCF and a significant portion of the citizenry. An important part of a citizen's access to justice is the ability to file a complaint about police misconduct with an impartial body tasked with investigating the facts and taking the appropriate disciplinary action. The **independent** Police Public Complaints Authority (PPCA) and the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) within the JCF were established by the GOJ to fulfill this mandate. However, there is little public confidence in the ability of the PPCA or the OPR to impartially resolve complaints. This is in large part due to the lack of transparency and public information available about the investigation and final disposition of cases.
- 1.28 Lack of targeted rehabilitation. The Correctional Services is designed to ensure that persons convicted of various crimes receive the type of rehabilitation support most applicable in each case. However, there exists little capacity to provide adequate risks and skills assessments upon incarceration, which could be linked to specific interventions tailored to violence prevention. Although short-term inmates between the ages of 17-25 constitute the majority of Jamaica's male prison population, rehabilitation efforts have tended to concentrate on long-term offenders. Short-term offenders are often returned to society without any significant exposure to rehabilitation. While little institutional learning occurs and there is no real basis for innovations as to how to make rehabilitation more effective, the Correctional Services itself lacks the trained personnel and organizational structure to deliver targeted, effective rehabilitation.
- 1.29 Lack of coordinated and sustained delivery of services among CSOs. The many NGOs and CBOs which work in violence prevention and crime reduction do not coordinate efforts on a sustainable basis in the delivery of their services, particularly in the KMA. Though they may well be the best placed organizations to work in the communities, many demonstrate weak managerial capacity in such areas as financial administration, project management and impact evaluation.
- 1.30 Inadequate support for juvenile justice. The family and juvenile courts in Kingston and St. James suffer from inadequate facilities and are overcrowded, often resulting in the holding of youth offenders with adults. In addition, children's services and probation officers serving these courts, along with the judges, receive little if any training in the dynamic field of juvenile justice. The collection, processing, storage and analysis of data from the various agencies involved in juvenile justice are still carried out manually; and the system offers no separate treatment for the administration of case files for juveniles, which would allow for more sensitive handling of their records.

3. Government's approach

- 1.31 Providing adequate security and access to justice in Jamaica, as well as overcoming the obstacles to social stability and economic growth posed by crime and violence, is considered both a high priority and a major challenge for the GOJ. In order to meet this challenge, the GOJ intends to elaborate an integrated national strategy for crime and violence prevention that, together with a comprehensive action plan, should provide a coherent framework for a set of complementary activities to be carried out- with both short and long term impacts.
- 1.32 A number of positive steps have already been taken. For example, a strategic performance review of the MNSJ was completed in December 1999 and many of its recommendations are being implemented. The JCF has developed a new corporate strategy in an effort to modernize. Several promising programs, often in partnership with civil society, have been initiated in recent years. The GOJ has responded favorably to many of the recommendations outlined in a recent study commissioned by the private sector business community. The key will be to improve and expand on these initiatives, embrace stakeholder participation throughout the process, fully engage capable NGOs/CBOs in targeted service delivery and intensify the level of multi-sector collaboration- especially the vital role to be played by education and health.
- 1.33 The GOJ intends to achieve its goals and objectives through a sequential approach- a short-term action and pilot-oriented set of interventions, with focused capacity building, as the first stage; to be followed by a second stage aimed at implementation of the activities identified in the comprehensive action plan. The GOJ considers Bank support for the first stage (the proposed program), though not the only source of external support, as pivotal and catalytic.

F. Bank's strategy and experience

- 1.34 The Bank's strategy for Jamaica has two overriding objectives. The first is to support the establishment of a satisfactory macroeconomic environment. The second is to promote an improved environment for long-term private sector-led growth and development. This program will respond to the second objective since the decrease in violence and crime in the country will lead to higher productivity and competitiveness (especially in the tourism industry), and it will improve social sector performance and environmental conditions. The program will also complement other Bank operations in execution or in preparation and provide opportunities for synergy. Finally, the proposed program is fully consistent with the GOJ's priorities for public sector investment.
- 1.35 There are two non-reimbursable operations in the Bank's technical cooperation pipeline for Jamaica that are expected to complement the program's efforts to deal with crime and violence. The first supports the Kingston Restoration Company's work to revitalize the downtown areas, which includes support for communities on violence prevention initiatives as well as shelter and enterprise development.

The second involves strengthening the management capacity of NGOs that provide social services, often within inner city communities prone to violence.

- 1.36 The Bank has contributed directly to the early development of a strategic framework to address crime and violence in Jamaica. It has done so by co-sponsoring a national workshop of key stakeholders that led to the drafting of a concept paper on the issue of violence reduction. These efforts have helped to conceptualize the structure and logic of the proposed program.
- 1.37 The Bank has not yet implemented any stand-alone violence prevention activities in Jamaica, but several on-going or planned operations have components that partially address this problem. In 1997, the Bank approved an operation in support of the Jamaica Social Investment Fund (JSIF). The JSIF was designed with the capacity to finance activities in violence and crime prevention, but sub-project approvals and disbursements in this area have been minimal. Reasons advanced to explain the low level of JSIF activity in this area include: not targeting violence-ridden communities, insufficient capacity within communities to formulate violence prevention proposals, no explicit promotion of this type of activity, and the tendency for communities and JSIF to prioritize subprojects in more traditional sectors. Lessons learned from the JSIF experience, as well as the Bank's experience in direct anti-violence programs such as in Colombia and Uruguay, have given valuable guidance to the design of the proposed program.
- 1.38 During the period 1999-2000, the Bank financed a regional technical cooperation project (ATN/FF-7069-RS and ATN/FF-6819-RG) to help address domestic violence in the Caribbean through intervention skills training for police and social workers. The project resulted in the preparation of a standardized training manual in domestic violence for all the police of the Caribbean and the training of 200 trainers from within the police and from other front-line professions that deal with domestic violence on a daily basis. One of the two "training of trainers" programs sponsored by the project took place in Jamaica. The program included the training of 14 professional trainers from the JCF, and with additional funding from other donors these trainers are in the process of delivering the domestic violence intervention skills course to the entire JCF.

G. Other donor activities

- 1.39 Over the last decade the Jamaican legal system has benefited from two projects funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which were designed to upgrade the court system. The Caribbean Justice Improvement Project contributed substantially to an improvement of the image and working conditions in the Resident Magistrates Courts when fourteen of these courts countrywide were fully renovated. Training opportunities were also provided to judicial personnel under this project. Subsequently, the Sustainable Justice Reform Project aimed to close existing gaps in coverage and to promote policy reforms in the justice area, particularly those designed to ensure future sustainability in legal system maintenance and development.

- 1.40 Within the last three years, the interest of the international donor community in the area of security and justice has increased considerably. UNESCO, for example, has supported peace promotion and conflict management within prisons. UNICEF, another example, has helped train Family Court personnel on the rights of children and youth, and is planning to support the extension of Family Court facilities outside the KMA. A Donor/Lender Group has been established to monitor all these activities and facilitate good coordination. Below is a table summarizing donor interventions in the area of security and justice, followed by a brief outline of those interventions considered to be in direct complement to the proposed program:

SUMMARY OF DONOR INTERVENTIONS IN SECURITY AND JUSTICE

Funding Agency	Name of Project/ Duration	Implementing Agency	Objective
CIDA Cdn. \$7M	Social Conflict and Legal Reform (1998 – 2003)	MNSJ	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Promote conflict avoidance and resolution. Strengthen institutional and community management capabilities in conflict resolution
CIDA Cdn. \$3M	Enhancing Civil Society (1998 - 2003)	MLGYCD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strengthen the capacity of community organizations. Deepen the interest in and the understanding of civil society issues within the Jamaican context.
DFID £0.9M	Community Service Community Enhancement(2000 – 2003)	MNSJ (Correctional Services)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Pilot an effective, affordable and sustainable system of community service as an alternative to prison terms. Offer alternative options to criminal courts when sentencing for lesser offences.
DFID £2.9M	JCF Reform and Modernization (2001 - 2004)	MNSJ	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assist in the implementation of the Corporate Strategy of the Jamaica Constabulary Force. Promote community policing.
United Nations Agencies US\$10M	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Social mobilization, Advocacy and Education on violence against women and girls. 2. Poverty Eradication and Community Empowerment 3. Children and Youth at Risk (1997 - 2001). 4. Judiciary and Penal Reform. 	Sistren Theatre Collective, Bureau of Women's Affairs, MLGYCD, MOEC, MOH, MNSJ	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Create public awareness and social advocacy and mobilization to prevent violence against women and children. Provide basic services and empower low-income communities to improve their quality of life. Support the implementation of policies and legislation aimed at improving the protecting rights of children. Equip warders and inmates with Dispute Resolution Skills as well as NGOs and Inner-city Adolescents
UNDP US\$0.15M	Inter-Agency Media and Public Education Campaign against Violence against Women and Girls (2001-2002)	Bureau of Women's Affairs (BWA)	Sensitize members of the media, judiciary, JCF and other publics to issues of violence against women and girls.
USAID US\$3M	Improved Economic and Social Conditions in Targeted Inner City Communities	USAID	Promote sustainable economic and social development of the Grants Pen and Standpipe communities.

- a. **The Department for International Development (DFID) of the British Government:** In 1998, DFID provided guidance and funding to support the development of JCF's new corporate strategy. In early 2001, building on this effort, DFID initiated a Police Reform and Modernization Project with funding of roughly US\$5 million. The project is designed to assist the JCF in full implementation of the corporate strategy across seven work streams including the reshaping of the organization, ethics and values, crime management and community policing. The project also provides technical support to the Corporate Strategy Coordination Unit, with an emphasis on monitoring and quality assurance, and some minor civil works to make the reception areas of some police stations more community-friendly. DFID is funding a separate project in the area of penal reform that is aimed at expanding the use of alternatives to custodial sentences such as community service orders.
- b. **USAID:** USAID recently approved an inner-city assistance project, funded in the amount of US\$3 million, that is focused on the areas of Grants Pen and Standpipe. Given some geographic overlap with the proposed program (Grants Pen), the USAID project will offer an opportunity for intensive collaboration and knowledge exchange in an area undergoing active conflict.
- c. **The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA):** CIDA has recently approved a Social Conflict and Legal Reform (SCLR) project that will provide approximately US\$4.5 million to strengthen the capacity of the Jamaican legal system, and to work with two inner-city communities (Trench Town and Flankers) to manage conflict effectively. One objective of the project is to enhance the effectiveness of the Jamaican legal system in managing social conflict. The project also aims to develop the capacity of the public in two pilot communities, working through the legal system, to manage conflict. Its primary partners will be the MNSJ, the Judiciary, the Justice Training Institute, the DRF, the Women's Bureau, PALS and selected CSOs.

H. Program rationale and scope

- 1.41 A general consensus is emerging on a diagnosis of the crime and violence problem in Jamaica. There are many inter-related contributing factors. Political violence has played an integral part in the historical evolution of violence over much of the last twenty years. Poverty, poor quality education and lack of marketable skills, high unemployment in a stagnant economy, and associated social dislocation at the community level – all are factors contributing to what is often described presently as a culture of violence fueled by gang and drug activity. At the same time, the GOJ's limited institutional capacity, inability to sufficiently mobilize a collaborative approach to the many dimensions of the problem and failure, until recently, to place sufficient emphasis on prevention, also are factors that have contributed over time to the problem. Consequently,

though curbing the high incidence of homicides and other drug or gang-related violence is an immediate priority, the problem of violent crime is broader.

- 1.42 The broad and systemic nature of the problem of crime and violence in Jamaica calls for a comprehensive, long-term and sustained effort. Much of this effort will necessarily fall outside the scope of the proposed program – i.e. the proposed CSJP is not intended to be a one-time, all-out solution to the violence problem. Yet it reflects the need to start somewhere, with a more limited and narrow focus. It is considered important to develop a framework for guiding a larger effort, while building institutions better equipped and more capable to manage and coordinate this effort and, ultimately, provide adequate public security and access to justice. It is also important to reinforce or introduce interventions at the community level, if only in a small geographic area (KMA) and on a pilot basis, that will address the most pressing forms of violent crime today and also make inroads towards a more stable and peaceful society in the long run. These considerations establish the rationale and scope for the proposed program.

II. THE PROGRAM

A. Program goal and objectives

- 2.1 The overall goal of the program is to enhance citizen security and justice in Jamaica. The principal objectives of the program are to: (i) prevent and reduce violence; (ii) strengthen crime management capabilities; and, (iii) improve the delivery of judicial services.

B. Program description

- 2.2 In order to achieve the above objectives a number of priority activities have been identified for support. These activities have been organized into four basic inter-related components: (i) national strategy development; (ii) capacity building of the MNSJ; (iii) strengthening of the criminal justice system; and (iv) community action. The program also calls for the implementation of a social marketing and public education campaign.

1. Development of a national strategy (US\$0.6 million)

- 2.3 This component will provide support for consultant services to help elaborate an integrated National Crime and Violence Prevention Strategy. The strategy will establish a blueprint for future crime and violence reduction activities (including domestic violence), along with a medium to long-term Action Plan for implementation. The Action Plan will specify timetables, responsible organizations and financing needs. As a corollary to this effort, a study will be conducted on the economic costs of violence and a technical assistance fund (TAF) will be established in the amount of US\$300,000 to support additional studies deemed necessary to inform strategy development, address special program implementation or impact issues and lay the technical groundwork for the GOJ's future efforts. A very integral part of the overall program, this component is funded through a parallel, non-reimbursable Technical Cooperation, which is described in greater detail in Annex I.

2. Capacity building of the MNSJ (US\$4.6 million)

- 2.4 The component will strengthen the capacity of the MNSJ in two related areas. First, it will provide consultant expertise to help in the process of building the Ministry's capacity to carry out strategic planning, and it will improve the Ministry's long-term ability to execute and coordinate projects related to violence prevention and to interact effectively with CSOs (*US\$300,000*). Activities will include the provision of technical assistance, training and equipment to the MNSJ in order to establish a well-functioning Project Management Unit (PMU) within the Ministry upon program completion. Second, the program will finance technical assistance and equipment to improve the ability to monitor trends in crime and violence, facilitate information exchange and formulate appropriate policy or program responses (*US\$4,300,000*). Specifically, this last area will

support: (i) establishing an integrated inter-agency information system on crime and violence trends (a Local Area Network and Wide Area Network); and (ii) upgrading the Criminal Justice Research Unit, the arm of the MNSJ also charged with policy analysis.

3. Strengthening of the criminal justice system (US\$2.8 million)

- 2.5 This component is designed to improve the impact of programs and quality of services provided by the criminal justice system (CJS), and to increase the accountability of the JCF to civil society. There are four sub-components.
- 2.6 MNSJ programs sub-component (US\$350,000). Two programs administered by the MNSJ will receive support under this sub-component: the Victim Support Program (VSP) and the Boards of Visitors (BOV). Assistance will be provided to strengthen the central office of the VSP, particularly its ability to inform the public about available assistance in the case of serious crimes. Assistance will also be provided specifically in the field offices located within the areas adjacent to the KPH, in order to work in conjunction with KPH personnel to establish an effective referral system for victims of violence to receive appropriate services back in their communities. The BOVs are civic organizations charged with inspecting and reporting on conditions in the adult correctional facilities. The sub-component activities will support an annual conference, to enhance the contact and cooperation between BOVs and MNSJ staff, along with a series of training workshops on human rights, parole issues and health considerations.
- 2.7 PPCA sub-component(US\$205,000). The sub-component will support activities related to the PPCA and the JCF. First, it will support technical assistance, training and equipment to strengthen the PPCA, an independent entity established by law in 1992, in its investigative capacity. This is to be followed by an information campaign on the PPCA to encourage members of the public to report acts of police corruption or abuse, and in the long run increase the accountability of and public confidence in the JCF. Strengthening the PPCA is expected to complement the major work of DFID, in a coordinated effort to reform the JCF and improve its performance and accountability.
- 2.8 Correctional Services sub-component(US\$1,550,000). The activities in this sub-component are designed to provide effective and targeted rehabilitation in the short-run and reduce recidivism in the long run. The program will finance the: (i) institutional strengthening of the Correctional Service's Rehabilitation Unit, including technical assistance in risks and skills assessment and specific internal reorganization and equipment; (ii) establishment of a Transformation Center for young (17-25 years old), short-term male offenders, including infrastructure upgrading, technical assistance and equipment, (iii) implementation of a new Inmate Training and Rehabilitation Program, including targeted vocational training, remedial education and personal development for offenders at the Transformation Center; and (iv) the design of a pilot project to extend the benefits of the Youth Diversion Program in one or more of the communities participating

in the program. The inmates to receive rehabilitation services at the Transformation Center will be those young males with sentences ranging from one to twenty-four months and who do not require maximum security supervision and control. Establishing the Transformation Center requires retrofitting an existing adult correctional facility and the relocation of inmates of that facility to another so as to have a separate facility for those inmates selected for rehabilitation services. The Youth Diversion Program seeks to keep very young first time offenders out of the formal court system by mutual consent and by using community service as an alternative.

- 2.9 Court system sub-component (US\$675,000). This sub-component will support technical assistance, training and equipment for the Kingston Family Courts and the St. James regional court based in Montego Bay in order to improve judicial services. Specifically, the program will seek to provide necessary automation and training for judges and court personnel in improved administrative processes, as well as train children's services and probation officers serving the courts in such areas as substance abuse, intra-family violence and child abuse. Financing will also be provided to upgrade the electrical and other infrastructure and materials for the courts to accommodate their automation and upgrading.

4. Community action (US\$7.6 million)

- 2.10 Activities in this component will take place in nine inner-city communities within three zones of the KMA (Zones 2, 4, and 7). The list includes Drewsland, Waterhouse, Tower Hill, Denham Town, Trench Town, Fletchers Land, Hannah Town, Grants Pen and August Town. The three Zones and the participating communities have been identified and selected based on a set of established criteria, including low-income status, high crime and violence levels, and the demonstrated desire/ability of each community to actively participate in the program. An intensive and careful participatory approach with community residents was used during the pre-selection and selection process. These steps were taken not only for transparency purposes, but also to gauge community receptivity and to increase the prospects for successful interventions.
- 2.11 The key activity of this component is the delivery of violence prevention services by NGOs. The NGOs were pre-selected and pre-qualified on the basis of demonstrated experience and a track record of good quality service provision at reasonable costs. Subsequently, these NGOs were subject to in-depth organizational assessments to confirm their capacity to deliver one or more violence prevention services under the program, and to determine any needs for short-term strengthening that might be warranted to enhance service delivery. The list of NGOs expected to participate on a contract basis include the Dispute Resolution Foundation, the Kingston Restoration Company, Peace and Love in Schools, SISTREN, Youth Opportunities Unlimited (YOU), and Addition Alert. A provisional NGO-Community Matrix is available in the technical files.
- 2.12 The following activities will be financed under this component:

- a. Delivery of violence-prevention services by the group of NGOs (US\$5,200,000). The menu of services to be delivered includes alternative dispute resolution training (both school-based and community-based), mentoring, teen centers, job training, remedial education, parenting programs, and drug abuse prevention and treatment. These services are designed to prevent different types of violence, ranging from violence in schools and youth violence, more generally, to domestic violence against women and children. Each NGO will provide a unique and specialized service. Not all services will be provided in each community. A consultative process has been designed and carried out to give each community a voice in selecting those services of highest priority. This process has resulted in a basic match-up of NGO services with the articulated priority interventions of each community.
- b. Mobilization of the communities and building cohesion (US\$612,000). The mobilization of participating communities will begin with the formation and strengthening of Community Action Committees (CACs) to act as counterparts to the NGOs on behalf of community residents and to represent the broad interests of community groups in program-related activities. Community Action Officers (CAOs) (3) will be contracted to liaise with the communities in each of the three Zones. The CAOs will be responsible for identifying and brokering employment and training opportunities for youth and for providing networking support to micro and small business in the communities. The CAOs will also help each community to articulate and prepare at least one proposal for a rapid impact project that is geared toward the situational prevention of violence – an infrastructure project such as area lighting, a basketball court or security fencing that is concrete, tangible and serves to facilitate community cohesion. The design and implementation of these small-scale projects will receive technical support and supervision from the JSIF and funding support under the CSJP.
- c. Multi-purpose facilities (US\$1,457,000). Up to ten community-based multi-purpose facilities will be established to showcase and centralize delivery of the services being provided by the selected NGOs. Rehabilitation and/or refurbishing of existing GOJ-owned infrastructure will take place rather than new construction. These facilities will be managed by a representative of each community hired on a stipend basis.
- d. Improved community-police relations (US\$342,000). Activities call for the implementation of the new police Code of Conduct (model financed under the JSIF) in each participating community. Through joint workshops, video presentations, focus group discussion and even social events, this process entails constructive dialogue between the police assigned to the community and its residents. Also, as a means to further improve community-police relations, the reception areas of an estimated five local police stations will be refurbished in order to make them more community-friendly and accessible.

5. Social marketing and public education (US\$0.6 million)

- 2.13 The social marketing and public education campaign is designed to foster positive attitudinal change, to reduce the social acceptance of violence and to promote peaceful coexistence. Using the media and other public relations tools, its implementation by specialized consultants will promote wider pro-peace themes and it will cut across the program's basic components at the national and target community level. The campaign will be used to promote commitment and cohesiveness among the participating agencies, and to stimulate community involvement in the program. It will also be used to disseminate information to the public regarding program activities, available resources and how to access these resources. The citizens of the targeted inner-city communities will be a critical focal point for social marketing, where special attention will be given to youth and public legal education.

C. Program management and unallocated expenditures (US\$2.1 million)

- 2.14 An additional amount of US\$2.1 million has been included in the program to support the operation of the Program Execution Unit (PEU) (US\$1.8 million) and for unallocated expenses (US\$0.3 million). The PEU expenses include costs for personnel, equipment, administrative disbursements and monitoring and evaluation.

D. Cost and financing

- 2.15 The total cost of the loan-related program is estimated at US\$20.0 million, of which the Bank will finance US\$16.0 million (80% of the total) and the GOJ will provide US\$4.0 million in counterpart financing. In addition, the Bank will support the program through a non-reimbursable technical cooperation in the amount of US\$500,000, for which the GOJ is providing US\$100,000 in counterpart financing. The 80% share of Bank lending for the program reflects the GOJ's decision to utilize the 10 percentage points in additional financing available because of PTI eligibility. The GOJ has also indicated it may seek possible cofinancing from other sources in the future to help offset local counterpart requirements.
- 2.16 Bank lending for US\$16.0 million will finance a combination of consultant services, materials and equipment, training, infrastructure rehabilitation, financial expenses during execution and unallocated expenditures. A summary breakdown of loan-related program costs by component and source of funds is presented in Table II-1 below. A description of the parallel technical cooperation for the program, including costs and financing information, is provided separately in Annex I.

Table II-1. Summary Budget (in US\$ millions)				
Item	IDB	GOJ	Total	%
I. COMPONENT COSTS				
1. PPF	0.50	0.0	0.50	3.0
2. Program Management	1.39	0.39	1.79	9.0
3. Capacity Building of the MNSJ	4.11	0.46	4.57	23.0
4. Strengthening of the criminal justice system	2.08	0.70	2.78	14.0
5. Community action	6.89	0.73	7.61	38.0
6. Social Marketing/Public Education	0.58	0.06	0.64	3.0
7. Unallocated Expenses	0.25	0.03	0.27	1.0
Total Component Costs	15.79	2.37	18.16	91.0
II. FINANCIAL COSTS				
1. Interest Payment	0.0	1.41	1.41	7.0
2. Inspection and Supervision (1% of loan amount)	0.16	0.0	0.16	1.0
3. Credit Commission (0.75% on undisbursed amount)	0.0	0.22	0.22	1.0
Total Financial Costs	0.16	1.63	1.79	9.0
4. Audit	0.05	0.0	0.05	0.3
GRAND TOTAL	16.0 (80%)	4.0 (20%)	20.0 (100%)	100.0
* Totals may not add up due to rounding.				

E. Terms and conditions of the loan

- 2.17 The Bank's lending in the amount of US\$16 million will be distributed over a four-year implementation period. Bank financing will be drawn from the single currency facility (US\$) of the Ordinary Capital. Interest will be partially financed by the IFF account. The terms and conditions of the loan are presented in Table II-2 below.

Table II-2. Conditions of financing	
Source of funds	Ordinary Capital
Amount	US\$16.0 million
Amortization period	25 years
Disbursement	4 years
Interest rate	Variable, OC minus established IFF reduction
Inspection and supervision	1% of the loan amount
Credit fee	0.75% per year on undisbursed amounts
Currency	US\$ from the Single Currency Facility

III. PROGRAM EXECUTION

A. The borrower and executing agency

- 3.1 The borrower for this operation will be the Government of Jamaica. The Program will be executed by the Ministry of National Security and Justice (MNSJ). The Ministry exercises overall responsibility for the security and defence of Jamaica, encompassing the military, police, judiciary and correctional services. Military services are provided by the Jamaica Defence Force. The maintenance of law and order is exercised through the Jamaica Constabulary Force, and the punishment and rehabilitation of offenders is undertaken by Correctional Services. In addition, the MNSJ is given oversight responsibility for the independent judicature as well as the related legal services supporting the system of administration of Justice. The CSJP will focus exclusively on the non-military aspects of the MNSJ.
- 3.2 The MNSJ will delegate responsibility for program execution to a streamlined Program Execution Unit (PEU), specially created and attached to the ministry for this purpose. The PEU will be responsible for the operational and financial administration of the program, including planning, coordination, supervision and monitoring of all aspects of program implementation as well as report preparation, procurement, disbursement of program resources, and interface with the Bank and GOJ officials. The PEU will ensure that all aspects of the program's operating regulations are duly adhered to.
- 3.3 The MNSJ manages an annual budget of over US\$185 million, not including defense affairs and services. It is the third largest ministry, after the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Education and Culture. Recurrent costs represent 99% of the annual budget, and payroll accounts for 62% of these costs. The Capital A budget – including construction repairs and maintenance of government buildings, as well as custodial surveillance and rehabilitation of adult and juvenile offenders – accounts for 1% of the Ministry's overall budget.

B. Program execution and administration

- 3.4 The program will be implemented by the MNSJ over a period of four years, including a six-month start-up phase, a three-year execution phase and a six-month completion phase that would allow for the final impact evaluation. The day-to-day responsibility for supervising the CSJP will be delegated to the Manager of the PEU, who will report to the Permanent Secretary of the MNSJ.
- 3.5 Whereas the Correctional Services and the JCF fall directly under the jurisdictional purview of the MNSJ, the Judiciary represents a separate branch of Government. For this reason, activities involving the courts will also be supervised by the PEU, but coordinated with the Office of the Chief Justice.
- 3.6 Relevant staff within the MNSJ will be assigned to work closely with the PEU to help ensure that once the program enters its implementation phase, the MNSJ can

provide requisite support. A Technical Committee with broad representation (GOJ and civil society) was established to assist in program design. During implementation, a senior-level Program Steering Committee (PSC) with similar representation and a Program Operations Committee (POC) will provide oversight and support for the program, including promotion of inter-agency and donor collaboration. Both the PSC and the POC are considered advisable in that the PSC will help guide program implementation in the context of the country's economic and social development, especially the National Strategy for Crime and Violence Prevention, while the POC will have more direct responsibilities for implementation performance.

- 3.7 During the execution phase, a Project Management Unit (PMU) will be established gradually within the MNSJ and be responsible in future for coordination and supervision of other crime and violence reduction projects executed by the MNSJ. The PMU will become operational during the third year of execution. This will permit a one-year overlap transition with the PEU to help ensure continuity and provide applied training to PMU personnel.
- 3.8 Program execution will not only involve the central ministry of the MNSJ and its agencies, but it will also count on the assistance of other institutions for strategy development, on the JSIF for technical support in relation to infrastructure rehabilitation and on the participation of a core group of NGOs for the delivery of services under the Community Action component. The NGOs have been pre-selected based on organizational assessments, community consultations and the application of defined criteria. Operating regulations will determine the parameters of participatory execution mechanisms and guidelines.

1. Program Execution Unit (PEU)

- 3.9 The program will be managed and coordinated by a Program Execution Unit (PEU) the core of which is being established with resources of the Project Preparation Facility (PPF). The unit will comprise a Manager, a Criminal Justice Coordinator, Community Actions Coordinator, a Communications Coordinator, and an MIS Coordinator. The financial administration of the program will be the responsibility of a Financial Administrator who will also be responsible for procurement. An Administrative Assistant, a Secretary/receptionist, and an office attendant will provide support services to the unit. **Establishment of a fully operational PEU, with all staff hired, will be a contractual condition for disbursement eligibility.**
- 3.10 The specific responsibilities of the PEU will include: (i) management, supervision and monitoring of all program activities; (ii) procurement of goods and services in accordance with the Bank's requirements; (iii) establishment and implementation of a sound financial reporting and accounting system; (iv) preparation of financial and implementation reports on program advance, including the semi-annual revolving fund status, to the Bank and the MNSJ; (v) preparation of financial justification for drawn-down requests from the two special program accounts; (vi)

preparation of the program's financial statements and facilitate their timely audit; (vii) liaison with Bank and MNSJ officials in regard to program execution; and (viii) liaison with other stakeholders as required to disseminate wide-based understanding of program goals and objectives and to resolve operational issues that may arise.

2. Program Steering Committee

- 3.11 A Program Steering Committee (PSC) will provide the key governance structure responsible for strategic direction and oversight of the program from a broad country perspective and context beyond the scope of the program. It will review and provide feedback on all major strategic program directions and review overall program performance, although as a body it will not have decision-making or approval authority **directly** over program execution. It will comprise the Minister of National Security and Justice, the Minister of Education or his representative, the Minister of Health or his representative, the Chief Justice or his representative, and representatives from each of the following: the Office of the Prime Minister, the Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ), the Private Sector Organization of Jamaica and two other representatives of civil society, of which at least one will be from the NGO-sector. The Minister of National Security and Justice or his designate will chair the PSC. The PEU will act as the Secretariat for convening meetings and the preparation and dissemination of minutes of the proceedings, and the Program Manager will serve as Secretary. The PSC will meet quarterly.
- 3.12 The PSC will be responsible specifically for: (i) review and guidance on annual work plans; (ii) periodic review of program goals and purpose in relation to changing political, economic and social environments, and any consequent changes to the program mandate; (iii) periodic review of program scheduling and performance, and any consequent directives on program strategy; and (iv) review of all policy level decision-making for CSJP. **The establishment of the PSC will be a contractual condition to be fulfilled prior to first disbursement of loan funds.**

3. Program Operations Committee

- 3.13 A Program Operations Committee (POC) will be formed to provide operational oversight of the activities within the scope of the CSJP. The POC will meet on a monthly basis to review program advance and identify and provide recommendations to resolve operational issues that may arise. In addition, the POC will review annual program work plans. The POC will comprise the following members: the heads of the Jamaican Constabulary Force (JFC), the Office of the Chief Justice, and Correctional Services, or their representatives; a representative of PIOJ; a representative of the NGO service providers, to be rotated on a bi-annual basis; a representative of the Jamaican Social Investment Fund; and the PEU Program Manager. The Permanent Secretary of MNSJ will chair the POC. The PEU Program Manager will act as secretary to the committee.

follow-up on the legislative review process leading to the adoption of the strategy by the GOJ.

2. Technical Assistance Fund

- 3.15 A technical assistance fund (TAF) will be established to undertake action-oriented research and special studies not yet determined. The following types of proposals will be eligible for funding:
- (i) Proposals related to the formulation of the National Crime and Violence Prevention Strategy or the Action Plan
 - (ii) Proposals to clarify and resolve special implementation issues related to the CJSP
 - (iii) Proposals to obtain information that will inform the preparation of future crime and violence prevention initiatives.
- 3.16 On a strategic level, during the consultative process for the formulation of the National Strategy, issues requiring additional study will be identified. The Strategic Policy Advisor and the MNSJ Strategic Planner will share responsibility for identifying these additional studies. Also, the Program Manager will receive feedback from the CJSP Steering Committee and other stakeholders regarding strategic areas that may require further study. On an operational level, issues that require TAF studies will be identified by the Program Manager, the PEU component coordinators, and the CSJ Operations Committee.
- 3.17 For both strategic and operational studies, the PEU Program Manager is responsible for prioritizing the study needs, ensuring compliance with one or more eligibility criteria and presenting TAF study proposals to the Bank for review. Accountability will be ensured by the reporting relationship of the Program Manager to the MNSJ and the two committees. TAF proposals will be eligible for financing up to a ceiling of US\$50,000. All study proposals will require Bank no-objection for approval, including prior Bank review of terms of reference.

3. Capacity building of the MNSJ

- 3.18 This component includes strengthening the strategic planning capacity of the MNSJ, the development of an integrated management information system (MIS), upgrading of the Criminal Justice Research Unit, creation and strengthening of the Project Management Unit, and strengthening of the MNSJ's ability to interact and coordinate activities with CSOs.
- 3.19 The Ministry of Finance and Planning will approve, **as a condition prior to first disbursement**, organizational changes to the MNSJ to include the creation of a senior Strategic Policy and Planning Division (SPPD) within the central directorate and a Project Management Unit (PMU). This new division will encompass the PMU, the Criminal Justice Research Unit and the position of MIS specialist. Both the SPPD and the PMU will only become operational gradually

during program execution. During the 6-month program start-up period, the MNSJ will hire, as a public sector employee, a Senior Strategic Planner to head the SPPD.

- 3.20 **Strengthening of Strategic Capacity.** The PEU's Strategic Policy Advisor, on contract as a consultant, will liaise with and provide training to the MNSJ's Senior Strategic Planner in the areas of planning, research and statistical analysis.
- 3.21 **Development of an Integrated MIS.** An MIS Coordinator, to be hired for a period of 18 months, will coordinate and supervise the activities related to establishing an integrated inter-agency information system on crime and violence trends. The Coordinator will liaise on a regular basis with counterparts in JCF, Courts and Correctional Services. During the first 6 months of the program the Ministry will have hired an MIS Specialist on a full-time contractual basis. The MIS Specialist will work closely with the PEU's MIS Coordinator. An MIS development firm or firms will be selected through international competitive bidding to customize, install and provide training for the MIS. These contracts will be managed and supervised by the MIS Coordinator. Following completion of the Coordinator's contract, coordination and supervision responsibilities will shift to the MIS Specialist with oversight by the Program Manager.
- 3.22 **Upgrading of the Criminal Justice Research Unit.** This activity will be coordinated by the Strategic Policy Advisor under the supervision of the Program Manager. The consultant will liaise with the MNSJ Strategic Planner. Under the institutional restructuring of the MNSJ, the Unit will be placed under the Strategic Policy and Planning Department. The upgrading of the unit will include the installation of computers, statistical software, training in questionnaire and survey design, and training in statistical analysis and forecasting.
- 3.23 **Creation of a Project Management Unit.** In order to provide the MNSJ with the inherent capacity to identify and manage crime and violence reduction projects in future, a Project Management Unit (PMU) will become operational within the Strategic Policy and Planning Division by the beginning of Year 3 of the program. Initially, during Year 3, the PMU will consist of a Director of Project Management, a Community Action Project Officer, a Criminal Justice System Project Officer, a Financial/Procurement Officer and a secretary. With the possible exception of the PMU Director, staff will be recruited from within the Ministry. The identification and selection of possible candidates will occur in the following way: during the first 18 months of the program, MNSJ counterparts will be assigned to liaise with PEU component coordinators. These counterparts will receive applied training in the areas of project management and supervision through their daily interactions with the PEU coordinators. At the end of the 18-month period, candidates for the key PMU positions will be selected from amongst the MNSJ counterparts. These candidates will receive additional training in areas related to project preparation, management and supervision during the second half of Year 2 of the program.

- 3.24 By the beginning of Year 3 of the program, a Director of Project Management will be appointed to the PMU. If possible, this individual will be recruited from within the Ministry; otherwise an external competition will be held. The creation of the PMU will be supported with the purchase of computers. Following program completion, the PEU vehicle and office equipment will be assigned to the PMU. During Year 3 of the program, the PMU will begin to assume a coordinating and reporting role for other projects undertaken by the MNSJ, and will further develop their project management skills through an overlapping transition with the PEU during the final year of program implementation.


4. Strengthening of the Criminal Justice System

- 3.25 All activities under this component will be the responsibility of the PEU Criminal Justice Coordinator, who will liaise with other PEU coordinators and MNSJ departments as required to ensure efficient implementation. The Coordinator will be the focal point for coordination with the Office of the Chief Justice, PPCA and JCF, Correctional Services and service contractors. Activities involving public information campaigns will be implemented with input from the PEU Communications coordinator, in cooperation with the Public Relations unit of the central MNSJ directorate.
- 3.26 Under the supervision of the Criminal Justice System Coordinator, an external contractor will execute the infrastructure upgrading and retrofitting of the Correctional Services Transformation Center. A short-term engineering consultant will assist the Coordinator in the technical aspects this activity.

5. Community action

- 3.27 A Community Action Coordinator will coordinate and supervise the implementation of this component. Provision of violence prevention services will be carried out by pre-selected and pre-qualified NGO service providers under the management and administration of one or more management consulting firms (Figure 3.2). The NGOs will be contracted directly by the PEU, on behalf of GOJ, under a one-year contract (renewable annually for up to three years) to provide services to the beneficiary communities under the CSJP. Detailed annual work plans will be developed by the NGOs in consultation with the CACs and with oversight by the Coordinator. The financial management of these contracts will be carried out in accordance with the procedures outlined in the Program Operating Regulations, and a measure of flexibility will be incorporated into these regulations with respect to NGO contractual arrangements so as to allow for adjustment if deemed necessary . **Completed contracts with the participating NGO service providers and the management firm (s), with prior Bank concurrence on the detailed annual work plans, will be a disbursement eligibility condition for the Community Action component.**

Figure 3.2
Service Delivery Mechanism for Community Action Component



- 3.28 Under the coordination of the Community Action Coordinator, the Jamaican Social Investment Fund (JSIF) will support and supervise the rehabilitation of infrastructure under this component, including the multi-purpose community facilities, refurbishing of community reception areas in selected police stations and rapid impact community-based projects. JSIF's extensive experience in executing similar projects, including a detailed cost database as well as in-house engineering and technical supervision capacity, make it well-suited to the preparation, contracting and execution of such works. **A signed Memorandum of Understanding between the MNSJ and JSIF, outlining procedures and fee arrangements, will be a disbursement eligibility condition for the Community Action component.**
- 3.29 Community Action Committees (CACs), comprising representative community stakeholders, will be created in each of the target communities. One Community Action Officer, contracted by the PEU and reporting to the Community Action Coordinator, will be stationed within each of the three target zones. The officers will be responsible for providing a networking conduit between community members and potential sources of financial and technical assistance provided by other programs and institutions. With regard to the community-based actions of the NGO service providers, the officers will receive feedback from the CACs

regarding the effectiveness of the interventions. The officers will then channel this feedback to the PEU through the Community Action Coordinator.

6. Program operating regulations

- 3.30 A detailed description of program execution mechanisms and procedures will be defined in the Program Operating Regulations. **Presentation of the approved Program Operating Regulations will be a contractual condition for first disbursement.** Draft Operating Regulations are available in the program's technical files.

D. Execution Schedule

- 3.31 The program's activities will be executed over a period of approximately 3½ years, including a 6-month start-up period and a 3-year intensive execution period. A detailed first year execution schedule will be submitted as a condition prior to first disbursement, although a preliminary version has already been submitted. The execution schedules and coordination between different components will be reassessed and adjusted through the periodic reviews called for in the monitoring and evaluation scheme.

E. Financial aspects of program execution

- 3.32 CSJP finances will be administered through two Special Accounts set up in a commercial bank and established in the name of the CSJP. One account, established by the Ministry of Finance, will be denominated in US dollars. The other account, established by the Ministry of National Security and Justice, will be denominated in Jamaican dollars. Disbursements by the Bank will be made into the US dollar account, while Jamaican counterpart contributions will be made from the Consolidated fund into the Jamaican dollar account. Local payments may be made from either of the two accounts. All payments, with the exception of the petty cash fund, will be made by cheque. Cheques drawn upon the US dollar account may be denominated in either US dollars or Jamaican dollars. All foreign purchases will be made from the US dollar account. The establishment of both Program Special Accounts is a condition prior to first disbursement.

F. Procurement of goods and services

- 3.33 Bank procedures, except in the case of some NGO service providers, will be followed in the procurement of works, goods and consultant services. Internationally competitive bidding will be followed for purchase transactions of more than US\$250,000 for the procurement of goods and related services, or US\$1.5 million for civil works. Bids below these monetary thresholds will be in accordance with local legislation. Standard service contracts for NGOs will be developed during program start-up and reviewed during the first Bank monitoring mission. A detailed Procurement Schedule has been prepared and is attached as Annex II.

- 3.34 One NGO currently delivers rehabilitation services on contract within the correctional facilities. It is deemed advisable to sole source the services of this NGO (Cornerstone Ministries) to provide the targeted rehabilitation services called for in the Transformation Center. The amount of the contract for such services over the three-year period is estimated at less than US\$400,000. This exception, allowed for within Bank policy, is considered justified on the grounds that this NGO is the only NGO providing this type of service at present. The NGO has established a good track record and a rapport with corrections officers as well as inmates, and the NGO has experience in the kind of outreach within the communities necessary if rehabilitation is to be successful.
- 3.35 Similarly, it is deemed advisable to sole source, through direct contracting, the services of the six pre-selected NGOs for the Community Action component. These NGOs were pre-selected after careful stakeholder consultations and analysis of service delivery appropriate to program objectives, followed by in-depth organizational assessments of each NGO. Each of the six NGOs will provide a unique and specialized service under the program. The total cost of such contracts over three years is roughly US\$4.8 million. However, the actual amount per NGO will vary according to the final work plans and be adjusted annually in light of community needs and performance. This exception is considered justified on the grounds that each NGO is the only one with the capacity and a proven track record for providing a specific violence prevention service identified under the program. In most cases, these NGOs are the only ones with recognized stature that have gained the respect of the participating inner city communities.

G. Maintenance

- 3.36 The maintenance of all infrastructure rehabilitation and refurbishing of government facilities financed under the program will be the responsibility of the MNSJ, to be financed from the Ministry's Capital A budget. The maintenance of the multi-purpose community facilities will be the responsibility primarily of the Community Action Committees, jointly with GOJ since they will be existing GOJ-owned facilities. Maintenance reports on all works and equipment acquired under the Program will be prepared and submitted to the Bank on an annual basis during execution and for five years after program completion.
- 3.37 Maintenance for the multi-purpose centers, in particular, will be covered by drawing from the model used by the JSIF. A written agreement will be prepared and signed by the CAC indicating its commitment and responsibility for facility maintenance. A maintenance subcommittee of each CAC will be established while the facility is being refurbished or retrofitted, with specific responsibility for managing and coordinating structured maintenance activities, and each member will be given training on the importance of maintenance, management techniques and fund raising. In addition, representatives from each of the communities will be contracted under the program on a stipend basis to serve as facility managers.

H. Disbursement schedule

- 3.38 The disbursement period for the program is four years. The request for the final disbursement must be presented to the Bank no later than 30 days before the end of the period. The following table contains a projection of the annual disbursement by financier during the program.

Table III-2. Annual Disbursement Schedule by Financier (in US\$ million)						
Source	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	Total	%
IDB	2.9	5.1	4.7	3.3	16.0	80
GOJ	0.5	1.1	1.2	1.2	4.0	20
Total	3.4	6.2	5.9	4.5	20.0	100
% year	17	31	29	23	100	

I. Advance of funds

- 3.39 It is recommended that the US Dollar special account be established as a revolving fund, with an advance of up to 5% of the Bank loan, equivalent to US\$700,000. To assist in Program preparation and to initiate some key start-up activities under the Program, US\$500,000 was drawn down the Project Preparation Facility. These funds are being used to staff and equip the core of the Program Execution Unit, as well as to contract consulting services required for final design and start-up. Once the proposed loan is eligible for disbursements, the PPF funds will be automatically repaid to the Bank.

J. Program monitoring and evaluation

1. On-going Monitoring and Annual Reviews

- 3.40 The PEU will be in charge of monitoring the performance and progress of program execution. This will be done through periodic assessments of the program and its impact, including 6-month progress reports, annual reviews, a mid-term evaluation and a final evaluation after execution of program activities has been completed. The Logical Framework for the program, attached as Annex III, will be used as a tool in this process. In addition, an Impact Evaluation Plan has been developed to help measure in more depth the impacts of those program interventions considered by both GOJ and the Bank to be critical for future violence prevention and crime management activities. **Submission of the baseline information as required under the Impact Evaluation Plan will be a condition prior to the first disbursement of the loan.** Financing for implementation of this plan is included in the program. Consequently, notwithstanding the special conditions for first disbursement eligibility and once the general conditions have been met, up to US\$100,000 of program resources may be disbursed for the purpose of collecting the necessary baseline information.

The Criminal Justice Research Unit of the MNSJ will support the PEU in the monitoring of program impact indicators.

- 3.41 The Bank and the PEU, in accordance with loan contract obligations, will carry out annual reviews of program execution. The review will consist of an assessment of the overall program execution during the previous year, including a comparison of specific program achievements with the indicators in the logical framework, an evaluation of the effectiveness of program management, a review of stakeholder participation and perceptions, a comparison of actual versus planned disbursement, the identification of issues affecting program execution and of solutions or adjustments required for the upcoming year to ensure efficient implementation.

2. Reports

- 3.42 During program execution, the PEU will present semi-annual Program Performance Monitoring Reports to the Bank. These reports, as a minimum, will include disbursement information, program implementation progress on key delivery performance indicators, and a brief description of program status including an assessment of the issues affecting program execution and proposed solutions.
- 3.43 The PEU will establish and maintain adequate accounts and records in accordance with generally accepted international accounting practice. Within 120 days of the close of the fiscal year, commencing with the year in which the first disbursement is made, and during program execution, the PEU will present to the Bank financial statements for the CSJP. A firm of independent external auditors acceptable to the Bank should audit these statements, the costs for which will be covered by the Bank's loan resources.

3. Internal controls

- 3.44 The Financial Administrator, with accounting experience, will provide basic financial and procurement follow-up as well as monitoring of the performance of service contracts executed with CJSP funds. The Financial Administrator will receive full back-stop support as necessary from assigned certified accountants from within the MNSJ's Accounting Department. Procedural follow-up will be the responsibility of the Program Manager, who will ensure that Operating Regulations are adhered to and that the Operating Regulations are updated periodically as required.

4. Midterm evaluation

- 3.45 The GOJ and the Bank will collaborate on a midterm evaluation of the program when approximately 50% of the loan resources have been committed, but no later than 24 months after the first disbursement. The evaluation will be carried out primarily with the assistance of specialized external consultants under the

direction of the PEU and the CJRU. The major objective of this exercise will be to evaluate aspects of the program outlined in the Impact Evaluation Plan, but other aspects at the operational level may also be addressed. A midterm evaluation report will be presented to the Bank. This report will also review program performance, highlighting any major problems and issues and proposing adjustments for the remainder of program execution in light of evaluation results.

5. Final evaluation

- 3.46 Prior to the final disbursement date, the GOJ and the Bank will undertake a final evaluation of the program, again with the assistance of specialized external consultants under the direction of the PEU and the CJRU. The main thrust of the exercise will be to complete the Impact Evaluation Plan, since the impacts covered are considered most critical, but other performance and impact indicators stemming from the Logical Framework may be addressed if deemed necessary to help assess the program's overall impact, effectiveness and sustainability. A final evaluation report will be submitted to the Bank at least 30 days prior to the expiration of the disbursement period.
- 3.47 After consultation with the GOJ regarding the advisability of an ex-post evaluation of the program, it was agreed that the structure and content of the monitoring and evaluation scheme described above would be sufficient to track and measure critical impacts projected as a result of the program. In fact, conducting the final evaluation within the cope and timeframe of program implementation would allow for access to program resources for such purpose, facilitate a collaborative approach to the exercise and provide an advantage in more rapidly assessing community-based interventions.

IV. VIABILITY, BENEFITS AND RISKS

A. Viability

- 4.1 Financial feasibility. The financial feasibility of the program has been analyzed in terms of the availability of counterpart resources for the Bank loan, as well as the capacity of government and community stakeholders to meet incremental recurring costs associated with the program. With respect to counterpart funds, GOJ contribution represents less than 1% of MNSJ's annual budget. Satisfying counterpart obligations does not present a risk to the program.
- 4.2 With respect to the incremental recurrent costs to be borne by GOJ, program design has sought to limit the size of the PEU and the PMU with a view to minimizing fixed costs while maximizing operational flexibility and efficiency. Furthermore, it is expected that the net incremental impact of these and other program-related personnel costs on the MNSJ payroll will be negligible, as a policy of zero growth in full-time personnel will be adhered to. With regard to recurrent costs associated with the investments in GOJ infrastructure, these too have been dimensioned within budgetary constraints so that operation and maintenance will be sustained following completion of the program. With regard to the recurrent costs associated with the multi-purpose community centers, the involvement of the CAC in overseeing the management of the centers, plus the strengthening of these committees during the program in areas of fund raising, maintenance, management and business development within the communities, should help ensure the sustainability of the centers. The sustained delivery of violence prevention services, though the need for these services in participating communities is expected to drop significantly following program completion, will be addressed through these community mobilization and strengthening efforts, through the hands-on mentoring of CBOs by the selected NGOs and through the funding partnerships now emerging between GOJ, NGOs, donor agencies, beneficiary communities and the private sector.
- 4.3 Socioeconomic viability. This operation qualifies as a social equity-enhancing project in that it is consistent with the Eighth Replenishment's mandate to upgrade the urban environment and improve living conditions for city dwellers. Furthermore, the operation qualifies as a Poverty Targeted Investment, since more than 50% of program resources will be used exclusively to finance violence reduction activities in poor, inner city Kingston. Virtually all the interventions contemplated for Community Action are expected to benefit the poor directly. Several other important sub-components of the program — including rehabilitation of inmates, support for the Family Court and the strengthening of the Victim Support Program — will also primarily benefit poor residents of inner-city Kingston. Thus, the operation qualifies for poverty-targeted status under the geographic classification. Moreover, the program will benefit the poor in that many activities, though not targeted directly towards the poor at this stage, are explicitly intended to lay a solid foundation for effectively doing so through replication and expansion of anti-violence activities.

- 4.4 Gender considerations have been addressed in important ways in program design. Of course the program primarily targets young males, given their predominant role in the problems of crime and violence. However, the National Strategy for Crime and Violence Prevention will explicitly address the issue of domestic violence against women as well. In addition, the community action component, which finances the provision of violence prevention services by NGOs in inner-city Kingston, will include several activities (e.g., good parenting classes, substance-abuse treatment) that can be expected to reduce the incidence of domestic violence against women and children. Strengthening the Family Courts should also have a positive impact in this area. Finally, the Social Marketing and Public Education campaign will incorporate a concrete focus on gender and domestic violence issues.
- 4.5 Quantifying the economic viability of the program and the benefits of individual investments proposed under the program is complicated by the lack of quantitative data on the cost of violence and crime, as well as the inherently qualitative nature of the economic impact of certain types of crime and violence. Nevertheless, it is widely agreed that between direct costs, indirect costs, and multiplier effects, the impact on health and social well being, education, business, tourism and foreign investment is significant. The economic impact of the program will ultimately depend on the effectiveness of the interventions at reducing crime and violence. The program's design incorporates a multi-faceted approach to crime and violence reduction, and seeks to introduce sustainable mechanisms that should continue to have a positive effect in the target communities as well as set the stage for future programs and interventions. One of the initial activities of the program will be a study of the economic cost of crime and violence, which will permit a more accurate estimate of the program's economic viability.
- 4.6 Institutional viability. Proactive participatory mechanisms for stakeholders have been in place since the outset of the program's conceptualization. Specifically, the composition of interventions for each selected community, and the NGOs to carry them out, are the result of in-depth consultations with the residents and their leaders. The social marketing campaign, both national and community-focused, will begin the process of changing the culture of violence that prevails in high-risk communities. At the same time, the program is designed to foster community cohesion and build capacity that will impact positively on other initiatives for sustainable development.
- 4.7 This program will strengthen the capacity of the MNSJ to design, implement and monitor violence and crime reduction activities, thus ensuring the viability of this and future programs. Preparation of the national strategy and action plan will provide the ministry and other key actors a road map to guide future violence and crime prevention initiatives, including areas not addressed directly in the current program.

- 4.8 Environmental impact. No negative environmental impacts are expected as a result of program execution. On the contrary, through community interventions and corresponding social marketing efforts, the program is more likely to have a positive impact on the urban environment. The program calls for limited rehabilitation of existing structures in order, for example, to ready the community facilities for NGO providers of violence prevention services. In those cases where rehabilitation of infrastructure is required, procedures will be followed to ensure that any improvements are carried out by the contractors and utilized in compliance with the Jamaica Town Planning Act, along with other relevant national environmental standards or health regulations, and that the Bank's environmental guidelines and reporting requirements are met.

B. Benefits

- 4.9 Preparation of national strategy for crime and violence prevention. The national strategy for crime and violence prevention, financed by this program, will provide a blueprint for future crime and violence reduction activities, along with an Action Plan for implementation of these activities. A wide range of government ministries, along with important civil society stakeholders, will participate in the design and implementation of this document. The strategy itself will ensure a collaborative, multi-sectoral approach to crime and violence prevention, as well as the efficient use of governmental resources and the increased participation of civil society actors in the process.
- 4.10 Better police-community relations and reduced recidivism rates. The strengthening of the Police Public Complaints Authority should help improve the confidence of the citizenry in the Jamaica Constabulary Force and should help the Force remove officers whose conduct is unacceptable. Similarly, the community based implementation process for the Police Code of Conduct should also improve public confidence. The strengthening of rehabilitation services, especially those targeted to youth and short-term offenders, should produce reduced recidivism rates among released offenders.
- 4.11 Reduced levels of violence in targeted inner-city communities. The Community Action component, which provides violence prevention services to a selected set of inner-city communities, can be expected to result in less violence in these communities. These lower violence levels, in turn, will encourage the economic development of those communities as investments in both human and social capital are facilitated. Collateral benefits of Community Action include strengthening of NGOs working in the area of violence reduction, empowerment of inner-city communities via the creation of community action committees, and increased collaboration between GOJ and civil society. In addition, the experience garnered from the activities financed under the Community Action component will inform the development of the national strategy.

C. Risks

- 4.12 Sustained participation and commitment. Due to the multi-sectoral nature of the program, the active participation and continued commitment of all major stakeholders during program implementation are fundamental. These stakeholders include agencies of the criminal justice system, relevant ministries, NGOs and communities. This issue has been addressed through the formation of a core technical team for program guidance during the design stage that included representatives from these groups, and the establishment of a senior level steering committee with similar representation to guide implementation. In addition, steps are being taken to develop a mechanism for permanent consultation with the targeted communities.
- 4.13 Community involvement and access. There is a risk that communities selected for intervention will find their full involvement during execution restrained by gangs or “dons” who have a vested interest in the violent status quo. There is a risk that the NGOs called on to provide violence prevention services would find their access to the communities blocked by these same people. A similar issue is the siting of the community facility for service delivery. Care must be exercised that a facility is not placed in territory belonging to one faction in a community, with the result that persons identified with other factions would be unable to travel safely to and from the facility. These risks are mitigated through the regular consultation process to be carried out with community leaders and residents. The consultations will be conducted by respected individuals with intimate knowledge of the distribution of power and territory in inner city Kingston. These risks are mitigated also through the planned social marketing campaign, through efforts made to select communities for intervention where a high degree of cooperation has been demonstrated and through the application of previously successful experience. Nevertheless, in the unlikely event that one or more of the participating communities is confronted with a situation in which it can no longer participate, the program’s operating regulations will provide procedures and transparent criteria for addressing this issue.
- 4.14 Complexity of design. The complexity inherent in a multi-sectoral approach, even on such a limited basis, is a potential obstacle to effective program implementation. Recognition of this fact influenced the dimensioning of the program. The GOJ and Bank’s project team will continually assess design features during execution so as to further streamline and/or simplify program activities if needed.
- 4.15 Coordination. In an environment in which so many donor/lending agencies are involved, it is essential to ensure complementary use of resources. Several steps are being taken to achieve this. First, the development of a national strategy for violence prevention and a blueprint for future activities will entail active donor/lender participation. A Donor/Lender Group is already holding periodic meetings on the issues of governance, crime, and violence in particular. Second, the other activities of the program have been carefully selected in terms of

sectoral coverage and geographic focus in order to avoid duplication and maximize coverage. Finally, the combined work of the PEU, the Operations Committee and the Steering Committee will provide further protection against the duplication of effort and help facilitate a complementary approach.

Support for the Citizen Security and Justice Program

(TC0107008)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Executing agency:	The Ministry of National Security and Justice Program		
Beneficiaries:	The Government of Jamaica (GOJ), including the MNSJ and its branches (constabulary force, courts and correctional services), and low-income inner city communities in the Kingston Metropolitan Area (KMA)		
Amount and source:	IDB (FSO non-reimbursable):	US\$	500,000
	Local:	US\$	100,000
	Total:	US\$	600,000
Terms and conditions:	Execution Period:	36 months	
	Disbursement Period:	42 months	
	Deadline for requesting Final Disbursement:	41 months	
Objectives:	In support of the Citizen Security and Justice Program (JA0105), the objective of this technical cooperation is to enhance the Government’s capabilities, in collaboration with other key stakeholders, to coherently and effectively carry out a comprehensive and multi-sectoral effort to reduce the level of crime and violence, primarily through prevention activities.		
Description:	Resources of this technical cooperation will be used to finance the contracting of consulting services to help elaborate an integrated National Crime and Violence Prevention Strategy. The strategy will establish a blueprint for future crime and violence reduction activities (including domestic violence), along with a medium to long-term Action Plan for implementation. The Action Plan will specify timetables, responsible organizations and financing needs. As a corollary to this effort, a study will be conducted on the economic costs of violence. A Technical Assistance Fund (TAF) will be established in the amount of US\$300,000 to support		

additional studies deemed necessary to inform strategy development, address special implementation or impact issues and lay the technical groundwork for the GOJ's future efforts. During the preparation of the strategy, a well-targeted media campaign will be executed to support the consultation process and create public awareness on the initiative.

**Environmental/
social review:**

There are no negative environmental impacts expected under this operation. Through the consultations associated with preparation of the integrated national strategy and action plan, the operation is more likely to have a positive impact on the urban environment .

Benefits:

Preparation of a well-articulated strategy to prevent crime and violence is one of the main elements driving the design of the program for citizen security and justice, to ensure that combined efforts contribute to the crime reduction and violence prevention interventions proposed by state and civil society organizations.

Risks:

There are no major risks. The only potential risk identified is that ultimately the national strategy will not carry broad national consensus or commitment across political parties. This risk, however, is mitigated by the extensive stakeholder consultations planned for the strategy development process, by the associated media campaign that will be carried out in connection with the strategy and by the interest of key donor agencies in supporting the action plan that is generated by their participation in the process.

I. THE PROJECT

A. Objectives

- 1.1 To design a framework, for a ten year period, which is intended to be a blueprint for Government actions/initiatives aimed at more successfully preventing and managing crime and violence nationally.

B. Activities

- 1.2 To achieve the project's objective, the following activities will be undertaken.

1. Study on the Economic Cost of Violence (IDB: US\$50,000; GOJ: 0)

- 1.3 Both national and international consultants will be hired to undertake this study. The purpose of this study is to employ a set of rigorous methodologies that will generate careful estimates of the cost that crime and violence represents for Jamaican society. The results of this study will be published and disseminated widely in Jamaica. A series of analyses will be conducted utilizing varying

methodologies. Specifically, the consultants will analyze the types and magnitudes of crime and violence including homicides, robbery, theft, rape and domestic violence against women and children. Different methodologies will be used to gauge the cost to society of these crimes, capture disability-adjusted life years lost due to violence, measure the willingness to pay to live without violence, and assess the impact of violence on investment and growth rates. Draft terms of reference for this consultancy are available in the program's technical files.

2. Design of a National Strategy and Action Plan (IDB: US\$180,000; GOJ: 0)

- 1.4 Within the context of the Government's overarching development strategies, this operation will finance the elaboration of an integrated national crime and violence prevention strategy. This strategy will seek to consolidate initiatives across economic and social sectors into a comprehensive and multisectoral approach to reduce and prevent the incidence of crime and violence. In addition, an accompanying action plan to guide implementation of the strategy will be prepared. Both international and local consultants will be hired to consolidate sector strategy papers prepared for the Criminal Justice System, Health, Education, Tourism, and Domestic Violence, as well as any other relevant information, into a comprehensive strategy document which emphasizes integration, establishes the links and complementarity amongst the several sectors, and defines the roles for stakeholders, including the Government, Civil Society and the Private Sector. Draft terms of reference for this consultancy are available in the program's technical files.

3. Media campaign (IDB: US\$20,000; GOJ: US\$50,000)

- 1.5 The development and implementation of a media campaign -- that will complement a wider social marketing and public education campaign to be conducted under the Citizen Security and Justice Program (JA-0105) -- to disseminate the results of the economic study and the National Strategy. This campaign will draw society's attention to the need to substantially reduce crime and violence in the country, and it will help build consensus around the strategy and its action plan.

4. Technical Assistance Fund (IDB: US\$250,000; GOJ: US\$50,000)

- 1.6 A Technical Assistance Fund (TAF) will be established to undertake research and support additional studies deemed necessary to inform the strategy development or carry out special studies that complement the goals and objectives of the CSJP. TAF studies are eligible for financing up to a ceiling of US\$50,000. Eligible projects include studies related to the development of the National Crime and Violence Prevention Strategy, studies to clarify implementation issues and studies to obtain information that will inform the preparation of future initiatives on crime reduction and violence prevention. Guidelines for accessing the TAF and details

on the approval process are outlined in the Operating Regulations for the Citizen Security and Justice Program.

C. Organization and Execution

- 1.7 Execution of this operation will fall under the mechanisms established in Chapter III of the parallel loan “Citizen Security and Justice Program” (JA-0105). Accordingly, the Program Execution Unit (PEU) will manage and supervise this activity. A senior-level Strategic Policy Advisor will be hired under the CSJP for a period of 12 months, on a non-continuous basis over an 18-month period, to coordinate the activity. The responsibilities of the Strategic Policy Advisor will include: (i) development of final terms of reference for consultants that will be hired to consolidate existing reports and studies as well as to undertake, if required, new studies on specific issues of relevance to the development of the National Strategy; (ii) technical supervision and coordination of consultant work; (iii) coordination of stakeholder consultations; (iv) development of a National Strategy white paper; and (v) follow-up on the legislative review process leading to the adoption of the strategy by the Government of Jamaica.
- 1.8 During the consultative process to be undertaken in the formulation of the National Strategy, issues requiring additional study may be identified. The Strategic Policy Advisor and the MNSJ Strategic Planner will share responsibility for identifying additional studies. In addition the Program Manager will receive feedback from the CJSP Steering Committee and other stakeholders regarding areas that may require further study.
- 1.9 On an operational level, issues that require TAF studies will be identified by the Program Manager, the PEU component coordinators, and the CSJ Operations Committee. For both strategic and operational studies, the Program Manager will be responsible for prioritizing the study needs, ensuring compliance with one or more eligibility criteria and presenting TAF study proposals to the Bank for review. Accountability will be ensured by the reporting relationship of the Program Manager to the MNSJ and the two committees.
- 1.10 TAF proposals are eligible for financing up to a ceiling of US\$50,000. All study proposals will require Bank no-objection for approval, including prior Bank review of terms of reference.

D. Cost and financing

- 1.11 The total cost of the project is estimated at US\$600,000 of which the Bank would contribute US\$500,000 on a non-reimbursable basis from the net income of the Fund for Special Operations (FSO) and the remainder would come from counterpart resources. The consolidated budget distributed according to category and source of financing is described below.

Categories	IDB	GOJ	Total
Consultants:			
1. Economic Study	50	-	50
2. National Strategy	180	-	180
3. Media Campaign	20	50	70
Technical Assistance Fund	250	50	300
Total	500	100	600

E. Reports

1.12 The PEU will prepare the following reports for submission to the Bank:

- a. An Initial Report within 60 days after signature of the Technical Cooperation Agreement outlining the first annual plan and budget for the use of the resources. Annual plans will be submitted thereafter, to coincide with the annual plans of the CSJP, or within 30 days of the commencement of the new project year which ever is earlier. The effective date of the project is the signature date of the Technical Cooperation Agreement.
- b. Semi-annual Progress Reports providing detailed description of the activities undertaken during the review period, including an assessment of the target indicators. Actions proposed over the next period should be highlighted in the report.
- c. A Final Report within 60 days after completion of the project. This report should cover all aspects relating to the accomplishments over the execution period and the extent to which the objectives were met.

**CITIZEN SECURITY AND JUSTICE PROGRAM (CSJP) *JA-0105
SCHEDULE OF PROCUREMENT AND BIDDING**

MAIN PROCUREMENT NEEDS OF THE PROJECT	Source of financing % IDB	Source of financing % LOCAL	Method	Pre qualification Requirements	Publication SPN Semester/year
A. Procurement of goods					
Computer Equipment – hardware, software, integration) 6 lots					
1. Integrated Information System - MNSJ					
US\$1,906.0 thousands (software and integration)	88	12	ICB	YES	2/2001
US\$748.0 thousands (servers and networking infrastructure)	88	12	ICB	NO	2/2002
2. Strategic Planning					
US\$8.0 thousands (equipment and software)	90	10	PQ	NO	2/2001
3. Strengthening of CJRU					
US\$12.0 thousands (computers, software)	85	15	PQ	NO	2/2001
4. Victim Support Program					
US\$30.0 thousands (equipment and software)	88	12	PQ	NO	2/2001
5. PPCA					
US\$10.0 thousands (equipment and software)	88	12	PQ	NO	2/2001
6. Corrections Services					
US\$115.0 thousands (IT equipment – Rehab Unit)	88	12	LCB	NO	2/2001
7. Court System					
US\$ 65.6 thousands (equipment and software)	88	12	LCB	NO	2/2001
8. Transformation Centre					
US\$40.0 thousand (IT equipment)	100	-	PQ	NO	1/2003
9. Multipurpose Centres					
US\$300.0 thousands (IT equipment)	88	12	LCB	NO	2/2001
10. PEU					
US\$38.0 thousands (computers, software and peripherals)	88	12	LCB	NO	1/2001
Office equipment (furniture, materials, books and communication)					
5 Lots					
US\$ 10.0 thousands (Creation of PMU)	100	-	PQ	NO	1/2003
US\$ 10.0 thousands (VSP - Materials)	100	-	LCB	NO	1/2002
US\$59.4 thousands (Court system)	88	12	LCB	NO	2/2001
US\$ 25.0 thousands (Support to PPCA)	100	-	PQ	NO	2/2001
US\$340.0 thousands (PEU equipment and office supplies & rental)	-	100	LCB	NO	1/2001
B. Civil Works (including supervision)					
1. Rehabilitation works, (executions contracts): 5 Lots					
US\$ 928.9 thousands (10 Multipurpose Centres)	88	12	LCB	NO	2/2001
2. Rehabilitation works (5 police stations) 1 lot					
US\$ 200.0 thousands	88	12	DC	NO	1/2002
3 Refurbishing Transformation Centre					
US\$800.0 thousands (1 lot)	75	25	ICB	YES	2/2001
4. Retro fitting Court buildings					
US\$180.0 thousands (1 lot)	-	100	LCB	YES	2/2001
5. Situational Projects - Community Action					
US\$324.0 thousands (small contracts)	88	12	DC	NO	2/2001
C. Consulting Services					
International Consultants					
1. National Strategy					
US\$ 28.1 thousand (Economic Study)	100	-	PQ	NO	1/2002
US\$36.8 thousands Sector Specialists	100	-	PQ	NO	1/2002
2. MNSJ –					
Integrated Information Systems					
US\$333.8 thousands (Consultants)	88	12	ICB	YES	2/2001
US\$222.5 thousands (IT training)	80	20	ICB	YES	1/2002
US\$155.0 thousands (Strategic Policy Advisor – 1 individual)	88	12	LCB	NO	2/2001
US\$24.0 thousands (CJRU strengthening)	90	10	PQ	NO	1/2002

MAIN PROCUREMENT NEEDS OF THE PROJECT	Source of financing % IDB	Source of financing % LOCAL	Method	Pre qualification Requirements	Publication SPN Semester/year
3. CJS US\$78.0 thousands (PPCA upgrading – 1 consultant) US\$50.0 thousands (Corrections – 1 consultant Risk assessment training) US\$27.0 thousands (Court system training/workshop – 1 consultant)	80 80 80	20 20 20	PQ PQ PQ	NO NO NO	1/2002 2/2001
4. Community Action US\$385.2 thousands (NGO management Firm)	88	12	ICB	YES	2/2001
5. Social Marketing and Public Education US\$640.0 thousands (General Campaigns)	88	12	ICB	YES	1/2002
6. Monitoring and Evaluation US\$236.0 thousands (individual consultants – small contracts)	75	25	PQ	NO	2/2001
Local Consultants					
1. National Strategy					
US\$21.9 thousands (Economic Study)	100	-	PQ	NO	1/2002
US\$44.8 thousands (Sector Specialists)	100	-	PQ	NO	1/2002
US\$70.0 thousands (Sector Studies)	100	-	PQ	NO	1/2002
US\$300 thousands (Technical Assistance Fund)	100	-	LCB	NO	2/2002
2. MNSJ –					
US\$20.0 thousands (CJRU strengthening)	88	12	LCB	NO	1/2002
US\$30.0 thousand (Creation of PMU – 1 consultant)	80	20	LCB	NO	1/2002
3. CJS Initiatives					
US\$45.0 thousands (VSP community pilots)	80	20	LCB	NO	2/2001
US\$192.0 thousands (VSP Local personnel – 6 individuals)	100	-	LCB	NO	2/2001
US\$60.0 thousands (Board of Visitors – conferences and workshops)	88	12	LCB	NO	1/2002
US\$37.0 thousands (PPCA upgrading)	80	20	LCB	NO	2/2001
US\$95.0 thousands (Correction services – 4 individuals)	80	20	LCB	NO	1/2002
US\$177.0 thousands (Court System Local personnel – 1 individual)	85	15	DC	NO	1/2002
US\$400.0 thousands (Transformation Centre –inmate rehabilitation)**	-	100	DC	NO	N/A
US\$50.0 thousands (youth diversion – 1 individual)	85	15	LCB	NO	2/2001
US\$166.0 thousands (Court system training/workshops/study tours)	88	12	LCB	NO	2/2002
4. Community Action					
US\$30.0 thousands (Strengthening CACs)	88	12	LCB	NO	1/2001
US\$126.0 thousands (Police Code of Conduct)	88	12	LCB	NO	1/2002
US\$4,814.7 thousands (Community Action Providers – NGOs)**	80	20	DC	NO	N/A
US\$252.0 thousands (Community Action Officers – individuals)	80	20	LCB	NO	1/2002
US\$122.7 thousands (Centre Managers – 10 individuals)	80	20	LCB	NO	1/2002
5. Social Marketing Campaigns					
US\$80.0 thousands (PPCA media campaign)	80	20	LCB	NO	1/2002
6.0 Program Management					
US\$1,188.0 thousands (Technical and Support personnel)	90	10	LCB	NO	1/2001
D. Operations and Maintenance Costs					
1. Integrated Information System					
US\$1,100.0 thousands (Network maintenance and software Upgrades)	80	20	ICB	YES	2/2002
2. PEU program vehicle					
US\$30.0 thousands (insurance, operations and maintenance)	-	100	LCB	NO	1/2001

ICB-International Competitive Bidding; LCB-Local Competitive Bidding; PQ-Price Quotations; DC –Direct Contracting

* Includes parallel technical cooperation.

** Direct contracting as an exception to standard procurement procedures, as justified under Bank policy.

LOGICAL FRAMEWORK AND PROJECT INDICATOR TABLE.
CITIZEN SECURITY AND JUSTICE PROGRAMME
JA-OIO5

ACTIVE SUMMARY	PERFORMANCE MONITORING INDICATORS	MEANS OF VERIFICATION	MAJOR ASSUMPTIONS
citizen security and justice thereby creating a safer that promotes social and all being.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Reduction in the rate of violent crimes especially homicides during the project period. 2. Increases in the levels of foreign and domestic investments. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National statistics • Human Development Report 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Social sector development program effective • Jamaica continues to be attractive to investors • Government's fiscal and monetary will facilitate further investment • Mechanisms to attract investment will be enhanced
E:			
the GOJ in the on of a program that seeks to reduce violence, time management and improve the delivery of services.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Homicide rates in targeted communities reduced by 30% in 4 years. 2. Major violent crimes reduced by 25% by year 4. 3. 30% reduction by end of the program in number of people who express fear of leaving homes in targeted areas. 4. 25% increase by end of the program in willingness to enter targeted areas. 5. 25% reduction in incidences of protest on justice issues by 2004. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Crime statistics from CCN, • Surveys • Media reports 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • JCF able to design and adopt improved policing strategies • Increased public awareness and reception of alternate dispute resolution initiative • Private sector / Government positive collaboration maintained
S/COMPONENTS			
Strategy National Crime and Prevention Strategy and detailed Action Plan results from: on studies in Health, on and Tourism; and is supported by Technical at Fund.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1.1 Green Paper on Crime Prevention Strategy accepted by Cabinet by year 3. 1.2 White paper on National Crime Prevention Strategy and detailed Action Plan tabled in Parliament by end of Year 4. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Results of sector studies • White paper, Green Paper • Surveys of credible opinion leaders • Reports on Stakeholders' consultations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Government of Jamaica and IDB loan programme will proceed as currently • Relevant stakeholders support and their involvement in all stages of execution • Reliable data available for each performance category and the relevant authorities willing to release such data to program management

**LOGICAL FRAMEWORK AND PROJECT INDICATOR TABLE.
CITIZEN SECURITY AND JUSTICE PROGRAMME
JA-OIO5**

ACTIVE SUMMARY	PERFORMANCE MONITORING INDICATORS	MEANS OF VERIFICATION	MAJOR ASSUMPTIONS
<p>Capacity Building</p> <p>Directorate organized to projects related to violence and crime management and appropriate policy</p> <p>of a Strategic Planning Unit and Project Management Unit to execute and manage projects related to prevention and crime management.</p> <p>upgraded to provide timely Minister and Senior staff. planning capacity enhanced.</p> <p>ment of an integrated MIS.</p>	<p>2.1 Approval of Strategic Policy and Planning Division (SPPD) by Services Commission within 6 months of project signature and SPPD fully functional by start of year 3.</p> <p>2.2 Project Management unit established within the MNSJ by start of 3rd year.</p> <p>2.3 Equipment installed and CJRU staff received additional training in statistical analysis and forecasting.</p> <p>2.4 Integrated inter agency IS designed, related LAN and WAN installed and accessed by all participating agencies by end of year 2.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MNSJ Reports • PEU Project Reports • Evaluation Reports • CJRU publications • Ministerial briefings • Feedback from beneficiary agencies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MNSJ obtained qualified staff for CJ SPPD • Strong Donor coordination to avoid duplication and enhance complementarity of Information Technology requirements implementation • MNSJ organizational processes fully articulated and communication links formalized and institutionalized • Counterpart resources available
<p>Justice System Initiatives</p> <p>in the delivery and quality and greater impact of the provided by the criminal justice system.</p> <p>technical assistance to the Victim Support and the Boards of Visitors Programs.</p> <p>technical support and increased public awareness of PPCA.</p> <p>services</p> <p>improved management of rehabilitation services and</p>	<p>3.1 50% increase in the coverage of victims requiring support.</p> <p>3.2 Training Plan designed and all Boards of Visitors trained by end of Year 2.</p> <p>3.3 Enhanced capacity of the PPCA to investigate police misconduct.</p> <p>3.4 Staff of Rehab Unit trained, adopt and use risk assessment techniques.</p> <p>3.5 Transformation Centre for rehabilitation of young male offenders operational by start of year 2 with 150-200 inmates.</p> <p>3.6 Attitudinal and behavioural changes in juveniles that have left the Transformation centre.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Training Reports, evaluation questionnaires • Baseline data • MNSJ Reports • Feed back from wards • Feedback from Visiting Committee members • Reports from PPCA • Report of Construction Consultants 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Target personnel available and willing to participate in training • Various individuals and civic groups to participate as members of visiting committees and that they will be granted access to correctional facilities • Continued acceptance and commitment to proposed reforms by Correctional Service staff • Transformation Centre staffed, equipment maintained

LOGICAL FRAMEWORK AND PROJECT INDICATOR TABLE.
CITIZEN SECURITY AND JUSTICE PROGRAMME
JA-OIO5

BRIEF SUMMARY	PERFORMANCE MONITORING INDICATORS	MEANS OF VERIFICATION	MAJOR ASSUMPTIONS
<p>each in the correctional services to reduce recidivism.</p> <p>Transformation Centre refurbished and diversion for pilot program designed implemented.</p> <p>Improved Administrative processes and training for the system.</p>	<p>3.7 Diversion of youth program piloted and completed by year 3.</p> <p>3.8 Reduction in time between hearing and judicial dispositions.</p> <p>3.9 Kingston and St. James Family Courts refurbished and judges trained by end of year 2.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Opinion surveys • Survey of DPP • Tracer Study on juveniles released from the Transformation Centre • Records and reports of PEU • Reports of Correctional Services 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sufficiently qualified and experienced staff available to effectively deliver rehabilitation services in the Transformation Centre
<p>Community Actions</p> <p>Violence and crime initiatives implemented in communities.</p> <p>Execution of situational projects - rapid impact crime violence reduction projects.</p> <p>Refitting of multi-purpose centres.</p> <p>Refurbishing of public reception areas of select police stations.</p> <p>Establishment of Community Action Committees (CACs) to advise and undertake violence reduction activities.</p> <p>Implementation of Police code of conduct in collaboration with NGOs.</p> <p>Review of violence prevention</p>	<p>4.1 NOW projects identified and completed by end of year 1 to coincide with commencement of community actions.</p> <p>4.2 10 multipurpose centres refurbished and operational by year 2.</p> <p>4.3 Public reception areas of select police stations refurbished by end of year 3.</p> <p>4.4 CACs established and members trained in organizational governance, group dynamics and inter personal relations.</p> <p>4.5 Police code of conduct distributed and adopted in targeted communities.</p> <p>4.6 A menu of crime prevention services delivered by NGOs in 9 communities throughout the project.</p> <p>4.7 Changes in violent attitudes and behaviours among beneficiaries on</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project Completion Reports • Reports of Building consultants • Training reports • PEU Reports • Impact surveys (baseline provided by 1st survey) • NGO reports • Contract documents 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Community remains willing to participate in the program • Multi-purpose centres used for intended purpose • No escalation in the level of violence during delay program execution • NGOs maintain service delivery capacity • Management Firms are effective and efficient • The culture of violence ingrained in the fabric of targeted inner-city communities amenable to interventions which promote a different way of life

**LOGICAL FRAMEWORK AND PROJECT INDICATOR TABLE.
CITIZEN SECURITY AND JUSTICE PROGRAMME
JA-OIO5**

DESCRIPTIVE SUMMARY	PERFORMANCE MONITORING INDICATORS	MEANS OF VERIFICATION	MAJOR ASSUMPTIONS
Community based actions by selected NGOs.	account of targeted NGO services.		
Marketing and Public Information Marketing and public education conducted on the negative impact as well as some strategies used to combat them. CA/OPR public information campaign. Social Marketing Program. Other campaigns.	5.1 National public education campaign conducted on role and work of PPCA. 5.2 Targeted social marketing interventions implemented in select communities throughout the project period. 5.3 Stakeholder conferences, workshops and consultations completed over the life of the project. 5.4 Media and other public relation campaigns executed over the life of the project.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project document • Evaluation Reports • Newspaper articles • Opinion Surveys 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provision of public information on the project will be sufficient to overcome public cynicism that reported acts will be impartially investigated by the police • That current police information investigations and decisions will be made for public dissemination • That social marketing and public information initiatives can create a better climate for effective implementation of objectives
ESTIMATED COSTS	US\$'000		
Strategy To consolidate and update information and other works e.g. PERF report, report, MNSJ long term plan, development plan. To carry out TORs and conduct related studies on economic crime, effect on Tourism sector studies. To develop implementation plan for crime and violence prevention strategies. To develop and implement consultative participatory framework for development and evaluation of strategy. To carry out consultations.	Sector Studies - 170.0 Design and Action Plan – 130.0 Technical Assistant Fund – 300.0 Total - \$0.6 million	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Invoices and receipts • Payment records • Audited Financial Statements 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Adequate resources provided on time to carry out the studies • Data available in user format • Consultations can be carried out as planned • Public willing to participate

**LOGICAL FRAMEWORK AND PROJECT INDICATOR TABLE.
CITIZEN SECURITY AND JUSTICE PROGRAMME
JA-OIO5**

BRIEF SUMMARY	PERFORMANCE MONITORING INDICATORS	MEANS OF VERIFICATION	MAJOR ASSUMPTIONS
<p>strategy and accompanying plan. for Cabinet approval. Create mechanism for coordination and implementation of national crime prevention strategy.</p>			
<p>Strengthening technical assistance, equipment and training to the PMU. technical assistance, equipment and training to the technical assistance in the strategic planning. in LAN and WAN. in PMU. capabilities of MNSJ to receive and utilize reports of Boards of Visitors, CAC's as well as from the WAN in planning policy formulation.</p>	<p>Creation of PMU – \$40.0 Strengthening of CJRU – \$56.0 Strategic Planning capacity – \$163.0 Integrated MIS – \$4,311.0 Total - \$4.57 million</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MNSJ financial records 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Qualified staff available for PMU • Facilities are equipped and maintained • Hardware and software installed, trained and support to MNSJ staff provided • Availability of qualified trainers and programs of the required standards • MNSJ able to retain qualified staff
<p>Justice System enhance victim support and visiting committee programs. Establish mechanisms for directing referrals at KPH to support services. provide public education program about WPP. provide training for visiting committees to look ups and referrals.</p>	<p>Victim Support – \$290.0 Boards of Visitors- \$60.0 JCF – \$205.0 Correction Services - \$1,550.0 Court system – 675.0 Total - \$2.58 million</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Budget Executing Documents • Audited Financial Statements for project funds • Audited Financial statements of MNSJ Audited Financial statements for the Project 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Political consensus across party lines to provide support • Government maintains Ministry portfolio and responsibilities over long term • Stakeholders maintain positive commitment to project

**LOGICAL FRAMEWORK AND PROJECT INDICATOR TABLE.
CITIZEN SECURITY AND JUSTICE PROGRAMME
JA-OIO5**

NATIVE SUMMARY	PERFORMANCE MONITORING INDICATORS	MEANS OF VERIFICATION	MAJOR ASSUMPTIONS
<p>Develop and implement public information campaign on OPR and PPCA.</p> <p>Provide support training equipment to Family courts in juvenile cases.</p> <p>Effect infrastructural improvements to Kingston and James Family Courts.</p> <p>Provide technical assistance to Rehabilitation Unit of Correctional Services Department.</p> <p>Conduct pilot testing of Transformation Centre to rehabilitate inmates.</p> <p>Assess pilot experience of diversion for youth programs.</p> <p>Implement diversion for youth program.</p>			
<p>Key Actions</p> <p>Develop and implement situational awareness projects.</p> <p>Enhance community multi-purpose centres and refurbish public areas of select police stations.</p> <p>Engage NGOs and Management to co-ordinate delivery of</p>	<p>NOW projects – \$324.0</p> <p>Multipurpose Facilities – \$1,673.0</p> <p>Police stations - \$216.0</p> <p>CACs - \$36.0</p> <p>NGO based actions - \$5,200.0</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Budget Records • Audited Financial Statements for project funds • Audited Financial statements of MNSJ • Audited Financial statements for the Project 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Efficient management by contracted management entities • No disruptions to community action delivered by NGO and that an atmosphere of calm prevails in targeted areas • Community leaders receptive • High quality of services delivered by

**LOGICAL FRAMEWORK AND PROJECT INDICATOR TABLE.
CITIZEN SECURITY AND JUSTICE PROGRAMME
JA-OIO5**

ACTIVE SUMMARY	PERFORMANCE MONITORING INDICATORS	MEANS OF VERIFICATION	MAJOR ASSUMPTIONS
<p>by NGOs.</p> <p>technical assistance to GOs in target areas.</p> <p>and implement programs for groups in ADR, mentoring, police youth clubs, teen job training remedial n, parenting programs for youth pilot program, city policing drug on.</p> <p>the police code of conduct in areas in collaboration with</p>	<p>Police Code of Conduct - \$126.0</p> <p>Total - \$7.575 million</p>		
<p>Marketing</p> <p>and execute PPCA public ion campaign.</p> <p>and execute social g and public education</p> <p>and implement community- mmunication initiatives in of all components.</p> <p>Annual Work programs for me prevention activities for e.</p> <p>and implement national ducation and social g initiatives.</p> <p>evaluation.</p> <p>Social Marketing Plan results.</p>	<p>Total - \$0.640 million</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consultant records and reports • PEU records • Payment records 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Campaign information well designed and relevant • Dissemination channels are appropriate and effective • Campaigns are implemented on a time basis and linked to implementation of other services/activities

LOGICAL FRAMEWORK AND PROJECT INDICATOR TABLE.
CITIZEN SECURITY AND JUSTICE PROGRAMME
JA-OIO5

BRIEF SUMMARY	PERFORMANCE MONITORING INDICATORS	MEANS OF VERIFICATION	MAJOR ASSUMPTIONS
<p>Coordination and operationalize PEU. TORs for technical and administrative staff. Detailed Work Plan within 6 months of Project signature. other coordinating bodies C, PMU. controls and evaluation systems.</p>	<p>Personnel - \$1,188.0 Equipment and supplies – \$312.0 Unallocated expenses - \$50.0 Monitoring and Evaluation: \$236.0</p> <p>Total - \$1.786 million</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PEU records • Financial statements • Disbursement records • Minutes of PSC, POC and CACs • Work Plan 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project activities implemented on a time basis • Strong coordination among numerous consultants • Disbursements on target • Availability of counterpart resources • Effective coordination between PEU and MNSJ • Consultants are available and willing to accept positions • Persons are available and willing to serve on various committees

PROPOSED RESOLUTION

JAMAICA. LOAN ____/OC-JA TO THE GOVERNMENT OF JAMAICA

(Citizen Security and Justice Program)

The Board of Executive Directors

RESOLVES:

That the President of the Bank, or such representative as he shall designate, is authorized, in the name and on behalf of the Bank, to enter into such contract or contracts as may be necessary with the Government of Jamaica, as Borrower, for the purpose of granting it a financing to cooperate in the execution of the Citizen Security and Justice Program. Such financing will be for the amount of up to US\$16,000,000, from the Single Currency Facility of the Ordinary Capital resources of the Bank, and will be subject to the "Financial Terms and Conditions" and the "Special Contractual Clauses" indicated in the Executive Summary of the Loan Proposal contained in Document PR-____.

PROPOSED RESOLUTION

JAMAICA. PARTIAL PAYMENT OF INTEREST ON LOAN ____/OC-JA
TO THE GOVERNMENT OF JAMAICA

(Citizen Security and Justice Program)

The Board of Executive Directors

RESOLVES:

That the President of the Bank, or such representative as he shall designate, is authorized, in the name and on behalf of the Bank, as administrator of the Intermediate Financing Facility Account (the "Account"), to enter into such contract or contracts as may be necessary with the Government of Jamaica, as Borrower, and to adopt other pertinent measures to use the resources of the Account to pay a part of the interest due by the Borrower on outstanding balances of the loan authorized by Resolution DE- ____/01, in accordance with the provisions set forth in Document FN-263-2, as amended, approved by the Board of Executive Directors on December 21, 1983.

PROPOSED RESOLUTION

**JAMAICA. NONREIMBURSABLE TECHNICAL COOPERATION FOR THE
CITIZEN SECURITY AND JUSTICE PROGRAM**

The Board of Executive Directors

RESOLVES:

1. That the President of the Inter-American Development Bank, or such representative as he shall designate, is authorized, in the name and on behalf of the Bank, to take such measures as may be pertinent for the execution of the plan of operations referred to in Document AT-_____ with respect to a nonreimbursable technical cooperation for the Citizen Security and Justice Program.
2. That up to the sum of US\$500,000 or its equivalent in other convertible currencies, is authorized for the purposes of this resolution, chargeable to the net income of the Fund for Special Operations.
3. That the above-mentioned sum is to be provided on a nonreimbursable basis.