



# Project Completion Report

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## PCR

Project Name:	Emergency Assistance In Response To Flood Damage During The 2007 Atlantic Hurricane Season.
Country:	Jamaica
Sector:	Transportation
Original Project Team:	Brian Mc Nish, (TSP/CTT); Alejandro Taddia (INE/TSP); Nicolas Santiago Noro Villagra (LEG/SGO); Dennis Chong, (Consultant/CJA); Rosemarie Morgan (PDP/CJA); and Giovanna Mahfouz (INE/TSP).
Project Number:	JA- L1015
Loan Number:	LO-1959/OC-JA
QRR Date:	April 8, 2010
Approval Date:	May 7, 2010

PCR Team: Principal Author: Brian Mc Nish, (TSP/CJA).

## **ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

GOJ	Government of Jamaica
IDB	Inter American Development Bank
IRF	Immediate Response Facility
NWA	National Works Agency
PC	Parish Councils
PCR	Project Completion Report
PDO	Project Development Objectives
PPMR	Project Progress Monitoring Report

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## I. BASIC INFORMATION

BASIC DATA (AMOUNTS IN US\$)							
<b>Title:</b>	<b>Emergency Assistance in Response to Flood Damage during the 2007 Atlantic Hurricane Season August – October 2007</b>						
<b>Project No:</b>	<b>JA-L1015</b>						
<b>Loan(s) No:</b>	<b>1959/OC-JA</b>						
<b>Borrower:</b>	<b>Government of Jamaica</b>						
<b>Executing Agency (EA): The National Works Agency of the Ministry of Transport and Works</b>	<b>Date of Board Approval: 04 Feb 2008</b>						
	<b>Date of Loan Contract Effectiveness: 05 March 2008</b>						
	<b>Date of Eligibility for First Disbursement: 13 August 2008</b>						
<b>Sector: Transportation</b>	<b>1) <u>Months in Execution</u></b>						
	<b>* from Approval: 22 months</b>						
	<b>* from Contract Effectiveness: 21 months</b>						
<b>Lending Instrument: Investment/Immediate Response Facility</b>							
	<b><u>Disbursement Periods</u></b>						
	<b>Original Date of Final Disbursement: 05 March 2009</b>						
	<b>Current Date of Final Disbursement: 31 Dec 2009</b>						
	<b>Cumulative Extension (Months): 9</b>						
	<b>Special Extensions (Months): 0</b>						
	<b><u>Loan Amount(s)</u></b>						
	<b>* Original Amount: 10,000,000</b>						
	<b>* Current Amount: 10,000,000</b>						
	<b>* Pari Passu (if applicable):NA</b>						
<b>Poverty Targeted Investment (PTI): No</b>	<b><u>Disbursements</u></b>						
<b>Social Equity (SEQ): No</b>	<b>* Amount to date: 9,999,780.58 (100 %)</b>						
<b>Environmental Classification: A, B, or C</b>	<b><u>Total Project Cost (10,000,000):</u></b>						
	<b><u>Redirectioning</u></b>						
	<b>Has this Project?</b>						
	<b>Received funds from another Project [ ]</b>						
	<b>Sent funds to another Project [ ]</b>						
	<b>N/A [x]</b>						
	<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>To/From Project Number</th> <th>From Sub-Loan Number</th> <th>Amount</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	To/From Project Number	From Sub-Loan Number	Amount			
To/From Project Number	From Sub-Loan Number	Amount					
<b>Section .01</b>	<b>Section .04 * Current amount (adjusted for redirectioning):</b>						
<b>Section .02</b>	<b><u>On Alert Status</u></b>						
<b>Section .03</b>	<b>Is project currently designated "on alert" by PAIS: Yes/No</b>						
	<b>If yes then why is the project on alert (DO , IP Ratings and/or relevant PAIS indicators):</b>						
	<b>Comments on relevance of "on alert" status for this project (if applicable): No</b>						

Summary Performance Classifications				
DO	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Highly Probable (HP)	<input type="checkbox"/> Probable (P)	<input type="checkbox"/> Low Probability (LP)	<input type="checkbox"/> Improbable (I)
IP	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Highly Satisfactory (HS)	<input type="checkbox"/> Satisfactory (S)	<input type="checkbox"/> Unsatisfactory (US)	<input type="checkbox"/> Very Unsatisfactory (VU)
SU	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Highly Probable (HP)	<input type="checkbox"/> Probable (P)	<input type="checkbox"/> Low Probability (LP)	<input type="checkbox"/> Improbable (I)

## **II. THE PROJECT**

### **A. Project Context**

- 2.1 This operation entitled the Emergency Assistance in Response to Flood Damage (LO-1959/OC-JA) was developed and designed in late 2007 following Hurricane Dean a powerful tropical cyclone of the 2007 Atlantic hurricane season. Hurricane Dean was A Cape Verde-type hurricane which took a west-northwest path through the Caribbean Sea, passing just to the south of Jamaica on August 19th, 2007.
- 2.2 Beginning in the wake of Hurricane Dean on August 20, 2007 Jamaica experienced extraordinary rainfall<sup>1</sup> which continued intermittently for a period of approximately two months, resulting in extensive flooding and damage across the island. The flooding and damage was actually caused by a combination of factors which included: (i) the dumping of inordinate precipitation across the island because of the tropical depression associated with Hurricane Dean; (ii) attendant large storm surges and battering waves which accompanied the high winds of the hurricane and (iii) another seasonal depression which became stationary and lingered in the vicinity of Jamaica during September/October 2007 and brought with it persistent cloudiness and very heavy rain fall spread across the island, exacerbating initial flood conditions.
- 2.3 The floods left 11 communities marooned and major North South links were impassible. Six (6) lives were lost and there was approximately six hundred and twenty eight (628) flood and hurricane related injuries. Damages and losses due to the flooding were extensive across all sectors.
- 2.4 Significant parts of the national road network and related infrastructure of Jamaica was severely damaged or destroyed as the resultant storm water runoff breached several river channels and the resulting deluge, damaged roads island-wide, maintained by both the National Works Agency (NWA) and by Parish Councils (PCs). Rough estimates of the NWA after the flood reported that 30% of the road system was in in poor or very poor condition to the extent that 446 roadways remained closed, blocked by fallen trees debris, washed down silt and landslips with the total effect of the event on the road transport sector estimated as J\$1.112 billion
- 2.5 Accordingly, parts of Jamaica had limited access or could not be safely traveled which rendering the system in part unreliable and limited the mobility of the nation. The attendant social difficulties manifested in restricted accessibility and mobility, traffic congestion, difficulty for children to reach to school, difficulty accessing other basic social services health, public administration and other economic spaces such as markets and jobs. The net effect translates into high logistical cost and a compromised national standard of living. Because of the events the economy was projected

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<sup>1</sup> Recorded rainfall levels at a number of gauging stations across the island showed that three stations had rainfall readings 200% in excess of the normal for the period.

to only grow by 1.1 percent for 2007 instead of the 2.1 per cent forecast prior to the event resulting from the losses in output flows.

- 2.6 To address this issue the Government of Jamaica declared a state of national public emergency, on August 19, 2007 and made a formal request to the IDB to expedite the preparation of an Emergency loan. Accordingly, the project was prepared and approved in eight weeks. The operation was made effective in 30 days and implementation was immediate and was deemed highly satisfactory as 100% of the loan resources were committed within nine months following the event and all of the project's targets were met during the term of implementation. Accordingly, the project was fully disbursed by its term for execution. A 240 day extension to the term for disbursement was effected to facilitate final payments to commitments and to facilitate administrative closure and a final audit.

## **B. Project Description**

- 2.7 The operation entitled "Emergency Assistance in Response to Flood Damage during the 2007 Atlantic Hurricane Season" was structured as an Immediate Response facility which features a 12 month disbursement period utilizing the Bank's emergency procurement procedures so designed so as to facilitate agile and targeted responses for the rapid restoration of Jamaica's storm damaged transportation infrastructure.

### **1. Development Objective**

- 2.8 The overarching development objective which has remained unchanged throughout the 20 month life of the project was to immediately restore basic mobility to the population of Jamaica. The resources were used to undertake works and purchase goods and services required to address immediate reconstruction, stabilization, and repairs to the road network and ancillary physical entities damaged by the disaster.
- 2.9 To achieve this objective the main components of the operation were:
- i. **Civil Works** -: Related to the restoration of the transportation and road infrastructure network affected by the disaster. In particular the project supported the re-establishment of basic road infrastructure services to serve affected peoples.
  - ii. **Project Implementation Support** -: Relate to institutional strengthening to support the implementation of emergency works.

## 2. Components

2.10 In particular the program components were designed with the following:

### **Component I. Civil Works - US\$ 9.2 M**

2.11 The scope of work for the civil works component includes the following activities as follows: (i) removal of debris from roads; (ii) clearing of road blockages and road slips caused by heavy rains; (iii) clearing of blocked drains; (iv) structural work related to drainage systems along the roadway; and (v) road repairs

### **Component II Project Implementation Support – US\$ 0.80 million**

2.12 The scope of this component provides support for institutional strengthening hiring of consultants and experts and the conduct of an audit as related to the implementation of emergency civil works.

## **C. Quality -At- Entry Review**

2.13 This is not applicable to the IRF Loan Facility for Jamaica.

Quality -At- Entry Review			
<input type="checkbox"/> Highly Satisfactory (HS) - 1	<input type="checkbox"/> Fully Satisfactory (S) - 2	<input type="checkbox"/> Less than Satisfactory (LS) - 3	<input type="checkbox"/> Unsatisfactory (U) - 4

## **III. RESULTS**

### **A. Outcomes**

#### **Loan Outcomes**

- 3.1 The IRF loan assisted the GoJ with the financing of repairs to main roads, bridges and the cleanup and disposal of debris from the damage caused by the hurricane and thus contributed to the immediate restoration of basic mobility to the population of Jamaica and the normalizing of traffic flows and social services within a year after the passage of the hurricane.
- 3.2 The contribution of the IRF overall to the recovery effort was excellent as the project meet all of its targets. Mobility to the population was restored as no roads on the network remained impassible at the end of the project down from the 446 road closures shortly after the event.

- 3.3 Although the loan was signed five months following the hurricane events the executing agency's ability to provide audited documentation for retroactive expenditure was a very important institutional/financial outcome. The early appointment of a Project Manager and continuous fortnightly meetings during the implementation period contributed significantly to the project meeting all of its targets with 100% of the resources committed within the allotted time frame and 100% disbursed by the end of the project.

ACHIEVEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES (DO)				
Development Objective(s) (Purpose)		Key Outcome Indicators    Number of Blocked Roads		
1. To immediately restore basic mobility to the population of Jamaica due to hurricane and flood damage during the 2007 Atlantic hurricane season.				
Classification: HP,P,LP,I				
a) <u>Planned Outcomes</u>		2) <u>Outcomes Achieved</u>		
<u>Baseline</u>		<u>End of Project</u>		
1.1	446 (04 Feb 2008)	1.1E	0 (31 Dec 09)	1.1    0 (30 Jun 2008) 3)
i) <b>Reformulation.</b>				
ii)    [    X    ] N/A				
iii) <b>PPMR Retrofitting.</b> Indicate if and when the PPMR was retrofitted and explain any changes resulting from this exercise.				
iv)    [    X    ] N/A				
Summary Development Objective(s) Classification (DO):				
[X ] Highly Probable (HP)            [ ] Probable (P)            [ ] Low Probability (LP)            [ ] Improbable (I)				
<b>Briefly justify DO classification, based on degree to which planned targets were met, explaining the differences between planned and achieved outcomes as well as any other relevant factors. Include references to evidence that can support these results.</b>				
The developmental objective classification of high probable is justified on the strengthen of the developmental objective indicator which was fully achieved before the end of project. The classification is also based on the zealous institutional environment of implementation supporting the project and the absence of insurmountable risk.				
<b>Country Strategy.</b> Given the results described above, briefly discuss how the project contributed to the Bank’s strategy in the country.				
The restoration of the basic road infrastructure services achieved by this program was critical in order to sustain economic growth and safeguard living conditions by supporting the rapid normalization of access to basic economic services for the population of Jamaica including the poor. This is consistent with two of the Bank’s Country Strategy objectives with respect to (i) private sector development and (ii) reducing vulnerability to natural disasters				



## B. Externalities

- 3.4 The impact of this project has given rise to the idea of developing a comprehensive drainage master plan (which is currently being funded under JA-L1016 Transport Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project) in the context of mitigating the perennial water damage being exacted on the road infrastructure and to dialogue with the Bank on the need to establish an emergency facility given the frequency of hurricanes and the attendant flood damage to the road infrastructure.
- 3.5 The project executing unit was staffed with in-house expertise from the NWA which served to build project management capacity to implement future Bank projects. The project was very well implemented.

## C. Outputs

IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS (IP)			
<b>Components (Outputs):</b>			
<b>1. Component 1: CIVIL WORKS</b> Total cost of Component 1: <b>9,190,000</b> Counterpart: <b>0.00</b> IDB: US\$ <b>9,815,752.22</b> – [LP US\$9,190,000] IDB Disbursement: 100%  <u>Classification:</u> HS, <b>S</b> , U, VU			
<b>Key Output Indicators: Percentage of works completed.</b>			
<b>Planned Outputs</b>		<b>Outputs Achieved</b>	
<u>Baseline*</u> 1.1 B_0%_(10 Oct 2008)	<u>End of Project</u> 1.1E 100 %_(31 Dec 2009)	<b>1.1</b> (30 Jun 2009)	100%_
Briefly explain differences between planned and actual outputs (if applicable).			
[ <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ] N/A			
<b>Restructuring.</b> Indicate if this component was restructured (date of approval by Manager). Briefly discuss the consequences of these changes.  [ <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ] N/A			
<b>2. Component 2 : PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT</b> Total cost of Component 2: <b>US\$ 810,000</b> Counterpart: <b>US\$ 0.00</b> IDB: <b>US\$184,026.36</b> [LP US\$810,000] IDB Disbursement: 100%  <u>Classification:</u> HS, <b>S</b> , U, VU			
<b>Key Output Indicators: Percentage of technical services and key staff to the Project Execution Unit hired.</b>			
<b>Planned Outputs</b>		<b>Outputs Achieved</b>	
<u>Baseline*</u> 2.1B_0%_(10 Oct 2008)	<u>End of Project</u> 2.1E 100% (31 Dec 2009)	<u>End of Project</u> 2.1 <b>100%</b> (15 Dec 2008)	
Briefly explain differences between planned and actual outputs (if applicable).			
[ <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ] N/A			

**Restructuring.** Indicate if this component was restructured (date of approval by Manager). Briefly discuss the consequences of these changes.

[ **X** ] N/A

(In case of more components, create new row and complete.)

**Summary Implementation Progress Classification:**

[ ] Highly Satisfactory (HS) [ **X** ] Satisfactory (S) [ ] Unsatisfactory(U) [ ] Very Unsatisfactory (VU)

## D. Project Costs

CATEGORY	Total Project Cost - Planned (US\$000)	Total Project Cost - Actual (US\$000)	% Difference
	BANK	BANK	
1. <b>Consultant Services</b>			
1.1 Project Execution Team	35,000.00	0.00	(35,000.00)
1.2 Project Support	160,000.00	0.00	(160,000.00)
1.3 Institutional Strengthening	540,000.00	153,196.78	(386,803.22)
2. <b>Direct Costs</b>			
2.1 Transportation network	8,000,000.00	9,815,752.22	1,815,752.22
2.2 Contingency	1,190,000.00	0.00	(1,190,000.00)
3. <b>Audit</b>			
3.1 Financial Audit	75,000.00	30,831.58	(44,168.42)

The variation in the budget relate to a strategy which was adopted by the executing agency and agreed to with the Bank to maximize the use of loan resources towards the speedy restoration of the road network. Accordingly, the executing agency appointed in house staff to the key positions within the executing unit thereby realizing cost savings aggregated with contingencies these monies were transferred to Direct cost for the restoration of the transportation network.

## IV. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

### A. Analysis of Critical Factors

- By all accounts this project was successfully implemented and essentially hit all of its targets. Critical to this success was the confidence placed in the institutional capacity of the National Works Agency and their prior experience of working with the IDB and it policies
- The Bank's delegation of authority to Project Team leader following the realignment facilitated timely and sensible project decisions which favored the removal of obstacles to project execution.
- The project was essentially one hundred percent physical investments which traditionally pose no difficulty to implement or conversely there were no difficult institutional reform components which traditionally have been difficult to implement.
- Fortnightly project team meetings NWA/IDB served as a critical continuous communication tool throughout project implementation.

## B. Borrower/Executing Agency Performance

Executing Agency performance in key areas. The Executing Agency Performance in the following areas is as follows:

1. Participation and quality of its contributions during project design	Low ← 1 2 3 <b>4</b> → High ○ ○ N/A
2. Organization for project execution (Executing / Coordinating Unit's staff, infrastructure, coordination, communication, etc.)	Low ← 1 2 3 <b>4</b> → High ○ N/A
3. Coordination and integration of the project executing/Coordinating Unit with the Executing Agency	Low ← 1 2 3 <b>4</b> → High ○ N/A
4. Establishing a monitoring and results framework (baseline data, systems, procedures, data analysis and reporting, etc.)	Low ← 1 2 3 <b>4</b> → High ○ N/A
5. Executing/Coordinating Unit's management and decision-making capacity	Low ← 1 2 3 <b>4</b> → High ○ N/A
6. Timeliness in the fulfillment of the Bank's policies, procedures and contractual clauses	Low ← 1 2 3 <b>4</b> → High ○ N/A
7. Financial management (securing counterpart resources, disbursements, quality and timeliness of AFS, etc.)	Low ← 1 2 <b>3</b> 4 → High ○ N/A
8. Timeliness and efficiency for procurement of goods, works and consulting services	Low ← 1 2 3 <b>4</b> → High ○ N/A
9. Executing Agency top-level management's leadership, ownership and support to project execution	Low ← 1 2 3 <b>4</b> → High ○ N/A
10. Concrete actions to secure project sustainability	Low ← 1 2 <b>3</b> 4 → High ○ N/A

Borrower/Executing Agency			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Highly Satisfactory (HS)	<input type="checkbox"/> Satisfactory (S)	<input type="checkbox"/> Unsatisfactory (U)	<input type="checkbox"/> Very Unsatisfactory (VU)

## C. Bank Performance

1. Extent to which the Bank facilitated the project design in a participatory manner with the Borrower and Executing Agency	Low ← 1 2 3 <b>4</b> → High ○ N/A
2. Technical assistance and training as well as consistent follow-up provided so that the Executing Agency follow the Bank's policies and procedures	Low ← 1 2 3 <b>4</b> → High ○ N/A
3. Technical assistance and training provided to the Executing Agency to improve project management	Low ← 1 2 3 <b>4</b> → High ○ N/A

- |   |                             |                           |
|---|-----------------------------|---------------------------|
| 4. Benefits of the Bank's supervision and assistance to improve project management                      | Low ← 1 2 3 <b>4</b> → High | <input type="radio"/> N/A |
| 5. Timeliness in the Bank's response to the needs of the Executing Agency during project implementation | Low ← 1 2 3 <b>4</b> → High | <input type="radio"/> N/A |
| 6. Bank flexibility to respond to emergencies during project implementation                             | Low ← 1 2 3 <b>4</b> → High | <input type="radio"/> N/A |

Bank Performance			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Highly Satisfactory (HS)	<input type="checkbox"/> Satisfactory (S)	<input type="checkbox"/> Unsatisfactory (U)	<input type="checkbox"/> Very Unsatisfactory (VU)

## V. SUSTAINABILITY

### A. Critical Factors

5.1 The critical factors that will ensure sustainability of the major outputs of the operation are:

- A critical factor that will ensure that the NWA has the ability to effectively respond to marooned communities in the future following similar events when mobility is impaired due to blocked roadways was the purchase of four over loader with the appropriate spares.
- Recent increases in taxes on fuel which will be appropriated to the road maintenance fund is also a critical factor of sustainability that will ensure an appropriate level of funding is available to support initial mobilization following a similar event.

### B. Potential Risks

5.2 The potential risk to sustainability would be continuous staffing and training to establish a cadre of heavy equipment operators and repair technicians as well as the appropriate and timely maintenance of the over loader to ensure that its full economic life and utility is realized.

5.3 Monies from the road maintenance fund is diverted to activities which do not support the sensible sustainability of roads and their protection during a hurricane.

### C. Institutional Capacity

5.4 Given the past experience of the executing agency in implementing Bank operation this operation was perfectly structured and dimensioned to the institutions absorptive capacity given the nature of the lending instrument.

Sustainability Classification SU:			
<input type="checkbox"/> Highly Probable	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Probable (P)	<input type="checkbox"/> Low Probability (LP)	<input type="checkbox"/> Improbable (I)

## **VI. MONITORING AND EVALUATION**

### **A. Information on Results**

- 6.1 It is worth noting that the results framework to provide the grounds for judging achievements was adequate. There were clear time-bound PDO and outcome indicators, appropriate with respect to the objectives of the operation.
- 6.2 Indicators identified to monitor progress toward PDOs and to make sure that there was commensurate progress in implementation and disbursement were sufficient. Project data was convincingly documented using appropriate collection methods, and properly used to report decision-making and resource allocation. Therefore, it can be said that monitoring and evaluation design, its implementation and utilization were adequate.
- 6.3 The process of data collection was reported at fortnightly project meetings.

### **B. Future Monitoring and Ex-Post Evaluation**

- 6.4 Not applicable. An ex-post evaluation is not required

## **VII. LESSONS LEARNED**

The lessons learned from the project are as follows:

- 7.1 Having the project team and Divisions responsible for the project from cradle to grave coupled with the delegation of authority to the team leader to effect critical project changes allowed the Bank to be more responsive and flexible to the technical changes that inevitable happen during the implementation of a project.
- 7.2 The IRF has a significant restriction in that its proceeds may not be used for investments in permanent rehabilitation or construction and are to be used only to return works to their pre-disaster state. This aspect of the policy to restore damaged infrastructure to its “previous condition” needs to be reexamined. Failed infrastructure often results from defective conditions and outdated, deficient standards; therefore it would be inappropriate to “rebuild vulnerability”.
- 7.3 The Immediate Response Facility as a financing instrument would be better aligned with helping Government's respond to emergency situations for example the timeline for commitment of all the resources should be lengthened or the uncommitted balance should be allowed to roll over into an investment loan reverting to normal procurement procedures provided some triggers are realized.

## **ANNEX I**

### **Minutes of Exit Meeting**

**Jamaica**  
**Emergency Assistance in Response to Flood Damage during**  
**the**  
**2007 Atlantic Hurricane Season**  
(JA-L1015 – 1959/OC-JA)  
**Minutes of Exit Workshop**  
**Held in the Conference room of the IDB, Kingston, Jamaica**  
**March 17, 2010**

**Present were:**

Mr. Earl Patterson,	Director of Project Implementation	National Works Agency (NWA)
Mr. John Wright,	Director of Major Projects,	National Works Agency (NWA)
Mr. Desrick Litchmore	Project Manager	National Works Agency (NWA)
Mr. Patrick Rose	Director of Planning	National Works Agency (NWA)
Ms. Janet Aleman-Howlett, (MTW)	Director, Works Policy	Ministry of Transport and Works
Ms. Monique Gibbs,	Corporate Planner	National Works Agency (NWA)
Mr. Howard Duval Service	Senior Project Engineer	Ministry of Finance & Public
Mr. Julian Belgrave	Operations Officer	Inter American Development Bank
Mr. Glaister Cunningham	Senior Analyst	Inter American Development Bank
Mr. Brian Mc Nish	Project Team Leader	Inter American Development Bank

**Regrets:**

Mr. Barbara Scott	Director, External Cooperation	Planning Institute of Jamaica
Mr. Alejandro Taddia,	Senior Transportation Specialist	Inter American Development Bank

**II. WORKSHOP PROCEEDINGS**

**2.1 Introduction:**

The workshop was convened at 9:30 a.m. Mr. Mc Nish gave a briefing on the rationale behind the IDB project completion reporting mechanism and the Exit Workshop procedure. He informed that the PCR, upon approval, would be available on the Bank's website for public viewing and that the minutes of the Exit Workshop would be attached as an Annex to the Project Completion Report (PCR). Mr. Belgrave welcomed everyone to the Exit Workshop and disclosed that he had invited someone from civil society, however they had indicated their unavailability. Introductions of participants then followed.

- 2.2** Mr. Mc Nish presented a PowerPoint summary of the salient features and events of the project from design through implementation to project completion and thereafter facilitated the discussion on the challenges of the operation, issues of sustainability and on the lessons learned.

**III. DISCUSSIONS**

**3.1 Project Results:**

There was unanimous agreement amongst workshop participants that this project was a success in that the project was well designed, and properly dimensioned to the capacity of the executing agency to facilitate rapid emergency response. Also

the execution mechanisms helped the project team to meet all of its targets in terms of time, cost and outputs. In general, there was agreement that it was well implemented, which was based on a strong joint team approach between the executing agency and the Bank .

Participants unanimously confirmed that the development objectives of the operation had been achieved as basic mobility had been restored to the population roads, there were no longer any blocked roads, and there was a growing public perception that things in the transportation sector were improving, giving the population more confidence and reliability in the road network. Participants also agreed that as a result of the loan the executing agency has also built a capacity to rapidly respond, should another similar event occur.

### 3.2 **Initial Project Challenges**

Mr. Rose advised that, notwithstanding the success of the operation in achieving its targets, he advised that the project could have been completed even sooner given the uncertainty which existed early in the life of the project when the team leader for the operation was based off island. It was felt that because of this uncertainty 4 months were lost and effectively the project was implemented in 8 months.

Mr. Patterson said, and Mr. Belgrave agreed, that the lesson here is that much more value is added to the client if the Specialist resides in country. It was remarked by other participants that it was crucial to have the Bank's presence in country to provide timely guidance during the implementation of an operation.

Mr. Patterson also advised that frequent fortnightly project meetings during the term of implementation of this program facilitated an atmosphere of openness and a willingness to share challenges and discuss solutions on an ongoing basis with the Bank and was central to the success of this operation.

### 3.3 **Sustainability**

Participants agreed that the two principle outcomes of the project were (i) development of the capacity within the NWA to rapidly respond to landslips and road blockages (ii) development of NWA's capacity for project supervision and (iii) flood damaged repairs to the transportation system

In order to realize sustainability, meeting participants agreed that

- A cadre of over loader drivers and mechanics should be continuously trained by the Ministry of Transport and Works training unit.
- Funding for the maintenance and replacement of the four over loader units should be requested in the annual budget for the equipment fund.
- The NWA should continue with its biannual succession planning organizational scans to ensure that there is no loss of project supervision capacity due to natural attrition
- To achieve some sustainability on the flood damage repairs conducted a master drainage plan should be conducted and implemented.



### **3.4    Lessons Learned**

- Having fortnightly meetings between NWA and the IDB was critical to the success of the project. It has proved to be a key supervision tool which provided a forum for communication and for the continuous identification of risk, brainstorming solutions and for the Bank to provide guidance to the project execution unit.
- The use of force account modality of procurement allows the Executing Agency to be more agile and nimble in its response to emergency repairs.
- The NWA has demonstrated the institutional capacity and in house ability to supervise and manage the conduct of IDB financed multiple civil works projects.

## **ANNEX II**

**[Borrower's Final Report](#)**  
**(link- due to the size of the annex)**

## **ANNEX III**

### **Borrower's Evaluation**

**JAMAICA**  
**EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE IN RESPONSE TO FLOOD DAMAGE DURING THE 2007**  
**ATLANTIC HURRICANE SEASON (LOAN-1959/OC-JA-L1015)**  
**Borrower Evaluation**



Inter-American Development Bank  
 Project Completion Report –2006 PCR  
 Borrower Evaluation

**Project Name:** Emergency Assistance In Response To Flood Damage During The 2007 Atlantic Hurricane Season (Loan-1959/OC-JA-L1015)

**Executing Agency:** The National Works Agency of the Ministry of Transport and Works

**Borrower:** Government of Jamaica

**Date of Project Approval:** February 4, 2008

**Date of Contract Effectiveness:** March 5, 2008

**Date of Borrower Evaluation:** March 2, 2010

**Expected Date of Exit Workshop:** March 17, 2010

**Borrower Project Performance Ratings**

Probability on Achieving its Development Objective(s):

[ ☒ ] Highly Probable (HP)      [ ☐ ] Probable (P)      [ ☐ ] Low Probability (LP)      [ ☐ ] Improbable (I)

Project Implementation:

[ ☒ ] Highly Satisfactory (HS)      [ ☐ ] Satisfactory (S)      [ ☐ ] Unsatisfactory (US)      [ ☐ ] Very Unsatisfactory (VU)

Sustainability of Project Results:

[ ☒ ] Highly Probable (HP)      [ ☐ ] Probable(P)      [ ☐ ] Low Probability (LP)      [ ☐ ] Improbable (I)

Comments:

**All projects objectives were comprehensively achieved.**

**Borrower Performance During Project Execution**

Please rate your own performance during Project Execution:

[ ☒ ] Highly Satisfactory (HS)      [ ☐ ] Satisfactory(S)      [ ☐ ] Unsatisfactory (US)      [ ☐ ] Very Unsatisfactory (VU)

Comments:

**Project was completed within budget and minimal extensions to contract.**

### Bank Performance During Project Preparation

Please rate the Bank's performance during project preparation. Factors to be considered include the extent to which the Bank facilitated a participatory project design, proposed adequate technical solutions to the problems identified, and responded to the needs of the Borrower (timeliness, selection of instrument type).

☒ Highly Satisfactory (HS)      ☐ Satisfactory(S)      ☐ Unsatisfactory (US)      ☐ Very Unsatisfactory (VU)

Comments:

**There was excellent collaboration and consensus between the bank and GOJ during the design of the projects.**

### Bank Performance During Project Supervision

Please rate the Bank's overall performance during project supervision. Factors to be considered include technical assistance (including informal and formal training) to Executing Agency, timeliness of Bank response and the Bank's flexibility to respond to emergency situations during project implementation.

☒ Highly Satisfactory (HS)      ☐ Satisfactory(S)      ☐ Unsatisfactory (US)      ☐ Very Unsatisfactory (VU)

Comments:

**A very good spirit of partnership existed between the Bank and GOJ during the execution.**

### Additional Suggestions for Improving Bank Performance

Additional comments/suggestions for improving Bank performance in the future.

**Continuous fortnightly meetings between the Bank and the Executing Agency instituted by the Project Team Leader during project execution proved to be an invaluable instrument in the success of this project which should be explored as a monitoring tool for future Bank operations.**



# **ANNEX IV**

## **Presentation of the Exit Workshop**



# *Emergency Assistance to Flood Damage 2007 (LO/1959-OC-JA)*

**Project Exit Meeting**

# AGENDA

Time	ITEM
9:00 – 9:30 am	a. Welcome b. Meeting focus and background information
9:30 – 10:30 a.m.	a. Assessment of project results (Group discussion) a. Information on Project Design b. Information on Project Implementation c. Outputs d. Outcomes achieved and challenges
10:30 – 11:00 a.m.	<i>Break</i>
11:00 – 11:50 a.m.	a. Project Sustainability b. Lessons Learned and Recommendations
11:50 – 12:00 a.m.	a. Closing Remarks



# FOCUS AND BACKGROUND

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- Why are we here?
- Project Completion Reports are a requirement of the Bank. They are conducted to create a forum for the Bank to listen to frank discussion between all stakeholders on the performance of Bank operations from design through implementation.
- The focus is on results, what went right, what were the challenges, issues of sustainability, what lessons were gleaned and recommendations which can be used in future operations to serve the needs of our client's better.

# PROJECT DESIGN

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## THE PROBLEM

In the wake of Hurricane Dean in August 2007 the main road network was blocked and severely damaged from attendant floods resulting in pockets of socio-economic dislocation and impaired mobility to the population.

## THE PROJECT OBJECTIVE

To restore services and basic mobility to the population of Jamaica, through the urgent reconstruction, stabilization and repair to damaged road infrastructure.

# PROJECT DESIGN

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(US\$10 million Loan)  
COMPONENTS

- I. CONSULTANT SERVICES (US\$735,000)
  - I. Project execution Unit
  - II. Consultants
  - III. Institutional strengthening
  
- II. DIRECT COST ON THE TRANSPORTATION NETWORK (US\$9,190,000)
  - I. Transportation network
  - II. Contingency
  
- III. FINANCIAL AUDIT (US\$75,000)

# PROJECT DESIGN

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## Lending Instrument-: Immediate Response Facility

### Features:

- Allows the use of emergency procurement procedures.
- Uncommitted balances of the loan would be cancelled 9 months from the date of the natural disaster.
- 100% of loan resources were available for retroactive financing. (innovation)
- Conditions Precedent to first disbursement were based solely on the appointment of a Project Manager and an Accountant.
- 12 month disbursement period.

# IMPLEMENTATION

## Critical Initiatives and Events

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- The conduct of fortnightly IDB/NWA project team meetings over the implementation period.
- Conditions precedent to first disbursement were realized within the 6 month term established.
- All of the loan's resources were committed within the 9 month term establish facilitated by the Bank's flexibility to recognize a commitment as a letter of award in lieu of a signed contract.
- The project was substantively completed within the 12month term for disbursement but it was extended for an additional 8 months to bring the project to an administrative close.

# OUTPUT and CHALLENGES

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## **CIVIL WORKS**

### OUTPUT

- 100% of all the emergency works committed were completed on time and within budget by the end of project.

### CHALLENGE

- Works susceptible to flooding like river training works was deferred to the less rainy period to mitigate the risk of losing works in place on the river bed.

## **PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT**

### OUTPUT

- 100% of the goods, technical services and key staff of the executing unit were procured and hired on time and within budget.

# Project Cost

CATEGORY	Total Project Cost - Planned (US\$000)	Total Project Cost - Actual (US\$000)	% Difference
	BANK	BANK	
1. <b>Consultant Services</b>			
1.1 Project Execution Team	35,000.00	0.00	(35,000.00)
1.2 Project Support	160,000.00	0.00	(160,000.00)
1.3 Institutional Strengthening	540,000.00	153,196.78	(386,803.22)
2. <b>Direct Costs</b>			
2.1 Transportation network	8,000,000.00	9,815,752.22	1,815,752.22
2.2 Contingency	1,190,000.00	0.00	(1,190,000.00)
3. <b>Audit</b>			
3.1 Financial Audit	75,000.00	30,831.58	(44,168.42)

The variation in the budget relate to a strategy which was adopted by the executing agency and agreed to with the Bank to maximize the use of loan resources towards the speedy restoration of the road network. Accordingly, the executing agency appointed in house staff to the key positions within the executing unit thereby realizing cost savings aggregated with contingencies these monies were transferred to Direct cost for the restoration of the transportation network.

# OUTCOMES ACHIEVED

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- The IRF loan assisted the GoJ with the financing of repairs to main roads, bridges and the cleanup and disposal of debris from the damage caused by the hurricane and thus contributed to the immediate restoration of basic mobility to the population of Jamaica and the normalizing of traffic flows and social services within a year after the passage of the hurricane.
- The contribution of the IRF overall to the recovery effort was excellent as the project meet all of its targets. Mobility to the population was restored as no roads on the network remained impassible at the end of the project down from the 446 road closures shortly after the event.
- Although the loan was signed five months following the hurricane events the executing agency's ability to provide audited documentation for retroactive expenditure was very important to submitting eligible requests for reimbursement. The early appointment of a Project Manager and continuous fortnightly meetings during the implementation period contributed significantly to the project meeting all of it targets with 100% of the resources committed within the allotted time frame and 100% disbursed by the end of the project.



# CHALLENGES

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Challenges:  
Discussion

# PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY

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## **Critical Factors**

- A critical factor that will ensure that the NWA has the ability to effectively respond to marooned communities in the future following similar events when mobility is impaired due to blocked roadways was the purchase of four over loaders with the appropriate spares.
- Recent increases in taxes on fuel which will be appropriated to the road maintenance fund is also a critical factor of sustainability that will ensure an appropriate level of funding is available to support initial mobilization following a similar event.

## **Potential Risks**

- The potential risk to sustainability would be continuous staffing and training to establish a cadre of heavy equipment operator as well as the appropriate and timely maintenance of the over loaders to ensure that their full economic life and utility is realized.
- Monies from the road maintenance fund is diverted to activities which do not support the sensible sustainability of roads and there protection following a hurricane

# LESSONS LEARNT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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- Having the project team and Divisions responsible for the project from cradle to grave coupled with the delegation of authority to the team leader to effect critical project changes allows the Bank to be more responsive and flexible to the technical changes that inevitably happen during the implementation of a project.
- The IRF has a significant restriction in that its proceeds may not be used for investments in permanent rehabilitation or construction and are to be used only to return works to their pre-disaster state. This aspect of the policy to restore damaged infrastructure to its “previous condition” needs to be reexamined. Failed infrastructure often results from defective conditions and outdated, deficient standards; therefore it would be inappropriate to “rebuild vulnerability”.
- The Immediate Response Facility as a financing instrument is not properly aligned with helping Government's respond to emergency situations. The pace of development in Borrowing countries, the time required to approve use of the facility, and the strict rules, regulations and timelines governing the use of the facility all conspire to give with one hand and take away with the other. The timeline for commitment of all the resources for example needs to be reviewed or the facility has to be allowed to roll over into an investment loan reverting to normal procurement procedures provided some triggers are realized is a recommendation.