



Project Completion Report

PCR

Project Name: Education Sector Enhancement Program (ESEP)

Country: Barbados

Sector/Subsector: Education

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Project Number: BA0009

Loan Number: 1154/OC-BA

QRR Date: February 28, 2012

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

AVA	Audio Visual Aids Unit
BA	Barbados
BIMAP	Barbados Institute of Management and Productivity
BSSEE	Barbados Secondary Schools Entrance Exam
CDB	Caribbean Development Bank
CXC	Caribbean Examinations Council
EEC	Education Evaluation Center
EMIS	Education Management Information Systems
EPIU	Education Program Implementation Unit
ESEP	Education Sector Enhancement Program
ETTC	Erdiston Teachers Training College
GOB	Government of Barbados
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
ITC	Information Technology Coordinator
JBTE	Joint Board of Teacher Education
MEHR	Ministry of Education and Human Resource Development
OVE	Office of Oversight and Evaluation in the IDB
PCU	Program Coordination Unit
PMIS	Project Management Information System
PSC	Policy Steering Committee
PSR	Project Status Report
SILTS	School Information Technology Teams
SRC	Software Review Centre
UWI	University of the West Indies

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I. Basic Information

BASIC DATA (AMOUNTS IN US\$)							
PROJECT NO: 1154/OC-BA	TITLE: Education Sector Enhancement Project (ESEP)						
Borrower: Barbados	Date of Board Approval: August 13, 1998						
Executing Agency (EA): Ministry of Education and Human Resource Development (MEHR)	Date of Loan Contract Effectiveness: December 19, 1998						
Loan(s): \$119,918,040.78	Date of Eligibility for First Disbursement: July 19, 1999						
Sector: Education	Months in Execution						
Lending Instrument: _____	* from Approval: 124 months (from Cabinet approval)						
	* from Contract Effectiveness: 120 months						
	Disbursement Periods						
	Original Date of Final Disbursement: December 19, 2005						
	Current Date of Final Disbursement: December 19, 2009						
	Cumulative Extension (Months): 36 months						
	Special Extensions (Months): 12 months						
	Loan Amount(s)						
	* Original Amount: US\$85,000,000.00						
	* Current Amount: \$60,034,063						
	* Pari Passu (if applicable):						
Poverty Targeted Investment (PTI): Yes	Disbursements						
Social Equity (SEQ): Yes	* Amount to date: 100 %						
Environmental Classification: A, B, or C	Total Project Cost (Original Estimate):						
	Redirectioning						
	Has this Project?						
	Received funds from another Project [no]						
	Sent funds to another Project [no]						
	N/A []						
	<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>To/From Project Number</th> <th>From Sub-Loan Number</th> <th>Amount</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	To/From Project Number	From Sub-Loan Number	Amount			
To/From Project Number	From Sub-Loan Number	Amount					
	* Current amount (adjusted for redirectioning):						
	On Alert Status						
	Is project currently designated on alert by PAIS: Yes/No						
	If yes then why is the project on alert (DO, IP Ratings and/or relevant PAIS indicators):						
	Comments on relevance of on alert status for this project (if applicable):						

Summary Performance Classifications				
DO	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Highly Probable (HP)	<input type="checkbox"/> Probable (P)	<input type="checkbox"/> Low Probability (LP)	<input type="checkbox"/> Improbable (I)
IP	<input type="checkbox"/> Highly Satisfactory (HS)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Satisfactory (S)	<input type="checkbox"/> Unsatisfactory (US)	<input type="checkbox"/> Very Unsatisfactory (VU)
SU	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Highly Probable (HP)	<input type="checkbox"/> Probable (P)	<input type="checkbox"/> Low Probability (LP)	<input type="checkbox"/> Improbable (I)

II. The Project

a. Project Context

The high importance attributed to education was evident at the time that a dialogue began between the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the Government of Barbados (GOB) with regards to the Education Sector Enhancement Program (ESEP) in the 1990s. The Barbados education system is modeled after the British system and caters to approximately 28,000 students at the primary level and 22,000 secondary students; about 14,000 students are enrolled at the tertiary level. Education is free at all levels with the exception of enrollment in a few private schools. Additionally, Barbados (BA) established a school for the deaf and blind called the Irving Wilson School; the Learning Centre, the Ann Hill School, the Challenor School, and the Alma Parris Secondary school, all of which cater to special needs students. In 1995, the Ministry of Education, Youth Affairs and Culture, under the leadership of the then Minister of

Education, the Honorable Mia Mottley, produced a document titled, White Paper on Educational Reform: Preparing for the Twenty-first Century (thereafter the white paper) which outlined a philosophical vision of education in BA with a mobilizing theme of Each one matters...quality education for all.

Recognizing the substantial progress of education in BA, the white paper identified specific areas of education still in need of reform including: teacher empowerment, curriculum reform, special education, infrastructure, and technological advancement in schools, to meet the challenges of the 21st century. In turn, these reform initiatives became the blueprint of the ESEP, which encompassed the following five inter-related components: Civil Works, Technological Infrastructure, Human Resource Development, Curriculum Resource Development and Overall Institutional Strengthening. The program was seminal in several ways (see below).

ESEP constituted the largest loan that the IDB had made to a Caribbean country at that time. Additionally, ESEP was the first collaborative loan project of such scope between the IDB and the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) along with GOB funding. Most important was the magnitude of size and scope of the project: ESEP proposed to revamp the entire public education system at the primary and secondary levels in a variety of critical areas over a seven-year period. The sheer magnitude of the project resulted in several challenges that were compounded by what is now seen by a number of key players in the project implementation, as an unrealistic time frame (various interviews).

Throughout project implementation, changes in the schools to address the goals of the civil works and technological infrastructure components proved challenging because of the myriad interruptions in the schooling process. However, current gains in academic achievement (detailed later in the report) are now credited to a number of the changes resulting from ESEP. As the following sections will show, there have been a number of critical successes as a result of ESEP although some systemic challenges continue to exist. Importantly, all components of ESEP were implemented. However, even though ESEP is still in progress, school personnel and the public perceive the project as ended, in part due to the change in government in 2008.

III. Project Description

i. Development Objective(s)

As noted earlier, the policy paper out of which ESEP emerged focused on the need to improve the quality of education in order to ensure that Barbadian citizens were prepared to be readily trainable in a global, technologically changing society. The objectives, encompassing a coherent set of strategic measures, were outlined in the loan proposal as follows:

1. To improve the relevance and effectiveness of the national curriculum;
2. To improve the pedagogy and teaching practices of educators;
3. To improve the assessment mechanisms in the education system, and overall;
4. To ensure that the teaching methodology and materials used in the schools reflect the technological shift that was taking place in the world economy.

In 2005 when the loan was extended by three additional years, the objectives noted in the revised logical framework, remained unchanged in principle but were worded more specifically: enhanced physical and learning environment through rehabilitation of school facilities.

1. Effective use of ICT in education.
2. Integration of all available ICT within the educational system.
3. Improved [educational] outcomes at the primary and secondary levels.
4. Enhanced capacity of teachers, MES officers and Erdiston Teachers Training College (ETTC) tutors to deliver instruction and manage the educational system.
5. Improvement in the range and relevance of skills, knowledge and attitudes through the revised curricula.

ii. Components

The program consisted of the five following components:

1. **School Rehabilitation** (US\$28,120,014) – physical refurbishment and upgrading of classrooms and other facilities including the retrofitting of specific classrooms to accommodate installation of various educational multi-media resources.
2. **Technological Infrastructure** (US\$23,162,832) – a gradual computerization of all primary and secondary schools including the purchase of learning technologies, associated applications and necessary networking infrastructure.
3. **Human Resource Development** (US\$26,495) – training of 3000-4000 education-sector professionals toward the development of multiple support systems and, significantly contribute to the long-term sustainability of the program. To maximize available resources, most of the training would be in-service and site-based.
4. **Curriculum Reform and Evaluation** (US\$0) – a comprehensive reform of the national curriculum including the introduction of new content areas related to IT; the systematic integration of software into classroom activities; the development of new strategies for teaching and learning which maximize the options offered by IT; and, systematic support of this reform through the establishment of a Software Review Center and an Education Evaluation Center in the School of Education at the University of the West Indies.
5. **Overall institutional strengthening** (US\$8,724,722 – noted in the Exec Financial Summary as Project Management and Financial costs) – establishing a Program Coordination Unit (PCU) that monitors all facets of the program, including the design and supervision of all civil works activities, and local and international technical assistance as needed; and two external evaluations.

The project loan totaled US\$85,000,000 and was initially slated for a 7-year period (1999-2005). In 2005 negotiations between IDB and the GOB resulted in a three-year extension with a new completion date of December 2008 and a restructuring. The restructured plan upheld the original development objectives with more specifically targeted areas within these objectives as detailed above, and maintained the original components. However, activities within the Civil Works and Technological Infrastructure components were adjusted to reflect the new status of technology at the time (i.e. wireless technology). The restructuring resulted in the cancellation of funds of approx. US\$25,000,000. In 2008, another year of special extension was added to allow the successful completion of some ICT-related procurement processes and the installation of technology in the schools (final disbursement date was December 2009).

b. Quality -At- Entry Review (if applicable)

Quality -At- Entry Review			
<input type="checkbox"/> Highly Satisfactory (HS) - 1	<input type="checkbox"/> Fully Satisfactory (S) - 2	<input type="checkbox"/> Less than Satisfactory (LS) - 3	<input type="checkbox"/> Unsatisfactory (U) - 4

This Quality-at-Entry Review is not applicable for this project.

IV. Results

a. Outcomes

ACHIEVEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES (DO)			
Development Objective(s) (Purpose)			Key Outcome Indicators
1. Rehabilitated physical infrastructure			
1.1 57 of 77 (74%) schools were completed. This number of completed schools represent half of the primary targeted, all of the secondary schools and four private schools.			
Planned Outcomes			Outcomes Achieved
Baseline 0 (01 Jan 2000)	Intermediate 38 completed (Dec 2005)	End of Project 77 completed (Dec 2009)	1.1 57 - 74% (2011)
Reformulation			
Initially the target was 119 schools (public and private). During the restructuring period this number was revised to 77 schools.			
PPMR Retrofitting. Indicate if and when the PPMR was retrofitted and explain any changes resulting from this exercise.			
<input type="checkbox"/> N/A			
Summary Development Objective(s) Classification (DO):			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Highly Probable (HP)	<input type="checkbox"/> Probable (P)	<input type="checkbox"/> Low Probability (LP)	<input type="checkbox"/> Improbable (I)

2.1 Effective use of ICT in education.			
2.2 Integration of all available ICT within the educational system.			
2.1 ICT is available in 32 secondary schools (23 public and 9 private) and 83 primary schools (72 public and 11 private) with computers, related peripherals and specific software and audio-visual equipment.			
Planned Outcomes			Outcomes Achieved
Baseline	Intermediate	End of Project	
2.1 0 (May 2000)	78 (May 2004)	117 (2009)	2.1 115 - 98% (2011)
Reformulation			
In the beginning of the project, ICT was linked to civil works. During the restructuring period the focus shifted to wireless access and all schools still in need of ICT were each allotted 30 computers.			
PPMR Retrofitting. Indicate if and when the PPMR was retrofitted and explain any changes resulting from this exercise.			
<input type="checkbox"/> N/A			
Summary Development Objective(s) Classification (DO):			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Highly Probable (HP)	<input type="checkbox"/> Probable (P)	<input type="checkbox"/> Low Probability (LP)	<input type="checkbox"/> Improbable (I)
Human Resource Development:			
3.1 Improved outcomes at the primary and secondary school levels.			
3.2 Enhanced capacity of teachers, MES Officers and ETTC tutors to deliver Instruction and manage the educational system.			
3.1 Decrease by 50% the number of students scoring less than 30 in Mathematics at Barbados Secondary Schools Entrance Exam (BSSEE) by end of project.			
3.1.1 Decrease by 50% the number of students scoring less than 30 in English at BSSEE by end of project.			
3.1.2 5% increase in the number of students sitting CXC examinations.			
3.1.3 10% increase in pass rates in CXC examinations in Mathematics.			
3.1.4 10% increase in pass rates in CXC examinations in English.			
3.1.5 Computer mastery achieved for 75% of school leavers by end of project.			
3.2 4000 teachers, administrative and MEHR personnel trained in IT computer-assisted teaching and learning by 2015.			
Planned Outcomes			Outcomes Achieved
Baseline	Intermediate	End of Project	
3.1 34.40% (May 2000)	25.8% (May 2004)	21.59% (Dec 2008)	3.1 17.2 % (Dec 2009)
3.1.1 25.3% (May 2000)	18.98% (May 2004)	14.97 % (Dec 2008)	3.1.1 12.65% (Dec 2009)
3.1.2 4335 students (May 2000)	4444 (June 2004)	4552 (Dec 2009)	3.1.2 5189 students (20% increase) (Dec 2009)
3.1.3 35.5% (June 2000)	37.27% (June 2004)	39.05% (Dec 2008)	3.1.3 55% increase (Dec 2009)
3.1.4 50.2% (June 2000)	52.71% (June 2004)	55.22% (Dec 2008)	3.1.4 60% (Dec 2009)
3.1.5 42% (May 2000)		78% (Dec 2008)	3.1.5 75% (Dec 2009)
3.2 0 (May 2000)	2000 (May 2004)	4000 (Dec 2008)	3.2 2821 (June 2008)
Reformulation			
During the restructuring period, outcome indicators (3.1, 3.1.2, and 3.1.5) were revised. However the numbers here reflect the indicators prior to the restructuring period as reported to IDB by MEHR as the outcome indicators remained unchanged.			
PPMR Retrofitting. Indicate if and when the PPMR was retrofitted and explain any changes resulting from this exercise.			
<input type="checkbox"/> N/A			
Summary Development Objective(s) Classification (DO):			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Highly Probable (HP)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Probable (P)	<input type="checkbox"/> Low Probability (LP)	<input type="checkbox"/> Improbable (I)
4.1 Reformed curriculum and evaluation			
4.1 Revised curricula and relevant software in use in all schools by end of project.			
4.1.1 The full application of the Education Management Information Systems (EMIS) is deployed to 22 public secondary schools and 70 public primary schools; From this school year (2011-2012) schools are required to submit student roll, teacher and student absences, Students' admissions and removals and teacher qualifications to the MEHR through the EMIS.			
4.1.2 The Project Management Information System (PMIS) was developed in 2008.			
			Outcomes Achieved
			2.1 117 - 100% (2011)
			2.2 92 - 92% (2011)
			2.3 still to be implemented (2011)
Reformulation			
<input type="checkbox"/> N/A The number of schools noted in 4.1.1 represents the current number of public primary and secondary schools. Over the course of ESEP one secondary school closed and 4 primary schools amalgamated into 2 primary schools.			
PPMR Retrofitting. Indicate if and when the PPMR was retrofitted and explain any changes resulting from this exercise.			
<input type="checkbox"/> N/A			
Summary Development Objective(s) Classification (DO):			
<input type="checkbox"/> Highly Probable (HP)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Probable (P)	<input type="checkbox"/> Low Probability (LP)	<input type="checkbox"/> Improbable (I)
5.1 Overall Institutional Strengthening			
5.1 A Programme Coordination Unit was established.			
5.1.1 A Software Review Centre was established.			
Reformulation			
<input type="checkbox"/> N/A			
PPMR Retrofitting. Indicate if and when the PPMR was retrofitted and explain any changes resulting from this exercise.			
<input type="checkbox"/> N/A			
Summary Development Objective(s) Classification (DO):			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Highly Probable (HP)	<input type="checkbox"/> Probable (P)	<input type="checkbox"/> Low Probability (LP)	<input type="checkbox"/> Improbable (I)

Country Strategy

The IDB is assisting the GOB to strengthen the capacity of its school system by ensuring that every child has access to technology, and teachers' pedagogical strategies are improved through the use of technology. To this end, the white paper detailed a comprehensive revision of the education system and the ESEP was the means by which these revisions would be implemented.

Thus far, the ESEP project has achieved the following:

- The majority of the schools in BA were refurbished targeting initially all 73 primary schools and 23 secondary schools. Over the course of the project, 4 primary schools have amalgamated into 2 primary schools and one secondary school has closed, thereby reducing the number of schools to 71 primary schools and 22 Secondary schools for a total of 93 schools. The four primary schools amalgamated into two resulted in two new buildings built under ESEP. Of the revised 77 schools targeted under ESEP, 57 (74%) have been refurbished and refurbishment continues with the remaining schools using CDB funds (expected final disbursement date for CDB is December 2012).
- All schools have been made technologically ready; all 93 schools have technology available and access to the internet. Prior to ESEP, technology-supported instruction was minimal. Although a baseline study was not conducted at the onset of the program, the Education Evaluation Centre (EEC) in 2008 analyzed available technology at the beginning of the project indicating that prior to ESEP schools and the Ministry of Education and Human Resource Development (MEHR) had very little technology. As a result of ESEP, technology is visible in schools and in the MEHR and is used in the classrooms and school administrative offices. All public primary schools have one computer lab and all of the public secondary schools have at least two computer laboratories. Computer access for students at school is considered a given and teachers either have their own personal laptop or have easy access to a laptop provided by MEHR to the school.
- Every school has an IT Coordinator on staff.
- As indicated above (see outcomes), MEHR reports indicate that student outcomes achieved exceeded the end of project targets in all key outcome indicators. For example, one key indicator is 50% decreases in the number of students scoring less than 30 in Math and English on the Barbados Secondary Schools Entrance Exam (BSSEE). The baseline as reported by MEHR for these indicators were that 34% and 25% of students were scoring below 30 in Math and English respectively as of May 2000. The projected end-of-project targets were decreases by 17% in Math and 13% in English by December 2009. By December 2008, actual percentages achieved had already exceeded the projected targets with improvements in Math, evidenced in a decrease by 22% and in English, a decrease by 15%. Similar evidence is indicated for the numbers of students sitting Caribbean Examinations Council (CXC) exams as well as increased pass rates in Math and English.
- The key outcome indicator, computer mastery achieved for 75% of school leavers by the end of project is only measured by students sitting the CXC IT exam. Thus, by December 2008, there was an increase of 75% over a baseline of 42% students demonstrating computer mastery, this percentage only reflects the number of secondary school students who actually sit the IT examination at CXC. In sum, student outcomes had significantly improved in Math, English and IT by 2008.¹
- A total of 2821 teachers, MES officers and ETTC tutors received some type of technology training:
 - 1506 teachers and MEHR personnel trained in Basic Technology Mastery.
 - 45 ITCs were trained and Microsoft certified.
 - 249 persons trained in technology-integrated teacher training.
 - 121 persons trained in technology-integrated teaching.
 - 180 persons trained in academic software.

¹ The results in Math and English are substantiated by an EEC report, which details a longitudinal comparative analysis between 2 five-year periods (1999-2003 and 2004-2004) of BSSEE and CXC data. The report shows that of the 71 public primary schools, 33 (46%) and 38 (53%) recorded decreased numbers of students scoring in the 0-30 range in Math and English respectively. Of the 21 secondary schools, 14 (67%) in CXC Math and 16 (76%) in CXC English recorded improvements in passes.

- 122 persons trained in indigenous software.
- 778 trained in teaching methodologies.
- 127 trained in educational leadership.
- 23 trained in school financial management.
- 76 trained in school administrative procedures.
- 23 trained in management of school libraries/media resources.
- ETTC trained 467 primary and secondary academic and administrative staff of Phases III and IV in core programs.
- Training at Mount St. Vincent University, Canada: 52 teachers graduated with Masters in Special Education and 14 teachers have graduated with Bachelors in Special Education.

Additionally, a total of 144 teachers completed training with Illuminat (source: Illuminat Academic Software Training Final Report, 2007). During the restructuring period, teacher training was provided through the Audio Visual Aids (AVA) Unit and the PCU of the MEHR. The training focused on technology integration in teachers' pedagogical practices utilizing the software available in schools. In addition, Education Management Information Systems (EMIS) has been rolled out at 92 schools; a Project Management Information System (PMIS) was developed, however due to absence of a unique student identifier, is not operational yet.

- The AVA Unit at the MEHR now includes a Software Review Center (SRC).
- The new curriculum and attainment targets for every class and form level are implemented in all of the schools.

From all perspectives, efforts were lacking primarily in the area of monitoring and evaluation, both throughout the project (in the work of the EEC) and in the implementation of a sustainable monitoring and evaluation system in the MEHR through the implementation of a PMIS. Although the EMIS is available in all schools, its sustainability and full use will be limited without an operational PMIS in the MEHR.

Additionally, the pedagogical changes introduced through ESEP remain a challenge. From the outset, technological training for teachers took place over a year and half before the technology was placed at the schools. This delay discouraged teachers who were excited initially and increased the resistance of teachers who were already reluctant to implement the new pedagogical strategies in their classrooms. In the study conducted by the IDB OVE (2009), many teachers also cited the unreliability of the technology (mainly computers), as a major reason why they don't use them more extensively in their classrooms.

b. Externalities

The project was very large in scope and as a result was affected by consequences such as, changes in the economic focus of the country resulting in lower budget allocations by GOB; and, the construction boom that occurred during the early years of the project thereby limiting the capacity of the industry to serve the project. Moreover, the civil works component originally intended only to refurbish and prepare schools for technology became much larger in scope due to the poor conditions of the majority of the schools. Schools required more extensive work to accommodate the technological infrastructure than originally planned. Consequently, the learning environment in most schools has been significantly improved (Pirog & Kioko, July 2006).

The project also demonstrated the need to review the existing teacher training system. Prior to ESEP, persons were entering the teaching profession without any pre-service training. Only once employed, teachers had access to initial teacher training through the Associates Degree offered through the ETTC and accredited through the Joint Board of Teacher Education (JBTE) at the UWI Cave Hill Campus School of Education. However, as a result of the project, the ETTC started an induction program allowing persons to enter the profession with some initial training. Additionally, the project created opportunities for students and by extension, families, to have exposure to the technology. Particularly in the Phase 1 schools, students were exposed to a one-to-one laptop solution which allowed students to take the computers home. Because one-to-one solutions were in the very early stages of conceptualization, few

suppliers existed and the technology was evolving. The chosen supplier went out of business within a year of the implementation of the laptop computers; and the pilot project was discontinued. Nonetheless, families' exposure to technology created an awareness of the possibilities of technology for improved learning outcomes that remains and will serve as a foundation for future initiatives.

c. Outputs

IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS (IP)			
Components (Outputs):			
1. Component 1: Rehabilitated physical infrastructure Total cost of Component 1: \$38,068,014 Counterpart: \$9,948,000 IDB: \$28,120,014 IDB Disbursement: 74% Classification: HS, S, U, VU			
Key Output Indicators: Rehabilitated Physical Infrastructure			
<u>Baseline*</u>	<u>Planned Outputs</u> <u>Annual/Intermediate</u>	<u>End of Project</u>	<u>Outputs Achieved</u>
1.1 _0_ (Jan 2000)	1.1 38 (Dec 2008)	1.1 77 (Dec 2009)	1.1 _57_ (2011)
* (if applicable)			
Briefly explain differences between planned and actual outputs (if applicable). The completion of 57 schools represents 74% completion of the planned output. <input type="checkbox"/> N/A			
Restructuring. Indicate if this component was restructured (date of approval by Manager). Briefly discuss the consequences of these changes. Initially the target was 119 schools (public and private). During the restructuring period this number was revised to 77 schools. <input type="checkbox"/> N/A			
2. Component 2: Integration and Effective use of Technology Total cost of Component 2: \$43,578,638 Counterpart: 20, 402,000 IDB: \$23,162,832 IDB Disbursement: 53% Classification: HS, S, U, VU			
Key Output Indicators: Technology Integration			
<u>Baseline*</u>	<u>Planned Outputs</u> <u>Annual/Intermediate</u>	<u>End of Project</u>	<u>Outputs Achieved</u>
2.1 _0_ (May 2000)	2.1 _39_ (May 2004)	2.1 117 (2009)	2.1 115 (2011)
* (if applicable)			
Briefly explain differences between planned and actual outputs (if applicable). <input type="checkbox"/> N/A			
Restructuring. Indicate if this component was restructured (date of approval by Manager). Briefly discuss the consequences of these changes. In the beginning of the project, the ICT was closely linked to civil works. During the restructuring period the focus shifted to wireless access and all schools still in need of ICT were each allotted 30 computers. The advances made in wireless technology allowed for moving forward with the installation independent of civil works issues (e.g. rewiring and rebuilding classrooms). <input type="checkbox"/> N/A			
3. Component 3: Human Resource Development and Training Total cost of Component: \$4,808,495 Counterpart: \$4,782,000 IDB: \$26,495 IDB Disbursement: 0.55% Classification: HS, S, U, VU			
Key Output Indicators: Human Resource Development and Training			
<u>Baseline*</u>	<u>Planned Outputs</u> <u>Annual/Intermediate</u>	<u>End of Project</u>	<u>Outputs Achieved</u>
3.1 _0_ (May 2000)	3.1 2000 (May 2004)	3.1 4000 (Dec 2009)	3.1 821 (2011)
Briefly explain differences between planned and actual outputs (if applicable). <input type="checkbox"/> N/A			
Restructuring. Indicate if this component was restructured (date of approval by Manager). Briefly discuss the consequences of these changes. <input type="checkbox"/> N/A			
4. Component 4: Curriculum Reform and Evaluation Total cost of Component: \$1,490,000 Counterpart: \$1,490,000 IDB: \$0 IDB Disbursement: Classification: HS, S, U, VU			
Key Output Indicators:			
<u>Baseline</u>	<u>Planned Outputs</u> <u>Intermediate</u>	<u>End of Project</u>	<u>Outputs Achieved</u>
4.1 _0_ (May 2000)	95 (Dec 2000)	117 (2009)	4.1 115 (2011)
* (if applicable)			

Briefly explain differences between planned and actual outputs (if applicable).
☐ N/A

Restructuring. Indicate if this component was restructured (date of approval by Manager). Briefly discuss the consequences of these changes.
☐ N/A

5. Component 5: Overall Institutional Strengthening
 Total cost of Component: **\$77,924,722**
 Counterpart: \$69,200,000
 IDB: \$8,724,722
 IDB Disbursement: 11%
 Classification: HS, S, U, VU

Key Output Indicators: Overall Institutional Strengthening

Planned Outputs			Outputs Achieved
Baseline* May 2000 * (if applicable)	Annual/Intermediate	End of Project	End of Project PCU established SRC established

Briefly explain differences between planned and actual outputs (if applicable).
☐ N/A

Restructuring. Indicate if this component was restructured (date of approval by Manager). Briefly discuss the consequences of these changes.
 The original amount committed from IDB was \$1,961,827. However, this number increased significantly to reflect the current disbursement.
 The change was in response to the needs of the project as stated by MEHR during the restructuring period.
☐ N/A

Summary Implementation Progress Classification:

☐ Highly Satisfactory (HS) ☒ Satisfactory (S) ☐ Unsatisfactory (U) ☐ Very Unsatisfactory (VU)

d. Project Costs

Total Project Cost – Planned 1998-2005 (US\$000)					
CATEGORIES	BANK	CDB	LOCAL	TOTAL	% TOTAL
1. PROJECT MANAGEMENT	2,751	0	5,029	7,780	2.5
1.1 PCU	0	0	2,366	2,366	1.1
1.2 Program Evaluation	0	0	300	300	0.1
1.3 Technical Assistance	2,751	0	0	0	1.3
1.4 Design & Supervision	0	0	2,363	2,363	1.1
2. DIRECT COSTS	78,043	26,197	10,424	114,664	53.8
4.1 Civil Works	29,440	9,948	0	39,388	18.5
4.2 Curriculum Reform	0	55	1,435	1,490	0.7
- Software Review Center-	0	55	95	150	0.1
Evaluation Center	0	0	1,340	1,340	0.6
4.3 HRD-training	100	2,389	2,393	4,882	2.3
4.4 Information Technology	48,503	13,806	6,596	68,905	32.3
- Infrastructure	1,004	688	0	1,692	0.8
- Networks	3,974	1,109	0	5,082	2.4
- School hardware	24,114	12,009	0	36,122	17.0
- Ministry hardware	920	0	0	920	0.4
- Standard software	2,406	0	0	2,406	1.1
- Specialized software	10,349	0	0	10,349	4.9
- Technical support	2,738	0	3,921	6,659	3.1
- Other costs	3,000	0	2,675	5,675	2.7
3. CONCURRENT COSTS	0	0	26,625	26,625	12.5
1.1 Operational Costs	0	0	25,162	25,162	11.8
1.2 Civil Works Maintenance	0	0	1,463	1,463	0.7
SUBTOTAL	80,794	26,197	42,078	149,069	70.0
4. CONTINGENCIES	3,356	5,303	20,354	29,013	13.6
4.5 Physical Contingencies	3,356	2,296	5,794	11,446	5.4
4.6 Cost escalation	0	3,007	14,560	17,567	8.2
5. FINANCIAL COSTS	850	0	34,175	35,025	16.4
5.1 Interest	0	0	30,184	30,184	14.2
5.2 Commitment Fee	0	0	3,991	3,991	1.9
5.3 Inspection and Supervision	850	0	0	850	0.4
TOTAL	85,000	31,500	96,607	213,107	100.0
% FUND/YEAR	39.9	14.8	45.3	100.0	

Briefly explain any differences: In 2005, the two main components, Civil Works and ICT infrastructure were decoupled in order to improve the timeliness of execution of the components and resolve some of the burdensome issues associated with implementation as it existed from the start of the project in 1998. With the implementation of wireless technology, which became more affordable in the later years of the project, the refurbished infrastructure was not a prior condition for bringing technology to a school and providing internet for a computer lab. Therefore, during the restructuring period, the focus was on separating these two components more than was done before 2005. This change also modified the budget for the two components as the institutional capacity of the MEHR did not allow the completion of the full refurbishing of all primary and secondary schools. MEHR proposed to analyze the remaining schools and design different packages for refurbishing and providing technology. Mostly due to this de-coupling a cancellation of IDB funds in the amount of US\$25 million was done as part of the restructuring.

Total Project Cost – Actual 1998-2009 (US\$)					
(Reproduce cost table) CATEGORIES	BANK	CDB (as of March 2012)	LOCAL	TOTAL	% TOTAL
1.PROJECT MANAGEMENT	8,174,721.87	0	5,029,000	13,203,721.87	7.09
1.5 PCU	0	0	2,366,000	2,366,000	1.27
1.6 Program Evaluation	0	0	300,000	300,000	0.16
1.7 Technical Assistance	\$ 8,174,721.87	0	0	8,174,721.87	4.39
1.8 Design & Supervision	0	0	2,363,000	2,363,000	1.27
2.DIRECT COSTS	51,309,341.13	29,449,444.01	10,424,000*	91,182,785.14	49.00
4.7 Civil Works	28,120,013.54	17,399,500	0	45,519,513.54	24.46
4.8 Curriculum Reform	0	0	1,435,000	1,435,000	0.77
- Software Review	0	0	95,000	95,000	0.05
Center- Evaluation Center	0	0	1,340,000	1,340,000	0.72
4.9 HRD-training	26,495.10	2,207,758.21	6,596,000	8,830,253.31	4.75
4.10 Information Technology	261,069.55	9,842,185.80	0	10,103,255.35	5.43
- Infrastructure	3,974,000.00	0	0	3,974,000	2.14
- Networks	13,435,676.68	0	0	13,435,676.68	7.22
- School hardware	171,288.60	0	0	171,288.60	0.09
- Ministry hardware	2,448,608.85	0	0	2,448,608.85	1.32
- Standard software	2,580,683.16	0	0	2,580,683.16	1.39
- Specialized software	291,505.65	0	3,921,000	4,212,505.65	2.26
- Technical support	0	0	2,675,000	2,675,000	1.44
- Other costs	0	0	0	0	0
3.CONCURRENT COSTS	0	0	26,625,000	26,625,000	14.31
1.3 Operational Costs	0	0	25,162,000	25,162,000	13.52
1.4 Civil Works Maintenance	0	0	1,463,000	1,463,000	0.79
SUBTOTAL	59,484,063.00	29,449,444.01	42,078,000	131,011,507.01	70.41
4.CONTINGENCIES	0	0	20,354,000	20,354,000	10.93
4.11 Physical Contingencies	0	0	5,794,000	5,794,000	3.11
4.12 Cost escalation	0	0	14,560,000	14,560,000	7.82
5.FINANCIAL COSTS	550,000.00	0	34,175,000	34,725,000	18.66
5.1 Interest	0	0	30,184,000	30,184,000	16.22
5.2 Commitment Fee	0	0	3,991,000	3,991,000	2.14
5.3 Inspection and Supervision	550,000	0	0	550,000	0.30
TOTAL	60,034,063.00	29,449,444.01	96,607,000	186,090,507.01	100.0
% FUND/YEAR	32%	16%	52%	100.0	

Note: the numbers highlighted in the CDB and Local columns represent financial numbers reported in these categories in the restructuring documents (2007). Although financial figures are reported in the GOB's progress reports, they are not divided into spending categories as needed to complete this cost table, hence the decision to use the 2007 figures. Moreover, final figures would not be forthcoming from this time as CDB funds are still in execution with an expected final disbursement date of December 2012.

The final column of %Total is highlighted since these percentages will change once the final figures for the CDB and GOB are inputted. Notwithstanding, the final figures for the IDB are correct.

* This number is incorrect but was included as such in the loan contract.

Total Project Cost - Planned (US\$000)	Total Project Cost - Actual (US\$000)	% Difference
(Reproduce cost table) 1995 -2005 - \$85,000,000	1995-2009- \$60,034,063	
Briefly explain any differences: In 1998, the bank approved a loan of US\$85,000,000 toward ESEP (source: original loan document). As explained in the Administration Mission (Sept 19-23, 2005) Aide Memoire, the level of disbursement over the first 7 years of the project was 33% of execution...with an average annual expenditure of US\$5 million. (Annex II, p.1). By January 31 st , 2006, as reported in ESEP Project Status Report (PSR, January 31, 2006), only US\$30,772,232 has been spent. The year 2006 also began the restructuring period of three years as agreed by the bank (2005-2008). A special extension was granted for the year 2009. By the end of the loan cycle, funds were cancelled in the approximate amount of US\$25,000,000.		
Data collected during this consultancy point to a number of factors that affected the amount of monies spent annually. One factor is the amount of monies allocated from the GOB in a given year. For e.g., in January 2006 GOB financing for ESEP was US\$9,000,000. However, in that year the GOB had access to US\$25,369,505 from IDB under the restructuring plan. It appears that the GOB allocation to ESEP more reflected what had become the average rate of spending than the money that was allotted from IDB to be spent on the project. This led to scenarios such as the following: in the January 31, 2006 PSR, it was noted that while Bank approval for tendering had been granted, these schools were not advertised due to the absence of funds to pay contractors when selected to execute works. (p.4). These and other delays occurred during the entire program period (1998-2009). There were also difficulties that contractors experienced in sourcing equipment from eligible IDB countries.		

V. Project Implementation

a. Analysis of Critical Factors

A number of critical factors affected project implementation. Positive Factors included: (i) strong political backing at project start-up, (ii) the excitement generated by the program in particular, the implementation of ICT in schools, and (iii) the rehabilitation of schools. Challenging factors included: (i) unforeseen strong construction boom in the country and underestimated extent of disrepair of the schools which contributed to delay civil works; and (ii) the impact of the limited human resource capacity of the Solicitor General's office resulting in delays of signed contracts which is a requirement for IDB disbursements (more information below).

One critical factor for the positive outputs in the early stages of the project was the strong political backing by the then Minister of Education, the Honorable Mia Mottley. The white paper outlining the needed reforms was completed under her leadership. In reflecting on her role, Ms Mottley noted that Barbados had satisfied the obligation of [education] access. The next step was knowledge economy. We had to develop our human resources in the absence of natural resources. Under her leadership, extensive public relation activities were put forth to launch the project and to get buy in by the general public. To this end, town hall meetings were organized as well as public logo and jingle contests. For curriculum reform, instead of bringing in external experts to develop the new curriculum, ministry officials chose locally recognized excellent teachers to complete the task thereby ensuring greater buy-in from the teaching force.

Ms. Mottley was promoted to Deputy Prime Minister two years after the project began. Many persons interviewed noted her move from the Ministry as a setback for the project.² According to the interviewees, none of her successors showed the same level of enthusiasm and commitment. Along with the Minister's departure came also changes for the Permanent Secretary and the Project Coordinator within a two-year period. The departure of these critical players in the early years of the project had an adverse impact in championing the project (various interviews). In all, over the duration of the project, there have been five Ministers of Education, six Permanent Secretaries, and four Project Coordinators.

Execution Structures: To implement ESEP, MEHR created a PCU which worked closely with the established Education Program Implementation Unit (EPIU) to ensure all aspects of the program were managed. The EPIU was in charge of the civil works component of the project while PIU took charge of the other components. The EPIU was responsible for contract procurements, selection of consultants, architects, quality surveyors, civil engineers, civil works contractors, and accounting and financial reporting for all components. Critical factors adversely affecting the project pertain to GOB budget allocations for ESEP, the procurement process, and the reimbursement of IDB funds. These areas are discussed below.

GOB Budget allocation to ESEP changed over time. The IDB loans' policy stipulates that the country first spends the money and then is reimbursed by the bank. Thus, in its annual estimates, the MEHR has to identify priority areas in a given year and present financial requests according to the Ministry of Finance (MOF). However, as noted by the Head of EPIU, this amount may or may not have been approved. ESEP records show that in the early years of the project MEHR received the requested amounts, however, in later years, as funds remained unspent, budget allocations became smaller. These delays were critical to the GOB's decision in year 7 to request the cancellation of IDB funds; because monies were not being spent in a timely fashion, requests for reimbursements from IDB were very slow.

Other reasons for slow implementation included: (i) time required to award contracts; and the timeliness of the Solicitor General's office (SGO) in issuing signed contracts followed by the GOB's process of applying for reimbursements from the IDB. The internal review process of contracts for the provision of consulting services and goods, which included the non-objection of the Office of the Chief Solicitor, had significant delays, disbursements of Bank resources were subject to the fulfillment of such requirements.

² As one interviewee noted, it was like having a strong mother who dies and by the time your father finds a woman to replace her - you grew up.

To respond to these delays, the normal practice for the GOB at the time was an exchange of letters sufficing as a formal contract until the actual formal contract was completed by the SGO. This practice was necessary to get the ESEP work started, since formal contract completion from the SGO usually required considerable time. As one interviewee noted, we could get close to finishing a school before a contract could be signed by government.... The delays experienced resulted in the accumulation of fees of approximately US\$13,982, 874 (estimate by consultant; actual credit fee was US\$2.3 million and interest payment US\$14.8 million IDB data 2012) which, according to a former Deputy Chief Education Officer, became a huge associated cost informing GOB's decision to relinquish monies from the IDB loan. All of these reasons for delay, in effect, reflected the country's capacity to manage the scope of the ESEP project.

One external unforeseen critical factor over which the MEHR had no control was the construction boom that occurred during most of the years of ESEP. According to the Head of the EPIU, due to the boom civil works under the project competed with numerous other construction jobs perceived as more lucrative and less bureaucratic. Other internal critical factors will be analyzed below by ESEP components.

Internal Critical Factors Analyzed by Component

1. School Rehabilitation

According to the Loan Agreement, IDB agreed to finance the civil works of all primary schools [73]; five secondary schools and the School for the Blind and Deaf (Loan Proposal, p. 12). Civil Works is described as including the development of computer laboratories; electrical upgrading and wiring; the provision of dust-free environments; protection systems for hardware and software; and furniture adapted to the technologies in use (p.12). However, a critical factor was the underestimation of some of the schools' extensive need for renovation far beyond infrastructure readiness for technology. Over the life of the project, one primary school had to be completely rebuilt and a number of other primary schools were rehabilitated to such an extent that little of the original structure remained. Moreover, once construction began, unforeseen structural issues had to be addressed. For example, at South District Primary, once construction began to replace the roof, it was found that the building had no ring beam, a beam essential to ensuring that the building stands up against a high-grade tropical storm or hurricane. In such cases, the building plan had to be re-conceptualized in terms of money, time, and scope. Unforeseen conditions such as this occurred more than once over the course of the project. Delays were also experienced due to poor craftsmanship, inadequate labor force at the sites, slow delivery of supplies from overseas, problems with contractors sharing space in schools, noise, dust and, in the case of the foreign contractors (financed by CDB at the time) language barriers.

In summary, despite the implementation challenges listed, the school rehabilitation component is generally considered successful because of the visible changes to the majority of schools.

Technological Infrastructure

According to the former Deputy Chief in charge of the Planning and Development unit at the MEHR, technology was never seen as an end in and of itself, it was always seen as a means to an end. Technology was to become another stimulus in the classroom for students and for teachers' use in instruction. [Additionally with technology] there would be easier access to information on students. [interview, June 20, 2011]. Similar delays as experienced in the Civil Works component also affected technology; in fact, delays in civil works inevitably led to delays in the technology component. For example, if a school was slated for technology but the civil works were not completed, then the technology could not be implemented. As indicated above, due to new developments in technology (wireless), as part of the restructuring about US\$25 million of IDB resources were cancelled as wireless allowed for savings. Further delays resulted from the long procurement process, which impacted the delivery and installation of IT in schools. This gap was mentioned by most interviewers as a major setback for the use of technology by teachers. The time lapse decreased teachers' confidence in utilizing the technology once available at the schools.

At the time, Barbados appears to be the first Caribbean country that initiated a one-to-one laptop solution that students could take home. The company chosen to source this solution went out of business a year

after its computers were implemented and this solution was seen by most of the people interviewed as a costly failure of ESEP.

Nonetheless, this IT component is considered successful today, specifically from the perspective of access to technology. As one interviewer noted, internet access is a new standard in all schools. The thinking behind this was that there was a divide being created in the country: middle class children would have had access but the poor children would not have. These students now have a tool they didn't have before. In terms of outcomes, more secondary school students are taking the CSEC IT exams. However, even though access to computers is one successful strategy of the ESEP, the impact on academic achievement still needs to be studied. Thus far, one study has examined the impact of access on computers specifically, on academic achievement.

In a study conducted collaboratively between the EEC and the IDB Office of Oversight and Evaluation (OVE) (2009/2010) it was found that in all of the Secondary schools, students had access to computers (the primary focus of the study) as well as other types of technology (printers, scanners, digital and video cameras, video players, LCD and overhead projectors and electronic whiteboards) and schools can choose from at least 133 different IT software packages. However, the use of the technology varies among high and low performing schools.

Human Resource Development

Technology was welcomed by the majority of persons involved in the project although from the outset, some Principals and teachers resisted due to their lack of knowledge of the technology. However, it was noted that some teachers already began personal training for technology and those later on became the Information Technology Coordinators (ITCs) (principal focus group 2011). Other teachers were resistant initially because of lack of training. The gap between the training and the actual use of the technology was mentioned by all MEHR interviewees as a major setback in teachers' current use of technology in their pedagogical practices.

Teachers were also trained in Special Needs Education at the Mount St. Vincent University in Canada. Fourteen teachers completed a Bachelors in Education with an emphasis on learners with exceptionalities. Fifty-two teachers completed masters degrees (of those 43 focused on Curriculum Studies for inclusionary practices for primary and secondary teachers, and 9 focused on Education Psychology with emphasis on the deaf and hard of hearing/blind or visually impaired). Some of the interviewees noted that these teachers were not successfully utilized once they returned to the country as they were reassigned to their original posts.

However, none of the persons interviewed felt that they could speak to the impact of the training on students' academic achievement. The former Principal of ETTC noted that while she felt that the college was successful in training teachers in basic technology mastery, more could have been done in training teachers in technology integration (various interviews). Starting in 2007 the MEHR through the Audio Visual Aids Department (AVA) began a series of workshops on technology integration.

For the most part these workshops were seen as successful by the participants. These workshops were formatively evaluated by the EEC from the planning to execution stage. They represented the best collaborative efforts in the monitoring and evaluation process of ESEP and should be a model of M&E for future projects going forward.

2. Curriculum Reform and Evaluation

The Curriculum Reform initiative of the MEHR, which began prior to ESEP, was completed and implemented under ESEP. For the first time in the history of Barbadian education, secondary schools have a written curriculum, and the primary one was updated. This component of the project is perceived as a clear success in that it was completed very early on in the project. The new curriculum was implemented in the schools by the year 2000. The way the curriculum was developed and introduced was noted as successful. Additionally, the teachers who assisted in the development of the new curriculum were later re-assigned to schools to assist in its implementation. Today, all schools have copies of the new curricula accompanied by attainment targets for students at every level. An update was slated for 2005 but that

process has yet to be completed. Nevertheless, it remains unclear how the changes are reflected in the standardized tests (BSSEE & CXC).

Overall institutional strengthening

In considering the overall institutional strengthening of the entire public school system of Barbados, the following facts are noted:

- The majority of the schools in Barbados have been refurbished;
- All schools have been made technologically ready;
- All public primary schools have at least one computer lab and all of the public secondary schools have at least two computer laboratories;
- Computer access for students at school is accepted as a given;
- All teachers either have their own personal laptop or easy access to technology at school;
- Every school has an ITC in place;
- In the last 3 years of the project there is an increase of students taking the IT exam at the CXC level;
- The new curriculum is implemented in all of the schools;
- A significant number of teachers are trained in at least basic technology use;
- The Audio-Visual Aids Unit was strengthened by the creation of the SRC.

From these developments it can be construed that despite major delays, project outputs are now in place to fulfill the goals of the project. However challenges remain, particularly in technology maintenance, human resource development (in particular technology integration, and related, the implementation of a comprehensive evaluation and monitoring system) and curricular reform (in terms of a periodic assessment of impact and the need for realignments to keep up with global changes).

b. Borrower/Executing Agency Performance

Borrower/Executing Agency			
<input type="checkbox"/> Highly Satisfactory (HS)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Satisfactory (S)	<input type="checkbox"/> Unsatisfactory (U)	<input type="checkbox"/> Very Unsatisfactory (VU)

c. Bank Performance

Bank Performance			
<input type="checkbox"/> Highly Satisfactory (HS)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Satisfactory (S)	<input type="checkbox"/> Unsatisfactory (U)	<input type="checkbox"/> Very Unsatisfactory (VU)

VI. Sustainability

a. Analysis of Critical Factors

ESEP will never come to a full end. There will always be a cadre of staff to look after the continuation of the project. Though there does not seem to be a planned integration of the coordination within the MEHR itself, (in that a PIU still exists) because all of the components of the project are integral to how schools are managed, these components will naturally be sustained. To elaborate, even before ESEP, the MEHR had a system in place to refurbish schools during the summer vacation. This refurbishment process was given a tremendous boost during ESEP and due to the upgrade future maintenance is manageable. Technology is now a standard in all schools and will be maintained because of demand: All teachers have their own personal laptop or easy access to laptops available at schools. Every school in Barbados has at least one computer laboratory for students to access. More teachers use technology in their classrooms even though many at a basic level. However the expectation that computers are available in schools is firmly established as a result of ESEP and thus this component will be sustained. Further, every school has an IT Coordinator; a position that has been institutionalized. The new curriculum is implemented in every school; and future updates will be managed again by MEHR.

Teacher training has to be addressed more aggressively in the future since it was noted that ESEP did not go far enough to assist teachers in technology integration. However, the AVA units, with the established collaborative efforts of the PCU, have the potential to fill this gap if their training of small cadres of Principals and teachers continues.

b. Potential Risks

The perceived risks are minimal. As listed above, it is expected that MEHR will continue to work on all the components as many / most are considered to be part of its core business.

c. Institutional Capacity

Institutional capacity is one of the components of ESEP and has been detailed above in the discussion of overall institutional strengthening. Although a PIU has been formed specifically for the project, many steps were taken to institutionalize personnel and functions, such as the SRC, and the ICT coordinators. Furthermore, PCU staff consists of MEHR staff seconded to the unit. Moreover, since ESEP focused on areas of educational reform that are part of the Ministry's core work, the components will be sustained. In hindsight, the project did not plan for changes in management and did not provide much support for change management. Movement of managers will occur in future projects and should be anticipated and addressed at the inception of any project.

Sustainability Classification SU:			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Highly Probable (HP)	<input type="checkbox"/> Probable (P)	<input type="checkbox"/> Low Probability (LP)	<input type="checkbox"/> Improbable (I)

VII. Monitoring and Evaluation

a. Information on Results

At the inception of the project, the GOB financed the creation of the Education Evaluation Centre (EEC), but as noted by all interviewed, it was felt that its work was unsatisfactory. One interviewee suggested that this could be in part because the Center, housed at the UWI, was never given the human resources they requested from the MEHR. However, fundamental evaluation techniques were never employed by the EEC (e.g., developing baseline data of all public primary and secondary schools at the inception of the project; setting up systems of formative evaluation throughout the ESEP years using existing data (BSSEE and CSEC scores, and so forth) in the first seven years of the project. During the restructuring period, the EEC then under new management worked collaboratively with the MEHR trying to address some of the shortcomings, however, with limited success. Nevertheless, the *new* EEC concluded two longitudinal reports on the public primary and secondary schools' academic achievement, which continue to be important to any research being conducted on the public educational system in Barbados. Once the IDB funding ended in 2009, so did funding for the EEC.

Efforts by MEHR's to develop in-house monitoring and information systems have not been successful. The PMIS was developed by a consultant but has yet to be fully implemented. According to Ministry officials, the software for the EMIS, which was initially piloted in 7 schools in 2007, is now in place at all of the public primary and secondary schools (70 and 22 respectively) except for 2 special needs elementary schools. One secondary school actually developed its own information system. However, the majority of schools were not utilizing the software, a fact the MEHR addressed in summer 2011 by requiring all schools to submit annual statistical information via the EMIS.

b. Future Monitoring and Ex-Post Evaluation

Monitoring and evaluation remains a challenge in the Ministry's operations. Although important information is collected to satisfy legal and educational requirements, using this information as data that tracks changes over years, progress on initiatives (starting with collecting baseline data followed by continuous monitoring and evaluation) is inadequate at best and nonexistent at worst. The recent push by the Ministry to make schools utilize the EMIS software is a move in the right direction. However, if similar emphasis is not placed on the implementation of the PMIS software at the Ministry, these efforts from the school will still not result in a rigorous and consistent monitoring information system. It is therefore recommended that in the future MEHR implement systems of information management and evaluation more proactively and formatively, in order to more effectively analyze the impact of reform efforts on student achievement.

The final evaluation for ESEP, initially proposed to be funded by the GOB, will now be funded by the CDB. Cabinet approval to proceed with the evaluation has recently been received, and as such, the evaluation should begin in 2012. As per IDB loan contract, the ex-post evaluation to take place was done by OVE in 2009 and focused on IT.

VIII. Lessons Learned

As one interviewee noted, No other country has ever attempted to revamp an entire system [for IT access] at the time that ESEP started implementation 13 years ago. This sentiment, although it may not prove accurate, was a view echoed in almost every interview conducted for this PCR and many of the lessons learned and recommendations for the way forward pertain to this sentiment. These included the following:

1. Build in the issue of capacity of country's institutions in the design of the loan (reference to the construction sector).
2. Assess the synergy of the operating systems, policies/legislative oversight of the all agencies involved (both the country's and the bank's).
3. Countries should be required to develop baseline data on components of a project *prior* to the start of the project. Additionally, the MEHR was aware of school disrepair but conducted only limited assessments of the extent of disrepair because of costs. Ironically, the costs of underestimation of schools' disrepair far exceeded the costs saved in the assessment and furthermore, derailed the project in ways that were costly beyond a financial perspective.
4. There is need to examine the best approach to large projects; that is, whether they should be funded entirely incorporating a phased approach, or whether funding should be on a phased basis. There are pros and cons to each approach and determining the best approach can only be done through an analysis of information learned from lessons 1-3 above.

Political support and stakeholder buy-in were other frequently mentioned aspects of ESEP that interviewees thought provided lessons to be learned. For those actively involved in bringing ESEP to fruition, they highlighted the need for stakeholder buy-in. The need for continued strong political support was also frequently mentioned. Lessons learned include:

1. Key leadership personnel should remain in position during the major development years of a program to ensure continuity.
2. Key stakeholders should be involved throughout the project cycle.

Annexes:

- I. Minutes from the Exit Workshop
- II. Borrower Evaluation

Loan 1154/OC-BA – Education Sector Enhancement Programme**Minutes of the Project Completion Workshop****1. Background**

- 1.1 A Project Completion Workshop was held on December 8, 2011, as part of the closing activities under Loan 1154/OC-BA – Education Sector Enhancement Programme (ESEP). The purpose of the workshop was to assess the results achieved by the ESEP, to foster its sustainability and to extract the lessons learnt to improve the design and execution of future operations.

2. Welcome and Introductions

- 2.1 Ms. Joy Gittens, Acting Deputy Chief Education Officer of the Ministry of Education and Human Resource Development (MEHR), welcomed all participants to the Project Completion Workshop.
- 2.2 Mr. Paul Murphy, Programme Director of the ESEP, likewise welcomed all participants to the MEHR and stated the review of ESEP aimed to look at components, procurement, lessons learned, and how to build on lessons learned as the MEHR embarks on other projects with the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) and the Delegation of the European Union to Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean (EU). Mr. Murphy stated the critical nature of this workshop and its implications for the future of the MEHR-Donor relationship. Mr. Murphy encouraged discussion and questions during the workshop.
- 2.3 Ms. Christel Saab, Operations Specialist of the IDB, thanked all persons present for their attendance. Ms. Saab added that the lessons learned in the workshop would have implications for future initiatives and as such, it was important that the workshop elicit the positive as well as the challenging facets of the ESEP in order to generate potential solutions. Ms. Saab further noted that some outcomes surpassed the goals of the project, i.e. there was intent to increase by 5% the number of youths sitting Caribbean Examinations Councils (CXC), however the increase was, in fact, 19%. Active participation was encouraged to generate a rich and complete Project Completion Report (PCR) that could serve as a roadmap for future Donor interventions with the MEHR. The CDB was thanked for its participation in the process and appreciation was demonstrated to the MEHR for its role as host of the workshop.
- 2.4 Mr. Martin Baptiste, Operations Officer of the CDB, looked forward to a fruitful meeting and much participation.

3. Summary of the Discussions and Lesson Learnt

- 3.1 IDB Consultant, Dr. Jennifer Obidah expressed her enthusiasm about the workshop. All persons present were invited to introduce themselves and explain in what capacity, whether personal or professional, they have been impacted by the ESEP. Dr. Obidah noted that the PCR is not set in stone, but rather should be considered a document open to the inclusion of the comments/recommendations of those present. Dr. Obidah noted that in compiling the draft PCR, a cross-section of people were interviewed including 5 focus groups, former Permanent Secretaries (PSs), Information Technology (IT) groups from the MEHR and so forth. In addition to interviews, there were also significant amounts of information that were analyzed to inform the report. Here, special thanks went to Ms. Annette Gibson, Administration Officer of the MEHR, Mr. Murphy and Ms. Rochelle Franklin, Operations Senior Associate of the IDB.
- 3.2 Dr. Obidah noted that there is room to create a more systematic, efficient and effective way of gathering data. Concern was expressed about the collection of information and the failure to transform that information into usable data. It was noted that information becomes transformed into valuable data when those responsible for collecting/analyzing the data are not constrained in their thinking of how to use the data. In order for data to be valuable, it should be used to answer multiple questions and elicit new insights. There needs to be an anticipation of the utility of information. Dr. Obidah stated that if participants noted possible contributions in the presentation of the highlights of the PCR, those contributions should be voiced and would be taken under consideration.
- 3.3 Dr. Obidah affirmed that there are 5 components of the ESEP, but noted that the 5th of these components could be considered a comprehensive umbrella of the other 4 as it entailed institutional strengthening. The 5 components are:
1. School Rehabilitation
 2. Technological Infrastructure
 3. Human Resource Development and Training
 4. Curricular Reform and Evaluation
 5. Institutional Strengthening, Program management and Technical Assistance
- 3.4 It was acknowledged that the presentation would only present the funds contributed by the IDB, but that the presented results would be for the entire project. Cancelled funds and incurred fees were noted.
- 3.5 Dr. Obidah noted that for the 1st component (School Rehabilitation), 57 out of 77 schools, or 74%, were rehabilitated. However, the initial target was 119 schools and the restructuring decreased the ambitiousness of the target.
- 3.6 For the 2nd component (Technological Infrastructure), it was noted that the use of technological infrastructure is now in place in 32 secondary (23 public and 9 private) and 83 primary schools (72 public and 11 private). Initially this was linked to civil works and posed an obstacle as no

infrastructure for wireless internet existed in the early years of the project. However, with the advent of wireless technology these components were decoupled.

3.7 For the 3rd component (Human Resource Development and Training), it was noted that there was a difference of recording indicators and outcomes which complicated the analysis of impact. For example, a goal to measure all school leavers for competency in IT was not measured but rather the measurement looked at only youths who sat the IT CXC examination. Mr. Murphy concurred that not all students take the IT CXC, however it should not be construed that only those who take the exam have competence in IT. Ms. Cadogan recommended that a tool should have been developed to correctly identify IT competence. Ms. Cadogan further questioned whether the change in pass rates for CXCs was taken into consideration. Dr. Obidah noted this was a good point to investigate.

3.8 For the 3rd component (Human Resource Development and Training), it was pointed out that the goal was to train 4000 people by 2015. In June 2007, 2655 people were recorded as trained. However, this number does not correctly represent the number of trained individuals, as one person might have received different types of training.

Mr. Chesterfield recommended that the training of MEHR personnel be included. Dr. Obidah agreed, noting that the same recommendation had been made in interviews and inquired where the records of training were housed. Mr. Murphy indicated that training has been ongoing since 2008 and a count of 60 people should be added to the achieved goal. Dr. Obidah concurred. Dr. Obidah noted that the records detailed the types of training more than tracking the persons who undertook the training. As such, the numbers could be duplicated. It was acknowledged that the cleaning up of data, due to unclear reporting, is very difficult retroactively. One participant noted that it is likely that the training was undertaken in a progressive fashion, and as such, duplication of headcount is probable. Mr. Jones recommended that, in the future, each individual be issued with an identification number to enable easier tracking.

Ms. Marica Strickland from the Public Investment Unit (PIU) enquired whether there was training post-2007. Dr. Obidah advised that the Audio Visual Aids (AVA) Department, under Mr. Lemuel Jordan, organized various workshops, which are not reflected in the number listed above pertaining to the number of persons trained. Additionally, at Erdiston Teachers' Training College (ETTC) each class contains an IT component that is not captured in the record of impact. Mr. Best expressed concern regarding the data and the double counting and recommended the collection of new data. Mr. Murphy advised that the MEHR has attempted in the past to clean up the data, however he noted the difficulty of getting survey responses. The cost attached to the collection of new data was raised. Mr. Murphy mentioned the possibility of hiring professionals to collect and clean up the data regarding training. Mr. Best shared that when teachers attend the ETTC, surveys are completed. Dr. Obidah expressed her interest in this data and welcomed access to the analyzed data.

3.9 For the 4th component (Curricular Reform and Evaluation), it was noted that there was a pride in the inclusion of local teachers in the process of preparing the curriculum, rather than utilizing

external knowledge/personnel. A component goal was full deployment of the Education Management Information System (EMIS) and the Project Management Information System (PMIS) in all schools. It was noted that, to date, the PMIS is not yet operational. Ms. Sabine Rieble-Aubourg, Education Lead Specialist of the IDB, stated that the consultant developing the PMIS noted that in order to make the system operational, it will require the assignment of a unique identification number for each student to ensure proper recording and absence of duplication. The absence of such an identifier has been the main obstacle for populating the PMIS with data and to actually use the system. Mr. Murphy acknowledged that the lack of unique identifiers for each student is a major challenge in the implementation of the PMIS yet noted that the MEHR has recently made a decision to use the national identification number as the student identifier. Dr. Obidah stated that it is critical to ensure a fully functioning process of clean data collection and recommended that a pilot should be undertaken in place of a full rollout to all schools. Mr. Murphy expressed a desire to begin the process by the upcoming school term of January 2012. Dr. Obidah offered the services of the School of Education at the University of the West Indies to work with the MEHR in this pilot initiative (2-3 schools) where the national identification number will be used to track student progress in the education system.

- 3.10 One of the critical factors affecting the ESEP identified was its size and ambition. This was seen as a positive and a negative factor. It was recorded that the very strong political backing of the then Minister of MEHR from the inception of the project was noted as an important impetus for the project. Dr. Obidah also explained that the extent of disrepair of schools was underestimated. The lesson learned was that it is better for the Government of Barbados (GOBA) to invest more in investigating disrepair so as not to be surprised by the extent at a later stage. Dr. Obidah suggested that the capturing of interviews of parents whose kids took home laptops would have been value added to the review of the project.
- 3.11 Dr. Obidah noted that an obstacle was the bureaucracy involved in preparing GOBA contracts as opposed to private sector contracts. The IDB's policy is that GOBA is reimbursed for any good/work/consultancy performed based on a signed contract which is prepared by the Solicitor General's (SG) Office. It was noted that the GOBA had a policy that after a letter of offer and acceptance is signed between the MEHR and a contractor, work can start, however a signed contract is still required for reimbursement from the Bank. This requirement caused a lag between the status of work and the IDB's record of disbursement, which meant that the project appeared to be undergoing delays. Mr. Murphy explained that while there is a lag in processing signed contracts through the SG's office, this is due to limited human resource capacity compared to the existing workload. Mr. Murphy noted that the SG's office is responsible for reviewing all signed contracts between the GOBA and other parties. Ms. Rieble-Aubourg inquired how, moving forward, we would be able to address this issue of limited personnel capacity within the SG's office as well as the delays experienced in processing documents through the Special Tenders Committee (STC). A query arose as to what options are available to working through the GOBA procurement system. Ms. Strickland commented that the use of the IDB's Standard Contract document for all IDB-financed activities should enable quicker processing of contracts through the GOBA procurement system. Dr. Obidah stated that

the SG and STC processing have to be included as accepted delays and built into the design of future projects. Dr. Obidah noted the new templates that were introduced under an IDB-financed operation to strengthen the SG's office are important in setting a standard operating procedure and streamlining efforts to prepare contracts for IDB-financing.

- 3.12 Dr. Obidah noted that the ESEP had a significant amount of changes in key personnel, which initiated pauses and delays in the project as new team members had to be introduced to the project. By the end of the Project, there were only two (2) persons remaining, who would have been involved in the Project from its inception. Dr. Obidah recommended that although the Permanent Secretary's position is a rotating one, the PS should ideally remain with the project for at least five (5) years, into its implementation to ensure that there is continuity.
- 3.13 Dr. Obidah further noted that greater attention should be paid to links between components and how they are rolled out during implementation. There was a significant delay between the implementation of the IT equipment and the training of teachers in IT. As a result, in many cases, refresher courses were required to re-acquaint the teachers with the use of IT systems.
- 3.14 Dr. Obidah queried what information exists on computer labs and the current technology assets of schools. It was stated that certainty only exists for the 12 that were looked at under the IDB consultancy through the Office of Evaluation and Oversight. It was noted that challenges still remain regarding the maintenance of the IT systems. There are currently a lot of old technologies within the schools as computers are becoming obsolete in 3-5 years. It was mentioned that some attention has to be paid to this area to ensure that plans are put in place for the adequate maintenance of the technology.
- 3.15 It was queried whether the curriculum prepared under the Project was still in its draft form. MEHR mentioned that the curriculum reform was a draft and that there was no clarity on whether a decision had been made to finalize the curriculum or if a timeline was stipulated within which there was intent to finalize. Dr. Obidah stated that, according to her research, 2005 was the intended year in which the curriculum was to be revamped and finalized, however this was never accomplished. It was noted that there was an absence of personnel to deal with the curriculum and there was a lack of focus on the curriculum being part of the integration of IT. It was queried where the funding came from, and a response was made that the GOBA funded the curriculum. Dr. Obidah noted that the creation of a curriculum was seen as a success, as no national curriculum occurred prior to the project. However, there was no awareness of a process set up to finalize the curriculum. It was also mentioned that there was no framework to guide the development of the curriculum and the inclusion of integration of IT.
- 3.16 Dr. Obidah pointed out three (3) key lessons learned: (i) the personnel capacity should be taken into consideration in the design of a loan; (ii) the synergy of operating systems should be assessed and; (iii) baseline data should be developed prior to the start of a project and that baseline data should be prepared at the component level. In the case of the ESEP baseline data was prepared only at the country level and this proved to be a challenge. Ms. Rieble-Aubourg noted that in the future, Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E) would be increasingly important.

Appropriate systems will have to be created to gather data and do impact assessments. To achieve this, funds should be reserved from within the project allocation. Dr. Obidah recommended that in the initial stages of a Project more emphasis should be placed on setting up systems for M&E. It was mentioned that this could be done by consultants who could translate the project design into a workable plan and the MEHR will only be required to input the information. This would ensure that all necessary data would be collected, which could then be used to generate the necessary reports. It was noted that M&E should not be considered a hindrance, but rather a benefit to the project.

- 3.17 It was mentioned that the implementation of the project is an addition to one's job, but is considered a performance indicator. It was noted that with the increase in responsibility which comes with working on a project team, there should be a corresponding decrease in one's prior responsibilities. Dr. Obidah noted that it is important not to create too much for an individual/team to handle, but rather to maintain a balance and be aware that an addition in one area of workload requires a corresponding reduction in another part of the workload. The CDB noted that commitment fees stemming from project delays could be reduced if additional personnel were hired to assist in project implementation. During the discussion, it was recommended that GOBA should look into the development of a team dedicated solely to doing M&E for Donor projects.
- 3.18 Dr. Obidah concluded her presentation and proposed that the list of questions (see Appendix 1) be looked at in small groups, and that 3 critical points would be generated out of the response to each question (see Appendix 2).
- 3.19 Dr. Obidah thanked all persons present for their reception of her report. Ms. Rieble-Aubourg thanked everyone for their participation and contributions.

Appendix 1: Questions for Discussion (small groups)

Question 1

With the many demands on the budget of the MEHR, what would you recommend as the most effective way to ensure the maintenance of buildings, furniture and equipment?

Question 2

Monitoring and evaluating is a key component of a successful project. What do you believe are the opportunities and challenges for this to occur? Is it possible?

Question 3

Building on the strengths of ESEP will require continued dedication of many people in the Ministry of Education. Are there sufficient resources to continue the initiative undertaken through ESEP? What and where are the needs? Do you believe that there is any area that is over resourced?

Question 4

Should future operations more focus on parent involvement? How do you believe that parents should be engaged in the learning environment?

Question 5

Although strides have been made in training teachers in technology, how far have they come in technology integration in pedagogical practices? What do you believe are the challenges? What possible next steps can be taken in technology integration?

Question 6

The EMIS is now available in the majority of schools. What do you perceive as the main challenges to ensure that the system is used efficiently?

Question 7

At this point, do you think additional time and resources were well invested in the PMIS? What are the main bottlenecks why the system never got off the ground?

Question 8

What do you consider the main accomplishments of ESEP and the main challenges for the future of education in Barbados?

Appendix 2: Responses to Discussion Questions

Question 1

With the many demands on the budget of the MEHR, what would you recommend as the most effective way to ensure the maintenance of buildings, furniture and equipment?

1. Need for a maintenance policy, which outlines a structure that includes timelines and resources for effecting timely repairs of furniture, buildings and equipment. Should include an option for outsourcing of services. Schools should be responsible for operationalizing the maintenance plan/policy.
2. The private sector, community groups which use the buildings, alumni can be approached for assistance with repairs and maintenance of buildings, furniture and equipment.
3. Where appropriate, students can be involved in simple repairs/maintenance, the skills of persons who are incarcerated can also be utilized.

Question 2

Monitoring and evaluating is a key component of a successful project. What do you believe are the opportunities and challenges for this to occur? Is it possible?

Yes, effective monitoring and evaluation is possible.

The opportunities and challenges for monitoring and evaluation to occur should take the following into consideration:

1. It is important to develop an appropriate, relevant and well structured template with clearly defined indicators that are SMART (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Reliable and Time-bound). Clarity of purpose is important (Edutech example: Teachers should be clear about the purpose and objectives of the programme: why they are doing what they are doing and how it should be done to achieve the most effective results etc).
2. There should be a strategic identification and use of existing human resources to conduct monitoring and evaluation of projects. (Edutech example: The GOB should undertake effective use of persons trained under the UWI MSC PM&E considering the programme is funded by the GOB.)
3. M&E affords the opportunity to identify problems at an early stage and be proactive.
4. M&E allows us to determine whether the desired results were actually achieved and whether the benefits reached the target population.

5. M&E would allow the Ministry to justify a request for future funding, based on the results of the previous project (ESEP).

Question 3

Building on the strengths of ESEP will require continued dedication of many people in the Ministry of Education. Are there sufficient resources to continue the initiative undertaken through ESEP? What and where are the needs? Do you believe that there is any area that is over resourced?

Not sure about “over” resourced. Concerns:

1. Adequate resources for maintenance and replacement of existing equipment
2. Provision of full IT package at all schools
3. Continued collection and analysis of data for use in PMIS and EMIS – appropriate number of persons with requisite skills, training in use of systems in school/ministry. Operations manuals available?

Question 4

Should future operations more focus on parent involvement? How do you believe that parents should be engaged in the learning environment?

1. Move school-parent dialogue re school-system, curriculum changes, technology integration, child-centered initiatives
2. Parent education and collaboration re their role in child rearing and enhancing children's academic achievement, using technology to assist learning and monitor progress
3. Seminars for teachers on how they could involve parents in the learning environment, building meaningful relationships. Parent involvement in enhancing school's learning environment, physical environment, grounds, classrooms, facilities, child care, pastoral, etc.

Question 5

Although strides have been made in training teachers in technology, how far have they come in technology integration in pedagogical practices? What do you believe are the challenges? What possible next steps can be taken in technology integration?

How far have they come in technology integration

1. Teachers appear more competent in the use of technological tools-PowerPoint, Word, Spreadsheets, Smartboard.
2. Early apprehension associated with technology has been greatly reduced, partially because many young teachers are the product of the technological age and therefore more comfortable with technology.
3. ICT is now a part of Teacher training at Erdiston and so all teachers are exposed to this training.

Challenges

1. Teachers use the technology more for preparing lessons than for use and integration in the classroom.
2. Underutilization of other technological tools- DVDs, OHP, recorders, digital cameras and camcorders
3. Persons who have been trained as ITCs are subsequently promoted to other positions leaving a void.
4. Teachers have been trained in the early years and need to be retrained to manage new technologies e.g. Smartboard.

Possible steps

1. Retrain teachers on a cyclical basis.
2. Have Principals drive the technological integration process in their schools.
3. Showcase best practices in technology integration.

Question 6

The EMIS is now available in the majority of schools. What do you perceive as the main challenges to ensure that the system is used efficiently?

1. Implementation process
 - a. Weakness in older version leading to constant modifications
 - b. Limited human resources
 - c. Slow process of training
 - d. Conflicting EMIS systems
2. Identification of the perceived challenges
 - a. Date not entered and updated effectively
 - b. Initial data entry time consuming
 - c. Difficulty importing data from other software applications
 - d. Difficulty in comparisons and analysis re: schools
 - e. Not useful for planning purposes
 - f. Resistance to change
3. Examination of the efficiency of the system
 - a. Lack of feedback to/from parents
 - b. Not useful for planning purposes
 - c. Tracking student progress from level to level
 - d. Registration
 - e. Smart stream

Question 7

At this point, do you think additional time and resources were well invested in the PMIS? What are the main bottlenecks why the system never got off the ground?

It is my understanding that much time and effort has been invested in the development of the PMIS. It is near completion. The outstanding issues could be resolved within a brief time frame. The PMIS is a well conceptualized system and indeed necessary. Time and resources are well invested in the PMIS. The developer must inform MEHR about the additional development work that is outstanding and the projected timeline for the completion of these tasks.

3 bottlenecks were identified as being responsible for the failure of the system to get off the ground. These are:

1. Absence of a unique identifier to track student progress from secondary to post secondary level. As discussed earlier, however, students' National Registration number has been identified as an appropriate method of tracking student progress.
2. Another bottleneck responsible for the system not getting off the ground was the failure of the system to make a link between the EMIS (primary to secondary) to PMIS since they operate under different operating systems.
3. The final bottleneck identified was the unavailability of the EMIS developer (Mr. Quintero). To recruit a new developer would be a costly undertaking.

Conclusion:

1. Absence of unique identifier
2. Failure of linkage between EMIS & PMIS
3. Unavailability of developer

Question 8

What do you consider the main accomplishments of ESEP and the main challenges for the future of education in Barbados?

Accomplishments

1. Infrastructural development
 - a. Improved emotional and physical health of persons in the school environment
2. Human resource development on a large scale
 - a. Per administration of education
 - b. Solidification of content areas
3. Curriculum reform

Challenges

1. Sustainability
 - a. Equipment and training
 - b. Maintaining currency of technology whilst maintaining the type of curriculum
2. Improvement of student performance is guaranteed

3. Assessment – if we teach the same thing and assess in the same way then we would have a serious challenge with teachers migrating to technology
4. Skill

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Barrower Performance - Project Completion Report

Project Name: Education Sector Enhancement Programme	
Executing Agency(ies): Ministry of Education and Human Resource Development	
Borrower: Government of Barbados	
Date of Project Approval: December 1998	Date of Contract Effectiveness:
Date of Borrower Evaluation:	Expected Date of Exit Workshop: December 2011

Borrower Project Performance Ratings

Probability on Achieving its Development Objective(s):

☐ Highly Probable (HP) ☒ Probable (P) ☐ Low Probability (LP) ☐ Improbable (I)

Project Implementation:

☐ Highly Satisfactory (HS) ☒ Satisfactory (S) ☐ Unsatisfactory (US) ☐ Very Unsatisfactory (VU)

Sustainability of Project Results:

☒ Highly Probable (HP) ☐ Probable(P) ☐ Low Probability (LP) ☐ Improbable (I)

Comments:

The scope and complexity of the Education Sector Enhancement Programme (ESEP) required several stakeholders to be involved in the implementation process. Despite this challenge, the execution process was successful. In many instances, the programme met or exceeded its objectives.

In areas such as technology distribution, maintenance of equipment and professional development, the Ministry of Education and Human Resource Development (MEHR) has included these activities into its operational structure. In addition, the MEHR has commenced a review of the curriculum 2000 syllabuses and the MEHR In collaboration with the Caribbean Development Bank will be embarking on ESEP 2, commencing in 2012. Therefore the sustainability of the outcomes produced from the ESEP is very much a priority of the Ministry of Education and Human Resource Development.

Borrower Performance During Project Execution

Please rate your own performance during Project Execution:

☐ Highly Satisfactory (HS) ☒ Satisfactory(S) ☐ Unsatisfactory (US) ☐ Very Unsatisfactory (VU)

Comments:

Given the scale and complexity of the programme and the fact that the programme achieved many of the prescribed objectives, the Borrower's performance may be rated/classified as satisfactory.

Borrower Performance During Project Execution

Please rate your own performance during Project Execution:

☐ Highly Satisfactory (HS) ☒ Satisfactory(S) ☐ Unsatisfactory (US) ☐ Very Unsatisfactory (VU)

Comments:

Given the scale and complexity of the programme and the fact that the programme achieved many of the prescribed objectives, the Borrower's performance may be rated/classified as satisfactory.

Bank Performance During Project Preparation

Please rate the Bank's performance during project preparation. Factors to be considered include the extent to which the Bank facilitated a participatory project design, proposed adequate technical solutions to the problems identified, and responded to the needs of the Borrower (timeliness, selection of instrument type).

☒ Highly Satisfactory (HS) ☐ Satisfactory(S) ☐ Unsatisfactory (US) ☐ Very Unsatisfactory (VU)

Comments:

The advice and the cooperation received from the Inter American Development bank were critical to the Borrower's ability to successfully conceptualise and develop the Education Sector Enhancement Programme. The IDB provided significant technical assistance during this period as well as assisted with the professional development of the officers involved in the preparation process.

In addition, the IDB provided its own expertise to the Project Preparation exercise and spent many long hours working with policy makers and technocrats alike to ensure that the best possible programme was developed for the Ministry of Education and Human Resource Development.

Bank Performance During Project Supervision

Please rate the Bank's overall performance during project supervision. Factors to be considered include technical assistance (including informal and formal training) to Executing Agency, timeliness of Bank response and the Bank's flexibility to respond to emergency situations during project implementation.

☒ Highly Satisfactory (HS) ☐ Satisfactory(S) ☐ Unsatisfactory (US) ☐ Very Unsatisfactory (VU)

Comments:

The guidance and the support given by the IDB during the implementation of the programme, significantly contributed to the successful implementation of the ESEP. The flexibility of the Bank was particularly evident when dealing with such issues as procurement and disbursement. The Bank's facilitation of the disbursement process during the final stages of the programme was extremely useful in ensuring the GOB secured maximum reimbursement from the Loan.

Additionally, the Bank was outstanding in the area of project review and monitoring. The Ministry of Education and Human Resource Development generally and the Programme Coordinating Unit specifically enjoyed an excellent relationship with the members of the Bank who were professional at all times.

Additional Suggestions for Improving Bank Performance

Additional comments/suggestions for improving Bank performance in the future.

As the Inter-American Development Bank is about to enter a new era in which project performance is being emphasized. The Bank will need to begin to work more systematically with borrowing member countries to evaluate the viability and the sustainability of social sector projects, such as education. As noted by the bank itself, properly executed evaluations, involving managers and staff, borrowers and executing agencies, strategically linked to all stages of the project cycle, can be a vital tool to improve the performance of IDB-sponsored projects.

Managers and staff, borrowers and executing agencies should also be given early exposure to Bank operations in an effort to ensure timely and effective project implementation during the executing phase of any project or programmes. The converse of this is also important so that the officers of the Bank become familiar with and develop an appreciation for the operations of the Borrower.